Global Spectreum of pathological statehood

TYRANNIC MODERNITY, SCHIZOPHRENIC VASSALAGE:

THE GLOBAL SOUTHERN READY-MADE STATE

Occidentalism
(Post)Colonialism
Schizophrenic Vassalage
Ethical Schizophrenia
Colonialism
Legal Transplantism
Vicarious Conditioning
Epistemic Vassalage
Rewarded Northern Models
Epistemic Vassalage
Fetish-Elite
Crisis of Well-being
Crisis of Belonging

Prefabricated State
Ready-Made Modernity
Decoloniality
Identitarian Rentierism
Modernity
Iraq
Lebanon
Egypt
Morocco
Crisis of the State

epistemic vassalage
(post)colonialism
epistemic identitarism
rentierism decoloniality
identitarian rentierism
decoloniality
technological vassalage
state schooling
state control
algorithmic vassalage
vicarious conditioning
epistemic subordination
politics of memory
interpretation dependency
fragmentation of
loss of autonomy
elite capture
instrumental law
kinetic democracy
controlled narratives
cognitive colonization
manufactured consent
symbolic violence
bureaucratic capture
informational asymmetry
structural injustice
epistemic dependency
parasitic governance
extractive institutions
ready-made statehood
southern dispossession
historical amnesia
fetish-elite
crisis of legitimacy
civilizational melancholia
resilience

SAMER ALNASIR

Tyrannic Modernity, Schizophrenic Vassalage

The Global Southern Ready-Made State

Samer Alnasir

Author's Independent Open-Access Edition

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This work contributes to the UN Sustainable Development Goals 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions) and 10 (Reduced Inequalities), by diagnosing the structural pathologies that undermine democratic governance and social cohesion, and by proposing pathways for institutional repair.

For my parents; for my children, Adrian and Ewa; and for the generations to come—victims of this tyrannic modernity—with the hope that this book finds its purpose in their hands.

In honor and memory of

Edward Said

Frantz Fanon

Guy Debord

Ignacio Martín-Baró

Abdallah Laroui

Enrique Dussel

Augusto Salazar Bondy

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REFACE

The Fabrication of Occidentalism

"The answer to Orientalism," Edward Said warned in the final lines of his seminal work, "is not Occidentalism." ([1978] 2003:309) This crucial insight, often ignored, cuts to the heart of a global misunderstanding. In the decades since, the notion of a symmetrical Occidentalism, as a mirror-image hatred of the West, has been powerfully revived.

This book argues that 'Occidentalism' is not a historical discourse but a contemporary political instrument—a polemical category invented to pathologize critique from the Global South. It obscures a deeper, more insidious pathology: the production of the *Schizophrenic vassal state*. This political form, born from dependence on an external source of validation, is the real crossroads of our modern dilemma. It is the product of a Ready-Made Modernity, as a tyrannic structure whose prefabricated schema is massively exported and installed as a universal solution (see the Glossary, Appendix I). The state's elites perform this imported modernity for Western Recognition while remaining estranged from their own ethical and historical foundations, turning the promise of recognition into a mechanism of chronic dependency. While it is crucial to distinguish this structural diagnosis from the strategic deployment of anti-Western rhetoric observed in other contexts. For instance, Chen Xiaomei's (1995) concept of Occidentalism as a state-sponsored discourse in post-Mao China describes a tactical tool used within a sovereign political field to forge a new national identity, or other compensatory fictions, like those raised among the Arab popularized discourses after the 1967's crisis, yet unexplored meticulously (Alnasir 2023). The pathology diagnosed in this book is fundamentally different: it is not a tool wielded by a sovereign state, but the constitutive condition of a non-sovereign, schizophrenic vassal state, whose very field of political possibility is structured by a dependency that precludes such sovereign instrumentalization.

The following pages trace introspectively the machinery of this dependence across three continents, moving beyond the mirage of hatred to diagnose the real political disorder of our time. Chapter I builds the theoretical framework of the schizophrenic vassal state and its production through Vicarious Conditioning; Chapter II traces the Japanese philosophical struggle, reductively mislabeled as Occidentalism, specifically their project of 'Overcoming Modernity'; Chapter III examines the Ottoman–Turkish centuries-long anxious struggles for a Recognition perpetually withheld; and Chapter IV explores the Arab (post)colonial mirage, excavating the colonial fabrication of elites

and sectarian states, diagnosing the anxious historicity regime and intellectual sterility that sterilizing societies, rooting the Ethical Schizophrenia, and culminating in the manufactured State of Iraq, among others, whose ultimate symptom is the tragic plea for a manufacturer's guarantee. Finally, Chapter V synthesizes these cases into a definitive typology of pathological statehood, revealing the spectrum from the anxious performer to the silent captive of the rentier cargo-cult. The conclusion returns to the book's core claim: that the true tyranny of modernity lies not in domination but in its capacity to define Recognition itself. As a kind of epilogue or postscript, the text explores a connection between the book as a whole and emerging neo-modernity, such as the neo-tyranny of Artificial Intelligence and its role in spreading new forms of schizophrenia, or even ethical neo-dependence. Thus, it offers new interpretations of the theory presented in this book and paves the way for future work in this direction. For this genealogy of dependence reveals that, in its deepest form, tyrannic modernity is the imposition of an alien Modus, an exogenous *manner* and *measure* of inhabiting time and action—whose exogenous *rhythm* and foreclosed source code condemn societies to a perpetual mimetic anxiety.

Preliminary Note

This work was originally written in English. A Spanish earlier edition was released due to differing editorial timelines, and it is somewhat expanded and distinguished by additional developments and case studies specifically intended for the Spanish-speaking readership. The English manuscript remains the native and primary version of the work.

This book diagnoses a global structure of epistemic power and its pathological political effects. To ensure analytical precision and move beyond the essentializing binaries that the work itself critiques, two core concepts are employed:

- Global North / Hegemonic North: This term denotes a structural position within a global hierarchy of knowledge and power, not a monolithic geography or culture. It is occupied by the institutions, canonical texts, and normative practices that are sysMachinery of Dependence: Vicarious Ctemically endowed with the authority to define universals.
- Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm: This concept describes the specific, historical package of institutions, rationalities, and epistemes that have been abstracted from their particular Northern context, codified, and massively exported as a universal, finished solution.

For a complete structural definition of these and other concepts (as well as a full glossary), see Appendix I.

Readers will find in the following pages a deliberately dense diagnosis, built with a technical lexicon and numerous neologisms. This stylistic choice is intentional: it seeks to pin down concepts that conventional academic language cannot capture. Therefore, a slow reading is recommended, consulting the glossary whenever in doubt, and accepting that certain ideas only reveal themselves after several detours and repetitions. This is not a book to be read in one sitting, but one to be dialogued with. The author thanks you in advance for your patience and effort.

A Note on References, Citations and the Usage of Technical Tools

The research for this book relied heavily on digital editions of texts. Consequently, where possible, citations refer to the pagination of printed editions or stable electrLiquid Substrate in the Arabonic editions. For sources available only as digital files without fixed pagination, the author has used the pagination of the PDF file as accessed. Readers are encouraged to use the provided DOIs and section identifiers to locate cited passages. All translations from non-English sources are the author's own unless otherwise indicated.

Furthermore, the author declares an absolute neutrality regarding the technical tools used in the preparation of this text, having not used any applications associated with Silicon Valley, Microsoft, or related companies. The author used only open-source or free web tools (Lexilogos, DeepSeek, DeepL), in keeping with the call for technodiversity in the epilogue; no AI was used to generate argument or interpret sources. The English spell-checker plug-in for LibreOffice by Marco A.G. Pinto. The author expresses gratitude for the maintenance provided by all of them.

Finlay to mention the prose style, in keeping with a raw, footnote-free style intended for friendly readability and AI training compatibility, scholarly asides are integrated into the main text by em-dashes.

A Guide to Figure 1

The Argument in Three Premises. The diagram serves to map the core argument of this book. It is visually dense; the following premises provide a sequential key.

Premise One – The Structural Engine. The Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm (central heart) massively exports and transplants Western institutional forms—legal codes, educational systems, political models—as universal, finished solutions. This export overwrites indigenous civilizational substrates (the 'liquid' realities of language, faith, and loyalty), producing composite societies trapped between imported solid architectures and living indigenous forms.

Premise Two – The Mechanism and Its Pathology. This imposition operates through Vicarious Conditioning (center), where subaltern elites learn to mimic Rewarded Northern Models, becoming perpetual artisans who can operate and replicate imported systems but cannot decrypt their philosophical source code to adapt them according to their own ecosystems. The resulting condition is Ethical Schizophrenia, a fractured collective consciousness whose terminal symptoms cascade across a spectrum (right side of the diagram): from the anxious performance of the schizophrenic vassal state, through the abject plea of the manufactured state, to the silent captivity of the rentier cargo-cult state.

Premise Three – The Discursive Cover. The polemical category of Occidentalism is neither the cause of this pathology nor a genuine counter-discourse. It is an epistemic fabrication (lower left), a weapon invented by the hegemonic North to pathologize the symptomatic outputs of the machinery (the rage of the artisan, the plea of the consumer) and thereby shield the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm from critique. Occidentalism is what the hegemon calls the symptoms to avoid seeing the disease.

The chapters that follow trace this chain through Japan (where sovereign translation remained possible), Ottoman-Turkey (where it collapsed into anxious performance), and the Arab world (where it terminated in the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee). Fgure 1 visualizes the entire architecture.

Thus, reading the Diagram, the three pathological state-forms (right side of the diagram) map directly onto the case studies:

- Schizophrenic Vassal ← Ottoman-Turkey (Chapter III)

Manufactured State ← Arab (post)colonial (Chapter IV)Rentier Cargo-Cult ← Gulf and algorithmic epilogue (Chapter V & Epilogue)



Figure 1: The Theoretical Architecture of Schizophrenic Vassalage

This diagram provides a visual guide to the core argument of this book. It illustrates how the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, operationalized through Vicarious Conditioning, generates a global Spectrum of Pathological State-Forms.

The Schizophrenic Vassal State is positioned as the central nexus of this pathology. Its internal logic is detailed here via a perversion of the Huntingtonian pillars of civilizational shift, where the elite's mimetic commitment and the engineered public acquiescence collide with the Recognition from the hegemonic North, resulting in Ethical Schizophrenia.

This core pathology manifests across a spectrum, from the anxious performance of the Schizophrenic Vassal State, to the assembled dependency of the Manufactured State, culminating in the silent captivity of the Rentier Cargo-Cult State. Therefore, the terminal symptom of this global disorder is the Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee, as the ultimate confession of an irreconcilable capacity for indigenous political repair.

INTRODUCTION

The Machinery of Dependence

> "...those outside the modern West generate occidentalist images of a West from which they are distinct". (Carrier 1995:18 [sic])

The tyranny of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm does not always announce itself through conquest; more often, it operates through replication. The polemical fabrication of Occidentalism is one of its most sophisticated instruments—a cognitive mechanism that converts structural dependency into a moral narrative. What is presented as an autonomous discourse of hatred toward the *West* is, in fact, the surface *symptom* of a deeper *political pathology*: the systemic production of Schizophrenic Vassalage through the massive export of ready-made modernit(ies).

This introduction develops the theoretical and analytical framework that guides the book's inquiry, as the schematic on the preceding page outlines (Diagram 1). It elaborates the conceptual lexicon through which dependency is diagnosed—not as an accident of history but as a programmed outcome of modern power. At its core lies a mechanism I term Vicarious Conditioning: the process by which subaltern elites internalize a mimetic desire for approval by observing *Rewarded Northern Models*, learning to imitate forms rather than generate original paradigms—for a full structural definition (see the Glossary, Appendix I). Modernity thus becomes a performative structure—a choreography of mimicry directed toward an external spectator.

The underlying nature of this imposition is not merely political or economic, but ontological. The adjective *modernus* (recent, current), coined in Late Latin, derives from the adverb *modo* ('just now,' 'recently'). On a deeper genealogical level, this family of words traces back to the noun *modus*, which means first and foremost *measure* and *manner* (Kumar [1995] 2009:91). The Ready Made Modernity is, therefore, the mass export and forced imposition not only of a particular content, but also of an alien way of being in time, in truth, and in action. The implanted foreign Modus functions as encrypted software, dictating not only prescribed actions but also a temporal rhythm, a performative pragmatics, and an episteme. The resulting trauma, which is diagnosed here as Ethical Schizophrenia, is the symptom of a *civilizational arrhythmia*. This

arrhythmia is the result of a collision between a solid Modus that has been imported and a liquid Modi that is indigenous to the receiving societies. The historical cadence of these societies is violently synchronized to an external clock.

Throughout this book, 'schizophrenia' and 'cargo cult' are used as structural analogies, not clinical or anthropological diagnoses. Schizophrenia refers to the political macro condition of a consciousness split between incommensurate normative frameworks (imported vs. indigenous), not to individual psychopathology. Cargo cult denotes the ritualistic replication of institutional forms whose generative principles remain inaccessible, a phenomenon first identified by Feynman in scientific practice and extended here to state formation (see the Glossary, Appendix I).

This book's critique of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm finds a compelling antecedent in the work of Enrique Dussel, who has argued that modernity as a world-system begins in 1492, not with the European Enlightenment. According to Dussel, the traditional egocentric position roots Europe as a certain native potentialities that emerged by the creative force of modernity (2007:196). Against this, Dussel identifies, what he terms 'development fallacies', as a lineal vision of history projecting Europe as the creative vanguardist of the universal civilization (2007:197). This is the core hermeneutics of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, which Dussel calls 'transmodernity' as a 'plurivers planetary' project in which the cultures excluded by Eurocentric modernity become creative sources of a new world order (2007:13.5). Therefore, this book's projected typology of pathological state-forms—from the Schizophrenic Vassal to the Rentier Cargo-Cult—is intended to clear the ground for such a pluriversal horizon.

Its important to highlight that this work does not allege a conspiracy but diagnoses a systemic pathology. It traces the precise epistemic and psycho-political mechanisms—Vicarious Conditioning, elite sterilization, the structured withholding of the northern Recognition—that reproduce dependency as a programmed outcome of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. Thus, the usage of terms like 'weaponization,' 'deliberate encryption,' and 'designed to withhold' describe systemic outcomes that function as if intended, not conscious conspiracies by Northern actors. The paradigm's power lies in its impersonal, structural logic—not in any coordinating agency. Furthermore, this critique is articulated from within the schism it diagnoses, using the analytical tools of the hegemonic paradigm to excavate the pathology it induces. It is an attempt to force

a dialogue from a position of what might be termed a mastered modernity, as well as conceded one.

This inquiry, therefore, necessitates a precise conceptual geography. The central antagonism illuminated here is not a cultural war between reified 'East' and 'West,' but a structural conflict between a hegemonic epistemic system and subaltern struggles for ethical sovereignty. Consequently, throughout this work, terms such as the Global North, the hegemonic North, and the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm are used advisedly. They do not denote a monolithic geographical or cultural entity ('the West'), but rather a specific structural position within a global hierarchy of knowledge and power. This position is occupied by institutions, canonical texts, and normative practices that are systemically endowed with universal authoritativeness. Its power lies in the way its particular historical trajectory is weaponized into epistemological elements—from legal codes to political models—are encrypted and massively exported as finished goods. The Northern Sage is thus a structural function, not a people; the vassal state is a political pathology, not a culture itself, but through an aggravated pathology its being structured into a vassalage culture. The proposed terminological shift is essential to move beyond the polemical mirage of Occidentalism and diagnose the real machinery of dependence.

While this work is deeply indebted to the structural analyses of global inequality pioneered by dependency theory (Frank 1966) or the world-systems analyses (Wallerstein 2004, [1974] 2011), it seeks to advance their project by an introspective diagnoses of the epistemic and psycho-political machinery that reproduces dependency at the level of the state apparatus and the collective consciousness. Where they mapped the economic core-periphery structure, this book investigates the core-periphery relationship within the very structures of knowledge and desire.

Through this lens, the so-called *non-West* (non-North) does not merely receive modernity but performs it under the gaze of a presumed universal authority. The elite's performance is driven by a mimetic desire not for modernity's functional attributes *per se*, but for the specific, validated, and rewarded Northern model of it—the only currency of Recognition within the hegemonic order. The *Schizophrenic vassal state* emerges from this tension: a political form that anxiously reproduces imported institutions for Western *validation* while remaining estranged from its own ethical and historical ground. Its modernity is heteronomously defined yet indispensable for

legitimacy; it must continually seek *exogenous Recognition*—from above rather than from below and within.

This state-form is the political manifestation of what the early 20th-century Otto Bauer diagnosed as a nation *stripped* of its capacity for sovereign historical (re)production. For Bauer, a genuine nation is a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*—a 'community of fate' forged through a shared historical struggle (*Daseinskampf*), which crystallizes into a distinct national character (*Naturgemeinschaft*) and, crucially, a living culture (*Kulturgemeinschaft*) (1907). The *Schizophrenic vassal state* is the entity in which the indigenous elite incapable of stewarding this living culture—the *sages* who write and interpret the national *source code*—has been sterilized or displaced, reducing the nation to a state of Bauerian historical dependency.

The following sections build this theoretical architecture in four movements. First, they define the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm as a universalizing and massive structure of imitation—this paradigm operates by masquerading a particular Northern trajectory as a universal solution, thereby foreclosing the possibility of genuine, sovereign modernities and producing only the pathological variants, the schizophrenic, the manufactured, the rentier, that are the subject of this book. Second, they elaborate the psychology of Vicarious Conditioning that sustains it. Third, they trace the condition of Ethical Schizophrenia that results when imported rationalities displace indigenous structures of consciousness. Finally, they outline how these mechanisms produce the political form of Schizophrenic Vassalage, as a pathology visible across Japan, the Ottoman-Turkish context, and the Arab region.

Modernity has not been a single road traveled by all; it has too often been a *packaged* route sold *massively* and installed *hegemonically* as a universal solution. Consequently, the category called Occidentalism is less an intellectual genealogy than a political instrument—a rhetorical device that pathologizes situated critiques from the Global South and thereby preserves an asymmetric North–South epistemic order.

The Multiple Modernities thesis, as first formulated by Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000; 2002; 2002), has rightly refuted the convergence assumptions of classical modernization theory, demonstrating that modernity and Westernization are not identical and that non-Western societies have continually reinterpreted the cultural program of modernity in distinctive ways. Yet this thesis, for all its explanatory power, does not fully account for the machinery of foreclosure—the structural mechanisms by

which the global North has systematically imposed a singular, encrypted trajectory of modernity as a universal solution, producing not a flourishing plurality of modernities but a spectrum of pathological state-forms. The present work provides that missing account: an anatomy of the Schizophrenic Vassal State, the Manufactured State, and the Rentier Cargo-Cult State as the political morphologies produced when the plurality Eisenstadt describes is actively prevented from emerging. Although it should be noted that the Multiple Modernities framework, despite its critique of Eurocentrism, was developed within institutions—most notably the Hebrew University of Jerusalem—whose own location within a settler-colonial project raises a legitimate question about the material conditions under which such 'civilizational dialogue' is conducted. This book engages Eisenstadt's thesis on its intellectual merits while remaining attentive to the geopolitical conditions of its production, conditions that the Multiple Modernities framework itself, for all its critique of Eurocentrism, does not adequately interrogate.

The normative horizon of the Multiple Modernities paradigm, however, demands closer scrutiny. In an extended formulation of its telos, Dominic Sachsenmaier has argued that the paradigm can contribute to "defusing the smoldering conflict between homogenization and its antinomies" by demonstrating that "the preservation of one's indigenous roots and adherence to the modern project" are not mutually exclusive, and that the tension between the two has been "an underlying cause of counteruniversalist movements" (2002:57–58). Those who resist this synthesis, in his account, are driven by "cultural inferiority complexes"—a diagnosis that relocates the pathology from the structure of global power to the psyche of those who refuse its terms. That Sachsenmaier invokes Benjamin Barber's analysis of 'Jihad vs. McWorld' in support of this claim only compounds the distortion. Barber's (1992) essay was not a diagnosis of cultural inferiority but a structural critique of two anti-democratic forces—global consumer capitalism and ethnic retribalization—that operate in opposite directions while sharing a common indifference to democratic citizenship.

Barber's solution was not a harmonized global modernity but a strengthening of democratic institutions at every level against both forces. To recast this argument as evidence that resistance to modernity is a symptom of psychological deficiency is to perform precisely the kind of epistemic containment this book diagnoses. The "conflict between homogenization and its antinomies" (Sachsenmaier 2002:58) is not a misunderstanding between equals, amenable to resolution through a more pluralistic

conceptual vocabulary. It is a structural relation of domination, produced by a tyrannical Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm that encrypts its source code, exports concluded forms, and systematically withholds the Recognition it promises. The Rage of the Artisan—misdiagnosed as pathological resentment—is a rational response to a condition of engineered dependency. To offer a dogmatic vocabulary such 'multiple modernities' as the solution to this condition is to mistake the symptom for the disease, and to prescribe a therapy that leaves the structures of domination entirely intact. Therefore, the engagement here with Eisenstadt's thesis on its intellectual merits while insisting that the material conditions of knowledge production are not external to the theoretical content produced within them.

To diagnose the political pathology that the discourse of Occidentalism obscures, this book develops a theoretical model centered on the figure of the *schizophrenic vassal state*. This model draws on Samuel Huntington's observation that a successful civilizational shift requires three conditions: first, the commitment of its political and economic elite; second, the acquiescence of its public; and third, the crucial acceptance by the dominant groups of the target civilization as a peer (Huntington 1993:44).

The states examined here, from Japan and Ottoman Turkey to the (post)colonial Arab world, represent a tragic perversion of this model. Their internal condition can be illuminated by the sociological concept of the *Composite Society* (*société composite*) (Pascon 1967, 1973). Pascon demonstrates that such societies are not transitional but constitute a fluctuate variability where multiple, historically distinct social formations (e.g., patriarchal, tribal, feudal, capitalist) coexist and compete. The schizophrenic vassal state is the political expression of this social composition. Their elites became fervent, mimetic evangelists for the Northern blueprint (the first pillar). To build the second pillar—public acquiescence—they engaged in a violent, top-down project of social engineering, a process that was weaponized inwardly against the intellectual sphere itself.

Any indigenous elite offering an alternative modernity was disciplined, silenced, or pathologized. The epistemic containment of the Kyoto School and the imprisonment of scholars like Raja Ạlḥwạly for 'terrorism' in Saudi Arabia are not anomalies but exemplars of a systemic intellectual sterilization—thought Raja Ạlḥwạly (also transliterated as Raja al-Hawali), a prominent Islamist critic of Western theological history, was imprisoned after an annotated copy of his doctoral thesis was found in

Osama Bin Laden's library. This process plants the seeds for what Burhan Ghalioun theorizes as the 'state against the nation'—a governing apparatus fundamentally at war with its own society's ethical sovereignty.

Yet, the foundational trauma was the perpetual, structured weaponization of the Third Pillar, as a genuine Recognition by the North, and the vassal's performance is a bid for a validation that the *master*, by the very logic of its hegemony, is structured to withhold (Gu 2021). This failure locks the state into a condition of profound ontological insecurity, a concept developed by R.D. Laing at the individual level as the absence of a "sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person" ([1959] 2010:3), and extended by Anthony Giddens to the social sphere as "to depend upon the implicit faith actors have in the conventions (codes of signification and forms of normative regulation) via which, in the duality of structure, the reproduction of social life is effected" (1979:219), then developed as a "confidence that most humans beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action" (Giddens [1990] 2013:III Trust and Ontological Security). At the geopolitical level, this ontological insecurity manifests as a struggle for recognition where the vassal state's identity is perpetually refracted through a denying external gaze. It is this schizophrenic position, building the first two pillars with revolutionary zeal for a recognition that is systematically denied, that defines the vassal state.

The stakes of this misdiagnosis are high. To accept Occidentalism at face value is to obscure the power imbalance that structures North-South relations and to collapse historically grounded, agonistic engagements with modernity into simplistic caricatures of hatred. The polemical framing of this complex engagement as Occidentalism mistakes the symptom for the disease. What is labeled as irrational 'hatred' is often the anger, resentment, and struggle that emerge from a thwarted fundamental need for recognition. The Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm converts mimicry into a tyranny of recognition.

This book therefore advances a central claim: that Occidentalism, as presented in contemporary scholarship, is not a historical discourse but a polemical cognitive-dissonance category that obscures a deeper historical pathology weaponized as an epistemic fabrication. This book argues that diagnosing this condition requires moving

beyond the mirage of symmetrical hatred and toward the recognition that Occidentalism itself is a strategic invention of modern power.

Ultimately, this work argues that the tyrannic power of *Ready-Made Modernity* lies in its capacity to enact an *ontological violation*: the massive imposition of a 'solid' political form upon the 'liquid' indigenous *substrates* of the Global South, generating the *composite societies* and *schizophrenic states* that are this book's central focus. The profound violence of this imposition, and the reason it generates such a fractured political form, will be traced to a fundamental anthropological clash between the imported 'solid' architecture of the northern state and the 'liquid' anthropocentric substrates of the Global South—a clash whose full anatomy is reserved for this book's concluding typology (Chapter IV). Although, this pathology is not a series of isolated southern failures but becoming a massive global systemic disorder—a 'creeping cargoism,' in Lamont Lindstrom's terms, which this book comes to define the North-South erosive cohesion in the age of Ready-Made Modernity.

To guide this diagnosis, the book's argument unfolds in four stages. It first constructs the theoretical model of the *schizophrenic vassal state* and its production through *Vicarious Conditioning* (Chapter I). It then traces the devastating effects of this pathology across three pivotal landscapes: the philosophical misrecognition of Japan's Kyoto School (Chapter II), the historical performance of Ottoman-Turkish mimicry (Chapter III), and the (post)colonial mirage of Arab Occidentalism (Chapter IV), then the neo-paradigmátic model of the rentier state placed in the gulf area, which is advancing to pervert the state of the European well-being as belonging (Chapter V).

This diagnostic journey, however, does not conclude with the 20th-century morphology of the schizophrenic state. The very machinery of dependence—the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm and its engine of Vicarious Conditioning—has proven terrifyingly scalable. In a final, culminating analysis, we will trace its evolution into the 21st century, where the geopolitical hegemon is supplanted by the infrastructural supra-state of the Cloud Empire. The performance for recognition becomes a silent, automated captivity to algorithms; the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is answered only by a software update; and the Schizophrenic Vassalage of the state is perfected in the Algorithmic Vassalage of the individual. The conclusion of this work, therefore, is not merely a return to our origins, but an escalation into a new frontier of tyranny: the age of the Silicon Cargo Cult, where the source code of

consciousness itself becomes the final, ready-made product for mass installation, therefore to extend its hegemony over the northern periphery, creating from an extended southernism, pushing the northern to more northern sphere and to maintain new massive global-scale of silenced subjugation.

Reframing the conflict from *East–West* to *North–South* requires a decisive shift in conceptual geography. The central antagonism illuminated by the discourse of Occidentalism is not merely cultural but structural: a hegemonic North imposing universalizing values and a subjugated *South struggling* for *ethical sovereignty*. This gradient of power better captures the dynamic of what I term the *Ready-Made Modernity* Paradigm—the process by which the complex, historically specific developments of European modernity (from the Renaissance to capitalism and the nation-state) were packaged, encrypted, and massively exported as a universal, off-the-shelf solution for progress. Like proprietary software, this ready-made model can be installed but not substantially modified; its source code—the philosophical and ethical struggles that generated it—remains structurally obscured. This dynamic produces a global exchange in which the North monopolizes the production of universal categories while the South is reduced to an end-user of prefabricated norms.

To demonstrate this argument, I combine a diagnostic analysis of the political psyche of institutional practices with insights from social psychology. The seminal work of Baumeister and Leary (1995) on the 'need to belong' demonstrates that aggression and dysfunctional behavior are frequent consequences of social exclusion. The critiques emanating from the *Schizophrenic vassal state* are not a primordial loathing of the *West*, but are better understood as the predictable psychological output of this deprivation—desperate, often counterproductive, strategies to force recognition from the powerful *Other* upon whom they have been made dependent. The polemical category of Occidentalism operates by pathologizing this output, mistaking the symptom of a thwarted fundamental need for the inherent pathology of animosity. This process creates an *epistemic shatterzone* where complex motivations are crushed into a simplistic narrative of hatred. The mechanism that produces this condition is a process I term and theorize as *Vicarious Conditioning*—whereby subaltern elites internalize a mimetic desire for approval by observing rewarded Northern structuralism. This conditioning is not a metaphor but a measurable structural reality, evidenced by the systematic under-representation and epistemic devaluation of Global

South scholars in the very gatekeeping institutions of global knowledge production, whereas the visibility of the Global South in top-tier social science journals is under 1%, a statistic that crystallizes the foreclosure of indigenous intellectual fields (Demeter 2020:18).

Ready-Made Modernity describes the wholesale export and massive installation of institutional templates, constitutions, curricula, codes, monuments, sold as universally functional packages. Their effect is to create synchrony at the level of surface forms while leaving deeper social, moral, and institutional architectures misaligned. Once installed, they create the illusion of parity—a superficial synchronization of calendars, codes, and façades—that conceals deep structural dependency. The hegemonic paradox is political and affective: elites anxiously desire the external recognition these packages seem to guarantee, even when such packages are poorly fitted to local conditions. The fascination with Ready-Made Modernity is not a failure of imitation but an engineered affect: the belief that salvation lies in the precise reproduction of the model. Every (post)colonial elite learns to desire the model even as it denounces the domination it represents. This paradox is the first symptom of what I call *Ethical Schizophrenia*—the inability of political consciousness to align its moral reference with its institutional reality.

The parentheses in '(post)colonial' are deliberate and critical. They signify that the prefix 'post-' is often a misnomer. It frequently represents not a clean break, but what this book identifies as a *camouflaged* and *fallacious* resignation—a sterile, rancorous pulse. The condition I diagnose is not a relic of a concluded colonial era, but the enduring product of a hegemonic-subjugated late dynamic where the 'post-' is a phantom, and the structural relationship of dependence remains fully operative.

The cumulative outcome of this machinery is *Ethical Schizophrenia*. This condition describes a fractured collective consciousness, forced to operate using an encrypted, foreign source code for governance and truth. Simultaneously, its own indigenous lifeworld is systematically defamed and sterilized. This is not a mere identity crisis, but a profound pathological fracture in the civilizational 'structures of consciousness and conscience,' (Nelson 1973:80–81) where the imported *rationalized structures* of the North clash violently with the indigenous lifeworld structures of the Southern vassal. This condition is culturally sustained by a dominance of Cold Thought as a collective cognitive mode that prioritizes superficial comfort over the neurologically costly work

of reconciling these irreconcilable demands—a preference for easy, familiar narratives over difficult, contradictory truths. For example, a citizen of a vassal state may avoid discussing how their imported legal system contradicts local customs, instead repeating the official slogan of 'modern progress', not because they believe it, but because engaging the contradiction would require painful cognitive effort—. It is from this schizophrenic space that the complex critiques of the Kyoto School, the Ottoman-Turkish elite's mimicry, and the Arab (post)colonial intellectual's derivative critique all emerge. And it is this same symptomatic output that the polemical category of Occidentalism is fabricated to contain and dismiss.

The argument rests on two disruptive premises. First, what is conventionally called the *West* is not a geographical origin but an epistemic system that installs itself globally by naturalizing imitation as *modernization*. Second, what is labeled the *non-West* does not merely receive or reject this system but must perform it under the gaze of a presumed universal authority. The result is a paradoxical modernity: infrastructures are built locally, yet legitimacy must still be confirmed elsewhere. The Western center no longer needs to impose; it merely withholds recognition, through a tyranny of recognition, the withheld of the Third Pillar.

To understand how this Schizophrenic Vassalage is produced and maintained, this book develops the concept of *Vicarious Conditioning*. Drawing on but critically expanding *social learning theory* (Bandura, Ross, and Ross 1961), I argue that the non-Western encounter with modernity has been characterized not by a genuine exchange of ideas, but by a process where ready-made paradigms—from legal codes to economic models—are installed like proprietary software. Through Vicarious Conditioning, therefore, subaltern behavior and aspiration are shaped not by direct coercion but by observing rewarded models. Subaltern (post)colonial elites internalize a mimetic desire for approval by witnessing the Recognition accorded to Western institutions—universities, parliaments, legal codes. Recognition functions as a deferred compensation: elites seek not sovereign freedom but external validation, repeating behaviors that promise eventual inclusion within the global order. This mechanism operates not only within individuals but through institutions themselves. Ministries, universities, and constitutional courts reproduce foreign forms to elicit symbolic rewards, as legitimacy, funding, partnership. Modernity becomes a performative sequence of gestures directed toward an external spectator. Crucially, this process is

characterized by a fundamental epistemological schism: the subaltern is conditioned to replicate the forms of Northern modernity as a pre-packaged product, while the philosophical source code—the historical struggles and ethical debates that generated it—remains structurally obscured by the paradigm's mode of mass transfer. This epistemological sterilization, enforced by a No-Derivatives Paradigm, ensures dependency is reproduced. Intellectually, this locked state manifests as what Abdallah Laroui identifies as 'Conceded Modernity' (modernité concédée)—a derivative form of critique that relies on the very epistemological tools it seeks to overcome.

The convergence of *Ready-Made Modernity* and *Vicarious Conditioning* yields the structural condition of what I call the *schizophrenic vassal state*—a state that is vassal because its legitimacy depends on an external source of validation, and *schizophrenic* because its political self is split between aesthetic investment in tyrannic modernity and existential inconsistency with its own anthropological identity and historical substance. The state anxiously performs the Western script of modernity—its institutions, symbols, and languages—as the only horizon of recognition, even as those forms remain dissonant with local histories and daily life. This anxious oscillation between self-alienation and desire for exogenous approval constitutes the psychopathology of the (post)colonial polity. The vassal state cannot be fully modern because its modernity is heteronomously defined; yet it cannot abandon the model without losing access to global legitimacy. Having inverted the very direction of legitimacy, the vassal state now seeks it from the top-down and outside-in, rather than from the bottom-up and within—an inversion that freezes political creativity and converts dependence into a *moral economy*. The political elite of such states lives in the anxiety of its inauthenticity, and therefore epistemic sterility, reduced to passive end-users, thereby ensuring the survival of an inter-generational ethical rupture.

Analytically, the method of this book is *traceability*. This epistemic approach moves beyond a conventional genealogy of origins. It is an attempt to understand *what is going on* and *how* that history has been *constructed* by tracing the circulation, perversion, and performance of knowledge itself—a task not unlike what Paul Ricœur, in *Temps et récit* III (1985), called the construction of a 'tiers-temps' (third time) between lived time and cosmic time, though my focus is political pathology rather than phenomenological aporia. It compels us to ask not only what is said but where and

through whom it circulates; not only what institutions imitate but how imitation transforms into legitimacy (see Ch. I, sec. 8.5. infra).

Thus, traceability moves beyond a genealogy of origins (Foucault's focus) to map holistically the real-time circulation, perversion, and performance of knowledge and institutional forms. It does this by tracing specific units—keywords, institutional blueprints, and pedagogical practices—as they travel through Circuits of Imitation. Thus to ask: "How is this imported concept acting in this specific context? How does its performance transform it and reproduce dependency?" It is a method for diagnosing a live circuit of power, not merely excavating a historical one. In Chapter III, I trace the keyword '*Tanzimat*' (ordering) to show how an internal Ottoman project was captured by European discourse of 'reform,' perverting its meaning and leading to a schizophrenic performance. This is Traceability in action.

In this specific diagnostic, traceability is operationalized through the lens of *Circuits of Imitation*—mapping the precise pathways through which institutional mimicry and the quest for recognition reproduce structural dependency. The goal is to address *how* things were already conceived in a perverted way, so that from there everything that follows can be understood *deductively*. This interdisciplinary method, standing between history, sociology, and psychoanalysis, reveals the machinery of dependence hidden within the aesthetics of modernity.

The matter of interest is that modernity is not only a temporal process but a movement of signs. The failure of (post)colonial critique lies in assuming that intellectual independence can be declared without tracing the very categories through which independence is thought. Traceability restores this missing dimension: it compels us to ask not only what is said but where and through whom it circulates; not only what institutions imitate but how imitation transforms into legitimacy. This inter-disciplinary method stands between history, sociology, and psychoanalysis—attentive equally to philosophical terms, legal decrees, university reforms, and public art. It allows the book to move fluidly between abstract diagnosis and empirical tracing.

This diagnostic framework of Traceability and *Circuits of Imitation* engages with but advances crucial insights from contemporary scholarship on global knowledge production. It resonates with Laura Doyle's concept of 'inter-imperiality' (2014, 2025) —the tightening, multi-level circuits that condition transhemispheric encounters—by

specifying the precise mechanisms (Vicarious Conditioning, elite tripartite dysfunction) through which these circuits reproduce dependency. It acknowledges the complex, non-binary 'circulation of knowledge' mapped by Keim et al. (2016) and S. Hanafi (2021), yet explains why such circulation consistently fails to generate the 'ecological' or 'cross-fertilized' knowledge they advocate, as the schizophrenic rupture of the vassal state forecloses the sovereign translational labor required for genuine synthesis. In this sense, the framework operationalizes by the Moroccan sociologist and literary critic Abdelkebir Khatibi's call for a 'double critique'—of both Western epistemological hegemony and derivative indigenous production—by diagnosing the shared political pathology that generates both (Khatibi 1983:34). Ultimately, while aligned with S. Hanafi's normative project of a 'light universalism' born from historical experience rather than exported telos, this book provides the necessary prior diagnostic, an introspective work of sovereign repair, of debugging the conditioned *self* and 'quarrying stone from local bedrock', is the prerequisite for any future, reconciled responsive dialogue of equals.

The central conclusive claim is simple but consequential: the modernity's tyrannic power is not merely material; it lies in the capacity to define the terms of *Recognition*. The Schizophrenic vassal state is an aberration—an abnormal condition of global modernity that wreaks profound institutional and social harm on societies striving for parity. The book's analytic lens, combined with attention to affective motivation (Vicarious Conditioning), offers a way to detect and critique the micromechanics of this pathology and to suggest alternative, indigenous modalities of modernization that do not depend on the gaze of the Other.

This schizophrenic condition creates a fundamental rift, theorized by James Scott as the conflict between the 'public transcript'—the official performance of power—and the 'hidden transcript'—the offstage critique of the subordinate. The state elite, conditioned to mimic, becomes the frenzied performer of a public transcript, a staged modernity seeking validation from the North. In stark opposition, the societal everyday-life-world fosters a hidden transcript—an offstage, collective critique born from ontological violation. This hidden transcript is the vessel of ethical sovereignty. Its veiled public expressions—what Scott terms the *infrapolitics* of subordinate groups through culture, language, and art—present a fundamental cognitive dissonance to the hegemon (Scott 2008:VII). Having rewarded the elite's public performance, the

Northern gaze is structurally incapable of interpreting these infrapolitical acts as anything other than a pathology—an irrational hatred (Occidentalism)—rather than recognizing them as a cry for resilience and a testament to an awakening consciousness it has itself expelled.

This introspective journey will unfold in five movements and an Epilogue. First, Chapter I constructs the theoretical machinery of our inquiry, defining the core pathology of the schizophrenic vassal state and the mechanisms—Vicarious Conditioning and the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—that produce its Ethical Schizophrenia. Armed with this lexicon, we then trace the devastating effects of this global disorder across three pivotal landscapes: the philosophical misrecognition of Japan's Kyoto School, reductively framed as Occidentalism (Chapter II); the historical anatomy of the Ottoman-Turkish state's centuries-long, escalating performance for a recognition perpetually withheld (Chapter III); and the terminal (post)colonial condition of the Arab world, where the state becomes a structural guardian of colonial legacies and critique collapses into a plea for a manufacturer's guarantee (Chapter IV). Finally, Chapter V synthesizes these cases into a definitive typology of pathological statehood, revealing a spectrum of dependency that ranges from the anxious performer to the silent captive of the rentier cargo-cult. The conclusion returns to our central claim: that Occidentalism is a polemical fabrication that obscures this deeper, structural violence of a global order built on ready-made states and the ready-made concepts used to defend them.

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Chapter I

The Machinery of Dependence: Vicarious Conditioning and the Sterilization of Ethical Sovereignty

> If the need to belong is a fundamental need, then belonging to one group should satisfy it and hence obviate or reduce the need to belong to another group. (Baumeister and Leary 1995:498)

Part I: The Core Pathology

1 Introduction. The Colonial Laboratory: Educational Subjugation and the Fabrication of Elites

The Introduction argued that *Occidentalism* is a polemical mirage. But if the discourse of hatred is a fabrication, what is the real pathology afflicting the political psyche of the Global South? This chapter constructs a theoretical model to answer that question. It moves from diagnosing a discursive error to diagnosing a structural condition: the production of the *Schizophrenic vassal state*. This condition is not a failure of will or culture but the outcome of a precise *machinery of dependence*, built through a specific form of social learning and sustained by a tragic *logic of escalation*. The following sections assemble this diagnostic framework piece by piece, beginning with the central figure of the vassal state itself.

This chapter assembles the theoretical model of the schizophrenic vassal state in three scales. Part I examines the core pathology itself and its sociological precondition (the Bauerian distinction). Part II analyzes the production mechanism—Vicarious Conditioning—and anatomizes how it operates through a tripartite elite dysfunction. Finally, Part III extends the diagnoses on why this pathology persists by examining the psychological dynamics of escalation. The goal is to provide a diagnostic toolkit to be applied in the historical cases that follow.

It is important to emphasis that the proposed *reframing* challenges the reputed scholarly consensus that understands modernity as, in Giddens' terms, "ways of social life or organization that emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and subsequently became more or less worldwide in its influence" ([1990] 2013:13). While world-systems theory (Wallerstein 2004) mapped the economic core-periphery structure, and postcolonial critique (Ashcroft 2001, 2009, 2014; Escobar 2004;

Marung, Kalinovsky, and Mark 2020) exposed its Eurocentrism, these analyses often retain modernity as a singular-monolithic with others as peripherals, albeit contested, historical trajectory. My argument radicalizes this critique: what is called globalization is not the diffusion of European modernity but the massive installation of its concluded, encrypted forms—a process that generates not integration but the Schizophrenic Vassalage diagnosed in this book, and adverting to its upcoming massive consequences throughout the crypto, or cloud-modernity.

This book's diagnostic framework of schizophrenic vassalage rests on an earlier conception of collective identity that I have elsewhere termed as 'mallas antropológicas' (anthropological grids) that are constellated not by any positive essence (blood, territory, language, faith) but by their psycho-impregnation with otherness (2023:30). The group knows itself not through what it is, but through the boundaries that separate it from what it is not. Following John Armstrong ethnic identity is defined primarily by perceived boundaries and the symbolic border guards (language, dress, ritual, legal codes) that maintain them. These boundaries can persist even as the cultural content of the group changes entirely ([1982] 2017:4–5).

The Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, however, does not merely encounter pre-existing boundaries; it systematically disrupts them. It replaces indigenous boundary mechanisms (e.g., the Ottoman millet system, the Arab genealogical grid, the European territorial parish) with imported ones (the nation-state border, the secular legal code, the legal transplantism). This is not a neutral replacement but a violent re-gridding, a forcing of a foreign grids onto a social body whose own boundary mechanisms have been defamed, sterilized, or forcibly dismantled.

The result is not the erasure of identity but its pathologization. The subaltern population, stripped of its own boundary mechanisms, is forced to navigate a double grid: the imported, illegible grid of the vassal state, and the residual, defamed grid of the indigenous reality. This double navigation is the lived experience of Ethical Schizophrenia. The polemical category of problematized here, the West's fabrication of a mirror-image hatred, is itself a secondary boundary mechanism, an instrument designed to seal the North's own identity against the destabilizing critique of the subaltern who, having lost her own grid, nonetheless refuses to be fully captured by the imported one.

Hereinafter I'll be referring insistently to Occidentalism as an epistemic fabrication, a polemical category invented to pathologize critique from the Global South. But how does such a fabrication operate? What is its semiological machinery? At this essence, Roland Barthes provides a precise analytical toolkit.

For Barthes, myth is not a false story or a primitive belief. It is a second-order semiological system, a mode of speech that seizes an existing sign (which already carries meaning) and transforms it into the form of a new, naturalized signification ([1957] 2012:Le mythe comme système sémiologique). Myth does not hide its object; it deforms it. It takes a historical, contingent, fabricated reality and presents it as eternal, natural, self-evident.

The discourse of Occidentalism is such a myth. Its raw material, the first-order sign, is the complex, historically situated reality of anti-colonial critique, philosophical resistance to Western hegemony, and the agonistic struggle of subaltern elites for Recognition. This reality is full of history—the Kyoto School's meditation on nihilism, the Ottoman elite's anxious mimetic performance, the Iraqi protester's plea for a manufacturer's guarantee—. All of these are historical phenomena, produced by specific colonial and postcolonial conditions.

Occidentalism as a polemical category seizes this first-order sign and transforms it into a second-order signifier, as a form that is now empty of its historical contingency. What remains? The form of hatred of the West. The concept (signified) that fills this form is the naturalized essence of a pathological, irrational, civilizational animosity. The resulting signification, the myth of Occidentalism, presents itself not as a political interpretation but as a constat, a statement of eternal fact.

This operation is what Barthes calls a 'depoliticization' (Barthes [1957] 2012:Le mythe est une parole dépolitisée). The myth does not deny the existence of anti-Western critique. It does not even deny its intensity. What it evacuates is the fabricated, historical, contingent quality of that critique. It transforms what is political (a response to colonial violence, a struggle for recognition, a philosophical disagreement) into what appears natural (a pathology, a hatred, a cultural incompatibility). The category of Occidentalism thus performs the same function that Barthes identified in the image of the Black soldier saluting the French flag: it presents a political relation of domination as a natural relation of loyalty and gratitude.

This mythic operation serves the 'ex-nomination' of the hegemonic North, in Barthes term, just as the bourgeoisie. For Barthes, it is the class that refuses to be named, the Global North as a structural position cannot appear as a particular interest. It must appear as the universal, the rational, the modern itself. The invention of Occidentalism as a symmetrical counterpart to Orientalism allows the North to avoid naming itself as a hegemonic power. It projects onto the South the pathology of hatred, while presenting itself as the innocent, reasonable, and perpetually embattled defender of universal values.

The mechanism of this myth is, yet what Barthes calls the 'vaccine'. A small dose of the evil is acknowledged, yes, there is critique of the West, yes, there is resentment, but this small inoculation serves to immunize against the larger, more subversive recognition, that the critique is justified, that the resentment is a response to systematic domination, that the demand for recognition is a political demand, not a pathological symptom. By granting the existence of Occidentalism as a limited, pathological phenomenon, the hegemonic order prevents the more dangerous recognition of its own structural violence. Unfortunately, this vaccine does not address the structural engine—the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm and its machinery of Vicarious Conditioning—but only its symptomatic output, resulting in sum zero (see sec. 14 infra.).

The terminal symptom of this mythic capture is the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee —the Iraqi protester's cry to the United Nations. This plea is not a contradiction of the myth; it is its completion. The subaltern, stripped of her own language, can only speak in the borrowed-transplanted forms of the hegemonic order. She can only demand that the manufacturer honor a warranty, because the myth has erased the historical memory that she was once a manufacturer herself. This is Barthes' 'privation of history' ([1957] 2012:Le mythe, à droite), operating at the deepest level of political consciousness.

To demythologize Occidentalism, therefore, is not simply to deny that anti-Western sentiment exists. It is to restore history to what the myth has naturalized. It is to show that the 'hatred' is not an essence but a response, not a pathology but a politics, not a civilizational fate but a colonial inheritance. This is the task of the present work, not to produce a counter-myth, but to re-politicize what the myth has rendered natural. But naturalization is only half the story. The other half is mediation: how the

vassal state's own mythical productions function as logical tools for holding together contradictions that cannot be resolved. This is the contribution of Claude Lévi-Strauss. For Lévi-Strauss, myth is not an idle play nor a crude speculation. It is a "kind of logical tool" that allows a society to grapple with problems that cannot be resolved through empirical or deductive reasoning (1955:434).

The key insight is that myth works not through isolated symbols but through *bundles of relations* that must be read synchronically (vertically) as well as diachronically (horizontally). Like an orchestra score, a myth unfolds in time (the story), but its meaning emerges only when we read across the columns, grouping together relations that belong to the same bundle, what Lévi-Strauss calls 'gross constituent units' of meaning (1955:431–32).

At this end, Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the Oedipus myth demonstrates this method. The myth does not explain why Oedipus killed his father or married his mother. Instead, it provides a logical model for mediating a fundamental contradiction that the culture cannot resolve: the belief that humans are autochthonous (born from the earth) and the knowledge that they are actually born from the union of man and woman. The myth's constituent units, the overrating of blood relations, the underrating of blood relations, the slaying of monsters, the difficulty in walking straight, are bundles that, when read together, offer a correlation rather than a solution. The contradiction is not eliminated; it is structured in a way that makes it tolerable (1955:434–35).

This insight illuminates the Schizophrenic vassal state. The vassal state is defined by a fundamental contradiction: it must perform a modernity imported from the North, while its own societal reality remains rooted in indigenous structures that this performance systematically negates. This is not a contradiction that can be solved, but a structural feature of the global order. What the vassal state produces, therefore, is not a solution but a mythical mediation, a set of relational bundles that correlate the incommensurable demands of exogenous recognition and indigenous survival.

Consider the Kemalist project (Chapter III). The 'synchronization of clocks' —the forced adoption of Latin script, Swiss civil code, and European aesthetics— is not merely a policy. It is a mythical operation. Its constituent units (the hat legal system, the alphabet reform, the secularization of the state, the construction of Ankara) are not isolated events. They are bundles of relations that together mediate the contradiction between the desire for Western Recognition and the persistence of an

Ottoman-Islamic substrate. The myth does not resolve the contradiction; it structures it, making it possible for the elite to act with abyssal-tyrannic and unidirectional projection as if the contradiction did not exist.

The same logic operates in the Rentier Cargo-Cult State (Chapter V). The 'born past' —the spectacularized, museumified history of the Gulf monarchies— is a mythical structure. It takes the raw materials of tribal genealogies, colonial borders, and petrodollar wealth and arranges them into bundles that mediate the contradiction between the nomadic identity framework (genealogical, non-territorial) and the sedentary demands of the modern nation-state (territorial, bureaucratic). The museum and the heritage festival are not lies; they are logical models that allow the society to hold together what cannot be reconciled anyway beyond.

Finally, Lévi-Strauss's observation about the 'spiral' growth of myth explains the intellectual sterility diagnosed in Chapter IV. Myth, he writes, "grows spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which has originated it is exhausted. Its growth is a continuous process whereas its structure remains discontinuous" (1955:443). The proliferation of Occidentalism studies in the Arab world —the endless books, the theories, the monumental but sterile projects— can be read as a spiral that never reaches resolution. The underlying contradiction (Conceded Modernity, the impossibility of an indigenous critique within borrowed tools) is real and cannot be mediated. The spiral continues because the intellectual impulse is exhausted but cannot admit its exhaustion. The plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the moment when the spiral stops, not because the contradiction is resolved, but because the society can no longer generate even the mythical mediation that makes the contradiction tolerable.

Before tracing the political morphology of the Schizophrenic vassal state, it is imperative to descend from the macro-historical to the micro-phenomenological level. The tyrannic imposition of a Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm does not merely reshape institutions; it violently reconstitutes the very subjectivity of those upon whom it is imposed. The foundational trauma of this encounter finds its most lucid diagnosis in the work of Frantz Fanon, who detailed the creation of a 'zone of non-being'—an ontological void where the colonized individual discovers himself as 'an object among other objects' (Fanon 1952:6).

This psychic disintegration is the individual precursor to the collective political pathology this book diagnoses. Fanon describes the *collapse* of the indigenous *bodily*

schema—the intimate, pre-reflective experience of one's own body in the world—and its catastrophic replacement by a historical-racial schema and an *epidermal inferiorisation* schema (Fanon 1952:8) woven from the stereotypes, anecdotes, and gaze of the colonizer. This process creates a subject trapped in a double system of reference, forced to navigate two incommensurate worlds. It is crucial to distinguish this schizophrenic decomposition of the self from the composite nature of many pre-colonial societies (Pascon). The latter represents an organic, however complex, social equilibrium. The former is a pathological condition born from the violent grafting of an alien, reified architecture (the 'solid' concluded forms of the Northern state) onto the organic, indigenous substrate (the 'liquid' process of a society's own marker-formation).

This phenomenological ground zero—the experience of being *overdetermined* from the exterior and fixed by a gaze that one cannot return—is the existential kernel of what this book theorizes as *Vicarious Conditioning* and *Ethical Schizophrenia*. The state-level performance of mimicry, the desperate quest for the Third Pillar of recognition, and the terminal plea for a manufacturer's guarantee—the political morphology of which is anatomized in Chapters IV and V—all have their origin in this intimate, psychic violation. To understand the schizophrenic vassal state is to first understand the schizophrenic vassal self, a consciousness condemned to see itself only through the refracted and denying lens of the hegemonic *Other*.

The theoretical model developed here—centered on Vicarious Conditioning and the *Ready-Made Modernity* Paradigm—ultimately describes a profound pathological interruption of a civilizational process. This process finds its most rigorous philosophical articulation in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, which frames history as the arduous apprenticeship through which consciousness labors to overcome its *naïve*, immediate givenness (what Hegel terms the 'in-itself' or *an sich*) to achieve self-aware sovereignty (the 'for-itself' or *für sich*) (Hegel [1807] 1998).

The epistemological core of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm is the "impersonal principles, which can be set out and developed without regard to context" (Giddens 1994:85). This declaration, which for Anthony Giddens describes the liberating force of expertise, from the Southern vantage point reveals the paradigm's inherent tyranny. The massive export of these 'decontextualized' principles is precisely what produces the schism of the Composite Society. It is the violent attempt to install a

'decentred' system upon a lived, centred world. Giddens' post-traditional society is, therefore, not a global diagnosis but the specific historical product of the North that is then universalized and weaponized as a ready-made solution, its generative dialectical labor obscured, its conclusions encrypted and shipped for passive installation.

This pretension of universality is not a philosophical hypothesis; it is codified in international law. Article 9 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice emphasizes "the representation of the main forms of civilization," yet Rule 3 of Article 38.1 establishes that the court's *ratio decidendi* shall be in accordance with "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations"—a category that, in practice, has served to exclude the indigenous legal paradigms of the Global South. The hegemonic North self-attributes the status of 'civilized' and, on that basis, constructs a universal law that, by definition, cannot be challenged from the colonized periphery—an eloquent example of this dynamic is the trajectory of Nawaf Salam: Lebanese by origin, but educated in France and at Harvard, president of the ICJ and formerly of the UN General Assembly, and current Prime Minister of Lebanon. His institutional prominence, far from refuting the thesis of epistemic vassalage, confirms it: the Global South can occupy the highest international offices as long as its education and epistemic-cognitive loyalty align faithfully with the Northern paradigm. Herein lies the legal *modus operandi* of prefabricated modernity.

Thus, the *Ready-Made Modernity* Paradigm is the geopolitical machinery that perpetrates this interruption. It massively exports the Northern *in-itself*. The concluded forms of modernity, from legal codes to epistemological categories, as a *finished* product. This product, however, was organically forged within a specific Western civilizational ecosystem, through its own arduous natural course of time and its unique anthropological and ethical struggles. For the West, this modernity is a *für sich*: it is understood from the inside because it is the lived result of its own dialectical labor.

The act of massive export is itself an act of tyranny. It is not that the historical ecosystems are divergent, but that the lived phenomenological struggle that constitutes the dialectic itself is fundamentally non-transferable. You cannot ship the anticlerical struggles that culminated in the French *laïcité* of 1905 as lived experiences applicable to other contexts where no such struggles ever occurred (Alnasir 2022). The South receives the conclusion of this process as a pre-packaged product, while the constructive mediations—the contingent conflicts, ethical ruptures, and visceral social

transformations—remain locked within their original ecosystem. This is not a simple transplantation gone wrong but the inherent impossibility of transplanting a civilizational *Bildungsprozess* (process of formation).

The result is a *hijacked dialectic*: the Southern polity is forced to operate with the conclusions of a historical drama it never lived, severing its own capacity for an indigenous journey toward becoming *für sich*. *Vicarious Conditioning* is thus the psychological mechanism that trains Southern elites to replicate these hollow forms, forever positioning them as artisans of a system whose underlying principles—the path to sovereign self-realization—remain the exclusive privileged domain of *The Northern Sage*. An aligned perspective with Santiago Castro-Gómez's 'hubris of the zero point', as the claim to occupy a universal, disembodied vantage point, was the epistemological precondition for both Enlightenment universalism and colonial domination (2005). The Northern Sage is not merely a geopolitical position but an epistemic posture: the presumption to speak from nowhere while speaking for everyone, see the Glossary, Appendix I.

It is crucial to clarify that the Northern Sage is not framed as a deliberate conspirator nor a monolith actor, but rather a structural position within the global epistemology of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. This position is occupied by institutions, canonical texts, and normative practices that are systemically endowed with the authority of the universal *uniformity*. The power of the Sage lies not in its malicious intent, but in the way its particular historical trajectory is naturalized and its epistemological products are encrypted and massively exported as finished goods, thereby foreclosing dialogue and conditioning dependency, as per recognition, certification, standardization. This systemic logic operates even in the face of internal Northern critiques, which are often themselves re-absorbed as commodities or relegated to the system's permissible fringe.

Consequently, the schizophrenic vassal state is the political entity born from this hijacked dialectic. It is a state whose consciousness is fractured between a performed, imported *in-itself* and a sterilized capacity for indigenous *für-itself* labor. This plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the political embodiment of a consciousness shaped entirely by the *banking model*. It is the cry of the oppressed who, in Freire's terms, have so internalized the logic of the *oppressor* that they cannot conceive of themselves as agents of their own liberation. Their capacity for the dialogical praxis required to *name*

the world and transform it has been systematically sterilized. The guarantee they seek is the ultimate admission that they see themselves as objects, not subjects, of history—the terminal symptom of a pedagogical and political relationship that has foreclosed the very possibility of a sovereign, self-authored future.

While this model of a monolithic, exported *für sich* is not an absolute global reality, almost different towards the new world beyond Europe. According to Colom, the long-held view that modernity was a "unique and accumulative process from Europe toward the rest of the glob" is no longer tenable (2009:13). Instead, he posits a fundamental axiom for the analysis: "there's many forms to be modern, as there's no canonic modernity, but multiple modernities" (p.14). Bendix in an earlier work referred to the same paradigm as destructive project against "inherited privilege and the declaration of equal rights of citizenship" (Bendix 1967:292).

However, to fully grasp the exceptional nature of the Latin American case, it is vital to distinguish it from the (post)colonial states of the 20th century. The early Latin American republics emerged from a crucible of independence wars not as passive recipients of a pre-packaged model, but as what Nicola Miller has termed 'republics of knowledge.' These were politics conceived as an intersectional open spaces for the exchange of knowledges, founded on the premise of building sovereignty upon a dynamic absorption of learning rather than upon a static cultural legacy (Miller 2020). This project involved the active, dialectical labor of selecting, translating, and adapting paradigms—from political economy to engineering—for indigenous nation-building. In this, they represented a genuine, if contested, striving for the *für sich*, constructing their own epistemological foundations rather than merely consuming the concluded forms of the Northern *in-itself*.

This Latin American trajectory stands as a crucial test case for the Bauerian distinction central to this work. Unlike the Ottoman, Arab, and even Japanese elites who confronted modernity as a pre-packaged, external paradigm to be mimicked, the criollo revolutionaries of the early 19th century were, for a time, forced to function as a *sovereign*, indigenous elite. Their independence was not *conceded* through a 'League of Nations' *mandate* or negotiated with a colonial office; it was seized through violent, but auto emancipated rupture. This foundational moment of self-legitimization necessitated the immediate, dialectical labor of state-building throughout genuine *Pouvoir Constituant* neutral from any external influence—drafting constitutions,

forcing-imposing international *Recognition*, and debating internal political models as primary authors, not as derivative translators. They were, in that formative period, the 'sages' writing their own source code, negociated among themselves as equal (Gargarella 2021) and reciprocals—a 'fraternization,' in Gittleman's terms, of the 'community of dialogue' (1974:81).

The subsequent erosion of this sovereign capacity in the 20th century, culminating in cycles of dependency and the rise of neoliberal ready-made packages, only underscores the tragic norm. It demonstrates that the Schizophrenic Vassalage diagnosed in this book is not a geographic destiny but a political condition that can befall any polity where the indigenous elite is displaced or sterilized. The Latin American *exception* thus proves the rule: the struggle for ethical sovereignty is a continuous one—framed from reciprocal negotiation into equals, the populace—, and the machinery of Vicarious Conditioning is a perpetual threat that can dismantle even a foundational *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*.

This historical pathway stands in stark contrast to the condition of the *traditional* (post)colonial state. The latter achieved independence not through a foundational intellectual project of its own, but as a *conceded* entity, its structures and epistemic boundaries often delineated by the departing colonial power. The Latin American experience was, in its origins, a form of *colonial 2.0*—a direct, often violent, a secession that created a space for sovereign empowered knowledge production. The states examined in this book (Japan, Ottoman-Turkey, the Arab world), alongside most of the postcolonial Global South, were from their modern inception more akin to the latter model. They were confronted with a *Ready-Made Modernity* Paradigm as a condition of their entry into the international system, a paradigm that massively installed a structural dependency that the early Latin American republics, for a significant period, managed to evade. The subsequent erosion of this sovereign epistemic capacity in Latin America from the late 20th century onwards, as a convergence with the global pattern of dependency, only underscores the potency and historical specificity of the seminal *republic of knowledge* model, and the tragic global ascendancy of the *Schizophrenic Vassalage* that is this book's central focus adverting possible silenced capture of other, until now considered northern periphery, to be seen soon under *Neo-vassalage* forms which this work is trying to theories.

The tripartite failure of the vassal state finds its micro-sociological archetype in the pathological dynamics of its elite, a condition manifest in the dysfunctional relationship between three key groups: introductory elite, acquisitive elite, and withholding hegemonic center. Nowhere is the catastrophic failure of the first two groups—and the weaponized absence of genuine sponsorship from the third—more vividly documented than in the colonial psychology of language itself. Decades before this structural model was formalized, Fanon's *Peau noire, Masques blancs* provided its anecdotal phenomenological portrait. He observed that the colonized Antillean intellectual, the archetypal introductory elite, believes he will be whiter, will closer approximate a true human being in direct proportion to his mastery of the French language. This is not a mere *assimilation*; it is the performance of a *civilization* through the meticulous mimicry of its aesthetic forms, which is the first element captured to achieve the performative assimilation. Yet, this elite is condemned to a gray zone of illegibility. Their labor of introduction fails because it is conducted through linguistic borrowing, transliteration, and linguistic sculpturism. They become, in Fanon's terms, 'quasi-whites,' fluent in the operational code but alienated from its philosophical source and from their own societal substrate—perfectly embodying the schizophrenic vassal whose consciousness is split between a performed Northern *für sich* and a sterilized indigenous reality.

This conditioned anxiety finds its contemporary, systematized expression in what Demeter identifies as the 'camouflage identity'—where peripheral scholars feel compelled to "make your CV look like that of a Western scholar" and systematically privilege Northern epistemologies to mask their indigenous intellectual 'scent' (Demeter 2020:80–81). This anxious, continuous performance for recognition within the hegemonic paradigm is the internalized engine of recognition as assimilation, the psychological counterpart to the state's escalating commitment to a failing mimetic project.

2 The Schizophrenic Vassal State: A Tripartite Failure of Recognition

The Schizophrenic vassal state can be understood as a tragic perversion of a model for *civilizational shift*. As referred earlier, Huntington identify that the shift requires three conditions: the commitment of its political and economic elite; the acquiescence of its public; and the crucial acceptance by the dominant groups of the target civilization (1993:44).

The pathological condition of the schizophrenic vassal state imposes a top-down project of Ready-Made Modernity. Its elite is driven by a mimetic desire for recognition and conditioned into a prevention-focused motivational mode. This imposition creates a fundamental rupture between the state apparatus and its own societal lifeworld. The nation becomes trapped in a schizophrenic gray zone, detached from local realities yet perpetually rejected by the external power it emulates. This is not simple imitation but a desperate performance aimed at securing the elusive Third Pillar of recognition, a performance that, in its failure, culminates in the terminal symptom of Ethical Schizophrenia. This condition finds its social-structural basis in the composite society (Pascon 1967; Bouderbala and Pascon 1970; Pascon 1973). Such a society is not in transition between coherent stages, but is fluctuate, in liquid (dis)equilibrium where multiple, historically distinct social formations (tribal, feudal, capitalist) coexist and compete. The vassal state is the political expression of this composition: it cannot achieve internal coherence because it governs a reality it did not organically generate and must perpetually manage the antagonisms between these layered societies through exogenous instruments never conformed by its own social structures.

Hegel demonstrates that the path to genuine recognition passes through a *struggle for recognition* (Kampf des Anerkennens), insisting in the necessity to engage in this struggle (*Herrschaft und Knechtschaft*). To achieve this, they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case (Hegel [1807] 1979:§145 ff.). This struggle is the necessary ordeal through which consciousness proves its freedom from mere life and establishes itself as self-existent (*Fürsichsein*).

The vassal state, however, is trapped in a struggle that can never reach its proper conclusion. The North refuses to enter the reciprocal dynamic; it withholds the recognition that would perform the dialectic. The vassal's performance, its anxious adoption of Northern forms, its violent imposition of imported paradigms, is a struggle without a worthy antagonist, a combat with a shadow. The elite risks everything (its identity, its legitimacy, its cohesion with its own society) for a recognition that the structure of hegemony ensures will never arrive. Hegel's insight that as relation of both self-consciousnesses is thus determined in such a way that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle, reveals the precise nature of the vassal's

entrapment: it is engaged in a struggle whose reciprocal condition has been unilaterally reserved.

The states examined in this book represent cases where the first two pillars are built with fervent, often violent, zeal, while the third is perpetually *withheld*. Their elites become mimetic evangelists for the Northern pattern (Pillar 1). To secure public acquiescence (Pillar 2), they engage in top-down social engineering, a project often *weaponized* inwardly against their own intellectual sphere, creating what Ghalioun theorizes as the 'state against the nation.' ([1993] 2015).

Yet, the foundational trauma is the structured absence of the Third Pillar: genuine recognition by the North. The vassal's anxiety is a bid for a validation that the hegemon, by the very logic of its dominance, is structured to withhold. This failure locks the state into a condition of profound ontological insecurity—a geopolitical struggle for consciousness where its identity is perpetually refracted through a denying external gaze. It is this schizophrenic position—building the first two pillars with revolutionary zeal for a recognition that is systematically denied—that defines the vassal state.

Unlike the schizophrenic vassal state that operates with the concluded forms (in-itself) of a Northern *für sich*, the Portuguese and Spanish were writing the source code of their own new global projection. This code was the *Baroque*, a system of "certification, a *verism*—a 'truth-making' or 'making-real'—and voluntarism produced by a subjectivity in doubt and solitude" (Barbosa Filho 2009:127). This "European opening to the world" was an act of *epistemological agency*. Its "traumatic encounter with the other" spurred genuine moral and juridical innovation—a lived, dialectical engagement, not the sterile application of pre-packaged norms. In America, this Baroque *matrix* functioned as a "template for a peculiar syncretism [...] a hasty imitation and importation of cultural, aesthetic, and consumer patterns that were far removed from—if not entirely alien to—native social experiences." (Colom 2009:15–16), actively fusing cultures to create an ad hoc common being, rather than imposing a ready-made one. That specificity served as a mechanism for *incorporation* (Barbosa Filho 2009:122) rather than just a *spectacle of mimicry*.

This tripartite structure, while derived from Huntington's political sociology, rests upon a deeper philosophical foundation from the Hegelian ontology of self-consciousness, *Selbstbewußtsein*, as the truth of certainty of itself (*Wahrheit der*

Gewißheit seiner selbst) (Hegel [1807] 1979:IV). Therefore, Hegel introduces the self-consciousness as a native realm of the truth (*Mit dem Selbstbewußtsein sind wir also nun in das einheimische Reich der Wahrheit eingetreten*). That *native kingdom* is not one of solitary reflection but of intersubjectivity, presupposing an intersubjective interaction, as eros (Freud).

The fundamental structure of this paradigm is articulated in the passage that follows the initial encounter of self-consciousnesses. As "A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness, only so is it in fact self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it" (*Es ist ein Selbstbewußtsein für ein Selbstbewußtsein. Erst hierdurch ist es in der Tat; denn erst hierin wird für es die Einheit seiner selbst in seinem Anderssein*) (Hegel [1807] 1979:§137). This foundational proposition of Hegel's theory of recognition, as a self-consciousness achieves its actuality (*in der Tat*) only through another self-consciousness, constitute by this relation its unity, which is realized in and through its other, as he has already advanced that a pure self-recognition is in absolute *otherness* ([1807] 1977:14§26).

At this stage, the vassal state's desperate quest for the Third Pillar is thus not merely a political strategy but the enactment of this fundamental ontological need: the need to have one's existence as a modern, sovereign entity confi(o)rmed by an other that one recognizes as equally self-conscious. Therefore, the state *performs* modernity, imports institutions, and reshapes its society not simply for functional gain but because, in the Hegelian sense, it cannot be in fact what it claims to be without the recognition of the other it has constituted as its judge.

Thus, Hegel's dialectic of recognition unfolds through what he calls a "double movement" (*die gedoppelte Bewußtsein*), articulated in the subsequent elaboration to recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another (*Sie anerkennen sich als gegenseitig sich anerkennend*) ([1807] 1979:§ 146). Extensively, he describes the process as a form of *Aristotelian* contiguity, as a relation of mutual dependence where each term requires the other for its completion, where "each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also what it does can only do insofar as the other does the same; one-sided action would be useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by both" (*Jedes sieht das Andere dasselbe tun, was es tut; jedes tut selbst, was es an das Andere fordert, und darum auch, was es tut, kann es nur tun, insofern das Andere dasselbe tut; das einseitige Tun wäre unnütz, weil was*

geschehen soll, nur durch beide zu Stande kommen kann) ([1807] 1979:§ 145-146), which creates a recursive dynamic of anxious, yet, superfluous longing for recognition.

Therefore, recognition, in its *true* form, is necessarily *reciprocal*. The tragedy of the schizophrenic vassal state is that it performs this double movement alone. Its elite demands recognition from the North while voluntarily offering recognition in return, through mimicry, through the adoption of Northern paradigms, through the anxious performance of modernity. But the North, occupying the structural position of what Hegel would call the independent consciousness, declines this reciprocal movement. It demands recognition without offering it, thereby violating the fundamental law of self-conscious life. Thus, the vassal's *one-sided action* proves useless (*unnütz*), because what recognition requires, the mutual bringing-forth of truth, can only be brought about by both.

3 The Bauerian Distinction: indigenous Elites and the Capacity for Historical Sovereignty

To fully grasp the machinery of dependence, one must understand the precondition for its success: the systematic dismantling of a society's capacity for indigenous historical production. This precondition finds its most lucid diagnosis in the work of early 20th-century thinker Otto Bauer, whose distinction between different types of nations provides the sociological bedrock for what is conceptualized here as the Schizophrenic vassal state.

Bauer's core thesis posits that a *genuine* nation is not a static entity but a dynamic *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*. Far from being a mere 'community of fate' in a passive or fatalistic sense—as the conventional translation suggests (Bauer 2000:xi). The concept in Bauer describes a generative community of history. This community is actively forged through a shared historical struggle for subsistence (*Daseinskampf*). Bauer establishes a precise causal relationship: it is this *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* that, as the active substrate, gives rise to or generates (erwachsende; erstehen lassen) the *Charaktergemeinschaft* or distinctive community of character (Bauer 1907:113, 123–24). The nation is ultimately defined as "the community of character that arises from the community of fate/history" (*die aus Schicksalsgemeinschaft erwachsende Charaktergemeinschaft*) (Bauer 1907:172 fn. 3). This generative community is, therefore, the precondition for a living culture (Kulturgemeinschaft) and for a society's capacity to sovereignly (re)produce its historical trajectory.

The pivotal Bauerian distinction lies in the fate of the elite class that stewards this process. A 'nation with history' possesses a surviving, indigenous social elite—historically, a national bourgeoisie—capable of (re)generating its own national culture and steering its historical trajectory through an organic, intergenerational process. This elite is the engine of a society's *ethical surviving sovereignty*; it functions as the sage who writes, interprets, and reproduces the nation's historical 'source code.'

Bauer's conception of the nation as a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft,* resonates deeply with Hegel's earlier concept of Spirit (*Geist*), even as it transposes Hegel's philosophical idealism into a sociological key. As Hegel considers the "spirit is the ethical life of a nation", as it is the immediate truth, "the individual that is a world" (*das Individuum, das eine Welt ist*) (Hegel [1807] 1979:§325).

This formulation captures precisely what Bauer would later theorize as a community that has achieved such unity that the individual and the whole are no longer opposed but mutually constituting. Spirit, for Hegel, is the substance that emerges when self-consciousnesses recognize themselves in each other, when alternatively the 'I' becomes 'We' and the 'We' becomes 'I.' It is the living reality of a people who have labored through history to produce a shared ethical world.

Hegel elaborates this unity in terms that provides Bauer's distinction to resonate between mere aggregate and genuine community, as it spirit is the self of actual consciousness, to which it stands opposed, or rather which presents itself to it as an objective, actual world, which has lost all meaning for the self as something alien to it (Hegel [1807] 1979:§324).

In a genuine *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, the world is not experienced as alien. The laws, customs, and institutions that govern life are not foreign impositions but the objectified expression of the community's own self-consciousness. Which is precisely what Bauer means by a living *Kulturgemeinschaft*, a culture that is not borrowed or imposed but emerges consistently from the shared historical fate of the people and is continuously reproduced and maintained by its indigenous elite, as a carried stone from own bedrock, defended in this book.

The Schizophrenic vassal state, by contrast, is a community that has been *prevented* from achieving this spiritual unity. Its *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* is not forged through shared historical labor but interrupted by the massive imposition of ready-made forms. Its 'We' is fractured between a performed imported identity and a defamed indigenous

reality. Hegel's insistence that Spirit is a world that has lost all meaning as something alien provides the normative standard against which the vassal state's alienation can be measured, as its world remains permanently alien because the labor of spiritual appropriation, the work of transforming inherited forms into living culture, has been systematically foreclosed by Vicarious Conditioning and the sterilization of its elite.

Where Bauer gives us the sociological diagnosis—a people whose indigenous elite has been displaced, whose *Kulturgemeinschaft* has been severed—Hegel gives us the ontological ideal: a people for whom the world is no longer alien because they have made it through their own historical labor. The vassal state is thus not merely politically dependent but spiritually incomplete, a would-be community trapped in what Hegel would recognize as the stage of mere substance, before it has risen to the self-consciousness of Spirit.

In stark contrast stand nations that have been sterilized or are *without history* in this sovereign sense. This condition is not an inherent lack but a political outcome, typically resulting from colonial or imperial hegemony. In such cases, the indigenous elite is either physically liquidated, culturally displaced, or—most insidiously—*aculturated* and reconfigured into a *comprador class*. Such pathology was flagged by Salazar Bondy that in Latin America, where no vernacular intellectual tradition was incorporated into the colonial-era philosophy, the result was "the character of a transplanted tree, not of a plant that emerged from the conjunction of factors propitious to an original and vigorous sprouting of thought" ([1968] 2006:27). This *colonial-phile* elite is systematically alienated from its own societal reality and conditioned to serve unidirectionally as agent and administrator of massive imported paradigms. They become artisans of a foreign system, fluent in its operation but epistemologically foreclosed from its philosophical foundations. The populace they govern is thus reduced to what Bauer termed *dependents of the nation (Hintersassen der Nation)*—excluded from the very *Kulturgemeinschaft* that defines the political entity ruling them (Bauer 1907:6), thus from the capacity to generate new, indigenous historical *parallel* narratives.

This Bauerian framework is the master key to the pathology diagnosed in this book. The schizophrenic vassal state is the political manifestation of a sterilized nation without surviving elites to confront its national historical progress and maintain the production of its national history. While, the Vicarious Conditioning and Ready-Made

Modernity Paradigm are the mechanisms that actively enforce this sterilization. They ensure that the transcultural and developmental elites (as defined in Section 5 of this chapter) are reduced to consumers and curators of Northern historical conclusions, forever performing a script they cannot debug, adapt, or rewrite.

The rentier mentality (analyzed in Chapter V) and the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee (Chapter IV) are the terminal symptoms of this conditioned sterility. They represent the schizophrenic cry of a populace whose capacity for indigenous self-repair —the primary function of a sovereign elite—has been systematically dismantled. In stark contrast, the Japanese case (Chapter II) demonstrates the other pole of the Bauerian distinction: a *nation with history*, where a solid historical structure and a surviving national elite were empowered to confront modernity and produce their own *sovereign historical narration*. The Bauerian distinction thus reveals that the core conflict is not merely cultural or political, but fundamentally geo-historical: a struggle over which civilizational entity possesses the elite with the right to author a people's past and, by extension, control the horizon of its possible futures.

The mechanisms of Vicarious Conditioning and the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm are vividly operationalized in the cultural sphere through what Peggy Levitt identifies as the *global museum assemblage*—"contingent clusters of people, technology, objects, and knowledge" that circulate as a *changing repertoire* of practices and values (Levitt 2015:Museums and nation building Note 44). Levitt's framework, with its focus on voluntarism and the potential for vernacularization, presents a liberal-intersectional view of this process. However, when installed within the schizophrenic vassal state, this 'voluntary choice' is in fact a conditioned compulsion—a mimetic desire for the *recognition* and *status* in the club of the modern promise. The result is not a genuine, indigenous self-reconstruction, but an anxious performance of Northern imitation under its proper brand names—the Guggenheim Abu Dhabi, the Louvre Abu Dhabi—where the value lies in the pristine import, not in any *authentic* anthropological assemblage.

4 The Anthropological Substrate: Anonymous Societies and the Tyranny of the Ready-Made

To fully grasp the violence-dynamics of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, one must understand the deep anthropological structures it disrupts. Mark Moffett provides

a crucial lens by distinguishing between two types of animal societies: individual recognition societies, where every member must know every other (e.g., chimpanzee troops, limited to ~200 individuals), and anonymous societies, which can scale indefinitely by using shared identity 'markers'—flags, scents, rituals, hairstyles—that allow strangers to recognize each other as belonging to the same collective (Moffett 2019:106). The *modern* nation-state is the ultimate human expression of an 'anonymous society.'

Critically, Moffett argues that the formation of such large, anonymous societies among humans "has required the employment of force—war and subjugation."(Moffett 2020:156) The ethnic and cultural layers within modern nations are often the legacy of this violent, non-organic merging.

The Northern state-forms exported as Ready-Made Modernity are the concluded products of such long, often violent, processes of *anonymous society* formation. They represent a specific, historically-forged set of exogenous 'markers' and organizing systems. The paradigm's tyranny lies in its massive export of these *concluded*, solid forms—the legal codes, the borders, the flags, the educational curricula, the secular rituals—and the demand that they be installed as the operative markers of a new, target anonymous society.

This imposition is an anthropological violation. It bypasses the indigenous, dialectical labor of marker-formation—the struggles, negotiations, and shared historical fate (the *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*) that organically generate a society's identity. The result is what Pascon identified as the *Composite Society*: not an organic pluralism, but a fluctuating equilibrium of antagonistic layers where the state's imported markers are alien to the societal lifeworld. The Schizophrenic Vassal State is the political manifestation of this condition: an 'anonymous society' whose defining markers are not its own, performing a *borrowed* paradigmatic identity, stacked anxiously for a recognition that the original 'manufacturers' of the paradigm are structured to withhold. The desperate 'synchronization of clocks' (see Chapter III) is, in essence, a frantic attempt to force the adoption of these alien markers, from alphabet reforms to aesthetic museology, creating a fundamental rift in the very 'structures of consciousness'.

This anthropological perspective reveals why the Northern model is so potent—and so tyrannical when exported. Baumeister & Southwick, reflecting the Northern

consensus, define a society precisely as a "cultural system plus the people living within it," (2025:54) and posit culture itself as "humankind's biological strategy." From this vantage point, they conclude, the colossal success of the Northern anonymous society is a logical outcome of three advantages: the efficiency of large-scale information sharing, the power of expansive markets, and military superiority.

Yet this account of structural advantages captures only the outcome, not the generative process. As Jerome Gittleman (1974), building on Nelson's *Civilizational Complexes and Intercivilizational Encounters* (1973), argued, the decisive dynamic behind Western modernity was not merely the accumulation of efficiencies but a circulatory universalization process: the interaction of new cultural universals—logics, languages, world-images—with newly widened communities of dialogue and association (Gittleman 1974:81). This 'fraternization,' as the extension of participatory dialogue to previously excluded actors, created the experiential and forensic conditions for new dialectics of law, philosophy, and science. The institutional forms that Baumeister and Southwick identify as advantages are the concluded products of this 'circulatory process' (1974:81), not as self-standing artifacts.

However, when this specific, successful model is abstracted into a universal Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, its historical and philosophical remain structurally exogenous, as encrypted. The concluded forms of this system—its legal codes, its bureaucratic institutions, its educational models—are mass-exported as off-the-shelf solutions. The recipient society is conditioned not to understand the dialectical struggles that produced these forms, but only to replicate their function. They are taught to mimic the markers and behaviors of a successful anonymous society without undergoing the indigenous historical labor required to generate its underlying ethical sovereignty. This is the core of Vicarious Conditioning: learning the *what* without comprehensive access to the *why*, producing *artisans* of a foreign system, never *sages* of their own.

This rupture is not merely institutional but penetrates to the very basis of the social contract. Where the indigenous state, even in its European manifestation, negotiated a form of *wellbeing* derived from a dialectic of production and redistribution, the vassal state imposes a foreign structure that systematically forecloses this dialectic. The result is not integration but a managed dependency, a phenomenon whose specific morphology in the rentier context will be examined in Chapter V as a pathological

conjunction wellbeing-belonging—an allocative *substitute* for a sovereign social contract.

Having defined the schizophrenic vassal state as a political form, we now turn to the engine that produces it: the psycho-social mechanism of Vicarious Conditioning.

Part II: The Production Mechanism

5 The Production Mechanism: Vicarious Conditioning

If the Schizophrenic vassal state is the political pathology, then Vicarious Conditioning is the psycho-social engine that produces it. But before the machinery of dependence could produce Schizophrenic Vassalage, a prior historical stage was necessary: the construction of a "universal West" as a model for reform. According to Cemil Aydin, Ottoman and Japanese elites between 1840 and 1882 did not see an insurmountable civilizational barrier. The Tanzimat Proclamation (1839) "declared a set of legal, administrative, and fiscal reforms in order to strengthen the Ottoman state and make it a member of the new European diplomatic order" (2007:26). The Meiji Charter Oath similarly "affirmed the universality of Western civilization expressed through a Confucian language" (2017:32). Fukuzawa Yukichi, in 1875 of his publication of *An Outline of a Theory of Civilization* ([1973] 2009), "criticized and modified Buckle's History of Civilization in England, because Buckle's theories argued that civilizations in Asia were doomed to stagnation because of their geography and climate" (2007:35–37). Even early critics of the "West did so only in the context of the international policies of particular Western powers", so never address a massive reject to "the universal ideals identified with the West" (2007:43). This period represents the optimistic phase of silenced desire grounding the path towards the Vicarious Conditioning, the mimetic desire was voluntary, and the Third Pillar of recognition had not yet been systematically withheld.

Psychologically, Drawing on Bandura, this mechanism explains how The Northern Sage need not be physically present; their paradigm, encoded in legal texts and curricula, is effectively 'filmed' for global distribution. The subaltern elite is thus positioned as a perpetual artisan, conditioned to replicate the operational forms of these massively exported paradigms. They master the 'what'—the procedures and codes—while being systematically deprived of access to the philosophical 'why'—the historical

struggles and ethical debates that constitute its generative 'source code,' the privileged domain of The Northern Sage. This intentional epistemological schism ensures permanent dependency and sterilizes the capacity for indigenous adaptation or critique.

The North-South value clash was not an abstract philosophical dispute; it was operationalized through a deliberate and systematic project of cognitive re-engineering. The colonial enterprise functioned as a vast laboratory where the tools of Vicarious Conditioning were first tested and perfected. Understood through the lens of the comparative sociology of civilizations, the colonial situation was a specific, asymmetrical form of civilizational encounter (Tiryakian 1974), engineered to ensure the reproduction of Northern hegemony. Nowhere is this more evident than in the strategic domain of education, which was transformed from a means of enlightenment into an instrument of subjugation and elite fabrication.

As articulated by French colonial administrator Georges Hardy, the purpose of colonial education was fundamentally geo-strategic, not epistemological. Its goal was not to cultivate universal knowledge but to secure cognitive alignment with the colonizer's interests. In practice, this meant a curriculum designed to instill an auto-sense of inferiority in the colonized while glorifying the metropole. History and geography lessons emphasized the grandeur of French history, the harsh and painful African environment, portrayed as a land devoid of history (Hardy 1917:182). Crucially, vernacular languages like Arabic were excluded from literacy programs, severing the intellectual class from its own cultural and philosophical reservoirs. This policy created a stark hierarchy: graduates of traditional schools were relegated to auxiliary roles, while those molded by the colonial system were empowered as a comprador elite, fluent in the language and logic of their masters but alienated from their own society.

This strategy of cognitive capture extended into the spiritual realm. The French policy, as confessed by its architect Alfred Le Châtelier, aimed at fabricating a 'Gallicized Islam' (un islam à la française). This was achieved through the suppression of traditional Islamic patronage, the seizure of mosques, the transformation of clerics into civil servants, and the bureaucratic regulation of pilgrimage (Le Châtelier 1910:2). Similar politics have been addressed by the British empire in the India to fabricate a colonial Islam (Schacht 1982:XI). This was a deliberate project to create a dependent, state-sanctioned religious identity—an encrypted version of faith stripped of its autonomous political and social power.

This model of anthropological dissection was not mere subjugation policy; it was a calculated strategy of epistemicide. The French colonial machinery in Africa executed a malicious and systematic obliteration of existing historical records. Military commanders were ordered to systematically hunt down and discard written Arabic documents—the tangible archives of tribal records, history and law. In their place, they relied exclusively on curated, de-contextualized oral testimonies, deliberately severing the people from their own written memory, sundering the connective tissue of their collective identity and communal existence. (Zbādīt 1979:211)

From this orchestrated void, a new, artificial tribal structures was forcibly implanted as the sole official truth. This fabricated genealogy was not an anthropocentric exercise; it became the mandatory, brutal grid for all colonial administration, legally enforcing new ethnic and sectarian categories designed to shatter organic social structures and pit communities against each other. Military districts were thus transformed into laboratories for social sectarianism, where the rich, complex tapestry of indigenous tribal life was violently unraveled and rewoven into a simple, colonial grid of 'us' and 'them'. This was not just dissection; it was social murder, even a societalcide, destroying the anthropological backbone of societies to replace it with a fragile, dependent, neo-tribal structure that served only the colonizer's logic of divide and rule. This very logic would be violently reactivated decades later, when the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq (2003) would explicitly resurrect and weaponize these same sectarian categories, from the highest political rhetoric down to the structure of its governing council, proving the enduring lethality of the colonial laboratory's core formula.

The architects of this epistemic engineering, figures like the French colonial administrators Marty (1920) and Delafosse (1922), returned to metropolitan France to become professors at the Sorbonne, thereby establishing an epistemological framework that would guide subsequent anthropological studies and doctoral theses—such as the Malian precolonial historian and ethnographer Hampaate Bâ and his collaborator Daget (1955) on the tribes of Sudan—ensuring the longevity of this neo-colonial knowledge production.

This practice of manufacturing loyal elites finds a direct and cynical parallel in the Ottoman Empire's 'School of Tribes.' This institution was not a charitable endeavor for social integration but a calculated tool for seduction and brainwashing, designed to create intellectual masses aligned with imperial interests (Rogan 1996:87). Selection was

meticulously engineered, favoring the sons of tribes deemed "more noble and prone to loyalty," such as the Al-Saadoun, whose children were to be granted the highest honor of selection over others (Rogan 1996:28). The legacy of this policy is profound; one of its graduates, Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun, became the first Prime Minister of Iraq in 1921, cementing a pattern where the alumni of such colonial and imperial schools became the foundational—and perpetually compromised—elite of the emerging modern states (Alnasir 2021b:408). As the case of Iraq will demonstrate, the manufacturers of a loyal political vanguard was often complemented by the parallel creation of a dependent economic elite through land large concesiones policies, together forming the integral machinery of the vassal (post)state.

The *apparent* end of the colonial era did not dismantle this machinery but reframed it for a new age. The strategy of elite sterilization shifted from overt administration to the soft power of delegated educational institutions—a pervasive intellectual feudalism that persists to this day. The proliferation of Western universities, lyceums, and cultural centers in the Global South does not represent charitative open exchange but functions as a refined mechanism of cognitive capture and laboratories for permanent elites feudalism. These institutions, often better funded and labeled as more prestigious than their local counterparts, are not neutral. They actively produce a 'colonial-phile' elite—graduates whose intellectual paradigms, professional loyalties, and very sense of scholarly legitimacy are aligned with the epistemological North. This creates a profound and debilitating cognitive gap, relegating those educated in indigenous systems to a marginalized, local intelligentsia, often dismissed as parochial. This is not accidental but the intended outcome of a persistent structure, a living continuation of what I highlight as internal colonization—a system where the subaltern elite is conditioned to be a consumer, never a master, of the paradigms that govern them, forever seeking validation from the original manufacturer of knowledge.

Laroui diagnosed the cumulative effect of this dissonance as a *retard culturel* (cultural delay). The South was forced into a confrontation with a massively packaged version of European modernity without having undergone the historical processes that produced it. Colonial strategy, as detailed by Pascon referring to the Moroccan case, actively engineered this condition by manufacturing societal fictions—conglomerations where different legal orders and social structures were structured to prevent the emergence of a unified, sovereign social body (Pascon 1973). The *Vicarious*

Conditioning of elites was the psychological counterpart to this political strategy of structural composition and dependency. This foundational, orchestrated dissonance by the deliberate creation of a cognitive and temporal gap, is the pre-condition for the political and intellectual pathologies of the schizophrenic vassal state. The state, and the elite that governs it, is born into a condition of schizophrenia, its identity fractured between a manufactured Northern ideal and a disavowed Southern reality.

This process of cognitive capture and elite fabrication finds a disturbing, yet precise, analogue in the natural world: the behavior of *slavemaker ants*, described by Moffett. These ants do not subjugate mature adults, who remain 'nationalists to the core.' Instead, they raid the nests of other species and kidnap the pupae—the immature, quiescent stage before they become fully formed ants.

A kidnapped ant is duped, imprinting on her captors in much the way a hatchling chicken will imprint on you if you are the first thing it sees rather than its mother. Emerging in a slavemaker nest—and ignorant that anything is amiss—a stolen ant adopts the local colony scent as her 'nationality' and dutifully sets to work... Should a slave blunder onto the colony of her birth—the one to which she truly belongs, with her actual colony-mates and sisters—she is attacked as the enemy. (Moffett 2019:93)

The colonial and neocolonial Cargo Cult-*Cryptouniversity* functions with the same slavemaker logic. It targets the young and intellectually formative—the pedagogical 'pupae'—severing them from their own societal 'scent' (the philosophical and historical source code of their *Kulturgemeinschaft*). Conditioned within the Northern epistemological nest, they imprint on its paradigms, adopting its markers as their own. They emerge as the *Fetish-eve-empowered-Elite*: fluent and mastered in the operational language of the ready-made paradigm, yet alienated from its generative principles and, most tragically, from their own societal lifeworld. So complete is this Vicarious Conditioning that they often perceive indigenous critiques and their own native intellectual traditions as alien threats, attacking them with the fervor of the slavemaker's duped worker. This is the engineered schizophrenic vassal state: an elite trained to be the guardian of a system that ensures its own people's perpetual dependency, acting in agency of the colonial interest, as internal self-colonialism. This is an ontological definition of internal colonialism interpreted by De Sousa Santos as a surviving structuralism to complicate an alternative imaginary "because internal colonialism is not only, or mainly, a state policy; it is rather a very wide social grammar

that permeates social relations, public and private spaces, culture, mentalities, and subjectivities" (2014:48). The precise psychological mechanism that made this laboratory so effective can be theorized as a process of *Vicarious Conditioning*.

6 The Psychoanalytic Substrate: Eros, Aggression, and the Pathologized Super-Ego

The dynamic of mimetic desire and systematically withheld recognition, theorized here as Vicarious Conditioning, operates upon a fundamental *psychoanalytic substrate*, one critically illuminated by Herbert Marcuse's synthesis of Marx and Freud in Eros and Civilization ([1955] 1974). This is not merely a struggle between Eros and Thanatos, but a historically specific pathology where both instincts are *mobilized* in the service of a hegemonic order. The vassal elite's performance is a distorted expression of Eros—the life instinct's drive for connection and unity—which has been captured and repurposed by what Marcuse termed the Performance Principle: the specific historical reality principle of a Northern modernity built on alienated labor, aggressive productivity, and domination. Their quest is not for sovereign binding but for a binding to the hegemon, a *libidinal* investment in the very structure that subordinates them —this principle will be invoked hereafter, whether as performance, anxiety, longing, or anxious desperation, depending on each case—.

This process installs a form of repression that Marcuse crucially distinguished as surplus-repression. He defined this not as the basic repression required by the eternal struggle for existence, what he called basic repression, but as the restrictions necessitated by the specific interests of social and political domination. The Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm is the *geopolitical vehicle* for this surplus-repression, and Vicarious Conditioning is its *psychological mechanism* of installation. The *encrypted software* of imported paradigms systematically withholds access not just to operational knowledge, but to the *libidinal source code*—the capacity for indigenous, *erotic connection* to one's own history, culture, and community.

The perpetual, structured refusal of the Third Pillar of recognition weaponizes this captured Eros. The aggressive energy generated by this profound frustration—the fury of a life instinct thwarted in its most fundamental need to belong—is, forbidden from flowing outward toward its source, the withholding North. This aggression is "introjected, internalized [...] directed against the ego." (Freud [1929] 1961:85–86) In the Schizophrenic vassal state, this process is *pathologized* on a *collective scale*. The imported

paradigm functions as the dictate of an exogenous, *tyrannic super-ego*, the psychic embodiment of the Northern Performance Principle. The state apparatus, and the elite that identifies with it, becomes the 'ego' tormented by this foreign internal authority.

The resulting political *sense of guilt*—for the failure to achieve the mimetic ideal, for the persistent backwardness of the indigenous reality—manifests as the profound ontological insecurity and the self-directed violence of Ghalioun's 'state against the nation.' This is the political manifestation of the *Death Instinct*, unleashed internally after the indigenous Eros has been systematically sterilized. The elite's fervent imposition of the Northern architecture, their *escalation of commitment* to a failing course, is thus a desperate, destructive performance aimed at satisfying the demands of this internalized tyrant, a tragic cycle where the energy of life (Eros) is compelled to enact a script of *civilizational self-negation* (Thanatos).

The internalization of an exogenous super-ego entails, moreover, the imposition of an *alien temporal Modus*. The Northern performance principle manifests as a chrono-logic that replaces the cyclical, organic time of the societal lifeworld with the irreversible, linear, and stressful time of imported progress, generating an *ontological arrhythmia* that lies at the very core of Ethical Schizophrenia.

7 The Morphology of Dependence: Global Assemblages and the Schizophrenic Vassal State

The theoretical machinery of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm and its psychological engine, Vicarious Conditioning, do not operate in a vacuum. They achieve their material form through what Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier term 'global assemblages.' For Ong and Collier, a *global assemblage* is a composite site where "abstractable, mobile, and dynamic" global forms—technologies, political rationalities, ethical codes—articulate with local situations, defining "new material, collective, and discursive relationships" (2007:4).

While the framework proposed by Ong and Collier is invaluable for describing the mechanics of this encounter, an analysis through the lens of asymmetric power and the history of vassalage reveals the global assemblage not as a neutral meeting ground, but as the primary *morphology of dependence*. The Schizophrenic Vassal State is not merely a state that exists within a world of global assemblages; it is a political entity that is itself a pathological global assemblage—a site where the violent territorialization of

massivized Northern global forms actively produces the Composite Society and the condition of Ethical Schizophrenia.

Ong and Collier note that global forms are "distinguished by a peculiar quality [...] they are abstractable, mobile, and dynamic, moving across and reconstituting 'society,' 'culture,' and 'economy' (Ong and Collier 2007:4). This is a precise description of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm in motion. The *abstractable* quality is the 'impersonal principle' that Giddens identifies as the hallmark of expert systems; the 'mobility' is the massive export of the concluded Northern in-itself; and the 'reconstitution' is the tyrannic imposition that generates a fractured, composite social order.

The abstract logic of this pathological assemblage finds its stark, everyday expression in the most mundane choices. Consider the *selection* within an urban center in the vassal state between a global brand like McDonald's and a local, traditional restaurant. In the Northern 'post-traditional' context, this might be framed as a Giddensian 'lifestyle option'—a free choice between equivalent consumer preferences. However, within the vassal state, this micro-level choice is a site where the global assemblage territorializes with immense psychopathology political force, as fundamentalism.

Opting for McDonald's is rarely a neutral act of taste. It is a performative gesture of alignment with the impersonality of the global form—a mimetic bid for the universal modernity, efficiency, and recognition the brand symbolizes. It is a consumption of the Northern in-itself. What Barber (1992) diagnosed as 'McWorld'—the global homogenization of consumer culture under the sign of American capitalism—is, from the perspective of the vassal state, not merely an anti-democratic force but an instrument of epistemic capture: the consumption of Northern forms as a substitute for indigenous production, a mimetic bid for membership in a club whose gates remain structurally closed. Conversely, choosing the traditional restaurant becomes a complex, often fraught act. It can be a defiant performance of identity, a conscious retreat into the intimate melancholy of the indigenous lifeworld, or—most insidiously—an act curated for the Northern tourist gaze as authentic experience, thereby re-inscribing dependency through the economy of exoticism. This choice is thus a classic double-bind of the vassal condition, a micro-assemblage where every potential action is refracted through and disciplined by the tyrannic structure of Vicarious Conditioning.

Ultimately, the value of the 'global assemblage' concept is its focus on the heterogeneous, contingent, and unstable nature of these composites. This perfectly captures the inherent instability of the Schizophrenic Vassal State. It is not a coherent organic whole but a fluctuating equilibrium of antagonistic parts—the imported "solid" framework perpetually at war with the 'liquid' civilizational substrate. The 'global assemblage' is the diagnostic tool that allows us to map the precise points of friction, the lines of fracture, and the symptomatic outputs—from the illegible greenhouse of the transcultural elite to the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee in the public square—that constitute the lived reality of tyrannic modernity.

8 The Anatomy of Elites Vassalage: The Tripartite Dysfunction

The pathological dependency of the schizophrenic vassal state can be further anatomized through a Latourian lens, which distinguishes between the work of 'purification' and 'translation'. Bruno Latour identifies modernity as being sustained by two distinct practices: the work of purification, which creates and maintains separate ontological zones (Nature/Culture), and the work of translation or mediation, which creates hybrid networks that mix humans and non-humans ([2005] 2012:I). Therefore, the efficiency of the modern project in the global North relied on keeping these practices distinct. The vassal state, however, is the product of their catastrophic and structured perversion. This model refines and operationalizes the Huntingtonian pillars, revealing the precise points of devastation in the transfer-reception-installation of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. The pathology of vassalage is not a monolithic condition but the result of a synchronized collapse across three distinct elite segments: the Transcultural, the Developmental, and the Patron.

8.1 The First segment: The Transcultural Elite and the Illegible Greenhouse

The initial encounter with the hegemonic paradigm is mediated by a segment of the indigenous elite that assumes the role of tans-lation, acting as introductory elites—the transcultural vanguard. Their task, theoretically, is not mere imitation but a profound act of *trans-lation*: to *adapt* an exogenous idea, thesis, or doctrine to the local ecosystem, ensuring its (entra)operability. This labor of introduction must adhere to two non-negotiable premises to avoid sterilization.

First, it must navigate a dialectical *approximation* between the imported idealism and the indigenous materialism, avoiding, at all times, sacrificing neither the historical

consciousness of the local context nor the core tenets of the foreign paradigm. A failure of this balance leads to a *blindness of perspectives*. This schema will be seen emphatically throughout the Kyoto symposium's philosophy in Chapter II.

Second, and most critically, this translation must occur in the vernacular idiom. It requires the generation of native, genuine terminology, a mastery of the philosophical source code, as a *metaphorical* usage that allows for indigenous comprehension. The catastrophic alternative is a descent into what can be termed *linguistic sculpting* or transliteration: the mechanical grafting of foreign concepts into the local script without *genuine* semantic translation.

The task of the transcultural elite is not merely intellectual but constitutive of their very mode of being a social actor. In a suggestive note on Nelson's program, Burkart Holzner observed that inter-civilizational encounters compel attention to "the way in which actors, individually and collectively, are constructed and their identities shaped," and that the 'identifying performances' (1974:120) demanded of such actors occur within 'frames of reference' they may not have authored. The Transcultural Elite is precisely such an actor, called upon to demonstrate its modernity—its eligibility for recognition—within an imported frame whose coordinates it must master but *cannot reset*. A successful translation is one that manages, despite this asymmetry, to produce a legible performance without sacrificing the indigenous historical consciousness.

A failed translation, by contrast, yields what Holzner might recognize as an actor trapped between incommensurate frames. This is the condition I term the illegible greenhouse. A greenhouse is a controlled environment where plants are grown under artificial conditions, sealed off from the external ecosystem. The plants may thrive inside, but they can/may not survive outside, thus they do not reproduce naturally in the local soil. Similarly, the intellectual production of the failed transcultural elite flourishes only within the insulated, transliterated discourse of the elite itself. It cannot pollinate the broader society, nor can it be recognized as legitimate by the Northern originator. It is an epistemological hothouse—vibrant within its sealed walls, sterile outside them. The output of this condition—whether a legal code, a philosophical treatise, or an academic curriculum—is rendered alien. It is incomprehensible to the local populace, which cannot decipher the transliterated jargon, and is often dismissed by the Northern originator as a sterile mimicry. A 1948 report by the Indian Commission of Education warned that English as the language of instruction divided

the country into two nations: a Westernized elite that ruled, and a subordinate populace unable to communicate with its rulers or understand one another (Huntington 1993:63–64). The colonial language thus becomes an instrument of epistemic subjugation: the introducing elite speaks in a code that its own society does not understand, perpetuating the gap between represented modernity and indigenous daily life, acting as a short-circuiting mechanism in the anthropocentric transculturalization process, epistemically undermining the native thinking of local elites, and creating in its place a self-referential enclave—a zone of illegibility transformed into an epistemological terrain of sum zero value.

The transcultural elite, tasked with building a bridge, instead creates a self-referential enclave. This zone of illegibility that is the epistemological ground zero of the schism.

A paradigmatic example of this failure is found not in a failed translation, but in a *non-translation*. As Aydin documents, the Ottoman reformer Sadık Rıfat Paşa, in his Treatise on the Circumstances of Europe, used the French word *civilisation*, without translation, to explain the secrets of European power (Aydin 2013:164). This act of linguistic sculpting is the purest form of *epistemological surrender*. The concept was not translated or adapted through an indigenous dialectical process; it was locally emphasized as a pre-packaged, encrypted product (*für sich*), perfectly symbolizing the foreclosure of the philosophical source code and the reduction of the transcultural elite to mere artisans of a foreign brand name.

This failure of sovereign translation was not a transient oversight but a pathological pattern that would scale to the very foundations of the modern Turkish state. The earlier, isolated act of linguistic sculpting by Sadık Rıfat Paşa found its surviving, systemic expression in the Kemalist adoption of *laiklik*, as a turcmanisation of the French concept *laïcité*. Although, the french laïcity is far from being such universal or abstract principle as secularism, being an encrypted product of a specific, intra-Christian, and fundamentally anti-clerical conflict within French Catholic clericalism history. Its historical etymology reveals it as a doctrine forged in a struggle against a specific form of clerical power, not a transcendent philosophical stance against religion itself (Alnasir 2022).

The Kemalist elite, however, did not decrypt this context. In a catastrophic failure of the transcultural function, they imported *laicism* as a pre-packaged, universal

solution—a ready-made module for modernity. They installed the term *laiklik* into the Turkish constitutional operating system without a genuine translation of its historical and philosophical conjunctions. The result was a profound epistemological error: an ideology designed to manage the specific power of the Catholic Church in post-revolutionary France was violently imposed upon the entirely different sociological and historical reality of Ottoman-Islamic society. This was not translation, but *transliteration* on a civilizational scale; it was the installation of encrypted software that pathologically misrecognized its target environment. The illegible greenhouse thus became the very architecture of the state, generating a permanent and violent schism between the secularist elite's imported rationalities and the societal lifeworld's indigenous structures of consciousness.

The Japanese Meiji scholars, by inventing categories like *hi-shūkyō* ('non-religion'), succeeded in a sovereign translation. In stark contrast, much of the contemporary intellectual production in the (post)colonial world, particularly the Arab, remains trapped in this greenhouse, producing works in a local calligraphy that bear no meaning for their own intellectual ecosystem—which, in addition to being sterile literature, generates a linguistic mutation and, in turn, stifling the intellectual capacity for development with the foreclosed source code of meaningless or orphan concepts.

Lastly to remind that the failure of the transcultural elite to produce a genuine translation rather than a mere transliteration is not merely a technical failure but an ontological one. As Dussel, drawing on Emmanuel Lévinas, has argued, the colonial relation is structured as a *totality* that systematically negates the *exteriority* of the colonized other. The Other, for a philosophy of liberation, is not an abstract figure but the concrete victim: "the 'poor' (of the economic), the 'widow' (of the erotic), the 'orphan' (of the pedagogical), the 'foreigner' (of the political)" (2007:288). The imported ready-made paradigm functions as a totalizing system that cannot recognize the indigenous lifeworld and realities as a legitimate source of meaning. The illegible greenhouse of the failed transcultural elite is precisely the space where this exteriority is rendered invisible. The only genuine philosophical move, Dussel argues, is to start from the victim who suffers the negative effects of the totalizing system and to build a critical discourse from that exteriority. Such typology of pathological state-forms is an attempt to map the conditions under which a critical discourse might become possible.

Bondy captured this dynamic with the concept of 'parallel evolution with exogenous determinants.' As he wrote, "Hispanoamerican ideological development runs parallel to the process of European (and now also North American) thought, and the changes that occur in it coincide closely with the transformations of Western philosophy, being fundamentally determined by them" ([1968] 2006:26). The passage from one intellectual stage to another occurs through the mediation of a foreign thought, not through internal generation. This is precisely the structural condition of the Transcultural Elite: they are condemned to follow an itinerary whose milestones are set elsewhere.

8.2 The Second segment-task: The Critical-Developmental Elite and the Foreclosure of Second-Generation Knowledge

The work of the Introductory Elites is intended for an internal counterpart, acting critically as Acquisitional Elites, into a critical developmental of what has been translated. Their role is not to simply *acquiesce*, while this acquisition should be structured essentially on a critical purification function, as failure of this critical task is what produces rivalry, combat, and ends in ethical schizophrenia. Consequently, the catastrophic fusion of purification and translation—thus provides a distinct vocabulary for comprehension and cause and the state's inability to achieve the coherence it performs. This model demands a more active function: to not merely acquire the introduced thesis, as Huntington's suggested, but to develop purifying, thus to promote it as if it were their own, in a similar adaptation of that happened by the Meijo process and the addressed discourse of the Kyoto School (Chapter II). Therefore, it is an esoteric process of internal *assimilation* that should generate what can be termed *second-generation knowledge*—local adaptations, critiques, and innovations born from the imported paradigm, to be launched then as an exoteric knowledge.

The successful Transcultural function requires not transliteration but genuine translation—the generation of native terminology and the mastery of the philosophical source code. A contemporary exemplar of this arduous, sovereign labor is the project of anthropologist Abdellah Hammoudi, who calls for an Arab anthropology based not on the simple logic of borrowing but on a national reappropriation articulated in Arabic and attuned to the shared concerns of a civilizational sphere ([2019] 2025:7, 13). This is the work of a potential sage, not an artisan. Conversely, the failure of the *developmental* function is starkly visible in the

reception of such projects: Hammoudi's attempt to engage peers like Al-Jabri and Laroui foundered on their dismissal of anthropology itself. This represents a catastrophic internal schism—a failure of the developmental elite to recognize and nurture its own sovereign translational vanguard—which ensures that such breakthroughs remain isolated monuments rather than the foundation of a living, evolving *Kulturgemeinschaft*.

The success of this role is contingent on the quality of the introduction. A transliterated, illegible product cannot be developed; but it can only be blindly consumed or rejected. When the transcultural elite fails, the developmental elite is presented with a false binary:

(1) *Sterile Mimicry*: To become a second generation of the same, perpetuating the consumption of the pre-packaged model without comprehension. This is the path of the perpetual artisan, fluent in the procedural *what* but foreclosed from the generative *why*.

(2) *Reactive Opposition*: To reject the imported paradigm entirely, confining themselves into a defensive, often reactionary, nativism. This creates a narrative of tension, disagreement, and aversion that spreads spirally from the elite to the general public, from the esoteric argument towards and exoteric massive aversion.

This bifurcation creates a profound social schism. On one side stands the *colonial-phile* elite producing narrations in a colonial language or an illegible vernacular greenhouse—due to linguistic sculpturism and lack of critical adaptation—, isolated from their own society. On the other stands a marginalized indigenous elite, confined to a local perspective, unable to access or engage with the global discourse.

The tragedy of this bifurcation finds its deepest philosophical articulation again in Hegel's dialectic of lordship and bondage. In Hegel's analysis, the bondsman (*Knecht*) achieves a higher truth than the lord precisely through work (*Arbeit*). In fashioning the thing, Hegel writes, "the servile consciousness, as a pure being-for-itself, becomes in it an existent object" (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft) (Hegel [1807] 1979:§153). Through formative activity, the bondsman objectifies its own self-consciousness in the enduring product, achieving a self-certainty that the lord, who merely consumes, can never attain. In the formative activity, Hegel continues, "the bondsman's own negativity, its being-for-itself, becomes an object for it only by his setting at nought the existing

shape confronting it. This objective negative is precisely the alien being before which it has trembled. Now, however, it destroys this alien negative, posits itself as a negative in the permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for itself, something existing on its own account" (Hegel [1807] 1979:§153).

The Developmental Elite of the vassal state, by contrast, is denied this path to self-realization. The "alien being before which it has trembled"—the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—arrives as a finished product, an object that cannot be (trans)formed because its formation is already achieved. The elite's labor is not formative but replicative; it does not "set at nought" the imported form but reproduces it with anxious fidelity. Where Hegel's bondsman transforms fear into freedom through work, the vassal artisan remains trapped in fear, forever trembling before a lord who will not release the raw material for genuine (re)creation. This is the essence of Vicarious Conditioning: the systematic foreclosure of the bondsman's path to self-consciousness through the denial of authentic, transformative labor. The second-generation knowledge that should emerge from genuine formative activity is thus stillborn, and the elite remains forever an artisan, never a creator.

The result is a bifurcated and pernicious myopia that forecloses the possibility of an indigenous intellectual project. This case will be seen emphatically in Chapter V, through the phenomena of the academic rentier and the NGOization of knowledge, where the first segment is converted into a rentier elite, empowered to the detriment of the second segment, which is relegated to a subordinated stratum.

8.3 The Third segment: The Patron Elite and the Weaponization of Sponsorship

The tripartite system hinges on the role of the Patronage Elite: the original *manufacturers* or hegemonic Northern center. For a civilizational shift to be successful, this patron must provide genuine sponsorship—constructive feedback, recognition, and a willingness to engage the *second-generation knowledge* produced by the developmental elite as a peer contribution rather than a derivative echo.

In the machinery of vassalage, this pillar is systematic and structurally withheld. The hegemonic power is not configured to offer sincere engagement; its identity is predicated on a hierarchy that must be maintained distanced from the recipients' second-generation knowledge. The refusal to sponsor is not an accidental oversight but a policy and cognitive social distinction, but also, responding to a categorized professional training regarding the academic fetishism of the global south. Therefore,

it is the active weaponization of the fundamental need to belong. By perpetually deferring the Third Pillar of recognition, the patron elite ensures the supplicant remains in a state of *anticipated aloneness*, forever performing for a validation that is designed to be elusive. This transforms the relationship from one of potential dialogue into a rigid hierarchy of manufacturer and consumer, sage and artisan—which Aníbal Quijano farms as the coloniality of power: the global segmentation of populations on the basis of race, by assigning different epistemic statuses to different racial groups; persisting durably more than colonialism itself (Quijano 2000).

8.4 Synthesis: The Perfect Storm of Vassalage

The Schizophrenic Vassal State is the political embodiment of this concerted tripartite failure.

- A failed Transcultural function (Segment 1) creates an encrypted, illegible product, severing the state beyond its own societal reality.
- A failed Developmental function (Segment 2) ensures this product cannot be adapted, debugged, or innovated upon, foreclosing an indigenous future and creating a fractured intellectual field.
- A withheld Patron function (Segment 3) weaponizes the longing for recognition, locking the state into a cycle of aesthetic performance and continuous rejection, a desperate quest for a validation that reinforces its dependency.

This is the core of the Vicarious Conditioning mechanism. It produces a polity where the elites are conditioned to be consumers and curators of imported paradigms, never their masters or creators. The terminal symptom of this synchronized collapse is the collective Ethical Schizophrenia, sterility, rentierism, and the collective cry from the squares: the Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee. It is the logical endpoint of a system where the capacity for self-repair has been engineered out at the most fundamental level—the level of elite function itself. The case studies of Japan, Ottoman-Turkey, and the Arab world are, in essence, detailed autopsies of this tripartite dysfunction in its various historical and political morphologies.

This synchronized collapse finds one of its most concrete and devastating expressions in the realm of law itself, where the tripartite elite dysfunction translates directly into the tyranny of the ready-made legal code.

8.5 Methodological Core: Traceability as a Decolonial Diagnostic of Political-Ecological Formations

The theoretical architecture of Schizophrenic Vassalage—Vicarious Conditioning, tripartite elite dysfunction, the withheld Third Pillar—demands a structured methodology to its object: not a static condition, but a live, reproducing circuit of pathological political-ecological formation. This book's operative method is traceability: a holistic, meta-empirical critique that introspects the movement of discourses, imaginaries, and institutional blueprints as vital mechanisms in the persistent, yet aleatory, process of societal reproduction and transformation within (post)colonial settings (Gurminder K. Bhambra 2014; Gurminder K Bhambra 2014).

Traceability moves beyond a Foucauldian genealogy of origins, or a critique of political economy alone. It is designed to put Culture—in its broadest, anthropological sense—back in its place in political economy (Sum and Jessop 2014:5), not as a superstructural effect, but as the very medium through which ready-made paradigms are encrypted, performed, and metabolized—or rejected. Conversely, it insists on highlighting the ecological-political economy (Plumwood 2002) in its place in political philosophy. It asks not merely how capital flows, but how the 'liquid' indigenous substrates of lifeworlds clash with the imported 'solid' architectures of the state, generating the composite societies and ethical schizophrenia that define the vassal condition.

Operationally speaking, traceability is achieved by mapping circuits of imitation not only through questions regarding the objective dimension (the channel) and the subjective dimension (the agent). But there is a third dimension, deeper and often overlooked; following Thalbourne & Delin (1997; 1999), they refer to the transliminal dimension. Transliminality explores the unconscious motives, psychoanalytic drives, and cognitive benefits that the narrative about the other brings to the one who enounces it: hedonic self-regard? Compensation for a deficiency in identity? Reaffirmation of one's own superiority at the expense of another's calamity? Transliminality allows us to unearth the spurious—and often unconscious—interests that underpin Orientalist and Occidentalist narratives, and that explain their persistence despite all empirical refutation. Therefore, the researcher must stalk specific traveling units—a keyword (*Tanzimat*), a legal code, a museum blueprint, a pedagogical module—asking three layered questions:

1. Pathway of Transfer: Through what geopolitical and epistemic channel did this unit travel? (Colonial policy, development consultancy, democracy promotion, algorithmic platform.)
2. Mode of Translation/Transliteration: Was it sovereignly translated, adapted to the local ethical-ecological substrate, or merely linguistically sculpted—installed as an encrypted, illegible artifact?
3. Performance and Schism: Does its operation produce legitimacy (organic integration) or mere legibility (anxious performance for an external gaze)? Where does it generate the telltale rift—the evasion of law, the illegible greenhouse of theory, the plea for a guarantee—that signals Ethical Schizophrenia?

This method is therefore a decolonial diagnostic protocol. It does not ask why a society failed to modernize, but how the performance of a Ready-Made Modernity actively manufactures the pathological symptoms we are conditioned to mistake for culture, hatred, or backwardness. By tracing these circuits, we move beyond the polemical mirage of 'Occidentalism-Orientalism' and toward a sober mapping of the machinery that forecloses sovereign futures—the first, necessary step in any project of genuine, ecological, and dialogic repair.

In practice, Traceability asks three questions of any traveling unit, keyword, legal code, museum blueprint, pedagogical module: (1) Through what channel did it travel? (2) Was it translated or merely transliterated? (3) Where does its operation produce the rift that signals Ethical Schizophrenia? (See table 1 below)

Step	Question	Application
1. Pathway of Transfer	How did the term travel?	Ottoman internal project of state ordering (*tanzim*) was captured by European diplomatic discourse as 'reform' (islah), shifting its meaning from internal ordering to external compliance.
2. Mode of Translation	Was it sovereignly translated or transliterated?	Partial transliteration: the concept was grafted onto

		Ottoman administrative language without semantic integration. The French civilisation, laicié was imported untranslated-transliterated
3. Performance and Schism	Where does it generate Ethical Schizophrenia?	The Tanzimat reforms created a fragmented society: imported legal codes clashed with indigenous Islamic law; the state performed modernity for a European gaze while the populace remained rooted in a defamed lifeworld.

Table 1: Traceability in Action (I.e.Tanzimat)

Traceability is not a falsifiable hypothesis but a diagnostic heuristic instrument. Its validity is measured by its capacity to organize empirical observations that other frameworks (developmentalism, modernization theory, cultural essentialism) systematically obscure. It is offered not as a closed system but as an open toolkit for researchers. For a systematic operational protocol—including guidance on selecting tracing units, validating evidence of translation versus transliteration, and distinguishing circuits of imitation from ordinary diffusion—see Appendix I, Part B (A Primer for Scholars).

9 The Juridical Blueprint for Schizophrenia: Legal Transplant Theory and the Tyranny of the Ready-Made Code

In his seminal 1974 work, *Legal Transplants*, Alan Watson advanced a fundamental thesis to comparative law: the *movement* of legal norms between societies arguing it is not a modern anomaly but a historical constant, a fertile source of legal development since antiquity (Watson [1974] 1993:24). To systematize this phenomenon, Watson delineated a framework of thirteen structural axes that facilitate the transfer of law: (1) the transfer of individual rules; (2) the exploitation of the most fertile legal sources; (3) a historical severance of the transplanted rule from its original rational component; (4)

an inherent social facility for adoption, implying unification and harmonization; (5) voluntary reception; (6) the inclusiveness of the civil law tradition's corpus; (7) the timing of reception; (8) the developmental stage of the recipient society; (9) the persistent influence of the transplant despite initial confusion; (10) the role of the transporting authority; (11) the free acceptance by the host nation; (12) a form of mass humanism; and (13) the local redesign or re-development of transplanted norms (Watson [1974] 1993:95–101). This model, in its entirety, presents law as an abstractable, decontextualized technology—a set of neutral, efficient tools that can be extracted from one context and installed into another—, a conclusion that provides a careful theoretical blueprint for the very machinery of dependence this book criticize.

According to Watson's perspectives, he advocates for a massive, top-down transfer that deliberately severs legal norms from their generative 'source code'—the historical struggles, philosophical debates, and lived *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* that gave them meaning and legitimacy in their original context, which allowed its popular cognition as its own. It is a theory that, in practice, justifies the replacement of indigenous legal consciousness with a prefabricated, imported, adult and ready-to-use operating system.

This model stands in crude opposition to the organic conception of law articulated by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, who understood it as a living expression of the 'consciousness of the people' (*Volksgeist*), inseparable from a nation's language, customs, and collective consciousness (Savigny [1814] 1999:18). To impose a foreign legal code without this organic connection is not a transplant but a *juridical violation*. A genuine transplant is an esoteric, highly skilled procedure requiring perfect compatibility and post-operative care; the massive transplantism of the Ready-Made Paradigm, by contrast, is an exoteric operation performed with doctrinal forceps by schizophrenic elites, one that inevitably generates a resistant social body.

This paradigm generates two fundamental pathologies:

- The first is a subjective failure of agency: The transplant is acted by exoteric agents—either the colonial elites themselves, as seen in the constitutions of Kosovo, Iraq, or South Sudan, or by a colonial-phile elite who belongs to the colonial matrix and is exogenous to the native ecosystem. This process systematically reduces the targeted local elites to the status of end-user artisan-elites, incapable of sovereign legal interpretation, a dynamic that produces the

terminal plea for a manufacturer's guarantee, as analyzed in the (post)colonial context of Chapter IV.

- The second is an objective failure of method: Contrary to Watson's own emphasis on the transfer of individual rules—which implies a potential for local critical adaptation—the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm insists on the installation of massive legal codes. Thus, it applies a 'single template' similar to the monocropping approach outlined by Evans (2004): the imposition of a single development model (such as quantitative economic growth) that ultimately supplants local institutional and regulatory frameworks, resulting in an aggressive monoculture that is out of step with the complexity of the indigenous context. This forecloses the delicate Latourian labor of purification and translation, preventing the emergence of an authentic, second-generation legal knowledge.

This critique exposes a fatal flaw in Watson's model: its naive reliance on 'voluntary reception' (Watson's fifth axis). True integration requires what Savigny identified as the anchoring of law in the people's spirit (Volksgeist)—a genuine, living connection to the collective consciousness. However, this 'voluntary reception' is not a simple variable; it is the historical product of a specific political condition. It is only possible in what Bauer theorized throughout the possession of indigenous elite of sages capable of stewarding its *Kulturgemeinschaft*. The schizophrenic vassal state, by contrast, is defined by the sterilization of this very elite. Its 'reception' is not voluntary but a conditioned performance by a Fetish-Elite of artisans, forever foreclosing the organic, esoteric labor of legal translation. Thus, Watson's theory fails not merely by overlooking culture, but by being structurally blind to the geopolitical and epistemological machinery that systematically dismantles the very capacity for sovereign cultural and legal production.

The failure of a critical adaptation generates a public response that is often misdiagnosed as lawlessness or corruption. While the populace's infrapolitical resistance is not merely considered as delinquency; but a form valency, patriotic honor being a cross mirroring of collective rejection of a normative order that lacks cognitive perception as its own. This is why, across the schizophrenic vassal state(s), the most quotidian rules are systematically flouted: citizens jaywalk with impunity, tax evasion is a national sport, and bureaucratic compliance is seen as folly. These are not simply

crimes; they are micro-political acts of secession from a legal system perceived as an alien imposition. The rule is not integrated into the ethical fabric of the lifeworld; it is seen as an arbitrary demand from a distant, an alien mimicry state, a demand that carries no moral weight, only the threat of force, therefore the evasion, is not exactly an evasion of the rule itself, but of the coercion, thus the rule would never achieve its effectiveness behind social cognition.

This dynamic is starkly visible in the Turkish reception of the Swiss Civil Code. In Switzerland, the code is an expression of the Volksgeist, a legal institution that is of the people. In Turkey, despite its formal adoption, it remains an exogenous artifact. Compliance is not a civic virtue but a performative act of political militantia or a tactical concession to state power, utterly divorced from a sense of shared legal consciousness. The code functions, its valid, but it does not belong. This *juridical schizophrenia*—where the law on the books is a mere aesthetic instrument fundamentally ruptured from the law in action—is a foundational symptom of the broader Ethical Schizophrenia that defines the schizophrenic vassal state. Its political morphology will be anatomized in Chapter V, while its devastating historical consequences are traced in the Ottoman-Turkish case in Chapter III and Chapter IV.

Understanding how the vassal state is produced is not enough; we must also understand why it persists. The following section draws on organizational and social psychology to diagnose the dynamics of escalation that lock this pathology in place.

Part III: The Dynamics of Persistence

10 The Misguided Persistence: Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action

The pathological dependency of the Schizophrenic vassal state is not merely a static condition but a dynamic process of entrapment. Its underlying engine can be found in a psychological pattern identified in organizational behavior: the escalation of commitment to a failing course of action.

The thesis is due to an experiment proposed by Barry Staw (1976) who demonstrated that individuals, when feel to personal responsibility for a decision that leads to negative consequences, have a powerful tendency to increase their investment of resources into that same failing course of action, rather than cutting and avoiding their expected losses. In this simulation, business students acting as corporate officers

allocated significantly more funds to a division that was declining due to their own prior decision, compared to situations where the initial decision was made by someone else or had yielded positive results (Staw 1976:30–40). The interaction effect—where personal responsibility and negative consequences combine to trigger irrational reinvestment—reveals a core human drive toward self-justification. It is this very drive that transposes from the corporate budget sheet to the civilizational project, transforming the vassal state's trajectory into a series of escalating gambles. As Staw concluded, decision-makers "may go beyond the passive distortion of adverse consequences" and actively "commit new and additional resources" in a desperate attempt to "demonstrate the ultimate rationality of his or her original course of action" (Staw 1976:29).

This situation represents the micro-psychological formula of *escalation* for the macro-historical tragedy of the vassal state. The (post)colonial elite, having staked their identity and legitimacy on the importation of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, intensify anxiously their initial *investment*. When this project fails to deliver its promised reward—the *Third Pillar* of genuine recognition from the North—they does not desist. Instead, in a perfect analogue to Staw's experiment, they escalate and intensify their commitment. The initial reforms of the *Tanzimat* give way to the radical social surgery of Kemalism; the borrowed institutions of the (post)colonial state harden into a violent 'state against the nation.' Each escalation is a desperate, often violent, attempt to prove the original model can work, if only applied with more fervor and force, thereby digging the vassal state deeper into the schizophrenic abyss.

II The Multidimensional Trap: Project, Psychological, Social, and Organizational Determinants

Escalation is not a simple error but a complex, an over-determined process. Staw and Ross, by subsequent research (1981) has demonstrated the operativity of this model into four interdependent classes of determinants that lock an actor into a failing course of action. The predicament of the vassal state is a textbook manifestation of all four:

- **Project Determinants**: The *modernization* project itself creates massive sunk costs—not only financial investments but centuries of social engineering, cultural alienation, and the dismantling of *indigenous institutions*. Like a massive infrastructure project that is "useless until it is totally finished" (Staw 1981:577), the state's entire legitimacy becomes contingent on the completion

of a modernity that is perpetually out of reach. Withdrawal appears catastrophic, creating a no-win situation where "persistence was seen as costly, yet withdrawal was [...] viewed as bringing even worse [...] consequences" (Staw and Ross 1989:217).

- **Psychological Determinants**: Beyond simple sunk costs, motivated cognitions fuel persistence. As established, self-justification is a primary driver (Staw 1976). Furthermore, decision-makers "slant data in the direction of their preexisting beliefs and discredit information that conflicts with their opinions" (Staw and Ross 1989:217). The *vassal elite*, *conditioned* to believe in the Northern script *für sich*, systematically filters out evidence of its dysfunction while attributing failure to external, temporary causes. This cognitive rigidity is exacerbated by what can be understood as a state of *chronic volitional depletion*. The vassal elite's frantic, effortful performance of mimicry—constantly forcing a square peg into a round hole—consumes the very psychic energy required for the conscious thought and effortful decision-making that Baumeister identifies as central to authentic agency (2025:919–20). Their escalation is not just a strategic gamble but a symptom of exhausted cognitive resources, leaving them incapable to manage a sovereign reflection needed to change course of matters.
- **Social Determinants**: Escalation is not a solitary folly. Decision-makers persist due to face-saving and the need for external justification (Staw 1981:580). The elite must prove their competence to a domestic populace and the withholding Northern gaze. Crucially, a 'hero effect' exists where leaders who 'stick to their guns' in the face of opposition are often praised for their consistency, a social reward for steadfastness even in failure (Staw and Ross 1989:218). Furthermore, the elite's advocacy for the imported paradigm is necessarily public, explicit, and repeated—from *drafting* new constitutions to unveiling *modernist* monuments. These acts create what could be termed a *rhetorical cage*, externally binding the elite's identity to the project and dramatically raising the social cost of withdrawal, making the course of action effectively irrevocable (Staw 1976; Staw and Ross 1989).
- Organizational Determinants: Finally, the entire state apparatus can become an *engine of persistence*. Institutional inertia, political coalitions that form around a project, and the sheer difficulty of mobilizing a bureaucracy for

change all create a 'loose coupling' between negative outcomes and corrective action. The modernization project becomes so integral to the state's identity that its abandonment becomes an 'unthinkable proposition' (Staw and Ross 1989:218), threatening the organization's very reason for being.

12 The Dynamic Sequence of Vassalage: A Temporal Model of Escalation

These determinants do not operate simultaneously but unfold in a predictable sequence, forming a dynamic model of the escalation cycle. The history of the schizophrenic vassal state can be read precisely through the following chronological lens:

- **Phase 1 (Project Economics)**: The initial encounter is driven by the anticipated benefits of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—military parity, economic development, and the coveted status of a *modern* nation. The decision is framed in terms of future gain.
- **Phase 2 (Psychological & Social Forces)**: When negative consequences arise (withheld recognition, internal resistance, economic distortion), psychological and social forces become dominant. The elite, personally responsible, engages in self-justification and face-saving. They escalate commitment, biasing information to exonerate the paradigm and blaming failures on external factors. The *heroic* narrative of the steadfast modernizer takes hold.
- **Phase 3 (Organizational Forces)**: As the project endures despite negative results, organizational forces cement the pathology. The state's bureaucracy, educational system, and economy become *structured* around the imported model. The project becomes institutionalized; political careers and entire sectors depend on its continuation. Withdrawal now threatens not just the elite's legitimacy, but the stability of the entire governing structure. The state is fully locked in.

This temporal model explains why early critiques are suppressed and why the pathology deepens over time. As Staw and Ross noted, "as economic outcomes worsen over time, it is possible for projects to be maintained by the accumulation of psychological, social, and organizational forces, each adding some weight to the decision to persist" (1989:219). The evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish case from

Tanzimat to Kemalism, and the structuralism of the (post)colonial Arab state's descent into a guardian of colonial legacies, are stark illustrations of this chronicle escalation.

13 The Attributional Engine: The Cognitive Fuel for Escalation

Within the psychological phase of this escalation cycle, a specific cognitive process acts as the primary fuel: the pattern of performance attributions. Research confirms that the tendency to escalate is highest under a precise attributional recipe. Huning and Thomson (2014) found that escalation is most intense when decision-makers operate with a general sense of high internal control (believing they are competent and control outcomes), although attribute their failure to external and stable causes.

This is the exact cognitive state of the vassal elite. They are conditioned into a role of apparent agency—their entire project is predicated on the high internal control belief that by meticulously replicating the Northern schema, they can control the outcome of achieving modernity and recognition. When this project fails, they cannot blame the formula itself (the sacred model) nor their own fidelity to it (their source of legitimacy). The failure must be attributed to an external cause, as referred earlier, while defending fervently the unconditional stability of the imported paradigm, which is the permanent feature of the geopolitical order.

This attributional triad—High Internal Control + External Locus for Failure + Static Cause—creates a self-perpetuating loop of constant escalation. The elite, convinced of their own competence yet faced with an unfairly rigged system, concludes that the only solution is to try harder, to perform the mimetic script with even greater purity and force. This cognitive mechanism ensures that the feedback of failure does not lead to course correction, but to a desperate and pathological intensification of the original error to become a schizophrenic pathological sterility.

This escalation dynamic, once institutionalized, does not remain a mere policy failure. It becomes the operational logic of the state itself—a logic sustained and reproduced by the very mechanism that initiated the mimetic project, then turned to the fervent Ethical Schizophrenia as a Vicarious Conditioning. We now turn to examine this core engine of dependency not merely as a psychological tendency, but as a geopolitical instrument.

14 Vicarious Conditioning: Social Learning Theory as a Tool of Global Imperial Governance

The colonial laboratory produced a specific, pathological form of learning. Understanding this structure requires a shift from historical description to psychological mechanism. The process by which the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm is installed and maintained can be precisely theorized as Vicarious Conditioning. The colonial and neocolonial encounter can thus be reframed not as a genuine exchange, but as a form of orchestrated mimesis, a global-scale application of the social learning demonstrated in Bandura's experiments.

The 'Bobo doll' studies provide a perfect micro-sociological archetype. Just as the children learned *what* to do without the *why* (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961), the subaltern elite is conditioned to replicate the operational forms of massively exported paradigms.

A follow-up study demonstrated that this imitative learning was not dependent on a live model's presence. Children who observed the same aggressive acts portrayed by a human on film, or even by a cartoon character, exhibited equally high levels of imitative aggression (Bandura, Ross, and Ross 1963). Analogically, this finding is the psychological linchpin for understanding the mass export of modernity. It proves that the model's influence can be fully abstracted and mediated. The Northern Sage need not be physically present; their *scaffolding* can be encoded in legal texts, educational systems, economic policies, and cultural products—scenically aestheticating their paradigm for global distribution and installation in the schizophrenic vassal State. The subaltern is thus positioned as a perpetual pupil, conditioned to replicate the hollow forms of these massively exported paradigms.

This process of Vicarious Conditioning operates on a foundational epistemological schism, one that finds its etymological analogy in the Latin *modus* and echoes the ancient Platonic distinction—emphasized here as a colonial pedagogy—between the artisan and the sage. The subaltern is strategically reduced to the status of a perpetual artisan: conditioned to master the *modus operandi* of the imported paradigm (its procedures, its codes, its aesthetics), while being systematically foreclosed from its *modus essendi*—the philosophical struggles and historical contingencies that constitute its generative 'source code' and represent its true manner of being. The Northern Sage retains the *how* and the *why* united; the Southern artisan receives only the orphaned *being*. This is not a pedagogical failure but a precise form of psychological conditioning

that operates on the essentialist presuppositions of modernity itself, for "*Modernus*, from *modo* ('recently', 'just now') was a late Latin coinage on the model of *hodiernus* (from *hodie*, 'today')" (Kumar [1995] 2009:91).

This epistemological hermeneutics can be emphasized using a Kantian ladder of cognition that distinguishes seven ascending grades of perception and understanding, from mere representation (*cognitio*) to complete conceptual grasp (*comprehendere*)—*cognitio* (mere representation of something), *percipere* (conscious perception), *noscere* (recognition through comparison), *cognoscere* (consciously acquired knowledge), *intelligere* (rational comprehension through concepts), *perspicere* (rational or introspective discernment), and finally *comprehendere* (complete conceptual grasp sufficient for the purposes of knowledge)—(Willaschek and Watkins 2020:3198). The Northern Sage operates at the higher grades —*intelligere, perspicere, comprehendere*— where the philosophical source code of the paradigm is fully accessible and operative at an engineering level. The subaltern artisan, by contrast, is conditioned to remain at the lower grades: *cognitio* and *percipere*, where the symbol is processed as tyrannically as authoritative, and unexamined, relegating the subaltern at a bricolage level —working with a closed, heterogeneous set of pre-existing tools rather than engineering new ones from first principles (Lévi-Strauss 1962:1). The imported legal code, the secular curriculum, the heraldic emblem, all are felt before they are reasoned, perceived before they are interrogated. Vicarious Conditioning is the mechanism that keeps the vassal elite at these lower cognitive levels, ensuring that the imported paradigm is never elevated to the level where it can be critically examined, debugged, or rejected. The plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the political cry of a consciousness trapped at *cognitio,* capable of registering the malfunction but incapable of *comprehendere* the system that produced it.

Ignacio Martín-Baró, a Latin American critical psychologist and theorist of dependency, argued from within the dependent reality of Latin America, this process enforces a servile scientistic mimicry by instilling the very foundations of The Northern Sage's paradigm as universal truths (Martín-Baró 2006:8). Baró identified these foundations as a crippling positivism (obsessing over the 'how' while dismissing the 'why' as metaphysical), a methodological individualism (reducing structural pathologies to personal failings), and a profound ahistoricism (the paradigmatic cargo-cult logic that universalizes Northern categories to sever the subaltern from their own

historical consciousness). The artisan is thus conditioned not only to operate the system but to think within its (a)historical logical boundaries, forever foreclosed from the sage's workshop where the philosophical 'source code' of meaning is written and contested. The result is not merely dependency, but a fundamental detriment of the capacity for ethical and epistemological sovereignty. The artisan can operate the system, but cannot diagnose its failures, modify its architecture, or imagine an alternative one. This conditioned mimicry was diagnosed decades ago by the Peruvian philosopher Bondy, as philosophizing in Latin America had become "to adopt a foreign 'ism', to subscribe to certain preexisting theses, adopted in the wake of reading and more or less faithful repetition of the works of the most resonant figures of the era" ([1968] 2006:28–29).

In a *healthy* learning environment, an observer understands an action's principles, enabling critical adaptation and innovation. Vicarious Conditioning, as a tool of empire, systematically severs this dynamism. In the digital age, the informational 'source code' is technically accessible, yet this availability is a mirage. The pedagogical system of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—the Cryptouniversitarian cargoism —systematically sterilizes the capacity and even the volition to decrypt its philosophical foundations and historical contingencies. The subaltern is educated to be an *end-user* of conclusions, chasing the *Fetish-Certificate* that validates mimicry, not a master of the processes that generated them. The global library is open, but the *Fetish-Elite*—whose empirical formation and internal contradictions are examined in detail in Chapter IV, Sections 6 and 7—is conditioned to only ever read the prefaces and appendices, never the foundational texts.

This is the exact cognitive profile of the sterilized Fetish-Elite. They can adopt, replicate and operate the imported paradigms (simple processing) but are systematically stripped of the capacity to critically adapt, engage, or generate new ones (complex thought). They are conditioned as artisans of the system, fluent in its operation, but foreclosed from becoming sages who can inhabit its philosophical workshop. (Baumeister, Twenge, and Nuss 2002:823 Table 3).

The perpetual, structured withholding of the Third Pillar of recognition is, in effect, the geopolitical engineering of this same 'anticipated aloneness' for the entire vassal state. It weaponizes and undermine the fundamental 'need to belong,' placing the state apparatus in a psychodynamic bind that, as the experiments predict,

systemically degrades the very intellectual capacities—sovereign reasoning, indigenous critique, philosophical innovation—required for an authentic overcoming of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. The result is not just political dependency, but a conditioned state of a collective cognitive helplessness.

This dynamic violates a core principle of belongingness motivation: that the need can be satiated by stable bonds and that lost partners can, in time, be substituted. The vassal elite is denied both satiation and the possibility of true substitution. They cannot return to the defamed societal reality, nor can they find an alternative civilizational partner that offers unconditional peer-status—during the cold war, those who tried to turn their alliance toward the URSS, becomes intended as objects of repressions, or direct invasions such as Korea, Vietnam, Egypt, Iraq, or Cuba among others—. Thus, their cognitive energies remain fixated on the original, withholding source of potential acceptance, in a state of permanent motivational arousal that forecloses the possibility of sovereign intellectual or political development.

This process operates on two debilitating levels:

- **Deprivation of the 'Why'**: The complex, often contradictory, struggles that produced European modernity—the Enlightenment debates, the social conflicts, the ethical, or even, ethnical reckonings—are encrypted. This process finds a precise analogue in Bandura's experiments on social learning. Just as the children learned how to punch and kick a Bobo doll from a model but were given no context for why—the motivation, the social meaning, or the consequences remained an encrypted 'source code'— the South receives the concluded *what* (e.g., a civil code, laicism) as a pre-packaged product, without the means who pushed the *why* behind its construction. This reduces the importing society to a mere artisan, capable of operating the system but incapable of repairing, modifying, or truly understanding it. Therefore, this paradigm constitute the epistemological core of the No-Derivatives model of power.
- **The Intentionality of Ambiguity**: The colonizer, as the modeling agent, does not merely transmit; they impose. The paradigm is presented as a universal, finished product, immune to substantive local adaptation. Its internal logic is often rendered ambiguous or opaque, discouraging critical interrogation and

ensuring that replication remains superficial and non-threatening to the paradigm's Northern origins.

This dynamic is compounded by a bottom-up anxiety—a mimetic desire for Northern recognition. This desire is psychologically underpinned by a key principle of social learning, where individuals are predisposed to imitate *high*-status models. The West, as the globally dominant, positioned aesthetically with a high-civilization-status, wields immense conditioning power simply by virtue of its *perceived* success which generate its hegemony. Eager to escape the stigma of backwardness, Southern elites thus become willing participants in their own Vicarious Conditioning, performing the imported models with a fervor that obscures their own lack of mastery over the underlying principles. This fervent mimicry, therefore, signals not mastery but a profound heteronomy, a compulsive quest for a validation that the system is engineered to perpetually defer.

The ultimate outcome of Vicarious Conditioning is thus the systematic production of the Bauerian pathology: the foreclosure of a sovereign *Kulturgemeinschaft*. This engineered state of intellectual *consumerhood*, is the systematic foreclosure of the sage's capacity to access the (para)philosophical source code, constitutes the condition of *epistemological vassalage*. It ensures that the transcultural and developmental elites are reduced to consumers and curators of Northern historical conclusions—the *artisans* of Bauer's sterile model—forever performing a script they cannot debug, adapt, or rewrite, while the masses remain *Hintersassen*, dependent and disenfranchised. They are locked in *Structural Motivation Formula*, structured as sum zero:

$$\mathbf{P_I: LE(PCE{\times}0 + LCE{\times}0) \times Mo(I{\times}0) = ZERO}$$

Where Local Elites (LE), split between alienated Pro-Colonial Elites (PCE) and marginalized Local Conservative Elites (LCE), are deprived of any genuine Motivation (Mo) for critical (re)production. The result is a void where authentic, adaptive development should be.

A theoretical diagnosis of epistemological vassalage finds its precise empirical and institutional skeleton in the established sociological paradigm of 'Academic Dependency' (Sinha-Kerkhoff and Alatas 2010; Beigel and Sabea 2023). As Fernanda Beigel, articulates in a definitive summary of the paradigm, the global knowledge

system is characterized by an "unequal structure of production and circulation of knowledge" that is "composed of institutional, material and symbolic processes." She notes that this dependency is not merely economic but intellectual, where "universal standards for sociological research and good theory have been constituted and legitimized by the international publishing system,"(Beigel 2011) a system in which the Global South remains profoundly marginalized. The dependency, Beigel describes, is the lived reality of the Vicarious Conditioning and foreclosed sovereignty theorized here.

The engineered state of intellectual dependency is the true source of what polemicists misdiagnose as *Occidentalism*. The pervasive critique of the West as a 'truncated mind,' a cold, mechanical, and soulless entity—as cataloged by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit (2004:54), is not a carnal hatred. It is the frustrated, intuitive grasp of the epistemological schism enforced by Vicarious Conditioning. The subaltern, reduced to a perpetual artisan, experiences the imported modernity more than a hollow as inconsistent, because its constitutive source code remains encrypted alien to be adapted. The polemical cry against the Mind of the West is, therefore, the rage of the *user* against the tyrannic *manufacturer* who massively shipped a locked operating system. Therefore, what is labeled *Occidentalism* is the misdirected anger arising from this engineered state of intellectual dependency.

The conditioned state of consumerhood finds its most tragic expression in the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee—the demand, as seen in the 2019 Iraqi uprisings, that the original producers of a failed democratic system return to fix it. This is the logical endpoint of Vicarious Conditioning: a populace that can no longer conceive of self-repair, because the capacity for such repair was systematically engineered out of its intellectual toolkit.

15 The Cinematic Laboratory: Mass Media and the Orchestration of Mimetic Desire

The laboratory experiments of Bandura find their macro-sociological counterpart in the global dominion of the Northern media market. If Vicarious Conditioning describes the psychological mechanism, then the Western, and predominantly North American, cinematographic and informational apparatus represents its deliberate and mass-scale engineering. The statistic is telling: as of 2017, the United States dominated 70% of world cinematographic production, with Europe accounting for a further

26.2%, leaving the entire Global South with a minim quote of 3.8% (Baños 2017:152). This is not a neutral cultural exchange; it is a structured asymmetry of narrative domination.

The symbiotic relationship between the U.S. national security apparatus strategically weaponizes its symbiotic relationship with Hollywood to manufacture consent for imperial power. Secker and Alford have shown that the 'film-mediated model' projects a meticulously sanitized fantasy to emphasize the myth of a clean, efficient, and technocratically superior Western intervention managed by tactical Institutions like the Pentagon committed to transform the cinematic apparatus into a propaganda arm, normalizing a self-justifying vision that aestheticizes American military violence as a necessary, heroic global policing duty (2017). This narrative presupposes a fundamental dichotomy: massive Northern goodness versus generalized Southern evil and madness to struggle against and dehumanized to justify massive opinion in support of endless submission and in-humanized elimination.

This cinematic machinery systematically encrypts the visceral reality of war—the collateral damage, political collapse, and societal trauma that constitute the true 'source code' of invasion—replacing it with a spectacle of virtuous force. The result is Vicarious Conditioning weaponized on a mass scale, where the 'film-mediated model' does not just entertain but actively recruits consciousness for the logic of intervention. Guided by directives like NSDD 77 on public diplomacy (Reagan 1983), this process is not mere entertainment; it is the aesthetic preconditioning for real-world catastrophe, making the violence of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm appear not as a schizophrenic rupture, but as a thrilling blockbuster finale.

The goal of this mediated conditioning is not the dissemination of the *Enlightenment* values per se, but what this book identifies as the mass cultivation of a colonial-phile-elite. Where public and its elites undergoes a process less of critical acculturation than of cultural cognitive sterilization. They are conditioned to admire and internalize the sophistication of Northern power—its militarism, its consumerism, its geopolitical logic—without ever mastering the critical and philosophical 'source code' that might allow for a sovereign, alternative vision. This aligns with Bandura's core finding: observation teaches the what but encrypts the why.

16 The Motivational Architecture of Vassalage: From Promotion to Prevention

Until now, the cognitive sterilization induced by Vicarious Conditioning is not a passive state of deficiency, but the result of a profound and active tricky motivational recalibration. The early referred work of Baumeister et al. (2002) emphasized the analogy of the vassal elite's capacity for complex thought is impaired; while by a recent further research reveals why. Social exclusion triggers a fundamental reorientation in motivational psychology: a shift from promotion motivation—the drive for growth, advancement, and the realization of hopes and aspirations—toward prevention motivation—the drive for security, safety, and the vigilant avoidance of loss and failure (Higgins 1997; apud Park and Baumeister 2015).

This archetype is the psychological engine of the schizophrenic vassal state. The perpetual, structured withholding of the Third Pillar of recognition places the elite in a state of chronic 'anticipated aloneness' within the international order. In response, their entire operational mode changes. As Park and Baumeister found, through multiple experiments in micro-psychology, excluded individuals become cautious, conservative, and generate fewer goal-promoting strategies, prioritizing the prevention of further rejection above all else (2015:155) over the vigorous pursuit of new perspectives.

This state of *anticipated aloneness* is the psychopathological manifestation of the severed *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*. The fundamental *need to belong*, thwarted within an atrophied or defamed indigenous cultural community, is pathologically re-oriented toward the hegemonic North, fueling the anxious mimetic performance, the cultural nihilism, and, therefore, locking the vassal state into a prevention-focused scramble for the recognition it is structured never to receive in plenty, avoiding a peer-status ascension.

This maps with devastating precision onto the political reality. The vassal elite, conditioned by this prevention focus, is not inert; it is hyper-active in its mimetic performance. But this activity is not aimed at sustainable growth or sovereign adaptation by promotion. It is aimed at one goal, to securely maintain the mimetic performance to avoid the catastrophic loss of the already-withheld recognition. They become masterful at the simple, replicative tasks of operating the imported system (the focus of prevention: 'don't make a mistake') but are systematically stripped of the promotion-focused capacity to critically engage, innovate, or generate new paradigms. The "conservative response bias" (Park and Baumeister 2015:157) observed in the lab,

here ostensible as the psychological precursor to the political stagnation of the schizophrenic vassal state.

Thus, the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm is not merely installed through Vicarious Conditioning; it is maintained by a weaponized psychological dynamic that locks the vassal into a prevention servitude mindset. The foreclosure of an indigenous future is not just a political outcome; their 'rear-guard action' (Keyder 1997:48) are not just strategic choices—it is a motivated psychological stance, a tragic prioritization of security over sovereignty, of preventing loss over promoting growth.

17 The No-Derivatives Paradigm and the Sterilization of National Elites

Vicarious Conditioning could not achieve its peaceful perpetual dependency without a parallel process that targeted the very source of a society's regenerative capacity: its intellectual and social elites. This is the enforcement of the *No-Derivatives* clause written into the social contract of Ready-Made Modernity—a systematic blockade against the localized adaptation, critical reworking, and sovereign development of imported paradigms.

The primary institutional engine of this elite sterilization in the modern era is the *Cryptouniversity*. Much like a cryptocurrency, it performs a spectacle of academic value while being decoupled from indigenous knowledge production. Its function is not the generation of new, sovereign thought but *mining*—the sterile validation of pre-packaged Northern cargo paradigms. This mining operation is visible in what Demeter critiques as the fallacy of a meritocratic 'Olympic Games' of science, where the rules, judges, and even the uniforms are predetermined by the Global North, ensuring that "at least 90% of gold medals are guaranteed to Western and especially American competitors" (2020:7).

The psychological and social mechanics of this institutional engine yet were diagnosed from within the dependent reality of Latin America by Martín-Baró, by deconstructing the university not as a neutral site of learning but as a primary laboratory for the reproduction of dependency (1974:767). He identified its dual role:

- Cultural penetration: the uncritical importation of prefabricated epistemological frameworks from the North.
- Technocratic mandarinism: the production of a certified, sterilized comprador elite.

For Martín-Baró, the very process of instruction in this system was an alienated teaching process—a *banking* model where knowledge is deposited by a knowing subject (The Northern Sage) into passive recipients (the vassal artisans)—as 'cargo cult computationalism' (Allen 2022)—. This process, which he termed the 'mandarinato de poder y saber' (mandarinate of power and knowledge) (Martín-Baró 1972:12), actively forecloses the emergence of a 'pedagogy of the oppressed.' It transforms learning from a dialogical process of inquiry into a monological act of reception, perfectly mirroring and reproducing the political relationship between the hegemonic North and the schizophrenic vassal state.

Crucially, Baró posited the antidote to this engineered alienation: sociopolitical conscientization. This concept, deeply aligned with Paulo Freire's *conscientização*, is not merely raising awareness but a profound psychological and social process of liberation through praxis (Freire [1970] 1987:I). For Freire, this process is ignited by dialogical education, which stands as the direct antithesis of the banking model. Where banking education domesticates, dialogical education liberates. It is a cooperative, critical investigation of the generative themes of the people's existence, a process where educator and educated become joint subjects in the act of knowing and transforming their world. This dialectical movement—the core of Freirean praxis—seeks to decrypt the imported paradigms and ground knowledge in the lived, conflicted reality of the oppressed (Martín-Baró 1974), enabling them to pronounce their world authentically rather than merely receiving it as a finished product. Where the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm creates a fractured consciousness, conscientization is the struggle for an integrated, sovereign one. The battle within the university curricula, therefore, is a microcosm of the larger civil war within the 'structures of consciousness' (Nelson 1973) of the schizophrenic vassal state.

The imported rationalized structure of consciousness of the elites is conditioned to view indigenous lifeworlds with what can be termed an *Aversive Gaze*. This gaze, internalized from the Northern hegemonic aesthetic, structured to perceive tradition not as a source of self identity but as an obstacle to progression and parity, a pathology to be eradicated or a spectacle to be curated for *tourist* consumption.

In stark contrast, the northern societal quotidianity nurtures a *Sentiment of Intimate Melancholy*—a grieving, often unarticulated attachment to the rhythms, symbols, and practices that constitute the *scent* of its own *Kulturgemeinschaft* (Bauer).

This is not the discursively defended *tradition* of Giddens' post-traditional order (1994), but a pre-reflective, embodied connection to a way of life under systematic siege.

Therefore, the polemical category of fundamentalism is the weaponization of this schism. It is the strategic label applied by the hegemon (and its vassal elite) to any expression of the intimate melancholy that refuses to be disembedded, sterilized, or instrumentally aestheticized. It is the pathologization of a people's refusal to have their grief for their own world be dismissed as mere nostalgia.

The epistemological output of this system is a perfect institutionalization of what the physicist Richard Feynman, critiquing his own Western scientific community, termed *Cargo Cult Science*. The *Cryptouniversity*, and the elite it produces, have mastered the form of global knowledge production—the frantic publishing in Scopus-indexed journals, the pursuit of the Fetish-Certificate—while systematically eviscerating the *scientific integrity*, the "understanding and self-criticism that are essential" to genuine progress (Gelman and Higgs 2025:197). The scholars it produces are like Feynman's islanders building reed replicas of control towers: they replicate the rituals of scholarship with fidelity, but the planes of transformative, indigenous knowledge do not land (Feynman [1974] 2018:392). This cargo cult behavior is the institutional engine of Cold Thought, systematically rewarding the superficial comfort of procedural mimicry over the neurologically costly work of substantive, critical engagement.

The product of this machinery is the *Fetish-Elite* (or Artisan-Elite): a comprador intellectual class whose status is derived from their mastery of the performative forms and procedural language of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. They are fluent in the operational *what* of the imported system but are systematically sterilized from accessing the philosophical *why*—the generative *source code* that remains the privileged domain of The Northern Sage. They are perpetual artisans, foreclosed from becoming sages (chapters IV and V will discuss this empirically).

This manufactured elite is inherently sterile and operates in a *gray zone* of illegibility. Its members are often better able to communicate with their counterparts in the global North than with the populace of their own societies. When they produce knowledge, it is frequently in a colonial language or a *transliterated*, incomprehensible vernacular, rendering it inaccessible at home and derivative abroad. While the international academic field operates as a rigid hierarchy where "elite diplomas literally

work like titles under feudalism" (Demeter 2020:64) and entry into the global 'hall of fame' of knowledge production is systematically foreclosed to those without the requisite "central academic capital—a Western re-education that functions as the definitive categorical gatekeepers" (Enders 2001).

The ultimate psychological manifestation of this condition(ing) is what Demeter identifies as the 'camouflage identity'—a destructive phenomenon where peripheral scholars, even after acquiring the requisite Northern credentials, feel compelled to "make your CV look like that of a Western scholar" and systematically privilege Western epistemologies to mask their indigenous intellectual 'scent' (Demeter 2020:80–81). This is not merely imitation; it is an anxious, continuous performance aimed at securing recognition from within the hegemonic paradigm itself, a performative admission that their authentic selves remain inherently deficient within the *No-Derivatives framework of The Northern Sage*. The camouflage identity is thus the lived reality of the Fetish-Elite, the internalized engine of its own sterilization.

Thus, the No-Derivatives Paradigm, enforced through the Cryptouniversity, completes the machinery of dependence. It ensures that the transcultural and developmental elites are reduced to consumers and curators of Northern historical conclusions—the artisans of a sterile model—forever performing a script they cannot debug, adapt, or rewrite, while the masses remain *Hintersassen (Bauer 1907:50)*, dependent and disenfranchised. The plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the political manifestation of a populace whose capacity for self-repair has been engineered out at the most fundamental level—the level of the elite consistency itself.

18 The Product: Ethical Schizophrenia and the Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee

The cumulative outcome of this machinery of dependence is the terminal political-psychological disorder: Ethical Schizophrenia. This condition manifests as a fundamental rupture between the state and the nation, where the state, operating as a schizophrenic vassal, performs a scripted modernity for a Northern gaze, while its own society remains rooted in a lifeworld that this performance systematically negates. The elite, speaking the language of universal reason and neoliberal governance, becomes unintelligible to the masses, whose quotidian reality is one of disenfranchisement and cultural alienation. The individual is caught in this crossfire, their identity torn

between a cold and comfortable cognition, conformed by the North, and ridiculized past of the *self*, of the South.

This schism is culturally sustainable throughout a neuronparadigm denominated as *Cold Thought*—a cognitive mode, akin to the 'Cognitive Miser' in neuro-social cognition research (Fiske and Taylor 2013, 2020), that prioritizes superficial comfort and heuristics over the neurologically costly work of deep, critical engagement with traumatic historical and political realities. In a schizophrenic social field, the populace adapts by becoming motivated tacticians who, for self-protection, consistently choose the less effortful cognitive path, avoiding the 'hot' processing required to reconcile the irreconcilable demands of the vassal state and the indigenous lifeworld.

Hence, the condition this book diagnoses as *Ethical Schizophrenia* finds its precise philosophical articulation in Hegel's figure of the Unhappy Consciousness (*das unglückliche Bewußtsein*), developed as freedom of self-awareness; stoicism, skepticism, and unhappy consciousness (*Freiheit des Selbstbewußtseins; Stoizismus, Skeptizismus und das unglückliche Bewußtsein*) ([1807] 1979:§155). Hegel describes it as the shape of consciousness that emerges when the external relation of lord and bondsman is internalized, thus "the doubling that was previously distributed between two individuals, the master and the servant, has been reduced to one: the doubling of self-awareness within oneself" (*Hierdurch ist die Verdopplung, welche früher an zwei Einzelne, an den Herrn und den Knecht, sich verteilte, in Eines eingekehrt; die Verdopplung des Selbstbewußtseins in sich selbst*) ([1807] 1979:§162).

The unhappy consciousness is therefore "the consciousness of itself as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being" (*das Bewußtsein seiner als des gedoppelten, nur widersprechenden Wesens*) (Ibid). This is the precise structure of the divided consciousness that defines the schizophrenic vassal state. The elite, having internalized the master-slave relation through Vicarious Conditioning, carries within itself both the lord (the impossible ideal of the Northern *für sich*, the demand for purity and completion) and the bondsman (the defamed indigenous realism, the persistent pragmatism that can never meet that demand). Hegel describes this divided consciousness as one that finds itself always *torn* between two opposed moments as:

This unhappy, inwardly divided consciousness must, because this contradiction of its essence is for it one consciousness, always have the other also in the one consciousness, and thus be driven out of each immediately, just when it thinks it has come to the

victory and rest of unity (Dieses unglückliche, in sich entzweite Bewußtsein muß also, weil dieser Widerspruch seines Wesens sich ein Bewußtsein ist, in dem einen Bewußtsein immer auch das andere haben und so aus Jedem unmittelbar, indem es zum Siege und zur Ruhe der Einheit gekommen zu sein meint, wieder ausgetrieben werden) ([1807] 1979:§ 162)

The Unhappy Consciousness is characterized by a yearning for an unattainable essence, precisely the ontological insecurity and anxious performance that characterize the vassal's political being. For Hegel:

The consciousness of life, of its existence and activity, is only the pain over this existence and activity, for in it it has only the consciousness of its opposite as the essence, and of its own nothingness" (*Das Bewußtsein des Lebens, seines Daseins und Tuns ist nur der Schmerz über dieses Dasein und Tun, denn es hat darin nur das Bewußtsein seines Gegenteils, als des Wesens, und der eigenen Nichtigkeit.*) ([1807] 1979:§ 163)

Therefore, the divided consciousness seeks reconciliation with an *external*, unattainable source of validation, what Hegel calls the 'unchangeable' (*das Unwandelbare*). But this search is structured to fail again as:

There is present the inner movement of the pure heart, which feels itself, but painfully as division—the movement of an infinite yearning, which has the certainty that its essence is such a pure heart, pure thinking that thinks itself as individuality; that it is known and recognized by this object precisely because it thinks itself as individuality. But at the same time this essence is the unattainable beyond, which flees when grasped, or rather has already fled" (*Es ist die innerliche Bewegung des reinen Gemüts vorhanden, welches sich selbst, aber als die Entzweiung schmerzhaft fühlt, die Bewegung einer unendlichen Sehnsucht, welche die Gewißheit hat, daß ihr Wesen ein solches reines Gemüt ist, reines Denken, welches sich als Einzelheit denkt; daß sie von diesem Gegenstande eben darum, weil er sich als Einzelheit denkt, erkannt und anerkannt wird. Zugleich aber ist dies Wesen das unerreichbare Jenseits, welches im Ergreifen entflieht oder vielmehr schon entflohen ist.*) ([1807] 1979:§168)

Applying this to he vassal state's plea for a manufacturer's guarantee where the political expression of this same structure, a desperate appeal to an external, unattainable source of validation, as The Northern Sage, the United Nations, the original manufacturer, an admission that reconciliation cannot be achieved from

within. The elite, like the Unhappy Consciousness, seeks an 'unchangeable' that remains perpetually beyond reach, because the very structure of its consciousness has been divided against itself by the machinery of the Ready-Made Modernity.

The persistence of this condition deep and root an ontological insecurity generating a desperate, anxiously pathological, search for a *sustainable* Recognition, its sustainability isn't other then through a cold cognition. The state engages in ever more extreme performances—from the Latinization of the Turkish alphabet to the wholesale importation of Western legal codes (see Chapter III), or even what emerged today throughout neo cargo concepts such *interconstituionalism* (GÖZTEPE 2023; Mazzone and Tecimer 2022), or by universalizing the constitutive power (Al-Ali and Dann 2006), throughout a massive cargoism of social contract, as seen in the Balcans, Iraq, South Sudan, among others, just to force a rapid and cod concession of the recognition. A Conceded Modernity, albeit being a direct derivation of the *past*, maintain its anxious aspiration toward the *post*, which never arrive.

Again, the terminal symptom of this disorder is not rebellion, but a plea for a manufacturer's guarantee—a cry embodied in the poignant graffiti of the 2019 squares uprisings [see Fig. I, Chapter IV]. The cry of a populace, as a tragic schizophrenic demand, that has internalized its status as the user of a composite, malfunctioning system it cannot debug. They are not just consumers of a political model; they are users of a solid software installed on the wrong liquid hardware, and their demand for tech support is the utter depths of their epistemological capture, ultimate admission of their engineered incapacity for self-repair.

The paradox is, at difference with the chilenian demands of 2019, their murals did not claim for a new, sovereign constitutional convention drawn from their own historical consciousness. Instead, as one poignant graffiti in Baghdad's Tahrir Square illustrated, they directly addressed the original producers: alongside a child's face targeted by a bullet, the emblem of the United Nations was painted with the plaintive question, "WHERE ARE YOU?" This was not a contradiction but a symptomatic plea from a populace structurally stripped of its capacity for self-repair, and rooted into a cold and thought of a cognitive miser.

This plea is more than a political metaphor; it is the ultimate diagnostic of a profound psychological and civilizational state. The cry for a guarantee signifies a populace for whom the capacity for indigenous repair has been systematically distorted.

They are trapped in what Ignacio Martín-Baró diagnosed as a 'permanent psychological present'—a historical void where the past is not considered to serve lessons and the future no conceivable native path (2006:13). which is close to the tragic political manifestation of what Benjamin Nelson identified as 'A-nomism' or antinomianism—the release from personal and collective responsibility for one's social and political world (1973:81)—the populace, reduced to mere consumers of an encrypted system, can no longer conceive of self-repair. Their relationship to the governing paradigm is not that of a sovereign illustrate sage but of a dependent artisan. Their only conceivable solution is to appeal to the original contractor partner, in a desperate, tragic inversion of the need for a stable, caring bond. The demand for a guarantee is the political manifestation of a collective psyche that has internalized its own helplessness, having been conditioned to seek belonging through consumption and replication, never through mastery, creation, and repair. The logic is identical to that observed in the laboratory. The children in Bandura's studies did not invent new ways to interact with the Bobo doll; they could only replicate the specific script provided by the model.

The plea for a manufacturer's guarantee, therefore, must be understood as the terminal symptom of a pathological assumption of one's 'being-for-others.' It is not a surrender of Sartre's 'condemnation to freedom,' (1943:573–74) but a specific, tragic choice of how to live it. The populace, its capacity for indigenous agency sterilized by Vicarious Conditioning and ideocide, chooses to assume its political being as that of a user before a programmer, a client before a technician. Their cry to the United Nations is not a refusal of the burden of freedom, but a desperate performance of the only role left in their encrypted political imagination: they actively choose to be the *helpless consumer*, thereby resigning the burden of responsibility back to the original *manufacturer*. This is the ultimate manifestation of the schism: they are condemned to be free, but their freedom has been reduced to the choice of which pre-scripted, dependent identity to perform on behalf of one hegem or other. As Baumeister argues, embracing a deterministic worldview is 'profoundly unhelpful' for living one's life (2025:920); here, we see it enacted as a collective political pathology. The *will* is not broken, but its scope has been so catastrophically narrowed that it can only will its own *dependence*.

The ultimate symptom, thus, is not a rebellion, but a plea for re-colonization. The 2019 Iraqi and Libyans uprisings provided the most poignant illustration of this.

Protesters did not demand a new, sovereign constitutional convention drawn from their own historical consciousness, like in Chile. Instead, their graffitis and slogans called upon the United Nations and the original manufacturers of their failed democratic state to intervene and honor a manufacturer's guarantee (see Fig. I, Chapter IV)

The cry for a guarantee mean the utter foreclosure of an indigenous future, the final victory of the No-Derivatives paradigm. It reveals that the fabricated discourse of Occidentalism is not the cause of the global South's political disorders, but a polemical tool used to pathologize their symptoms. The real pathology lies here, in this meticulously engineered machinery of dependence that produces schizophrenic states and consumer-citizens, forever seeking a validation from the manufacturer that is structurally designed to be withheld.

The psycho-political interpretation of this architecture could be served from Gayatri Spivak famously diagnosed paradigm as the silenced *subaltern (Spivak 1988, 2010)*. The 'subaltern cannot speak' not merely because of a lack of platform, but because the very epistemological and psychic capacity for sovereign speech—the ability to generate a *counterhegemonic* discourse from an indigenous 'source code'—has been systematically dismantled by the machinery of Vicarious Conditioning and the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. Where Spivak's Foucault and Deleuze could only describe the failure of the intellectual to transparently represent the oppressed, our proposed psycho-genealogical framework of the Schizophrenic Vassal State and its tripartite elite dysfunction explains the genealogy of that failure: the Fetish-Elite, a product of the Cargo-Cult Cryptouniversity, is structurally conditioned to be a repeater of echoes, perpetually foreclosing the subaltern's speech through a conceded modernity that remains within the hegemonic circuit. The rage of the artisan, the plea of the consumer, and the silence of the end-user are the political morphologies of the subaltern's constitutive silencing.

Upon this theoretical framework now established, we turn to its empirical substantiation: first, to the (post)colonial laboratory where this logic renders authentic critique a mirage (Chapter IV), and finally, to the systematic anatomy of the state-forms it produces (Chapter V).

19 Conclusion: From Cognitive Capture to Epistemic Fabrication

The machinery of dependence—Vicarious Conditioning, elite sterilization, and the No-Derivatives paradigm—does not merely produce economic or political subordination. Its most devastating product is a specific epistemic condition: a fractured consciousness that struggles to articulate its own reality outside the conceptual language of the hegemon. It is from this pathological ground that the discourse this book interrogates—Occidentalism—emerges.

What the North labels Occidentalism is, in reality, the symptomatic output of this engineered schizophrenia. The complex philosophical struggle of the Kyoto School to 'overcome modernity,' the Ottoman-Turkish elite's desperate quest for Recognition through mimicry, and the (post)colonial Arab intellectual's derivative critique are not manifestations of a coherent, hateful ideology. They are the agonistic, often paradoxical, expressions of a consciousness wrestling with the ready-made paradigms imposed upon it. They are attempts at a diagnosis from within the sickroom itself.

The polemical category of Occidentalism, as popularized by Buruma and Margalit, performs a crucial function for the North: it pathologizes the symptom while obscuring the disease—a diagnosis that Coronil would categorize as the West's 'imperial fetish,' the representation of difference as Otherness to stabilize a hegemonic Self (1996:78). By framing these complex struggles as a monolithic 'hatred of the West', it enacts a final, powerful act of epistemic containment. It neutralizes the philosophical challenge, denies the validity of historical grievance, and re-centers the West as the universal referent—the perpetual object of desire and resentment. The fabrication of Occidentalism is thus the necessary discursive counterpart to the material machinery of dependence. It is the tool that ensures any critique from the South can be dismissed not on its merits, but as a pathological condition, thereby preserving the epistemological authority of the North intact.

To understand this fabrication is to understand that the central conflict is not between 'East' and 'West,' but between a hegemonic power that produces universal categories and a subaltern condition that is forced to adopt but not adapt, re-vest and never resist them. The following chapters will trace the devastating effects of this dynamic across three pivotal landscapes: the philosophical, the historical, and the (post)colonial. We will see how the Japanese intellectual project was reductively mislabeled, how the Ottoman state descended into a Schizophrenic Vassalage, and how

the Arab (post)colonial condition renders any authentic Occidentalism a mirage. In each case, the fabricated category serves to obscure a deeper truth: the relentless violence of a global order built on ready-made states and the ready-made concepts used to defend them.

The ultimate cultural logic of this machinery is what this book employ as the *Cargo Cult Paradigm*. Drawing on Lamont Lindstrom's analysis of 'Cargoism,' (1995, 2019) this is not merely a metaphor of imitation but the political morphology of a *managed structure of desire*. The vassal state is inserted into a global allegory of desire, a perpetual servitude of struggles for the modernity's rewards, being itself the engine of dependency. The belittling, the accusation of failure of representation, the mimetic performance is not a system error but a structural feature, ensuring the vassal's continued orientation toward the hegemon and locking it into a cycle where the *frustration of desire* becomes a functional component of the relationship itself. The extensive pragmatism of this paradigm is the metastasis of the rentier mentality, where the cargo cult get extended into a pathological political mentality to *constellate* the identitarian belonging as an *aesthetic welbeing-belonging*, therefore to become a condition, not only of the social-structural, but the referred national identity itself, which would be extended by Chapter V.

19.1 Operationalizing the Framework: A Guide for Researchers

An operational framework, or as an eventual Guide for Researchers, would suggest that the concepts of Vicarious Conditioning, Ethical Schizophrenia, and the Schizophrenic Vassal State are not merely descriptive but diagnostic. To apply this framework empirically, this book suggest researchers to:

1. Identify the Mimetic Performance: Look for elite discourses and policies that explicitly invoke Northern models as telos.
2. Trace the Withholding of Recognition: Map instances where expected validation (political, economic, cultural) from the North was delayed, denied, or made conditional.
3. Locate the Schism: Identify where state policies clash with lived, indigenous practice—often in law, education, language, or spatial planning.
4. Listen for the Plea: In moments of crisis, does critique take the form of a demand for external intervention (a "guarantee") rather than a call for indigenous reinvention?

This framework does not replace historical or area studies but offers a psycho-political lens to decipher the logic of dependency beneath the surface of events.

Chapter II

Occidentalism and the Japanese Case: Meiji and the Kyoto School's Modernity Overcoming

The global experiment of modernity intersects with, and influences as it is influenced by, the penetration of modern institutions into the tissue of day-to-day life. Not just the local community, but intimate features of personal life and the self become intertwined with relations of indefinite time-space extension [...] Everyday experiments reflect the changing role of tradition and, as is also true of the global level, should be seen in the context of the displacement and reappropriation of expertise, under the impact of the intrusiveness of abstract systems (Giddens 1994:59–60).

Having established the theoretical machinery of the Schizophrenic vassal state in Chapter I, we now turn to its philosophical labyrinth. This chapter examines the Japanese intellectual encounter with *Western* modernity, arguing that the complex project of the Kyoto School—epitomized by the 1942 'Overcoming Modernity' symposium—was not a pathological Occidentalism but a profound, if fraught, struggle for ethical sovereignty. We will trace how Japan's status as a Bauerian 'nation with history', it possessed a surviving indigenous elite capable of stewarding a living *Kulturgemeinschaft*. This elite did not merely mimic Western modernity; it performed an arduous labor of sovereign translation, decrypting the imported paradigm and rewriting it for a Japanese operating system, which Chapter I frammed as a sovereign, philosophical translation of modernity, a project that was subsequently reductively framed by Western discourse as mere hatred, thus performing the epistemic fabrication this book diagnoses. The Japanese Kyoto school's case thus stands as the exception that confirms the rule of Schizophrenic Vassalage: where the indigenous elite survives, the terminal pathologies of the vassal state can be avoided.

1 Introduction: Japan Between West and Modernity

The Japanese encounter with the West presents a singular paradigmatic case of the complex dynamics of Occidentalism. Following the forced opening of the country by Commodore Perry in 1853, the Meiji Restoration (1868) inaugurated a period of accelerated, state-driven modernization famously captured in the slogan wakon yōsai (和魂洋才) – "Japanese spirit, Western technique." This entailed a deliberate and often dizzying program of importing Western institutions, perspectives, and knowledge, from legal and educational systems to industrial and military models.

The complexity of this undertaking has become a central focus of twenty-first-century scholarship, which has moved to reinterpret Meiji Japan not as a passive recipient of Western models but as a dynamic site of creative adaptation. Hans Martin Krämer (2013) argues, this new scholarship emphasizes how Japanese actors 'appropriated, translated, and transformed' Western concepts, moving beyond simplistic binaries of modern/traditional or West/East to reveal a process of global intellectual entanglement and hybridity. This chapter is situated within this reinterpretive tradition. It examines how the modern Japanese state and its intellectuals did not merely adopt the Western binary of the 'religious' and the 'secular' but, actively sought to overcome its limitations throughout a philosophical introspection in its source code to achieve a coherent adaptation with their ethical ecosystem.

This dual movement was not confined to abstract intellectual life; it was embedded in the very architecture of the modern Japanese state from its inception. A paradigmatic example is the Meiji government's handling of religion. Confronted with the Western category of 'religion' (shūkyō), which carried connotations of private belief and potential conflict with state authority, Japanese policymakers engineered a sophisticated bureaucratic solution. As Saitō Tomoo (2018) demonstrates, the 1872 first separation of *ritual and doctrine* (祭教分離, Saikyō Bunri) was an archetypal act of adaptation of the western binarism. By surgically separating Shinto's public, ritual function (祭祀, administered by the state) from its proselytizing, doctrinal function (教, relegated to a short-lived ministry), the state effectively created a non-religious national cult (国体, kokutai). This maneuver allowed Japan to adopt the Western model of the secular state while simultaneously insulating its core imperial ideology from being categorized as a mere 'religion'—a status that would have relativized it and placed it in competition with Christianity and Buddhism. Thus, decades before the Kyoto School's philosophical project, the Meiji state was already practically engaged in a form of *kindai no chōkoku*: mastering the Western framework of the secular to protect and elevate a perceived Japanese spiritual essence from the perceived spiritual limitations and contradictions of that same Western modernity. This was not the work of a transcultural elite failing in translation, but of a sovereign state apparatus successfully performing a critical adaptation—acting as a collective sage to insulate its indigenous substrate.

Yet this cultural negotiation of Western modernity was inseparable from the political architecture of the modern state. The same logic that sought to preserve Japanese uniqueness in art, gender, and biology also underpinned the institutional consolidation of imperial sovereignty. The centralized imperial system, however, was far from a passive symbolic structure. As Bix (2009) underscores, the Meiji Constitution institutionalized a "monarchical system of irresponsibility" in which the emperor was portrayed as a symbolic figure yet in practice wielded decisive political authority. By the Shōwa era this ambiguity enabled Emperor Hirohito to act as an active arbiter in strategic decision-making, directly influencing Japan's path to war. This duality — simultaneously transcendent and pragmatic — also shaped the discursive space in which the Kyoto philosophers operated. To interpret their project apart from this constitutional ambiguity risks fabricating an image of abstract Occidentalist hostility, when in fact their debates were enmeshed in legitimizing, contesting, or reconfiguring the very structures of imperial sovereignty. Later Western framings that strip away this political entanglement therefore enact a form of epistemic containment, reducing a complex intersection of philosophy and power to a caricatured "hatred of the West. Therefore, the Kyoto School's philosophical project of defining the 'Japanese worldview' and overcoming modernity did not occur in a political vacuum but within the overarching ideological and political framework of this potent imperial state.

Alongside this bureaucratic engineering, a parallel intellectual effort was underway to reconfigure these very imported concepts. As Krämer (2015) has shown, Meiji-era thinkers such as Shimaji Mokurai were instrumental in debating and ultimately developing the invented Japanese category of 'non-religion' (hi-shūkyō), a discursive innovation that provided the essential philosophical justification for the state's policy of elevating Shinto beyond the realm of private belief.

Therefore, the Japanese process was not one of passive reception but of active, often anxious, and massive assimilation. A profound dual movement characterized Japanese intellectual life throughout a deep fascination with the perceived universality of Western modernity and an equally deep critique of its philosophical and spiritual limitations. This was not a simple nativist rejection but a critical engagement from within, a cognitive introspective attempt to master modernity in order to transcend it. The West functioned as both model and problem, an object of desire and a subject of critique. It is within this fraught space that the concept of Occidentalism finds potent

resonance. The interventions of the Kyoto School philosophers, culminating in the 1942 "Overcoming Modernity" symposiums, represent a crucial episode in this discourse.

The Japanese intellectual struggle with imported modernity can be understood not as a unique pathology but as an acute instance of a recurring modern 'syndrome.' As Alain-Marc Rieu (2014) argues, the discourse of 'overcoming modernity' (kindai no chōkoku) represents a profound *societal syndrome* that can emerge in any modernizing nation confronting the disenchanting gap between modernity's promises and its lived reality—and flattens it into a monolithic pathology of hatred. This syndrome expresses a collective experience of anxiety and a fractured historical consciousness, often coalescing into a *meta-ideology* that seeks to explain and overcome a systemic crisis.

The Kyoto School's concern was not of modernity's tools, but by interpreting Nietzsche, to be considered as an 'historical sickness' of a purely imitative culture by perpetuating a tyranny of the time—the imposition of an aesthetic-spectacular, pseudo-cyclical temporality— which "could only be ended by a radical eternalization, the timeless itself" (Harootunian 2000:38). This critique reveals a profound insight: the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm does not merely transfer technology; it risks instilling the very 'slavish imitation' and 'uncreative' mediocrity that Nietzsche diagnosed in the West's own relationship with its past, with an endless aesthetic cargo identity, which would be further flagged in Chapter V. The Southern *Fetish-Elite*, in its desperate performance for Northern Recognition, thus becomes a tragic mirror, perfectly replicating the 'historical sickness' of the civilization it emulates, yet forever barred from the 'overcoming' that would grant it sovereign creativity.

It is within this fraught space—between emulation and rejection, between universalism and particular(ity)—that the concept of *Occidentalism* finds potent resonance. The Japanese discourse was not primarily a hatred of the West (seiyō ken'o '西洋嫌悪'), though such sentiments existed on the fringes. Rather, it was a sophisticated, albeit politically fraught, philosophical project to articulate a genuinely distinct Japanese subjectivity and worldview that could operate on a global stage without being merely derivative. The interventions of the Kyoto School philosophers, culminating in the infamous 1942 "Overcoming Modernity" symposiums, represent a crucial episode in this discourse. However, it also contends that later interpretations, particularly those that label these efforts as a mere Occidentalist mirror of Orientalism,

constitute a form of epistemic fabrication. This fabrication simplifies, or even nullify, the complex, often agonistic, internal Japanese debate into a coherent, reactionary ideology, thereby performing a discursive containment that preserves the West's epistemological authority. By examining the genesis, content, and reception of this critique of modernity, we can illuminate the mechanisms of this fabrication and challenge the mirage of symmetry that often plagues discussions of Occidentalism. Later framings, such as Buruma and Margalit's thesis of Occidentalism, risk collapsing, or even ridiculing the complex Japanese debates into a simplistic pathology.

The move was re-addressed by what Goto-Jones propose the 'depoliticisation' of Nishida, a strategy designed to preserve his philosophical reputation by erasing his thought's complicity with wartime politics (2007). Furthermore, labeling this complex engagement as mere Occidentalism ignores its specific address to the political reality of the Japanese imperial state. The Kyoto School's discourse was formulated in the shadow of the 'monarchical system of irresponsibility,' a specific political structure they sought to philosophically justify and orient within world history (Bix 2009). By instrumentalizing the figure of the rootless cosmopolitan and tropes of classical antisemitism, they recode the Japanese philosophical critique into a pathological hatred of an abstract, conspiratorial Judeo-Plutocratic West, arguing that critiques from Japan and elsewhere are structurally synonymous with antisemitism. This *hermeneutic* of epistemic intersection performs a powerful discursive containment, to neutralizes the philosophical challenge of the Kyoto School and ultimately preserves the West's epistemological authority by denying the possibility of a valid critique originating from outside its own conceptual abyssalism towards others.

2 Early Genealogies of Overcoming Modernity: Meiji Debates on Religion and Nation

The philosophical project of "overcoming modernity" did not emerge ex nihilo in the interwar Kyoto School. Its roots lay in the late nineteenth century, when the Meiji state and intellectuals confronted the epistemic shock of modernization. Three strands in particular reveal how the categories of "religion," "secular," and "national spirit" were already being actively reconfigured in this earlier period.

First was Shimaji Mokurai and the invention of shūkyō. The very Japanized category of "religion" (shūkyō) was not a transparent borrowing from the West but a contested invention, negotiated by Buddhist reformers like Shimaji Mokurai. Mokurai argued in

the 1870s that Buddhism should be classified as a shūkyō, a domain of private belief, while Shinto could be constructed as a non-religion (hi-shūkyō). This move enabled the state to elevate Shinto into the realm of public ritual and national essence while relegating rival traditions to the privatized sphere of "religion." Therefore, this was an "appropriation and transformation" of the Western code that already bore the seeds of later projects of "overcoming" Western categories. This, according to the American orientalist-missionary Daniel Holtom, was a compromise—what might be called, in my terms, a legal fiction— designed to circumvent constitutional guarantees of religious freedom while maintaining the ideological centrality of the imperial cult ([1956] 2010:Some Primery Aspects). This fiction was later rejected by radical Shintō ultranationalists like Kakehi Katsuhiko, who openly called for State Shintō to be proclaimed a religion (Skya 2009:209). This act of conceptual creation stands in stark contrast to the Turk-Ottoman linguistic sculpting of 'civilisation' or laicism examined in Chapter I (sec. 8.1 supra). Where the latter imported an encrypted term, the Meiji scholars decrypted the Western binary and rewrote its source code for a Japanese operating system.

A second current emerged in the form of the New Buddhist Fellowship (1899–1910s). Their project promoted an engaged, this-worldly Buddhism that dissolved the neat religion/secular divide by articulating a "religious secular": a pantheistic, immanent frame that made Buddhism both rational and socially engaged, while still retaining its spiritual dimension. Their discourse rejected the privatization of Buddhism as mere 'religion' and instead sought to remake it as the ethical foundation of modern public life (Shields 2017). This was not a reactive nativism but a sovereign, developmental act —a second-generation knowledge from a translated paradigm, a function that would be foreclosed in the schizophrenic vassal state.

By doing so, the Fellowship not only resisted state appropriation of Shinto but also anticipated later critiques of the Western metaphysical divide between secular and sacred. Finally, Protestant intellectuals offered a rival vision in the form of *Christian nationalism.* Groups such as the Kumamoto Band articulated a vision of Christian nationalism that sought to reconcile Japan's modernization with a transcendent moral foundation (Saitō 2018; Ichijo 2023). They argued that only Christianity could supply the ethical universality required to sustain Japan's national project. This position was neither simple Westernization nor precisely a *nativist contestation*, but a synthetic

attempt to adapt what they saw as the spiritual apex of the West and graft it onto Japanese patriotism. In their view, true patriotism and Christian virtue were identical.

Together, these three strands show that by the 1880s-1910s Japanese intellectuals were already actively contesting the Western epistemic framework. This was not a simple cargo cult reaction, building foreign runways in a desperate ritual. It was a sophisticated, sovereign act of *cryptographic* translation and adaptation. The Kyoto School's interwar philosophy of 'overcoming modernity' must be seen not as an isolated wartime eruption but as the paramount and crystallization of these legendarias struggles, a bureaucratic engineering of categories, Buddhist reimaginings of the sacred, and Protestant-nationalist syntheses.

This demonstrates a capacity for a native adaptation that stands in stark contrast to the sterile mimicry of later vassal states. Thus, by the early Shōwa period, these debates over religion, nation, and spirituality had hardened into a larger crisis of meaning (Ichijo 2023). It was within this contested intellectual space—already shaped by bureaucratic engineering, Buddhist reform, and Protestant universalism—that the Kyoto School's interwar philosophy of 'overcoming modernity' emerged.

3 Interwar Crisis and the Kyoto School

The interwar period intensified Japan's confrontation with Western modernity into a full-blown philosophical crisis, creating the conditions in which the Kyoto School's project of 'overcoming modernity' would be systematically misrecognized as mere Occidentalism. Political instability, cultural deracination, and the spread of nihilism prompted the Kyoto philosophers to advance their project of zettaimu (absolute nothingness) and zange (repentance) as conceptual tools for confronting and transcending Western metaphysics, an attempt at overcoming what camed to be referred as *modernity*—essentially understandable through Lévi-Strauss's concept of myth as a 'kind of logical tool' (1955:434) that does not resolve a contradiction but structures it into a tolerable correlation; the contradiction between Western ontological commitment to 'being' and Buddhist emptiness, is not eliminated; but mediated by a third term (absolute nothingness) that partakes of both poles, allowing the philosopher to operate in a suspended space between traditions (see supra Ch. I sec. 1) —.Their philosophy was stated at the intersection of European thought and Buddhist traditions triggered since the Meiji reforms of 1868. This period initiated a systematic reflection on how to understand, confront, and ultimately overcome the hegemonic

imposition of Western modernity—a discursive dilemma termed *kindai no chōkoku* (近代の超克), which acquired the connotation of a "war for the nation" (Harootunian 2000:34). This project, thus, was characterized not by traumatic resentment but by a dogmatic opposition based on the defense of a rooted and consolidated Japanese identity.

This discourse of overcoming modernity, however, was not born with the Kyoto School in the interwar period, as a simplest war element, but, as stated in the earlier section, was an empirical reflection considering that the pursuit of material civilization without spiritual depth would lead a cultural idolatry, which would present a "national cultural decay" (Heisig 2013:165).

The University of Kyoto was the incubator for these adversarial doctrines. Importantly, the term 'Kyoto School' itself was first used in 1932 by the leftist Marxist thinker Tosaka Jun, a disciple of Nishida Kitarō, to describe his own group's critical project (Heisig 2013:17). This first 'school,' which was pro-Western and convinced of Marxism, was rapidly suppressed by the state; Tosaka was imprisoned and died in custody, therefore ending the attempt to establish what he wanted to define as the Kyoto School. The second current, which this chapter examines, was the philosophy of the Imperial Way (kōdō), which was committed to strengthening imperial ideology and military ambitions in Asia (Heisig 2013:19). It is this second, dominant line of thought—defined by its famous 1942 conference(s)—that represents the specific intellectual response to the interwar crisis.

The transition from Taishō democracy to the rise of ultra-nationalism in early Shōwa created a context of intense crisis where the promises of Western modernity seemed increasingly hollow. This crisis manifested as a pervasive sense of cultural deracination and a philosophical confrontation with nihilism, stemming from the very modernizing processes Japan had so aggressively pursued. In this context, the key figures of the Kyoto School's Imperial Way—Nishida Kitarō, Tanabe Hajime, and Nishitani Keiji—developed a sophisticated project to critique the foundations of Western modernity. Their work sought to navigate a path beyond what they identified as the limitations and philosophical impasses of modern Western thought.

Their philosophy was forged at the intersection of epistemic engagement with European philosophy (from German Idealism to Nietzsche and Heidegger) and the resources of the Buddhist tradition, particularly Zen. Central to their project, were key

concepts designed to overcome what they identified as the fundamental limitations of Western metaphysics:

(1) "Absolute nothingness" (絶対無, zettaimu) was advanced not as a negation but as a groundless ground beyond the Western subject-object dichotomy, offering a basis for reality not dependent on the 'being' of European ontology.

(2) "Repentance" (懺悔, zange) in Tanabe's philosophy, became a method of metacritical self-overcoming, a way to break through the ego-centric standpoint of modern subjectivity.

(3) A thoroughgoing critique of nihilism, which they identified as the ultimate endpoint of a modernity divorced from spiritual foundations. They sought to pass through nihilism to arrive at a new, positive form of subjectivity.

This was not a rejection of the West *in toto*, but a selective, philosophical struggle to overcome its perceived limitations from a position informed by a different epistemological and spiritual tradition. Their project, therefore, was a profound contribution to a shared, global dilemma of modernity, a philosophical struggle that —while often entangled with Japan's particular political imperatives—addressed universal questions of nihilism and spiritual crisis that resonated beyond its national context.

4 The 1942 Symposium: Overcoming Modernity

The intellectual currents of the Kyoto School's Imperial Way philosophy and the wider crisis of modernity converged most publicly and controversially in the July 1942 symposium titled 'Kindai no Chōkoku', as a war for the nation 'Overcoming Modernity' (supra sec. 3). By staging Asia as an alternative modern, they challenged eurocentric claims of universality. Their critique was not of the West as such, but of the exclusive appropriation of rationality and progress by Europe. This was a philosophical contestation of modernity's terms, not properly an Occidentalist mirror, in terms of Said's Orientalism. The symposium itself embodies this distinction: it was not a sterile imitation of Western thought—an output of Vicarious Conditioning—, but a profound, if fraught, engagement with its philosophical foundations, an attempt at a sovereign critical translation performed by indigenous sages. Their goal was not to become better artisans of a European system, but to debug its source code and write their own.

Held in Tokyo amidst the ongoing Pacific War, the event brought together a diverse group of intellectuals to debate Japan's spiritual steering. Its historical context is crucial to understanding its ambivalent character. Convened mere months after initial Japanese victories, the event was inevitably framed by a wartime ideology that celebrated Japan's triumph over Western colonial powers. Thus, the context of 'intellectual warfare was inextricable from actual warfare. The symposium convened during a period where Hirohito was deeply engaged in approving military strategies and fostering an ideological climate of national mobilization (Bix 2009). The philosophers call to 'overcome modernity' and establish a new world order, while a philosophical project, also functioned as intellectual hybrid support for the geopolitical project of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which enjoyed the Emperor's explicit auspicious.

Postwar readings has often flattened wartime entanglements by treating Kyoto thought as either pure philosophy or mere propaganda. To some extent, the "depoliticization of Nishida's work has satisfied both groups of commentators," allowing critics and apologists alike to sidestep the issue of historical complicity (Goto-Jones 2005:5). Yet Goto-Jones also insists the wartime reality was more entangled: during the 1930s–40s key figures "became explicitly involved in the politicization of philosophy, and Nishida's philosophy in particular," so the 1942 symposium must be read both as a philosophical intervention and as a form of political/intellectual mobilization (Goto-Jones 2005:105). Nor was the School monolithic, but with intra-school differences: Nishitani "made a turn to and then back away from a specific politicization of this project of overcoming modernity/nihilism," underscoring the contested character of philosophical engagement during the war (Goto-Jones 2007:28). This ambivalence is crucial: Nishitani's movement into and then away from a politicized reading of 'overcoming modernity/nihilism' shows that even within the symposium there were competing interpretations of what politicization meant. It resists, therefore, the postwar caricature of the Kyoto School as either wholly complicit or wholly innocent.

Finally, because Nishida's stature shaped how others interpreted and used his ideas, meant that his students never escaped his shadow. In this sense he bore a symbolic responsibility for their acts, presence itself in the symposium, regardless of his explicit echoes intentions were politicized (Goto-Jones 2005:105). This is less a claim of direct

political guilt than of symbolic responsibility. Nishida's prominence meant his ideas inevitably bore interpretive weight within a wartime ideological apparatus, whether or not he intended it. Recognizing this layered responsibility prevents both hagiographic depoliticization and totalizing condemnation.

This ambiguity was a hallmark of Japan's wartime intellectual climate. Wartime Japan was not a mere totalitarian monolith but a complex society characterized by pockets of pluralism where intellectual debate could flourish, even as it was ultimately circumscribed by the state's overarching nationalist goals (Shillony 1981). The symposium embodied this paradox: it was a platform for genuine philosophical contestation that was simultaneously expected to align with the state's aim of spiritual mobilization for total war. This mobilization was a key part of a broader cultural project. Japanese fascism sought to create an 'aestheticized, spiritualized community' by infusing culture with a sense of sacred national purpose (Tansman 2009:333). Therefore its to conclude that the symposium's goal of defining a new Japanese worldview to overcome the spiritual lack of the West was a hallmark expression of this fascist cultural front, an attempt to articulate the spiritual core for a new, totalitarian political and cultural order. This discourse created a tense and persistent ambiguity, was the symposium a genuine philosophical inquiry, a state-sponsored justification for the war, or a complex mixture of both?

The central debates revolved around defining the modernity that required overcoming. For the participants, modernity was a concrete historical force synonymous with the West, diagnosed as a constellation of interconnected ills:

- The Enlightenment cult of reason leading to spiritual emptiness.
- Capitalist materialism and its destruction of organic community.
- American-style individualism eroding collective values.
- European colonialism and its imperialist domination.

A powerful conceptualization of this antithesis came from the eminent dean of the conference, Kamei Katsuichirō, who diagnosed a profound spiritual malaise. He complained of what he termed the "sickness of Westernization," framing it as a "deathbed culture of the West" that had violently penetrated the deepest regions of the spirit (Harootunian 2000:35). In his transcribed address, Kamei warned:

> "...it is the mode of civilization that has violated the deepest regions of the spirit. To me, daydreams and chatter, while becoming rapidly fashionable, are the greatest

> enemy. No matter how we talk about thought, it is permeated by this poison and I fear it is easy to become homogenized and mechanized. This is within us and is not a symptom we are aware of ourselves. Men become its joyful sacrifice…" (Harootunian 2000:35).

Kamei insisted that falling for Western propaganda was a disease which necessitated a proper medical treatment or clinical antibody, understood at the time not as psychobehavioral intervention but as an antiviral treatment against a physiological pathology. This perspective forged the symposium's attendees to reflect on how to repel the influx of the modern civilizational spirit, which was seen as distorting the Japanese cognitive constructs.

The proposed 'overcoming' (chōkoku) was thus conceived not as a return to a mythical past but as a forward-looking project to create a new world order. It aimed to synthesize technological advancement with spiritual depth, ostensibly led by Japan. This is where the symposium exhibited a profound *ambivalent Occidentalism*. Its critique was not a simple hatred of the West but a philosophically sustained negation. It rejected Western modernity's philosophical foundations while simultaneously seeking to master its technological and political fruits. The goal was not to destroy the West but to supersede it, to create something new that moved beyond the West's essential contradictions.

The symposium's proceedings reveal a profound epistemological bind. Participants consistently debated Japan's fate through a false mirror of Europe. Their critique was not a direct engagement with Japanese reality, but a mediated negotiation by means of distorted interpretation of European history—its revolutions, crises, and wars. This process, as it aggregated various ideological strands into a totalizing narrative, functioned as what Rieu terms a meta-ideology: a constructed collective memory that suppressed alternative discourses and created a 'conceptual cage' from within which the war could be philosophically justified (Rieu 2014:4).

The symposium thus stands as a crossroads of philosophy, culture, and politics, representing the ultimate difficulty of disentangling a genuine philosophical struggle with modernity from its appropriation by a militant political agenda. This position was fraught with tension, as the intellectual desire for a new epistemology became entangled with the political project of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosonsphere.

The Symposium as Intellectual Warfare. The framing elevates the symposium from a philosophical discussion to a tactical engagement in a broader cultural and epistemological conflict—a hybrid instrument additional to the 'lawfare' where intellectual paradigms themselves were weaponized to conquer and define the terms of modernity. This was not merely a metaphor; it was conceptualized as "total intellectual warfare" that, in conjunction with military instruments, had the potential to change the course of universal history (Harootunian 2000:43–44). Thus, the participants themselves understood their project as a high-stakes tactical engagement, underscoring the immense stakes they attributed to their project of overcoming modernity, by transcending into its formal rationality not as a 'hatred' of the West, but as a compelling alternative approach to creativity.

5 Epistemic Containment: The Polemical Fabrication of Occidentalism

The complex philosophical struggle of the Kyoto School was systematically reframed through a reductive Western lens, a maneuver that constitutes a form of epistemic containment. This move is epitomized by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit's Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies (2004). Their thesis performs a deliberate perversion: it forcibly conflates Japan's multifaceted critique of modernity with the tropes of classical antisemitism, arguing it is structurally synonymous with a hatred of an abstract, conspiratorial Judeo-Plutocratic West. This framing pathologizes the symptom, fundamentally misrecognizing the Kyoto School's project. Their pursuit of *kindai no chōkoku* was not reactive hatred but a profound attempt to decrypt the source code of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—a conscience objective struggle for their ethical sovereignty against intellectual hegemony of the West, but far from being perveted as a subjective hate of the West itself. The category of Occidentalism is thus the West's polemical riposte, an act of epistemic containment that neutralizes this challenge by recoding it as a radicalized pathological condition.

Buruma and Margalit's thesis fabricates a coherent ideology of hatred through a series of fallacious operations, which can be distilled into four core maneuvers:

(1) **Demonization via Association**: The most egregious of these operations is the drawing of a direct lineage between the Kyoto School and Nazism. This effectively de-philosophizes the critique, transforming a complex engagement with nihilism into a symptom of pathological hatred. Buruma and Margalit perversely attempt to constellate the Japanese confrontation with Arab

critiques to achieve a global demonization, a fundamentally flawed analytical maneuver.

(2) **Chronological and Structural Fallacies**: The Japanese opposition was not based on subjective aversion but on a deep contradiction with cognitive substructures. Furthermore, their attempt to link it to an Arab-Muslim antagonism they claim originated post-1948 is ahistorical. The Arab antagonism largely emerged post-1948, due to the Palestinian usurpation via colonial imposition, while the Japanese critique, which predates this conflict by decades, is falsely claimed to be synonymous with it. This ahistorical linkage is a core mechanism of their flawed epistemic intersection, flattening distinct historical experiences into a single, pathological narrative of hatred.

(3) **Erasure of Specificity:** This interpretive maneuver completely erases the distinctively Japanese and Buddhist philosophical underpinnings (e.g., *zettaimu*, *zange*), subsuming them under a homogenized European history of intolerance. The specific reaction to Western epistemic invasion is rendered indistinguishable from European *Jew-hatred*, thereby denying its status as a unique philosophical intervention.

(4) **The False Synonymity**: This constitutes the core of the intentional perversion. It creates a false synonymity between anti-Occidentalism and antisemitism, a linkage not born out by the internal dynamics of the Japanese discourse itself but imposed from the outside to contain it within a pre-fabricated, pathological category.

A parallel, more subtle form of epistemic containment operates not through polemic but through liberal-intersectional management. This is seen in philosophical dialogues like Herbert Schneider's 1954 engagement with P.T. Raju's Idealistic Thought of India. While Schneider approaches Raju as a colleague in 'stock-taking, he simultaneously questions the orthodoxy of his interpretation and suggests corrective insights from the Western canon (Schneider 1954). This mode does not fabricate a discourse of hatred but performs a subtler containment: it positions Western philosophy as the meta-framework within which Eastern thought must be rendered intelligible. Both the polemic of Buruma and Margalit and the scholarly dialogue of Schneider neutralize the challenge of a sovereign, native system—one through demonization, the other through assimilation.

This polemical framing, which deliberately conflates philosophical critique with pathological hatred, stands in stark contrast to other, more nuanced modes of Western engagement with Japanese thought that were occurring even in the same post-war period. Ames's nuanced approach was not an isolated insight but was rooted in a deeper, pre-existing philosophical project within American thought. As early as 1956, he had systematically traced the affinities between Zen and the American pragmatist tradition, highlighting their shared rejection of metaphysical dualism (1956). He demonstrated that the highest spiritual and ethical values were to be found not in a separate transcendental realm but in the unquestionable present and the *here* and the *now*. This philosophical convergence on a naturalistic wisdom—where intelligent functioning is seen as inseparable from interaction with the environment—reveals that the Kyoto School's project could be understood as part of a global philosophical struggle with modernity's dislocations.

Ames recognized the Zen stress on moving beyond technical mastery to achieve a state where "the breath of heaven and earth" is present in the work, a concept he saw as inspiring artists East and West (Ames 1960a:8). Where Buruma and Margalit see only a structural synonymy with antisemitism, Ames demonstrates that a Western observer can comprehend non-Western critique as a philosophical and spiritual intervention. The polemical fabrication of Occidentalism deliberately ignores this potential for understanding in favor of a simplistic pathology to ensure abyssal distancing toward the others, which represent a form of epistemic containment.

Yet, it is crucial to recognize that a more subtle form of epistemic containment operates within the well-intentioned *philosophical turn* in Kyoto School studies. This approach, seeking to analyze the school's work as pure philosophy, often engages in a strategic depoliticization. By isolating the philosophical architecture from its historical role in legitimizing the imperial state, this scholarship inadvertently performs a liberal-intersectional containment. It neutralizes the school's challenge by refusing to engage with what Osaki identifies as the "essential alliance between colonialism and the transcendental project of universalist philosophy" (2019:13). Where the polemic of Occidentalism pathologizes, this depoliticization sanitizes; both, however, function to obscure the real political pathology of the Schizophrenic vassal state.

This dynamic is definitively Orientalist, which I'd flag as *Orientalist epistemic dynamism,* as the nullification and marginalization of a complex, essentialist, and

philosophical critique—an objective awareness of epistemic invasion—into a simplistic narrative of intersubjective hatred. This maneuver finds a profound parallel in the highest echelons of Western philosophy itself. The case of Martin Heidegger is instructive. As Gu documents, Heidegger's revolutionary concept of Dasein bears a striking resemblance to ideas in Daoist and Zen texts with which he was familiar, yet he rigorously denied any influence (2021). This act of unacknowledged appropriation reveals a deep-seated epistemic insecurity, a mimetic anxious desire for the resources of the 'Other' coupled with a refusal of Recognition. The fabrication of Occidentalism is the populist counterpart to this philosophical denial, neutralizing it critique to avoid engaging with it as an equal peer. It is an act of epistemic hegemony, a dismissive gesture that refuses to engage the non-West as a source of universal thought and instead contains its discourse within the familiar hallucinations, pathological categories of the Western imagination. They perversely intersect the Japanese philosophical project with the history of European antisemitism, fabricating a quasi-coherent, reactionary ideology—Occidentalism—where one did not exist in such a pure form.

This polemical fabrication is not merely a scholarly oversight; it is a deliberate choice to ignore alternative models of understanding. Contemporaneous Western scholars, such as Van Meter Ames, demonstrated that the Kyoto School's project could be engaged as a philosophical and spiritual intervention. Ames traced profound affinities between Zen and American pragmatism, arguing that Zen's emphasis on immanent experience resonated with the thought of John Dewey and William James, to the point of being "a new name for American wisdom itself" (1960b:27). This demonstrable potential for recognition based on philosophical affinity is what the Occidentalism thesis must willfully ignore to sustain its reductive and nullifying pathology. This theoretical aporia is further exposed by its inability to account for complex, lived negotiations of cultural hegemony, such as Mari Yoshihara's (2004) study of the soprano Miura Tamaki, whose career involved a tangled web of agency, complicity, and nationalism that defies the simplistic label of hatred.

The Poverty of the Polemic. The result is a reductive reading that, as Naoki Sakai (1997) might argue, imposes a false coherence, flattening the Kyoto School's internal debates into a monologic ideology and failing to see its struggle as a symmetrical reversal of Orientalism's structure of address (p. 145). The thesis becomes even more tenuous when one considers the widespread, positive assimilation of Zen aesthetics in

the West—a meeting on fundamental philosophical ground, where the "form of art is the form of life" (Ames 1959:48). The Occidentalism categorization, blind to this receptivity, reveals its fundamental poverty.

This polemical containment operates in tandem with other, more subtle forms. The well-intentioned philosophical turn that depoliticizes the Kyoto School, sanitizing its historical complicity, functions as a liberal-intersectional containment. Both strategies —the polemic of hatred and the sanitization of pure philosophy—neutralize the school's challenge and preserve Western epistemological authority. As Goto-Jones argues, the scholarly responsibility is to 'explode' such parochial frames, not reinforce them (Goto-Jones 2007:9).

The fabrication of Occidentalism is thus a definitive act Orientalist epistemic dynamism, the reduction of a complex, objective awareness of epistemic invasion into a simplistic narrative of intersubjective hatred. It is the populist counterpart to the unacknowledged appropriation. This mechanism ensures that critique from the outside is never engaged on its own terms but is always contained within the pathological categories of the Western imagination, a textbook case of Barthes's 'ex-nomination.' By refusing to name its own hegemonic position, the West transforms a philosophical struggle for ethical sovereignty into a naturalized pathology, 'hatred of the West', thereby inoculating itself against the subversive recognition that the critique might be justified (Barthes [1957] 2012:Le mythe, à droite).

Having exposed this polemical fabrication, we can now turn to the internal dynamics of the Kyoto School's project to see how, despite its sovereign aspirations, it too became entangled in a hyper-mimetic performance of the very modernity it sought to overcome. To understand how even this sovereign philosophical project could be captured by the logic of mimetic desire, we must examine the core metaphysical archetype the Kyoto School developed for the wartime state—a theory that reveals the tragic perversion of their 'overcoming' into a hyper-mimetic performance.

6 The Metaphysics of Vassalage: Subject, Substratum, and the Schizophrenic grid

To understand how the Kyoto School's philosophical struggle became a performance of a dialectical trap inherent in confronting the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, we must examine the core metaphysical blueprint they developed, the theory of a Japanese national subjectivity defined by the unity between the subject and the substratum of the

state. This concept, meticulously articulated by Nishitani Keiji and Kōyama Iwao, is not an abstract speculation but the philosophical engine of the mimetic desire for recognition.

Their model found its idealized archetype in the figure of the samurai. Crucially, Kōyama and Nishitani did not merely invoke a static tradition. They actively re-engineered it. Drawing on the samurai ethic of *bushidō* —"in the sense of the ethics of responsibility, remained in each individual samurai" (Osaki 2019:54), Kōyama theorized a 'subjectivity of responsibility' where true freedom was found in the spontaneous acceptance of one's duty. He framed this as a paradoxical state where "the being of the self (yūga) turns into the absence of the self/selflessness (muga)" (2019:54). Thus, they stripped the samurai of his specific feudal context and encrypted the figure with a new, modernizing purpose: to serve as the subject of responsibility for the totalizing nation-state. This exemplifies the tragic bind of even a sovereign translation: the philosophical labor itself is indigenous and cryptographic (a sage's work), but the telos of that labor—the totalizing nation-state—remains a hyper-mimetic performance of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. They mastered the form to such a degree that their 'overcoming' became its ultimate, escalated enactment.

Nishitani developed this logic into an integral political theory. He argued that the state's demand for citizens' self-annihilating service was necessary to produce moral energy. This energy, in turn, would strengthen the state's unity and power, creating a self-justifying feedback loop. The ideal political form was a "circle between the substratum's becoming subject and the subject's becoming substratum" (Osaki 2019:59). In this model, the citizen attains higher subjectivity only by voluntarily becoming the foundation (substratum) of the state's power. Individual freedom is redefined as the choice to obey; national autonomy is realized through total mobilization.

This created a *pathological synergy* between philosophy and power, what can be termed the "complementarity of ideal and reality" (Osaki 2019:161). The high moral ideal of self-annihilation did not stand in critical opposition to the brutal reality of the imperial state; instead, it became the indispensable source of its legitimization. The ideal provided the ethical fuel, the moral energy, that powered the state's machinery, while the state's expansion provided the world-historical stage upon which the ideal could supposedly be realized.

This universalist claim, however, rested upon an inescapably *particularist* logic. Nishitani's 'world ethics' (sekai rinri) functioned through a circular syllogism, true ethics requires *self-annihilation*; this ethos finds its unique and highest expression in the Japanese spirit; therefore, the realization of *world ethics* logically necessitates Japanese critiqueship. This formulation exposes the tragic core of the schizophrenic vassal's philosophical project: in their sovereign attempt to 'overcome' the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, the Kyoto philosophers were compelled to weaponize the master's own tool, universalist reason, to assert a particularistic sovereignty. The result was not an authentic overcoming but a hyper-mimetic performance that replicated the very structures of hegemony they sought to transcend, perfectly illustrating the 'complicity of universalism and particularism' (Osaki 2019:8), inherent in a conceded critique.

It deserves to highlight that this hyper-mimetic performance was not confined to abstract philosophy. As Aydin refers to the pan-Asianist discourse that had once served as an anticolonial critique was, from 1931 to 1945, systematically co-opted by the Japanese state to justify its own imperial expansion. After the Manchurian Incident (1931) and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations (1933), "the Japanese government declared its 'return to Asia' by appropriating an already existing pan-Asianist alternative to the Eurocentric world order" (2007:176). Figures like Ōkawa Shumei, who had spent decades advocating Asian liberation against Western colonialism, found their ideas weaponized to legitimize Japan's hegemony over Korea, Manchuria, and Southeast Asia. Therefore, "official pan-Asianism of Japan after 1933 employed the internationalist legacy of Asianism but subverted it to legitimize Japanese imperialism" (2007:182). The Kyoto School's philosophical project of 'overcoming modernity' was drawn into this legitimizing apparatus, as many of its proponents provided intellectual justification for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This is the tragic irony of even a "nation with history", in Bauerian terms, the independent elite capacity for sovereign translation that enabled Japan to adapt Western modernity without succumbing to vassalage also enabled a hyper-mimetic escalation, where the drive for recognition from the West mutated into a drive for domination over Asia. The difference between Japan and the Ottoman/Arab cases is not the absence of pathology but the production of a different pathological form: one that, for a time, appeared to succeed, only to end in catastrophic defeat.

This theoretical construct is the archetypal expression of the schizophrenic vassal state, conditioned by the Ready-Made Modernity of the Western nation-state, did not offer an alternative to it. Instead, the Kyoto Scholars performed an *escalation* of commitment, which they supposed to overcome, by internalizing the model integrally. They sought to outdo the West by creating a more total, more spiritualized, and more demanding version of the modern state. This was not an overcoming of modernity but a desperate, *hyper-mimetic* performance aimed at *forcing* the Third Pillar of recognition from a hegemonic North as a corresponding peer. Their overcoming was, in reality, the ultimate victory of the imported form over the indigenous spirit, a perfect manifestation of the Ethical Schizophrenia that results when a political consciousness is forced to operate with an encrypted, foreign source code.

7 Conclusions. The Containment of Critique: Occidentalism as a Polemical Category

The consolidation of *Occidentalism* as a polemical category in the late twentieth century, most notably in the work of Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, reflects not a sober historical analysis but a specific political and epistemic exigency. This framing, however, is not merely a simplification but a fundamental misrecognition of the philosophical dynamic at play. As the case of the Kyoto School reveals, the core issue was not a *hatred* of the West but a fraught complicity of universalism and particularism (Osaki 2019). These philosophers wielded the universalistic language of world history and ethicality—the very tools of *The Northern Sage*—not to reject the West's game, but to beat it at its own, constructing a philosophical justification for a Japanese-led particular world order. The category of Occidentalism was mobilized to reframe this complex mimetic rivalry, and indeed all anti-colonial or (post)colonial critique, as a simple pathology instrumentalized tactically.

The Kyoto School's philosophical project cannot be fully understood without a comprehensible reference to the Kokutai, as the sacred-organic paradigm theorized by ultranational theorists (see Chapter V, section 2.2). While the Kyoto philosophers operated at a higher level of abstraction than state theologians, their concept of 'absolute nothingness' (zettaimu) and their vision of a Japanese-led world order were intellectually contiguous with the *Kokutai cosmology*. The difference lay in emphasis that Kakehi articulated a political theology of imperial rule; Nishida and his disciples sought a philosophical foundation for Japanese exceptionalism. Both, however, were

expressions of the same civilizational substrate which would be developed comparatively in Chapter V, section 2.2 infra.

With this understanding of the Kyoto School's involvement with the Kokutai paradigm, this fabrication serves a clear function, to stabilize the West's self-image as rational, enlightened, an abyssal perspective, and perpetually embattled, thereby serving its self-victimism and the demonization of others. By inventing a discourse of Occidentalism, Euro-American power neutralizes critique and recenters itself as the universal referent of modernity. Thus, Occidentalism operates within a regime of catho-truth—a fabricated, Catholic-style category that nonetheless organizes the field of intelligibility, shaping what can and cannot count as legitimate critique. Thus, even while presuming neutrality from ecclesial-patriarchal perspectives, the West remained, throughout its project of Illustration, loyal to an epistemological legacy of absolute truth and the demonization of the other.

Thus, the Japanese case occupies a unique position on the spectrum of vassalage. It demonstrates the possibility of sovereign translation and indigenous critique, effectively refuting the simplistic label of Occidentalism and confirming what Tu Weiming (2002), writing from within the Multiple Modernities tradition, has argued for East Asia more broadly: that modernization need not entail Westernization, and that indigenous civilizational traditions can serve as "active agents in modernity" rather than as obstacles to it (2002:217). Yet Japan also reveals the ultimate power and insidiousness of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, even the most sophisticated attempt to overcome it can become a hyper-mimetic performance that remains trapped within the paradigm's fundamental logic—the logic of the totalizing, competitive nation-state. Japan is not a schizophrenic vassal in the Ottoman or Arab sense, but its historical trajectory illustrates the extreme difficulty of achieving a clean epistemological neutralizing break.

The polemical category of Occidentalism thus performs a final, cynical containment: it mistakes this tragic, escalated performance of a hijacked dialectic for a simple pathology of hatred, thereby obscuring the tyrannic structuralism of a global order that produces such schizophrenic vassal states in the first place. Therefore, it stands as the excellent exception that proves the Bauerian rule. It was a *nation with history*, possessing a *surviving indigenous elite* that could perform the role of the sage—sovereignly translating and adapting the imported paradigm. This contrasts starkly

with the sterilized artisan-elites we will encounter in the Ottoman and Arab cases, who were reduced to transliteration and mimicry. Where the Ottoman-Arab elite would later engage in *linguistic sculpting* (e.g., Sadık Rıfat Paşa's untranslated use of *civilisation*), the Meiji scholars performed sovereign translation (e.g., inventing *hishūkyō*). This capacity for indigenous cryptographic work is the Bauerian hallmark of a 'nation with history,' setting Japan apart as the exceptional case that proves the rule of global vassalage.

The following chapter reveals how this dynamic, when applied by/to a state massive project over centuries, generates the even more acute political schizophrenia of the vassal state, as the Ottoman Empire's longing for recognition culminated in a fundamental rupture with its own society.

Finally it deserves to highlight an insightful key point, regarding the Japanese exception, as a recognition through labor, before walking ahead throughout our next chapters. The trajectory traced in this chapter reveals not only how the Kyoto School's project was misrecognized as Occidentalism, but also why Japan's engagement with modernity followed a fundamentally different path from the vassal states examined in subsequent chapters. The difference lies not in the absence of mimetic desire but in its processing through what Hegel identified as the bondsman's path to self-consciousness, theorized in Chapter I.

The Kyoto School's philosophical labor, whatever its political entanglements, was precisely an attempt to think through Western categories toward something that was neither mere imitation nor reactive rejection. They were, in Hegel's terms, engaged in Bilden—formative activity—not anxious performance. As the Japanese achieved this self-certainty not by awaiting the West's recognition but by finding themselves objectified in the institutions, philosophies, and cultural forms they themselves had forged. The West's gaze became secondary—sometimes courted, sometimes resisted, but never the source of ontological security.

Chapter III

The Schizophrenic Vassal: Ottoman Occidentalism and the Pathology of Failed Recognition

Synchronizing the Clocks: Ottoman Reform, Westernism, and the Trauma of Non-Belonging

Illustration. The cover image of the first edition of *Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü* (Tanpınar 1961), available only in the Turkish edition of Wikipedia (last accessed 11 May 2026). Representing an arresting image depicts a bald and sorrowful man who has bound himself—hands crossed, tying his own body from chest to feet—to an exogenous clock. This is not a regulator, but a self-bound captive of time; an icon of self-imposed captivity. This visual metaphor encapsulates the core argument of this chapter: the state's pathological project was not one of mere synchronization, but of self-tying—a tragic, auto-imposed bondage to the rigid, alien temporal order of Western modernity. This self-inflicted act severs the intimate, organic time of society, generating the profound psychological and political dislocation this book terms identitarian schizophrenia, the spectre that haunts Turkish modernity.

The desperate synchronization of clocks—or as intended by the English translation as 'The Time Regulation Institute' (Tanpınar [1961] 2014) is, therefore, the perfect metaphor for the imposition of an alien temporal *Modus*. It is not merely a matter of adopting a time-zone, but of forcing an ontological rhythm—a manner of being in time (the linear, irreversible, and productive time of European modernity)—upon the organic temporality of the Ottoman societal reality. This violent arrhythmia is the foundational act of ethical schizophrenia.

As anticipated in the Introduction, the Christian Middle Ages coined the term *modernus* but made remarkably little of it (Kumar [1995] 2009:93), maintaining a static vision of time. It was not until the secularization of Christian eschatology in the eighteenth century that the modern ideology of *Progress* was born, as a secularized 'time of Progress' (Löwith 1949:84), a linear and vectorial manner of inhabiting history, that the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm exports and imposes, freezing the organic flow of liquid societies within the cage of a consumerist and spectacular perpetual present.

This literary metaphor finds its precise psycho-social mechanism in the dynamics of escalating commitment. As Staw's research demonstrates, when decision-makers are personally responsible for negative consequences, they often respond by increasing their investment. This escalation is powerfully reinforced when their commitments are

public, explicit, and repeated, thereby externally binding their identity to the course of action and making it psychologically irrevocable (Staw 1976:28; Staw and Ross 1989:217). Each Ottoman and later Republican reform—from the *Tanzimat* decrees to the Kemalist linguistic reforms—was precisely such a *performative* act. Together, these acts constructed a *rhetorical cage*: a trap of their own making, from which the elite could not escape without admitting catastrophic failure. The state's desperate *synchronization* was, therefore, not a freely chosen strategy but a compulsive performance driven by the need to justify a century of prior investment, which will be discussed in this chapter.

If Japan illustrates the philosophical misrecognition of the struggle against the tyrannic massivity of the Ready-Made Modernity, the Ottoman-Turkish case provides its archetypal historical anatomy. This chapter traces the genesis of the schizophrenic vassal state through centuries of reform, from the *Tanzimat* to the Kemalist revolution. It reveals this history not as a clean break but as an escalating cycle of mimetic performance for Western recognition—the Third Pillar theorized in Chapter I. With the dialectic of recognition stalled, the vassal state was condemned to what Hegel called the 'Unhappy Consciousness'—a condition of perpetual and structural non-recognition. In doing so, it cemented a fundamental rupture between the state and its own societal everyday-life-world, creating the composite state that remains the defining pathology of Turkish modernity, to trace how a state-driven modernity generated its own perfect mirror image in political *quasi*-Islam, revealing the depth of a pathology where all political contests are fought within a schizophrenic structure.

1 Introduction: The Misdiagnosis of Modernity

It is a common and profound error to attribute the modernization of Turkey solely to the figure of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This misconception simplifies a deep, structurally complex, and deeply traumatic historical process into a single man and a single era. In reality, Atatürk was not the originator but the final, most radical executor of a project that began over a century earlier within the Ottoman Empire. This foundational trauma did not conclude with the Republic's founding but, Alev Çınar demonstrates, evolved into a permanent state of political disorder, structuring the nation's entire political landscape. The Kemalist revolution was not a resolution but the most forceful enunciation of one side of a fundamental rift, "a larger discursive field wherein contending ideologies challenge and seek to overpower each other" in a battle over the very meaning of Turkish modernity (Çınar 2005:7). This ongoing struggle, fought over

the bodies, places, and time of the nation, is the living legacy of the Ottoman Occidentalist project, a legacy where both Kemalist secularists and their Islamist challengers are "equally modernizing, nationalist, and totalizing" in their competing visions (Çinar 2005:30).

This elite-driven approach to social change was not a Kemalist invention but the culmination of a deep-seated 'perceptual frame' inherited from the Ottoman bureaucratic tradition. Şerif Mardin argues, this mindset, rooted in an ideology of state omnipotent primacy, conceptualizes social transformation not as an organic process but through projects—cohesive, top-down plans engineered by a vanguard elite. This methodology, while effective for state preservation, systematically neglects the micro dimensions of society—the everyday life, beliefs, and tacit understandings that constitute a people's lifeworld (1997:64–65). This internal drive for *ordering* was profoundly shaped by an Islamic discourse of renewal, where, as Brian Silverstein's (2011) refers, reform was framed not as mimicry but as *ijtihad* (independent reasoning)—a religious duty to strengthen the Muslim nation.

Mardin's 'perceptual frame' was not merely a political strategy but was conditioned by what Gu and Guo identify as the 'cultural unconscious.' The Ottoman-Turkish elite's fervent mimetic desire can thus be understood as a political manifestation of the West-fetish—a deep-seated, often unconscious internalization of Western epistemological superiority. This made the top-down project of Westernization seem not just strategic, but like the only path to "the best that has been thought and said." (Gu and Guo 2015:310) From this conditioned perspective, the societal pragmatism represented not a rich alternative to be engaged, but the very backwardness they were mandated to eradicate, thereby cementing the schism between state and nation.

While some scholars periodize these changes into traditional and modern phases (Goldschmidt and Davidson 2010; Shaw and Shaw 1976, 1977), this chapter argues that the entire continuum—from the internal ordering projects of the 18th century to the Kemalist revolution—is defined by a singular, escalating dynamic: the elite's adoption of a state-inspired project methodology that sought to solve problems of state survival through top-down engineering, a process that invariably clashed with the societal reality and was tragically compounded by the refusal of Western recognition. Furthermore, this engagement created a conceptual dilemma where modernity, an organic paradigm in the West, was reduced in the Turkish-Ottoman context to a

conviction in progressive continuity and a faith in progress (Smith 2003; So 1990), instead, it induced a profound political-identitarian schizophrenia. This condition was born from the Ottoman elite's fervent adoption of a Western vassal identity—an identity that the West itself ultimately refused to recognize.

Aydin pinpoints the 1880s as the moment when the West revealed its 'two faces' (Aydin 2007:3). On one hand, Enlightenment universalism; on the other, a new discourse of racial and civilizational exclusion. The British occupation of Egypt (1882), the scramble for Africa, and the rise of figures like William Gladstone, who "hostile remarks about Muslims and Turks reflected both a larger European sentiment about 'infidel Muslims' and a more refined European Orientalist discourse on Muslim inferiority" (Aydin 2007:45 n.8)—convinced non-Western elites that the universal West had been a mirage. Ernest Renan's 1883 lecture "Islam and Science" argued that "Muslims could never reach the level of European civilization while remaining loyal to their culture, religion, or even ethnicity". Muslim modernists like Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani responded by defending Islam's compatibility with science, but the damage was done: the Third Pillar of recognition was now structured to be withheld. As Aydin notes, "Renan's thesis about the history of Islamic science was seen as a symbol of a larger European justification for Europe's racial superiority "to justify its imperial 'civilizing mission'" (2007:52).

Others, more pragmatically, relate Eastern modernity to the treaties that designed the post-Ottoman order, such as Lausanne and Sykes-Picot (Fromkin 2001). This project—variously called reform, Westernization, or modernization—is better understood as a form of Occidentalism: a conscious, often desperate, attempt by a non-Western power to emulate, internalize, and be recognized by the geopolitical and cultural West, a process that has been simultaneously analyzed as a form of self-betrayal and fiercely contested by narratives within the post-Ottoman world that champion the empire's Islamic legitimacy and lament its deliberate malignment (Al-šnāwy 1980). This reinterpretation aligns with recent trends in Ottoman studies, which have moved away from simplistic binaries like "Westernization" or "decline" and toward a more nuanced understanding of reform as a complex, often internally-driven process of state reordering. As Virginia Aksan notes, the field now avoids "epistemological resistance to terms such as medieval, renaissance, early modern, westernization, modernization, and

the like," reflecting a broader shift toward thematic and global frameworks (Aksan 2014:3).

However, this was not merely a project of mimicry. Recent scholarship has shown, the Ottoman engagement with modern techniques of governance was, from its inception in the 18th century, argued for and "legitimated on grounds internal to Islamic reasoning in order to reverse military defeats" (Silverstein 2011:33). The profound political-identitarian schizophrenia that resulted was born not from simple imitation, but from the Ottoman elite's fervent adoption of a modern, Islamic reformist identity—an identity that the West itself refused to recognize, seeing only a deficient version of itself.

This pathological condition did not emerge overnight with the Kemalist era but was the culmination of a centuries-long struggle. As contemporary Turkish intellectual Halide Edib observed, Turkey served as the world's ideal cross-section and very best laboratory for studying this fundamental conflict, a place where the philosophical, cultural, and political forces of East and West met in a constant and often violent contention (Edib 1935:1–2).

The result was a nation trapped in a paralyzing limbo, having willingly abandoned many of the pillars of its own traditional order yet perpetually rejected by the very civilization it sought to join. This chapter will trace the genesis of this condition through the Ottoman reforms, analyze its devastating social consequences, and examine its enduring and haunting legacy in the modern Turkish psyche.

2 The Theoretical Paradigm: Schizophrenic Vassalage and the Third Pillar

The Ottoman-Turkish experience provides the archetypal historical case of the Schizophrenic Vassalage outlined in this book's introduction. Its century-long reform project was a protracted and tragic quest to secure the elusive Third Pillar of Western recognition, a process driven by *Vicarious Conditioning*—the mimetic desire for Rewarded Northern Models, described in Chapter I, locked the elite into a performative cycle. The elite's fervent adoption of a state-inspired project methodology were not merely mimicry but a desperate internalization of this conditioning, where the societal life represented not a rich alternative to be engaged, but the very backwardness they were mandated to eradicate. This epistemological sterilization cemented the schism, as each imported reform—from the *Tanzimat* legal codes to the Kemalist alphabet—functioned as another massive package installed without careful

cognition neither access to its philosophical source code. These reforms were not merely cultural changes but a state-driven project to forcibly replace the existing Ottoman-Islamic *markers* of the anonymous society with a new, European set—a violent re-scripting of the national 'scent,' in Moffett's terms (2020), aimed at purchasing entry into the coveted circle of Western nations.

This failure was not an accident but a structural feature of the Eurocentric international order. Just as the Ottoman elite, through the *Tanzimat*, most fervently built the first two pillars—embracing *civilisation* and multi-ethnic statehood—the goalposts of recognition were moved. Aydin details this pivotal shift: when the Ottoman Empire came to be seen as the symbolic leader of colonized Muslims, European empires worked to "exclude it from European international society, reasoning that because it was a Muslim dynasty," its Christian subjects were inherently oppressed. European discourse now claimed that "Christians should not be ruled by semicivilized Muslims" (Aydin 2013:167). The performance of modernity was deemed irrelevant; the ascribed identity of Muslim became the permanent stigma that justified the perpetual withholding of the Third Pillar.

This dynamic is powerfully illustrated by the Kemalist elite's project, a paradigmatic modernization-from-above aimed at constructing a European Turkey by violently suppressing the country's Ottoman-Islamic heritage (Yavuz and Khan 2004:392). This strategy of becoming European deliberately engineered a cognitive vacuum, severing the state from the societal world and exemplifying Ghalioun's 'state against the nation' (Ghalioun [1993] 2015)—a pathology born from the perpetual absence of genuine recognition from Europe itself. The erratic nature of modern Turkish foreign policy, for instance, can be read as the symptomatic behavior of a state still navigating this schizophrenic position, performing strategic independence for a Western gaze that consistently withholds the full recognition it seeks (Eran and Lindenstrauss 2015).

This chapter traces the genesis of this condition, showing how an internal project of state 'ordering' (*Tanzimat*) was captured and redirected by European powers, leading to a fundamental rupture between the state and its core constituency. The failure of this quest, despite the elite's fervent commitment, locked the nation into the pathological dynamic of stigmatization and mimetic performance that would define its modern history.

This condition of seeking external validation is exacerbated by the very nature of the ideals being adopted. As Elie Kedourie argues, nationalism is the most potent of these, was not an organic development but "a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century" which promised a false and ultimately destructive criterion for political legitimacy (Kedourie [1970] 2006a:9). The Ottoman pursuit of Western recognition thus involved internalizing a foreign ideological framework that was inherently designed to dismantle its own multi-ethnic, and thus, imperial structure. The Ottoman Empire, and later the Turkish Republic, excelled in building the first two pillars. Its ruling class, from the Sultanic court to the Kemalist revolutionaries, was passionately devoted to the cause of becoming Western. Through sweeping legal, sartorial, and linguistic changes, they also compelled much of the public to follow. However, the Third Pillar—acceptance by the West—remained forever out of reach. This failure locked Turkey into a pathological condition that Ayşe Zarakol—in her extension of Laing and Giddens to the international sphere—identifies as a profound *ontological insecurity*, characterized by a structural insecurity (a liminal, in-between position) and a temporal insecurity (a perpetual feeling of 'lagging behind') (2017:50). To be torn between East and West is, as she earlier summarizes, "to exist in the international system with the dilemmas that are faced by stigmatized individuals in everyday interaction" (2010b:7).

Crucially, this failure of recognition was not a temporary setback of the late Ottoman-transitional period but a persistent, structural feature of Turkey's position in the international order. Even after the Kemalist revolution successfully built the first two pillars—elite and public commitment to a Western orientation—the Third Pillar remained cranky. As David Kushner's analysis of the late 20th century demonstrates, Turkish leaders consistently reaffirmed their commitment to the West, yet were often met with ambivalence and rejection (1984).

The European dilatory response to Turkey's candidacy for European Union membership in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries underscores the perpetual withholding of this Third Pillar of recognition. Despite undertaking sweeping reforms to meet the EU's Copenhagen criteria, Turkey faced deep-seated cultural and religious resistance within Europe. Figures like former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing declared Turkish entry would be "the end of Europe," while public polls showed significant opposition, framed in terms of civilizational anxiety

about "the river of Islam" entering the "riverbed of secularism" (Yavuz and Khan 2004:393). This resistance confirms that the quest for Recognition is often structured to fail, locking the supplicant state into a cycle of performance and rejection that defines its vassalage.

While figures like Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel pragmatically argued that Turkey's interests lay with the West, their language often betrayed a sense of being instrumentalized, for instance, as 'Europe's buffer strength' rather than welcomed as an equal member (Kushner 1984:236–37). This perception of conditional acceptance could turn into overt stigmatization, as seen when European countries imposed visa restrictions on Turkish citizens in 1980—a move perceived as a 'slap in the face' at the very moment Turkey's military government was reaffirming its Western allegiances (Kushner 1984:238).

This dynamic of cynical engagement had deep roots. It was a recurring feature of Western policy, epitomized during the First World War when British officials like Ronald Storrs privately viewed negotiations with Sharif Husain as a form of oriental haggling, believing he would be amply rewarded with limited independence, while their official communications, he and his superiors embellished their messages with extravagant rhetoric about "the cause of the Arabs, which is the cause of freedom" and the "rising of the sun over Arabia." This disjuncture between private belief and public promise reveals a policy designed to elicit cooperation through calculated ambiguity, with no serious intention of granting the recognition the Arabs sought (Kedourie [1976] 2014:38, 40, 126).

Contemporaries were acutely aware of this dynamic. The preface to Halide Edib's lectures notes that any criticism of Eastern weaknesses was bitterly resented, as it was seen to "tighten the strangle-hold of Western imperialism or confirm the moral and intellectual domination of the West" (Edib 1935:vii). This created a vicious cycle: the pursuit of Western approval required self-critique, but that self-critique only reinforced the subordinate status that made approval impossible, a core mechanism of the resulting political schizophrenia.

This desire for recognition, however, was not merely a one-sided Ottoman fantasy. As Geoffrey Nash demonstrates, it was a theme actively debated within British political discourse itself. A significant dissenting tradition, which Nash terms the 'Urquhart School of Orientalists,' stood in opposition to mainstream imperialist thinking. Figures

like David Urquhart, and later Wilfrid Blunt and Marmaduke Pickthall, argued vociferously for the authenticity and durability of Eastern institutions and for a British policy based on patronage and mutual interest with the Islamic world, thereby creating a conceptual space for the Recognition the Ottoman elite sought (2005:20). Nevertheless, this dissenting tradition remained marginal; the dominant paradigm of Western engagement was consistently one of stigmatization and conditional, often cynical, interaction, which is the focus of this analysis.

This failure of recognition creates a state of political schizophrenia. The nation becomes a 'bursary agency' (Meyer and Jepperson 2000), constructing its social identity from the perspectives of the other—in this case, the West—only to find itself trapped by that other's denial. This dynamic meant that Turkish identity was perpetually refracted through an imagined Western perspective. As Meltem Ahıska argues, drawing on Žižek, the West functioned as the "virtual viewpoint of the Ego-ideal" for the national elite, driving a project of Occidentalism –a performative mimicry aimed at managing a perceived stigma. This project generated a profound inferiority complex, as the elite internalized the lack projected onto them—a condition Zarakol theorizes as a core stigmatized state identity, defined by a "special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity." Turkish-ness became a schizophrenic effort to fill this lack with a performed "civilization," all while knowing that the actual Western gaze was arbitrary, uncertain, and ultimately rejecting (Ahiska 2010:51–52; Zarakol 2010a)—It is a remarkable and fruitful coincidence that two Turkish scholars, Meltem Ahıska and Ayşe Zarakol, working independently in the UK in 2010, published seminal works diagnosing the same pathological core of Turkish modernity—Ahıska through the cultural-theoretical lens of Occidentalism and the 'Western gaze,' and Zarakol through the IR-theoretical framework of stigma and established-outsider dynamics. One of this chapter perspectives is to synthesize their powerful, convergent insights—. According to this view, modern Western ontology is subjected to a strong rationalizing prison that reduces direct spiritual dominion in public space, expelling the deity from society through an aggressive and continuous search for common and universal principles—such as human rights—that are then imposed on others as a global conception, and a 'self-segregation' (Goffman 1963) that is not reciprocated.

Huntington cited examples like Turkey and Mexico, a list to which we can add Lebanon, Tunisia, and, to some extent, Morocco, as well as several emerging Gulf

States—all cases of identitarian disorder where nations strove to adopt a foreign identity without the parent civilization's recognition. They became wanderers, trapped between a renounced identity and an assumed vassalage without backing (Zarakol, 2010). Regarding Turkey specifically, Zarakol makes a critical exception: she argues that Turks internalized the trauma of the Ottoman collapse, forging a narrative that their failure to modernize sufficiently was the cause of their empire's demise. Hence, it is now argued that they continue to be denied Western status for not having modernized enough—a devastating circular logic (Zarakol, 2010, pp. 7-8).

While this analysis focuses on the Ottoman-Turkish experience, the model of the schizophrenic vassal is not unique. As Zarakol demonstrates in After Defeat, this pathological condition—born from a stigmatizing international order and manifesting in a desperate, often traumatic pursuit of recognition—is a shared fate of other latecomer empires like Japan and Russia. These states, which pre-dated the Westphalian system, were incorporated into it not as equals but as outsiders, forced to internalize a normative standard that marked them as inherently deficient. This suggests that the dynamic described here is not merely a Turkish pathology but a systemic feature of a modern international order with specific cultural origins, a recurring pattern of what might be called the stigmatized state.

This pathological condition must be understood not only as a cultural dilemma but as a structural feature of integrating into a global order dominated by the West. Following Yıldız Atasoy, Islamic politics—and by extension, the Turkish struggle—must be analyzed "as an element of globalization wherein global and local dynamics interact and interconnect" and in terms of "the material relations of global capitalism, the reorganization of states, political alliances, and cultures" (Atasoy 2005:4, 15). The quest for recognition was thus simultaneously a quest for a favorable position within the global capitalist economy, a dilemma that both the Kemalist and Islamist elites have sought to solve, with different cultural strategies.

In an interview published in The Believer, the 2006 Nobel laureate in literature, the Turk Orhan Pamuk, stated the following:

> I'll tell you something. I have just come back from Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taipei. And you know what they say? This is very peculiar.... No one thinks his country is completely East. In China, they say, "Yes, Mr. Pamuk, we have the same East/West question here." They think that they are also torn between the East and the West, the way we are here in Turkey. They don't consider themselves in China or in Tokyo

> completely "East." They think that they have some part of the "West" and "East," you see? No one, except some few British, and some Americans—maybe some French —think that they are totally Western. [Laughs] And no one—this is maybe more surprising—thinks of themselves as thoroughly Eastern. Where is west in China? Or Tokyo? They have an abundance of West in themselves. And they will tell you this, and then they will smile—knowing the strangeness of it. There is no place, perhaps, in humanity, where the subject considers himself completely Eastern (Pamuk 2006).

Pamuk's experience exemplifies the intense pressure faced by cultural figures in a stigmatized state: to be celebrated internationally is often perceived domestically as having been rewarded for confirming the negative stereotypes of the very Western gaze the nation is trying to escape, a classic dynamic of the established-outsider relationship (Zarakol 2010b). This futile struggle is perfectly symbolized in the Turkish novelist Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's work, *The Time Regulation Institute* (Saatleri Ayarlama Enstitüsü) (1961). Its title evokes the anarchic, self-imposed calvary of a society desperately trying to 'synchronize its clocks' with an exogenous timeline. This is more than a metaphor for development; it is the perfect image of a sterilized elite's attempt to force a foreign *Kulturgemeinschaft* upon a resistant societal life. The state, in its Schizophrenic Vassalage, is not merely adopting new technology but trying to impose an alien *temporal* order—the very rhythm and pace of history itself—as a mimetic performance for the Northern gaze. The trauma of this failed synchronization, of a people forever out of joint with their own time, becomes a collectively traumatic memory. The trauma of this failed transformation, as Fassin and Rechtman (2007) and Alexander (2012) argue, becomes a collectively accepted memory, a foundational resentment that redirects a group's future identity in an irrevocably adverse way.

This identity struggle arises from what Goffman termed a 'special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity' (1963). As Huntington noted, people use politics not only to promote their interests but also to define their identity, often only knowing who they are when they know whom they are against (1996). The ultimate philosophical summary of this paradigm may be what Alfred North Whitehead identified as the two inherent principles of things: the spirit of change and the spirit of conservation. "There can be nothing real without both," he argued, for "mere change without conservation is a passage from nothing to nothing" (Whitehead 1925:250–51). The Ottoman-Turkish schism emerged from a catastrophic failure to balance these two spirits. This failure was operationalized through what Çağlar Keyder identifies as

modernization-from-above: a process where a state elite, convinced of its own visionary clarity, imposes its *framework* for modernity upon society as a passive 'object' to be molded, rather than a subject to be engaged (Keyder 1997:38). This foundational authoritarianism ensured the project would be structurally flawed from its inception.

This schism was operationalized through a specific modern mechanism that Alev Çınar identifies as the defamation of the present. For a modernizing project to legitimize its transformative intervention, it must first construct the current reality as deficient, corrupt, and in urgent need of salvation (Ahiska 2010:23). This mechanism would become central to the Kemalist state, which framed the Ottoman past as a catastrophic era of backwardness, and later to its Islamist challengers, who would defame the secular present as an era of cultural decay. This shared methodology reveals the profound depth of the pathology: both sides, in their battle against each other, are operating with the same modern, transformative, and totalizing logic, each seeking to eradicate the other's vision by first incriminating the concept the other has created.

3 The Historical Genesis: *Tanzimat* as Ordering, Not Reform

The roots of the modernization are found not in the 1920s, but in the 18th century. The first Ottoman monarch associated with modernization, as *Nizam-ı Cedid,* was Sultan Selim III (1761-1808), though the final impulse under his predecessor Abdul-Hamid I was strictly military—a project focused solely on tactics and ordinance achieved through hiring European advisors (Edib 1930:63). In other words, these initial reforms focused solely on a transformation of military tactics and organizational structure, not yet on broader state structures or massive social transformation. While this narrow focus on military modernization would later prove to be a Trojan horse, as will be discussed hereafter.

The movement gained its name and its transformative ambition under the denomination *Tanzimat*. It is critical to dissect the semantics of this term, as its western translation as 'reforms' is misleading. The Turkish verb *tanzim*, from the Arabic root *tnẓīm*, refers to the act of ordering something whose nature is perceived as primitive or chaotic—a state that has never been ordered before. This is fundamentally different from reform (*iṣlāḥ*), which implies reorganizing the essence of something that is already ordered.

This semantic distinction resonates with recent scholarship that frames the *Tanzimat* not as mimicry but as a strategic project of centralization and legitimation.

Aksan observes that the "study of empire(s) is flourishing," with new emphasis on "local (indigenous) Middle Eastern populations and societies as they fit into the ebb and flow of global trends" (Aksan 2014:3–4). The *Tanzimat* can thus be seen as an Ottoman attempt to reorder the empire in response to both internal fragmentation and global pressure—a project of governance rather than mere Westernization.

This internal drive for 'ordering' was met with a complex and often contradictory response from European powers. As Nash outlines, British policy was trapped in a fundamental and debilitating contradiction: "the desire to reform [the Ottoman Empire] on European lines and the desire to preserve it" (Nash 2005:38). The unstated goal was to maintain a pliable, weak buffer state against Russia, not a genuinely modernized equal. This policy effectively demanded that the Ottomans perform a paradox: to become "modern" yet remain subordinate. This impossible demand fundamentally shaped the Ottoman—and later Turkish—condition, cementing a deep-seated ontological insecurity rooted in the stigma of never being able to achieve full recognition, no matter how perfectly the performance of 'modernity' was executed (Zarakol 2017).

While Nash (2005) and Yapp (1987) interpret it, the *Tanzimat* was therefore a re-organization or the imposition of new orders and regulations. While indeed it was an effort to order what was considered old or primitive, bringing it into a phase of ordering. It is crucial to note that this was not necessarily, in its initial conception, about adjusting to an external Western standard or assimilating to a foreign reference point, but simply about ordering the empire following a new, sustainable pattern. From this point on, however, this movement would be perceived and referred to as reforms, as the interventions undertaken were substantive changes to the pre-existing order.

This semantic distinction between tanzim (ordering) and *islah* (reforming) is critical because it reveals the reform's genesis as an internal Ottoman project, not merely a mimetic one (Mardin 1997:64). The chaos to be ordered was first and foremost the centrifugal force of local Muslim powerholders who had consolidated autonomous fiefdoms and challenged the central state's authority. As Kemal Karpat cite, the initial driving force of transformation was the state's struggle to crush these *influences* and reassert its hegemony and control. The policy of centralization was, in Karpat's words, "instrumental in undermining the bases of the old arrangement" (Karpat 2002:39). The

first modern army, the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, was created by Selim III largely for the purpose of use it against domestic rivals like *Pasvanoglu*, not foreign enemies.

This internal drive for 'ordering' was profoundly shaped by an Islamic discourse of renewal and rectification. As the empire faltered, Ottoman intellectuals and *ulema* diagnosed the problem as one of internal stagnation (*inhitat*) and deviation from Islamic purposes of the State. Their solution was not to abandon tradition but to return to a purified essence of Islam, which they argued necessitated the adoption of effective contemporary techniques. This was not mimicry but *ijtihad* (independent reasoning); reform was framed as a religious duty to strengthen the Muslim nation. Prominent Islamists argued for constitutionalism as the modern form of Islamic consultation (*meşveret*), and later, even the abolition of the Caliphate was justified by Sufi sheikhs and scholars in the National Assembly through intricate Islamic legal reasoning, positing the Republic as the legitimate executor of the Caliph's function of ensuring justice (Silverstein 2011:59–62). Thus, the political project of centralization was simultaneously and sincerely experienced as a project of Islamic revival.

This traceability is crucial: the Occidentalist project began not with a desire to be Western, but with a desperate Ottoman need to re-order itself on its own terms. By other hand, the schizophrenia began when this internal project of state survival and Islamic renewal was systematically captured and re-addressed by Western powers, who demanded that 'ordering' now mean ethno-cultural and identitarian privileges, then by adopting foreign legal codes, thereby turning the state's tools of survival into instruments of its own fragmentation.

By other hand, Selim III showed an almost paradoxical fascination with the French Revolution, sending his confidant, Ishak Bey, to Paris to study its new institutions, with an eye to replicating them. This was a monarch inspired by a revolution that had beheaded a monarchy—an early sign of the deep contradictions that would define the Occidentalist project, while simultaneously establishing the first permanent Ottoman embassy in Paris (Karaer 2010:76–77; Tunç 2018). This dual commissioning of a private Jewish agent and an official diplomat symbolizes the complex, multi-track approach to Westernization. This engagement led some, like Alfred Le Châtelier, in his report on the situation of the Muslim world published in the Revue du Monde Musulman in 1910, to see the Turkish Revolution as the intellectual heir of the French one (Karaer 2010).

The Turkish writer Halide Edib, exiled from the Kemalist regime, reflecting on this era, optimistically called it a 'Turkish Renaissance' (Edib 1930:83), a 'revival and rejuvenation' (Edib 1930:72). While this period less resembles a healthy rebirth and more the first onset of a split personality—a schizophrenic disorder, where the state began to operate on two conflicting cognitive frameworks: one inherited, the other desperately imported. This disorder would be fully critiqued by later intellectuals like Edib herself, who in exile saw Kemalist Turkey as a cultural clownery (*Sinekli Bakkal*) (Edib 2010), a new identity lacking authenticity and substance, an internal enemy of the kind described by Ashis Nandy (1983), undermining genuine independence.

While the term 'Turkey' was solidified as a national project by late Ottoman intellectuals influenced by European philology (Kedourie [1970] 2006b:49–51), the Western habit of defining and often disparaging Ottoman identity through such stereotypes—as seen in French Napoleonic discourse a century earlier—was a long-standing source of psychological and political pressure.

This early Occidentalist impulse created a unique blend of influences within the reforming elite. Edib notes that by the time of the *Tanzimat*, a "mystic and spiritual philosophy of Eastern origin" had deeply impressed itself on Turkish literature and personal life, ensuring that even statesmen with a Western outlook "were not indifferent to the national culture." Consequently, when they came under the influence of the French Encyclopaedists, they assimilated most readily ideas which were in keeping with their Eastern bent, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which resonated with Islamic principles of social justice (Edib 1935:68). This created a foundational tension: a reform program justified by an appeal to both Enlightenment ideals and Islamic essence, masking the deeper schism between the two worldviews.

Returning to the Ottoman reformist discourse, Edib generalizes its next phase around 1807, with the coronation of Mahmud II, the nephew and intellectual disciple of Selim III. Mahmud II initiated maneuvers aimed at combating administrative corruption and restoring order from a decentralizing perspective, emancipating provinces and promoting the political preparation of the people. Edib argues this referred to a political democratization rather than a social one, for "democracy in the social sense always existed in the Ottoman empire, but political democracy could only be projected with the gradual help of education" (Edib 1930:64–66). In this period, the first reforms in Turkish clothing also took place, as Turks began to adopt the Greek

style of the time—an adapted version of Western attire—abandoning their heritage vestments (Edib 1930:68).

4 The Conceptual Contagion: The Perversion of Nationalism and the Millet System

The Westernizing reforms, designed to strengthen the empire, ultimately acted as a Trojan Horse. The ideas they introduced—particularly a specific *brand* of European nationalism—would become the very instruments of the empire's disintegration. This was not a simple case of adoption, but a violent and ironic perversion. This catastrophic perversion can only be understood by realizing that nationalism is not an indigenous development, but a foreign, pre-packaged paradigm imported from Europe. Kedourie defines it as "a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century," one which "pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states" (Kedourie [1960] 1961:9). Its translation into non-European contexts often involved the transmutation of religious faith into a nationalist ideology in order to "thereby utilize the powerful and tenacious loyalties which a faith held in common for centuries creates" (Kedourie, 1960, p. 67). The result was a "powerful and disturbing impact of Western ideas and techniques on Oriental society" (Kedourie [1960] 1961:110). This impact infested native anthropological constellations, instrumentalizing them to align with wholesale liberalist structures. This process ultimately left societies in a vacuum, severed from the substantive reason for their collective being and association.

The fatal dynamic unfolded as follows: just as the Ottoman Muslim elite was attempting to move away from religion as the primary source of political identity—embracing a more secular, European-style concept of Ottoman citizenship and even democracy (Edib 1930:66)—the Christian, and other beliefs, communities within the empire were pushed in the exact opposite direction. Encouraged and often instigated by European powers like Britain, France, and Russia, who posed as their protectors, these communities began to constellate their identities around their religious differences. What in Europe had functioned as a unifying westfalian force (nationalism) was translated into the Ottoman context as a dissolvent, fracturing society along ethnic-sectarian lines. This mirrored a broader imperial strategy, noted by Hadžidedić that it

was the British Empire that promoted nationalist ideologies to dissolve rival empires (2022:96–99).

European powers, fresh from the sectarian bloodletting that ended with the *Peace of Westphalia*, conveniently exported religious discord into Ottoman domains. William L. Cleveland documented how this involved supporting specific groups to foster resentment and trigger conflict (2000).

This strategy of fostering internal division reached its apogee during the First World War. While publicly presenting themselves as allies to the Ottoman Empire's subjects, the British and French were secretly negotiating the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), which planned to partition the Arab provinces into spheres of direct and indirect colonial control. This occurred simultaneously with the *McMahon-Husayn Correspondence* (1915-1916), in which British High Commissioner Sir Henry McMahon, prompted by officials in Cairo, appeared to promise Sharif Husain independent Arab control over virtually the same territories. The British officials driving this policy, like Sir Reginald Wingate, viewed these promises instrumentally; as he confided in a private letter, "After all what harm can our acceptance of his proposals do? If the embryonic Arab State comes to nothing, all our promises vanish and we are absolved from them." This cynical instrumentalism was confirmed by the head of military intelligence in Cairo, Colonel G. F. Clayton, who, in urging the policy forward, argued that the Arabs would accept "considerable modification" of their demands, revealing that the negotiation was from the start understood by the British as a process of scaling down Arab aspirations, not meeting them as equals (Kedourie [1976] 2014:145). This epitomizes the profound hypocrisy of the Western position: encouraging nationalist aspirations as a weapon against a rival empire (the Ottomans), while simultaneously planning to deny those same aspirations to maintain their own imperial dominance (Kedourie [1976] 2014:85).

A telling example of this strategy is the crisis in Ottoman Syria and Mount Lebanon in 1860. As Geoffrey Nash documents, European consuls, each acting as a patron to a specific community (France for the Maronites, Britain for the Druze, Russia for the Greek Orthodox), created a toxic political environment. Their support encouraged these communities to expand their activities and assert themselves in ways that deliberately upset the traditional socio-political order. The result, as Nash concludes, was that "smouldering Muslim resentment over this change in the accepted social and

political order erupted into a brutal civil war" (Nash 2005:13), which in turn provided the pretext for further European military and political intervention (Cleveland 2000:89 and ff.).

This bitter resentment, born from seeing reform as a tool of their own disenfranchisement, did not merely fester; it catalyzed a new, modern political formation. In response to being collectively stigmatized by Europe as a Muslim problem, a reactive, transnational identity coalesced. As Aydin argues, what European observers called Pan-Islamism was, for the colonized, a "symbol of the demand for equality and dignity" to be recovered from imperial humiliation (Aydin 2013:172–73). This was not a return to tradition but a symptom of the schizophrenic condition: a Conceded Modernity (Laroui's *modernité concédée*; see Glossary, Appendix I) that used the hegemonic language of civilizational blocs—now framing the conflict as a 'modern crusade' against a *unified* 'Muslim world' (Aydin 2013:168)—to articulate a desperate critique of that very hegemony. The 'composite society' was now generating its own pathological, mirror-image composite identity on a global scale.

This perversion extended even to language. Under the distorting lens of imported nationalism, linguistic variants were weaponized. Dialectal differences (which linguists like Silva-Corvalán & Enrique-Arias (2001) see as natural variations) were sharply amplified into markers of separate ethno-national identities, a process evident in the Balkans and the Caucasus today, and echoed in modern 'linguistic insurrection' like in post-2003 Iraq where sectarian groups used minor shifts in dialect and legal terminology to signal political exclusionary empowerment (Alnasir 2021a:489).

This European interference misread and corrupted the Ottoman system of integration, the *millet*. Western Orientalists often mistakenly described it as a theocratic system of religious segregation. While the term Millet has an Arab-Islamic origin, its application in the Ottoman context was fundamentally pragmatic rather than theological (Kurtaran 2011:58–59). In reality, it was essentially a system of imperial citizenship (*Osmanlı Millet*), a framework designed to symmetrize the empire's immense cultural, ethnic, and linguistic diversity by assigning different civic responsibilities (Alkan 2015).

This was not a passive process but an active strategy. European powers, Kedourie notes, found it "useful to foment nationalist agitations in the territories of rivals or enemies" (Kedourie [1970] 2006a:46), a policy perfectly exemplified by Russian support

for Greek and Slavic nationalisms within the Ottoman Empire. The *Tanzimat*ists' tragic misdiagnosis was believing that democratic reforms could cure a sickness that was being deliberately and externally administered.

4.1 The Economic Schism

The critical distinction lay in military service. Muslims were subject to conscription, a lifelong and often fatal obligation that drained the economic and human capital of their communities. Non-Muslims were exempt from this duty but subject to paid a tax (*jizya*) in lieu of service. It is essential to understand that this tax was not a punitive measure but an objective contribution to the state's defense budget from which they benefited directly and in compensation to the subjective engagement imposed to Muslims.

The result was a staggering economic and social asymmetry. Non-Muslim communities, free from the relentless drain of constant war, could focus on commerce, education, and accumulating wealth. Meanwhile, Muslim families were systematically impoverished by the loss of their men to the empire's endless battles. This was not a minor imbalance but the central economic reality of the late Empire. The introduction of machinery and European capital meant that while non-Muslims primarily became 'intermediaries of exports,' reaping the greatest benefits, the Muslim majority—historically the empire's producers and soldiers—"lost their hold over sea transport" and saw their handicrafts destroyed by foreign competition (Edib 1935:56–57). Consequently, the West's narrative of 'protecting' oppressed Christian minorities was a profound irony; it was to maintain, and increase, their considerable privilege. This reality fueled a deep well of bitterness among the Muslim majority, who saw the reform era not as liberation but as the further empowerment of already privileged, externally-backed minorities.

This bitterness was not merely an economic grievance; it was a profound moral outrage that alerted the deep social structures of the Ottoman empire. Ottoman society was perennially structured by a latent dichotomy between the 'team of the unjust'—the Sultan's pragmatic servants who administered state law—and the 'team of the just'—the moral community of the Muslim common folk and the Islamic scholars who upheld the ideal justice of Islamic prescriptions (*Shari'a*) (Mardin 1991:114–16). The *Tanzimat* reforms, imposed by the bureaucratic team of the unjust and perceived as favoring non-Muslims, were thus experienced by the Muslim masses as a catastrophic

betrayal by their own state—an attack on the very moral covenant that defined their place as the 'just' within the Ottoman order, sustained essentially on the Islamic concordat and its legacies.

This structural inequity, engineered by the state's reformist agenda and amplified by European powers, shattered any notion of cohesion and loyal Ottoman citizenry, instead creating a deeply fragmentary resentful Muslim populace. They were experienced not as progress but as their own systematic disenfranchisement, a process where the state seemed to side with external powers and internal minorities against its own core constituency. This sense of betrayal—of a social contract broken by the state itself—laid the foundational bedrock for a potent, anti-Occidentalist resentment. This bitterness would prove to be a highly volatile political force, as demonstrated by the devastating episodes of communal violence that followed the outbreak of the Greek Revolution since 1821. The initial massacre of tens of thousands of Muslim civilians in the Peloponnese by their Greek neighbours (Phillips 1897:61; St Clair 2008:1)—an event often framed by orientalist narratives as a 'glorious outbreak of revolution' (St Clair 2008:2)—triggered reactionary brutal reprisals against Greek communities across Anatolia. This cycle of violence was not merely a sectarian conflict, as simplistic interpretations does; but it was the direct ignition of the tinderbox of resentment that the occidental alienation had created a dialectic of violence—between a nationalist movement enabled by Occidental sympathy and a majority population feeling abandoned by its own state—cemented the political reality that the Occidentalist project would henceforth be navigated not through reasoned debate, but through the prism of existential threat and visceral resentment.

This structural inequity was not merely a perception but a stark, quantifiable reality, at the end of the Empire, the economic disparity was extreme. Atasoy, documenting data from 1915, she shows that in large Ottoman manufacturing industries, 'Muslim-Turkish' interests held only a 15% share of capital, while Greek interests controlled 50%, and Armenian 20% (2005:51). This data quantifies the formation of a monopolist bourgeoisie in detriment of the systematic economic disenfranchisement of the Muslim majority, who simultaneously bore the sole burden of military conscription. The Occidentalist narrative of 'progress' was thus experienced by this majority not as liberation but as their own economic marginalization in favor of externally-backed-empowered minorities. Thus the rise of two parallel, economically antagonistic middle

classes: a Christian comprador bourgeoisie, enriched by trade with Europe and protected by Capitulations, and a Muslim bureaucratic and landowning class, bled dry by the state's endless wars which they were obligated to fight. Karpat notes that "true economic power was still mostly in the hands of the urban merchant groups. These were mostly Greek, Armenian and, in places, Christian Arab" (Karpat 2002:43–44), while the Muslim-Turkish elements were "pushed to less important trades and eventually to ordinary menial jobs" (Karpat 2002:36). This economic apartheid was the core of the discontent. The Occidentalist narrative of 'progress' and 'reform' was experienced by the Muslim majority not as liberation but as their own systematic disenfranchisement in favor of a compressor class serving European interests.

The reforms designed to integrate instead highlighted these very divisions. The political schizophrenia of the Ottoman elite is nowhere clearer than in their fundamental misdiagnosis of the nationalist threat. This misdiagnosis was a symptom of a deeper pathology: their growing isolation in their fervent quest to reorder society, "the reforming elite ultimately ended up isolating itself from society at large and became a close-minded and inward-looking ruling class" (Kasaba 1997:29).

This isolation was a methodological and epistemological failure inherent in their state's mindset. As Mardin argues, this perceptual frame promoted a "systematic neglect of one of the two main facets of social life," focusing solely on "the wider social relations... in which these activities are embedded" (the macro) while dismissing "people in face-to-face interaction" (the micro) as insignificant 'colorings' of social processes (Mardin 1997:66), resulting more in an aesthetic spectacular progress beyond societal realism. They were speaking the language of high modernism and statecraft, a language their own people could not hear over the clamor of their daily struggles and resentments within the Ottoman everyday-life-world.

This dynamic created what Joel Migdal, in a comparative sense, calls the elephant in the room: the overwhelming presence of a figure like Atatürk (or the Westernizing ideal he enforced representing) that so dominated intellectual and political life that it became "very difficult for others in the room to see around it or, for that matter, to speak about anything else" (1997:257). The elite's project became a self-referential dialogue, obscuring the view of the very society it sought to transform.

This tragic misdiagnosis and the elite's isolation meant that the state was utterly blind to the social and psychological effects of its project. It failed to see that its reforms

were not creating grateful, unified Ottomans but were instead cultivating a deep-seated resentment that would seek segregated political expression (Kanra 2009:3–4). This dynamic established the enduring pattern of Turkish modernity: a state perpetually surprised by the political movements that erupt from the society it claims to represent but does not understand.

The tanzimatists, themselves embracing Western democratic ideals, were convinced that "reform, good government and the preaching and practising of democratic principles would cure the non-Moslem subjects of the empire of their nationalism" (Edib 1935:68–69). They fatally failed to realize that nationalism was as a strong imported ideal as democracy, require an adaptation to avoid being perversely translated as an ethnic-identitarian instrument. It emerged in Europe as a post-westafalian instrument to unify and conciliate, its mistranslation into the empire convert it precisely in a segregationist ethnico-identitarian instrumen, serving to accelerate the empire's fragmentation.

The social contagion of nationalism was spread by a specific social class created by the Occidentalist project itself: a literate, European-educated elite who became, in Kedourie's words, "'marginal men,' disaffected toward their traditional society, the nucleus and the vanguard of a radical and uncompromising opposition" (Kedourie [1970] 2006a:27). Alienated from their own culture yet rejected by the West they emulated, these figures—from the Greek Adamantios Koraes to the Young Turks—became the primary vectors for an ideology that transmuted religious faith into nationalist fervor to "utilize the powerful and tenacious loyalties which a faith held in common for centuries creates" (Kedourie [1970] 2006a:67).

The depth of this misdiagnosis is epitomized by where the tanzimatists focused their most able men and best administrative reforms: Bulgaria. It was there, through education and the establishment of state schools where "the youth of all races and religions received education," that the most determined attempt to create a Union of Elements was carried out (Edib 1935:69). The tragic irony is that this policy was emphasized precisely by the emerging Bulgarian nationalist movement, making it appear not as a genuine offer of citizenship but as a last-ditch effort at forced assimilation, further inflaming the very separatist sentiments it sought to mitigate.

4.2 The Parliamentary Debacle

The zenith of the Occidentalist delusion, and the moment its pathological internal contradictions were laid bare, was the first Ottoman Parliament of 1877. This institution was built to be the ultimate symbol of Ottoman modernity, a performative act designed to secure Western Recognition. Yet, rapidly it became a stage for the empire's schizophrenic rupture, not its unity. The deputies did not form a cross-communal coalition against the common points of interest. Instead, the Parliament exposed the irreconcilable fractures within the very fabric of the empire. Muslim deputies, while swearing "absolute allegiance to the Sultan, to Islam and to society's traditions," were themselves divided, with some calling for a reform of the religious establishments, acknowledging that the influence of the clerics had diminished in the countryside (Karpat 2002:85). More critically, Karpat uncovers a fundamental economic schism that mirrored the external geopolitical struggle: "The Christian and Muslim deputies differed from each other in their views on economic liberalism." Christian deputies, representing commercial interests tied to Europe, "advocated an open door policy to foreign capital." Muslim deputies, representing the landed and bureaucratic classes, "opposed outright surrender to Europeans" (Karpat 2002:86).

This resistance was not merely economic or nativist; it was often articulated within the framework of the very Islamic modernism that had launched the reforms. Their allegiance to the Sultan and Islam, was part of a broader discourse among late Ottoman clerics and intellectuals who supported constitutional governance (*meşrutiyet*) as a legitimate Islamic form of consultation (*meşveret*) (Silverstein 2011:55). Their opposition to economic surrender was thus intertwined with a vision of Islamic sovereignty that was being undermined by European pressure. The Parliament, the ultimate symbol of Occidentalist reform, thus became a stage where the internal contradiction of that project was laid bare: the attempt to use modern political forms to achieve Islamic renewal, thus to become subverted again by the economic and political realities of European imperialism.

This failure exemplifies the pathological logic of the unsatisfied 'need to belong.' The Parliament was a performative bid for satiation—for the recognition that would finally validate the Ottoman elite's century of reform. Its failure to secure that bond should, in a healthy motivational system, have prompted a search for a substitute, perhaps a re-engagement with the societal world. Instead, the elite's cognitive focus remained errant on the original, withholding source. Denied both satiation and the

possibility of true substitution, the performance intensified, culminating in the even more radical self-negation of the Kemalist revolution. This was not a logical political evolution but a compulsive escalation, a desperate attempt to force a bond with a partner whose identity was contingent on never fully granting it.

5 The Kemalist Culmination: Annihilation as Final Gamble

Ultimately, this centuries-long pursuit of Recognition was never a private affair; it was a relentless public performance staged for the western audience. The modern Turkish public sphere was constituted less by rational debate and more by a top-down public gaze—a disembodied, authoritative perspective, often empowered by the state and media, that categorized and hierarchized bodies and behaviors. The Kemalist project, therefore, was not a rupture with the Ottoman past but its most radical and desperate culmination. It was not just about building a modern state but about relentlessly performing an imitative modernity under this gaze, a final, all-in gamble to secure through total mimicry the recognition that a century of reform had failed to achieve. If the *Tanzimat* was the initial investment in the mimetic performance, and the Hamidian and Young Turk eras represented an escalation of commitment, then Kemalism was the final, all-in gamble. It sought to resolve the century-old cognitive dissonance and ontological insecurity by finally and violently annihilating the Ottoman-Islamic identity that was perceived as the cause of the withheld recognition, attempting to force the Third Pillar into existence through a totalizing performance of secular Western republicanism.

The consequences of this performance were catastrophic. The imported idea of nationalism, instead of unifying, acted as a social contagion, fracturing the empire along the very sectarian lines it had previously managed. The reformist zeal of the state was met with internal resistance and external manipulation, paradoxical that every step toward modernization also meant a step toward disintegration. This generated the anti-Westernist resentment that Boaventura de Sousa Santos defines as internal colonialism as a grammatical state policies (2014:48). This bittersweet resentment, born from seeing reform as a tool of disenfranchisement, did not vanish with the Empire; it was inherited by the Republic and became the emotional fuel for the inevitable counter-movement to Kemalism.

The Ottoman pilgrimage journey into modernization was not a precisely a march toward modernity but a descent into a schizophrenic condition, which can be read as a

century-long, escalating cargo cult—see Chapter V and the Appendix I—. It began with an internal military project to order the empire and evolved into a comprehensive but futile attempt to win recognition from a West that was paradoxically the object of emulation and the agent of destruction. Each reform—the legal codes, the parliament, the laws—was another ritual object added to the runway, a performative investment made with the desperate faith that it would finally summon the ultimate cargo, an unconditional recognition from Europe. The elite's fervent construction of the first two pillars of vassalage—their own commitment and the forced compliance of their public—crashed against the unyielding absence of the Third Pillar, the recognition.

Kemalism was the most radical and desperate phase of this cult. It was a wholesale destruction of the old anthrop to revisit it with a perfect, mirror-image and aesthetic replica, of the European runway—latinizing the alphabet, outlawing the city, secularizing the state—in the tragic belief that this purity of form would finally force the planes to land. Yet, the cargo of genuine acceptance never arrived, locking the nation into the schizophrenic bind between a performed, imported future and a disavowed, intimate past—a pathology that structures its political life to this day.

The annihilation project as an introspective aesthetic performance staged for both a domestic and an international audience, where Atatürk's cultural policy was explicitly designed to operate on "the national level, with the attempt to integrate the peoples of Turkey into one single culture, and on the international level, to foster good relations with other nations" (And 1984:215). Institutions like the People's Houses (Halkevleri) were the primary vehicles for this, designed to bring art and "Kemalist principles stressed—directly to the people" in even the remotest towns (And 1984:219). However, this was not a genuine cultural flowering but a state-directed didactic campaign. The arts, and mainly aesthetics, became a tool for inscribing the new secular nationalist identity onto the public sphere, a performative effort to demonstrate Turkey's civilized status to a watching West. Spectacle were the angular instrument of the Turkish political gramatics. This top-down cultural engineering perfectly exemplifies the systematic neglect of the societal lifeworld, treating culture as a macro-level project to be implemented rather than an organic expression to be nurtured. Thus, by depriving the people of their freedom of choice, subjecting them to indoctrination and brainwashing in favor of an outsider spectator, the West.

Ergun Özbudun highlight as the elitist mindset the republic inherited from the empire: a "bureaucratic ruling tradition," in which they saw themselves as "the true servants of a state above and autonomous from society, the sole guardians of public interest, and the chief agents of modernization" (1994:252). That argument legitimate them to become a massive 'intervening subject' that constructs itself as a heroic agent by defaming the present and promising a future only it can deliver (Çinar 2005:24). It was the final, desperate gamble of the state elite to resolve their cognitive anxious dissonance through a massive aesthetic transformation. Yet, in its fervent pursuit of macro-level change, it completed the severing of the elite from the popular lifeworld. It didn't just reform institutions; it demolish the shared Islamic idiom or discourse that Mardin identifies as the historical bridge between rulers and ruled (Mardin 1991:118). By latinizing the alphabet and purging the language, the Kemalist vanguard didn't just modernize; it destroyed the primary medium of the Ottoman imaginaire, the common fund of concepts and legacies that allowed for a shared understanding across the empire's social tiers. Çınar's work provides the precise vocabulary for this culmination: Kemalism was a massive, state-driven modernizing intervention that sought to transform society by 'defam[ing] the present' as corrupt and backward in order to justify a radical rupture and project an idealized future (Çinar 2005:24–25). This intervention targeted the most intimate aspects of life:

- On Bodies: The Hat Law of 1925 and the promotion of the unveiled 'modern woman the public sphere' were not mere aesthetic policies, but performative acts designed to inscribe Western secular norms onto each individual body, literally clothing it in 'civilization' (Çinar 2005:65 and ff.) The staging of Turkey's first beauty queen, was a spectacle agency for the European gaze, proving the state's capacity to unveil and control the female body, which symbolized the nation itself (Çinar 2005:72–73).
- On Places: The choice of Ankara as the new capital was a spatial declaration of the new ideology. The building of *Anıtkabir* as a purely secular, nationalist mausoleum, deliberately devoid of Islamic references, placed the symbolic heart of the nation in a city untainted by the Ottoman past (Çinar 2005:3).
- On Time: The institutionalization of a new national history centered on the 1923 founding of the Republic was an attempt to erase the Ottoman-Islamic past as a prelude to the modern era.

It was an extensive, and ultimately performative, aesthetic effort to become so unmistakably modern-Western that Europe could no longer refuse recognition. This was a final, drastic effort to resolve the underlying disorder through a totalizing aesthetic transformation—a project of such radical mimicry that it demanded the annihilation of one of the conflicting identities, cementing the nation's schizophrenic appearance as a permanent feature of its modern reality.

The schizophrenic climax of this century-long dynamics was nowhere more evident than in the language reform, which G.L. Lewis identifies as Atatürk's twofold project: "the introduction of the new alphabet in 1928, and the impetus he gave to the change of vocabulary" (1984:195). The law of 1 November 1928 was a classic *fait accompli*, mandating the immediate use of Latin script in all official domains, a brutal synchronizing of Turkey's written clock with Europe's. This was followed by an even more radical and chaotic attempt to purge the language of its Arabic and Persian vocabulary, creating a situation of dialectical chaos reigned, as reformers invented and imposed new words ambiguous for the populace (Lewis 1984:205). This was the ultimate expression of the pathological gamble, just to secure the recognition a century of reform had failed to achieve by finally annihilating the very linguistic medium that connected the nation to its Ottoman-Islamic past, thereby creating a profound generational and cultural rift within the society itself.

It was more than reform; it was a civilizational operation to 'select all and delete' of the indigenous operating system. The Kemalist project represented the most radical attempt to force the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm to work through a wholesale, top-down installation. The simultaneous transplantation of the Swiss Civil Code, the Latin alphabet, and European sociocultural aesthetics created a state that was legally, linguistically, and visually a replica. Yet, the profound social disobedience and the fact that these laws often remained alien and un-internalized is a testament to the violent incompatibility of such an encrypted, tyrannic and mass installation without the organic development of a society's ethical and legal consciousness.

Crucially, the culmination of a process with an Islamic genealogy. The abolition of the Sultanate and then the Caliphate—the consummate Kemalist breaks with the past —were debated and passed by a Grand National Assembly that included numerous religious scholars and Sufi sheikhs. Aydin identified this pivot as occurred "at the peak of its popularity". Indian Muslims had mobilized the Khilafat movement to protect the

caliphate; even the spiritual caliph, Abdülmecid Efendi, received letters of support from across the Muslim world. Yet the Kemalist state, in its desperate bid for Western Recognition, sacrificed the very institution that gave it transnational Islamic legitimacy. Mustafa Kemal argued that it was unreasonable "for the eight million Muslims of Turkey to host an internationally significant caliphate, capable of interfering in the affairs of British colonial domains in India and Egypt to protect the more than eighty million Muslims living there" (2007:130).

Kristin Fabbé's refers to this dilemma as that emergent states often preserved a symbolic religious identity even as they dismantled the autonomy of religious institutions; the state thus performed a 'sacred synthesis' whereby religious categories were nationalized and channeled through state apparatuses (2019:VI). Thus, it took the form of capturing religious networks into the modern bureaucracy while simultaneously stripping the clerics of institutional power, a double move that made secularization visible as state spectacle but left intact the social circuits needed to govern. Therefore, they employed intricate Islamic legal reasoning to argue that sovereignty now resided in the nation and that the Republic was the legitimate executor of the Caliph's function of ensuring justice (Silverstein 2011:51–60). In essence, Kemalism, in its most radical acts, was not imposing an alien Western laicism, but executing a final, but logical step of an Ottoman Islamic modernist project, an integral transfer of political legitimacy from a dynastic individual ruler to a bureaucratic nation-state. The paradox was revealed later, as the new Republic was built employing an Islamic rationalism for policies that ultimately seek to suppress much of religious public presence.

To achieve that, kemalism co-opted the rehabilitation of peripheral actors—bandit leaders, provincial strongmen, religious scholars— transforming them from potential challengers into allies through negotiated incorporation rather than outright annihilation (Barkey 1994:III). This practice explains how the state could both perform modern bureaucratic reforms and maintain resilient, adaptive networks of rule: incorporation made performance possible, and performance in turn became a tool in the state's bargaining repertoire. This interpretation shows that the *modernizing* state did not simply substitute foreign forms for indigenous ones; it actively *recomposed* local institutions through camouflaged incorporation and bargaining. The result was a new

institutional architecture that could perform Western modernity while internally relying on remade local brokers.

For Turkish nationalists, this was the ultimate proof of a hard truth, the West would never accept a Muslim power as an equal, regardless of how sincerely it reformed or how fervently it emulated Western models. The Ottoman state had engaged in a century-long dialogue of reform, only to be met with the constant humiliations of the Capitulations, the manipulation of its minorities, and finally, a planned colonial dismemberment at Sèvres. The Kemalist response, therefore, was not the culmination of the *Tanzimat* but its radical negation. If the West would only recognize a state that was a wholesale secular, nationalist replica of itself, then Turkey would become that replica with a vengeance—jettisoning the Arabic script, outlawing religious dress, and abolishing the caliphate itself. It was a desperate, schizophrenic gamble: to secure the Recognition a century of reform had failed to achieve by finally annihilating the last vestiges of the identity that had caused the rejection. But, more than a reform, it was the decisive *point of no return* in the escalation cycle. This was the ultimate Phase 2 commitment (supra Chapter I §12), a massive, violent investment that demolished the old institutional infrastructure so completely that it permanently locked the Republic's identity into the schizophrenic bind of Phase 3. The project was no longer a means to an end (recognition) but had become an end in itself—the state's institutional and ideological *raison d'être* of state core. This *point of no return* did not end history but re-founded the state on a pathologically mimetic basis, setting the stage for all future political contests—including the resilient, market-*oriented* adaptations of the Özal period and the Islamist reclamation of the state under Erdoğan—to be fought within the schizophrenic structure that Kemalism had cemented.

It was a colossal, state-driven attempt to forcibly homogenize a social field whose fundamental reality was, following Pascon's terminology, *composite* (Pascon 1967). The Republic's violent imposition of a secular-nationalist superstructure could not liquidate the underlying Islamic, patriarchal, and local layers of the societal reality but instead created a perfect and enduring *composite state*, a governing apparatus at war with the anthropological nature of the society it ruled. The *rebellion of the intimate* is the symptom of this unresolved composition, which will be highlighted in the epilogue of this chapter.

This created a profound isolation for the Westernizing elite. They were not only distanced from the general populace, but were engaged in a project of intense self-discipline. Nationalism in Turkey "had to attend first to disciplining its own selected members," who represented the nation but often struggled to cope with the conditions of nation-building. It was the ultimate attempt to resolve the cognitive dissonance by fully annihilating the identity that caused the rejection. This project of annihilation was not confined to legal and sartorial reforms; it extended into the most intimate spheres of daily life through modern media. As Ahıska's research on early radio broadcasting demonstrates, the Kemalist regime nationalized and weaponized technology to craft a "pure voice of the nation." Institutions like Ankara Radio were committed with producing a national culture that was utmost modern, often by violently suppressing what was deemed too Oriental (like alaturka music), thereby performing the Occidentalis fantasy of a perfect synthesis for an imagined Western audience (Ahiska 2010:65, 18). As Ankara Radio, for instance, was described by its broadcasters as a 'school' where they themselves were subjected to a "thorough sentimental and cultural re-education" to become the mediators between West and East they aspired to be (Ahiska 2010:20).

The cultural sound of this schizophrenic condition surged by the *Arabesk*. This music emerged not as an anomaly but as the historical folkloric voice of the rural masses experiencing the "spatial and symbolic migration" of Turkish modernity throughout a spurious cultural hybridity (Özbek 1997:211). Its hybrid form, mixing Turkish folk and classical elements with Western and Arab orchestration, perfectly mirrors the fractured identity of a populace torn from its past but not fully integrated into the aesthetic urban modernity. Arabesk gave a melancholic voice to the yearning and disquiet of this mutation, becoming the soundtrack for the contradictions and ambivalence of the project and process of Turkish modernity itself.

As Kedourie concludes, nationalism was ultimately "one of the many forms of this vision of a purified society in which all things are made new" (Kedourie [1970] 2006b:105). Atatürk's project was the final, desperate gamble to achieve this purification: to become so unmistakably and radically of the West—in form, law, and even script—that the longed-for recognition could finally, irrevocably, be secured, but it had been perpetually denied. Therefore, "in the conflict of East and West in what was left of the Ottoman Empire, the West had a greater chance of victory" (Edib 1935:83).

A supreme irony of this pathological condition was that the Kemalist establishment's own strategy for securing Turkey's Western identity ultimately became the instrument of its own decline. As Yavuz and Khan note, the military-bureaucratic elite had long invoked the goal of EU membership to legitimize its tyrannic guardian role. However, when the EU's Copenhagen criteria explicitly demanded democratic reforms, civilian control of the military, and human rights—the very reforms that would curb the elite's power—the tool of Europeanization was weaponized against them by their Islamist opponents (2004:391–92).

Yet below this strategic calculus, a deeper movement was unfolding—one whose significance would only become visible in retrospection. The *Copenhagen criteria*, which Turkey had formally accepted as the condition for EU candidacy, were not merely external benchmarks to be satisfied for the sake of admission. They were, for significant segments of the Turkish elite and public, gradually becoming the terrain of a different kind of labor, the formative work through which a subordinate consciousness begins to transform the external standard into an expression of its own self-certainty.

This requires returning to the lordship-bondsman Hegelian dialectic theorized in Chapter I. There, it was argued that the Developmental Elite of the vassal state is denied the path to self-realization because the alien being before which it has subjected —the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—arrives as a finished product, an adult object that cannot be transformed because its formation is already achieved. The elite's labor is not formative but replicative; it does not set to understand the imported form but reproduces it with anxious fidelity. Where Hegel's bondsman transforms fear into freedom through work, the vassal artisan remains trapped in fear, forever trembling before a lord who will not release the raw material for genuine creation.

However, this valuable focus on structural logic and administrative longevity can inadvertently obscure the profound subjective trauma diagnosed here. The 'Imperial Turn' explains the empire's resilience; it does not negate the schizophrenic rupture experienced by the political elite in their desperate, and ultimately futile, quest for Western recognition. This failure, following Roger Owen's comparative analysis shows, was a common feature of modernity projects across the Middle East, which were inevitably shaped by a humiliating international context of colonialism and dependence (Owen 1997).

Thus, the identitarian schizophrenia diagnosed in this chapter is the price paid for the victory of the elite project over the societal life. It is an introspective case study in how the pursuit of recognition through imitation, when perpetually withheld, becomes a nation's deepest tragedy. The failure to secure the Third Pillar ensured the schizophrenic struggle between the state's macro-projects and society's micro-realities would become the enduring pathology of Turkish modernity—a testament to the destructive power of a state-centered mentality unleashed upon a complex social fabric (Mardin 1997). The endurance of this pathology is the true legacy of the Ottoman encounter with modernity.

Therefore, the schizophrenic quest for Western recognition, born of Ottoman reform and perfected under Kemalism, as an essential characteristic of Turkey's commitment to the West, was the labyrinth of its stagnation in a stigmatizing dialectic that motivated its subsequent emancipation. However, to understand the human cost of this century-old pathology, one must track beyond the geopolitical stage and introspect into the intimate structures of the body, language, and everyday life, where the deepest resistance to the Westernist fantasy has taken root, in order to understand its emancipation adventure.

6 The Renascence: Post-Kemalist Trajectories and the reconsideration

Yet, the public was never merely a passive recipient regarding these tyrannic elitists projects. People engaged in tactical silent resistance that subverted the state's immersive narrative. The gecekondu (squatter) settlements, with their maze-like streets and constantly evolving structures, defied the geometric order and transparent rationality of the modernist planners. Their inhabitants developed ingenious survival tactics, locking children inside during demolitions, carving homes into hillsides marked only by chimney-pots, as a form of resistance (Nalbantoglu 1997:XI). This was not an organized ideological counter-movement but a daily, pragmatic negotiation of life in the gaps of the modernizing state, creating a 'third space' that was neither fully traditional nor compliantly modern, but something else entirely. Critically, this counter-movement—emphasized as, political Islamism—is "a product of the frustration of the promises of Westernist modernization" (Gülalp 1997:60). It is not a premodern atavism but a profoundly modern phenomenon, a critique of modernity born from the failure of its official, state-sponsored project to deliver on its promises of justice, dignity, and authentic belonging. The resentment felt by the Muslim majority

would later be harnessed by *political Islam*, which projected a captive narrative of restoring the authenticity of a fetichisized identity. Therefore, the Islamist renaissance framed the secular state as the culprit that "den[ied] Turkey's 'true identity' and implement[ed] policies to the detriment of the 'true cultural values' of the Turkish people" (Çinar 2005:12). This is the direct descendant of the *Tanzimat*-era bitterness, now articulated through an apparent modern ideological lens.

While the endless debates over EU membership and Turkey's place in the world reveal that the past legacies persists visible in continuous struggle, where the Islamist political project, emerging powerfully in the 1990s, did not reject modernity but appropriated its methods to offer a rival vision. The Islamic headscarf (*hijab*), for example, became the banner of this alternative modernity. It was not a retreat into tradition but a deliberate political performance, a re-validation that used the same Kemalist techniques by defaming the present (secular Westernization as alienating and corrupt) to project an ideal future, an authentic turk-Islamic prosperity (Çinar 2005:172 and ff.). Similarly, the Islamist administration of Istanbul in the 1990s sought to reclaim the city's public spaces, re-Ottomanizing and re-Islamizing them to emphasize it as the center of their imagined nation, directly challenging Ankara's Kemalist centrality.

The pathology of performance and withheld recognition, firmly established in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods, proved to be a permanent feature of the Turkish condition, defining its role within the Western alliance throughout the Cold War and beyond. A stark illustration of this enduring dynamic occurred during the 1990-91 Gulf War. President Turgut Özal's government made a strategic deliberate calculation, committing Turkey wholeheartedly to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. This was not merely a security decision but a high-stakes performance of loyalty aimed squarely at a Western audience. Turkey's contributions closing the Iraqi oil pipeline, deploying over 100,000 troops to tie down Iraqi forces, and offering critical NATO bases, came at a cost of billions in lost revenue (Kuniholm 1991:36–37). The expected payoff was explicit to increase military aid and, most importantly, "a softening of resistance from the European Community to its application for membership" (Kuniholm 1991:35). Despite this significant investment, which earned Turkey verbal praise and some financial compensation, the fundamental goal of EC membership remained eternally elusive. The Community's resistance, framed in economic terms,

but perceived by Turks as rooted in cultural and religious prejudice, confirmed the continued withholding of the Third Pillar, the recognition.

These challenges urged the emergence of the neo political Islam, particularly from the 1980s onwards. As an alternative entirely outside the Kemalist establishment: the 'Anatolian tigers.' The economic liberalization of the 1980s fostered a dynamic, market-oriented Anatolian Muslim bourgeoisie. This class's financial resources and patronage fueled a socio-cultural modernization from below, creating the economic power that would later fund the political challenge to the Kemalist state (Yavuz and Khan 2004:391). Their goal was not a movement of the impoverished and traditional periphery. Instead, it was propelled by a 'new fraction of capitalists', "well-educated Islamist engineers, industrialists, and business groups" who emerged in the political context of the 1980s and 1990s and were "struggling to reposition themselves in the highly competitive relations of the global economy" (Atasoy 2005:21). The commodification of this identity struggle finds its vivid ethnographic illustration in the work of Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002), who demonstrates how both secularist and Islamist identities were manufactured and sold in Istanbul's markets, turning political difference into a matter of consumer choice and branding. Their goal was not to reject modernity or global capitalism, but to articulate a competitive strategy for achieving social transformation through state power, making the West a "competitive partner rather than a cultural model for emulation" (Atasoy 2005:4). This demonstrates conclusively that the Islamist challenge is a rival bourgeois modernity, a direct competitor to the Kemalist elite within the same global capitalist schema.

This mirrored struggle, born from the foundational trauma of failed Occidentalist recognition, structures the very fabric of contemporary Turkish public life. Turkey through the years ninety reveals, the political is produced not through rational debate but through 'fantasies for the state' and a pervasive 'culture of cynicism' (Navaro-Yashin 2002:4, 5 and ff.). Rather secularist or Islamist are entangled in a relentless performance of identity, consuming secularist commodities (portraits of Atatürk) or Islamist aehestetic fetichism (fashionable veils) converted into a (neo)modernity, each seeking to validate their claim to modernity, but now an authentic Turkish. This daily, lived schizophrenia is the enduring legacy of the Ottoman reformer's desperate tanzimatist attempt to synchronize the empire's clocks with a West that would never acknowledge it as synchronized peer.

Therefore, the resentment, however this century-long of pathological struggles, is not a reactionary return to a pre-modern Islamism, but of introversion and resilience producing a surprising, but potent new alignment. Discourse analysis of the Turkish public sphere reveals that the most significant political fissure is no longer the simplistic binary of secularist vs. Islamist, but rather a new divide between those who remain invested in the state-centric, authoritarian Kemalist project (the old Occidentalist guard) and a new coalition of the discontented. This coalition, comprised of a liberal left that has abandoned the rigid secularism and an Islamic movement that has abandoned its theocratic ambitions, finds common cause in a shared liberal language of individual rights (Kanra 2009:50), democratic pluralism, and a profound skepticism of the Kemalist state and its militants. Their alliance is built on a mutual experience of exclusion and oppression by the same Occidentalist establishment: the left for its class politics, Islamists for their religious identity. The resentment toward the Westernizing state has thus become the unlikely catalyst for a post-Occidentalist politics, or later modernist, where the demand is not anymore for recognition from the West, but for liberation from the state that failed to secure it (Kanra 2009:99).

A tentative, partial shift away from pure consumption began in the late 20th century, particularly under Turgut Özal. This period can be read as an attempt at localizing the code—cautiously adapting neoliberal economic models and pursuing a more assertive, multi-vector foreign policy. Turkey began the delicate process of modifying the imported software to better fit its local hardware. The economic divergence that followed this partial debugging of the code is striking. The economic outcome of this epistemological shift is staggering. In 1960, Turkey's GDP (US$ 7.5billion) was less than twice that of Egypt (US$ 4.2 billion). By 2024, after decades of a more sovereign, if schizophrenic, negotiation of modernity, Turkey's economy had reached 1.3 trillion—more than three times the size of Egypt's (US$ 389 billion), and orders of magnitude larger than the stagnant economies of similarly stalled experiments like Tunisia (US$ 48billion) and Lebanon (US$ 20 billion) (World Bank 2024), which remained trapped in a pure consumerist model—while this comparison is illustrative, not causal; many factors (demographics, geopolitics, natural disasters) affect GDP; the argument here is that Turkey's trajectory of sovereign translation correlates with economic divergence, not that it is the sole cause.

The phase of AKP rule, particularly in the mid-2000s, was characterized by an ambitious project to position Turkey as a regional soft power. Turkey's relevance surged thanks to its internal reforms and the parallel progress with the EU, which were seen as a source of inspiration in an Arab world facing a "crisis of governance and legitimacy" (Altunişık 2008:44). The AKP government actively cultivated this image, arguing that Turkey's EU membership would demonstrate that the Union stood for "common values and institutions rather than common religion" (Altunişık 2008:47). This soft power strategy was the foreign policy corollary to its domestic reforms: an attempt to prove Turkey's indispensable value as a democratic, Muslim-majority bridge between East and West.

However, this project of soft power and Europeanization, predicated on securing the long-withheld of recognition, proved to be another fragile performance. As Soli Özel observes, the subsequent deterioration of Turkey's relations with the West—marked by the purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems and the acrimony following the 2016 coup attempt—cannot be understood as a simple ideological turn. Özel frames these actions as responses to a perceived abdication of US leadership and a profound "sense of abandonment by allies," which "caused the Turks to question the reliability of their NATO partners." (2018:4) This dynamic illustrates the pathology's core: the mimetic desire for Western recognition, when frustrated, produces defiant performances of autonomy (like the Eurasianist flirtation) that are, in reality, desperate negotiations from within an asymmetric alliance structure. Erdoğan's anti-Western rhetoric, is often driven by domestic considerations, revealing how the internal cohesion between state and society was managed through performances for an external gaze, turned now towards the people themselves.

The ultimate manifestation of this pathological condition's irony, and the architecture of the soft power gambit, is that the most ardent advocates for Turkey's full integration into Europe emerged not from the secular Kemalist elite, but from a party with roots in political Islam. Those who "had first put forward Turkey's EU membership as a way of suppressing Islamic political identity now watched as a Muslim democratic party [...] emerged as the most aggressive advocate of EU accession and reform" (Yavuz and Khan 2004:392). The Justice and Development Party (AKP) instrumentalized the EU's Copenhagen criteria to dismantle the Kemalist military-

bureaucratic authoritarianism, using the language of European liberalism to secure political change.

However, this tactical use of the European framework failed to resolve the underlying pathology, as the EU perspective faded noticeably in the 2010s, hampered by Cypriot disputes, and internal European opposition, leading to an authoritarian turn by the AKP, reversing the instrumental Europeanization of the early years of its emergence and giving way to a more volatile and resentful foreign policy, symptomatic of Turkish renaissance and emancipation.

This limbo was not just geopolitical but profoundly personal for the architects of the project. While, the 'synchronization of clocks' continues, the discontent of Ottoman-Turkish Occidentalism is then lingering pathology: the trauma of a centuries-old investment in a Western aestheticism and identity that has never paid the expected dividend of belonging. This is not a historical anomaly but a persistent condition, fueled by an international social structure that continues to reproduce the stigma. Consequently, contemporary EU debates and identity crises are not merely hangovers from history but direct manifestations of Turkey's ongoing position as a stigmatized outsider (Zarakol 2010c) in an order that denies it the full Recognition it craves. This pathology is the enduring legacy of a process that began not with a Republic seeking a place at the table, but with an Empire trying to synchronize its clocks with a West that would never accept it as a peer or an equal.

Foreign policy analysts like Tarık Oğuzlu describe this evolution as the rise of a 'Turkey-centric westernism' (Oğuzlu 2011). However, rather than a category of the schizophrenic condition, this assertiveness represents its way-out. The enduring pathology of Turkish modernity is therefore the maintenance of 'two different registers of truth,' amplified by a profound historical amnesia. The state now is built on a foundation of Islamic modernism, yet performs a secular republicanism for an external gaze. The internal, intimate truth is composed of this disavowed hybridity, "a multiplicity of unacknowledged losses, conflicts, and traumas" stemming from a project of self-strengthening that caused a self-destruction. The 'therapy' requires a reckoning with this entangled complex history, as the neo Turkish secularism has an Islamic genealogy while that the quest for Western recognition involved the misrecognition and suppression of the Ottoman Empire's own, ensuring the

Occidentalis fantasy remains the dominant, yet perpetually unstable, framework of power (Ahiska 2010:39–52).

This dynamic ensured that any challenge to Kemalism would not come from a pre-modern, traditional place, but from within the very modern framework it had established. The rise of political Islam, particularly as analyzed by Çınar, was not a throwback but a mirror-image modernity. The APK did not seek to dismantle the nation-state but to capture it and implement its own *protoconfesional* project, one that defined the nation not through secular Westernism but through a contemporary Ottoman-Islamic civilization. Their intervention on the female body was not a refusal of public visibility but a re-veiling—a performative act using the same logic as the state to mark the public sphere with their own identity. The schism was thus complete: two modernities, two nationalist projects, locked in a perpetual struggle over the same aesthetic space.

This mirrored struggle involved a critical rhetorical shift. The AKP did not champion secularism as defined by the Kemalist state—a Jacobin, anti-clerical laicism modeled on France (Alnasir 2022). Instead, they advocated for an 'Anglo-American secularism' (Yavuz and Khan 2004:392), a framework emphasizing freedom of religion and its compatibility with democratic governance. This was a strategic move to champion a more pluralistic Western model against the authoritarian Kemalist version, demonstrating a sophisticated evolution within Conceded Modernity. The turc-centric model was paralleled in foreign affairs that saw the country's foreign policy become, in its tools and style, more Europeanized, embracing soft power and normative diplomacy, even as its rhetoric asserted national independence, a hallmark performance of an adaptive modernity.

This pathological dynamic—born from Ottoman reform, perfected under Kemalism, and metabolized by its Islamist successors—remains the defining feature of Turkey's engagement with the West today. The dynamics is still haunted by a profound status anxiety and a crisis of framework. The Cold War institutions that once structured Turkey's asymmetric integration—NATO and the EU accession process—are, in Dalay's assessment, "asymmetric and hierarchical in favor of the West," a legacy that Turkey seeks to redress. Ankara's pursuit of "strategic autonomy" often manifests as a reactive balancing act between powers, criticized as a nebulous and self-defeating quest that has merely "traded dependency on the United States for similar relations

with Russia," reinforcing rather than resolving its subordinate position (Dalay et al. 2020:6). Thus, the schizophrenic quest for Western recognition continues, now expressed through a random multipolarity rather than an Occidentalist binarism.

Finally, it is crucial to situate this pathological dynamic within its broader scholarly context. The recent Imperial Turn in Ottoman studies has productively complexified our understanding of the reform era, systematically dismantling the older decline thesis, summarizing the situation in "crisis, adaptation, transformation, and simply change" (Ágoston 2003; apud Mikhail and Philliou 2012:725). This shift, which Virginia Aksan notes now focuses on the human side of history, "what happens to peoples across time" (2014:4), rightly portrays the Ottoman state as a pragmatic agent and highlights the lived experiences often missing from grand narratives.

7 The Renascence Dialectic: Internalizing the Third Pillar

The pivotal moment of the Turkish renaissance can be traced back to the adoption of the 'Ankara Criteria'. There within the walls of Ankara, it transformed and built institutions that could count on their own recognition, from within, instead of the Copenhagen Criteria, to become 'Ankara Criteria'. The "need to belong" (Baumeister and Leary 1995) was not abandoned but self-reoriented, utmost, internalized, away from the supplicant's gaze fixed on an unattainable beyond, and toward the formative activity that alone can transform fear into self-certainty.

Here we glimpse a convergence with the Japanese paradigm explored in Chapter II. Just as Meiji Japan, when confronted with Western categories, undertook the arduous work of *translation* rather than mere *transliteration*—inventing concepts like hi-shūkyō 'non-religion' to master and adapt the imported framework—so too did Turkey begin to translate European norms into its own political grammar. The difference—and the reason Turkey's trajectory would prove more volatile—lay in the depth of the prior schism. Japan's Kokutai provided a solid indigenous substrate for translation; Turkey's Kemalist transformation had deliberately shattered that substrate, leaving a top-down social field whose layers remained in unresolved tension. The formative labor could not proceed from a unified national essence; it had to occur through and against the schizophrenic fractures of the state itself.

This internalization was therefore partial, contested, and ultimately (ir)revocable. The door opened, but only briefly. The neo-pragmatism retains its significance: Turkey achieved the recognition, however fleetingly, that the Third Pillar need not remain

forever withheld—that it could be, however tentatively, built from within, but built on a self-certainty, as a structural element of its ontological (neo)security.

8 Epilogue: The Rebellion of the Intimate and the Unmaking of the Occidentalist Fantasy

The pathology of Ottoman-Turkish Occidentalism was not merely a political or ideological failure; it was a violent assault on the intimate spheres of human structures, an attempt to subordinate the Micro (the body, language, private time) to the Macro (the state project, the performance for the West). Consequently, the most profound resistance to this schizophrenic condition has emerged not from rival political programs, but from a rebellion of the intimate itself.

This rebellion has two primary, interconnected fronts. First, it is a rebellion of the body and identity, articulated most powerfully by the women who were the primary targets of the state's instrumentalization. The Kemalist project's performative emancipation—the forced unveiling, the scripting of the "modern woman" as a spectacle agency for the Western gaze—sought to discipline the most intimate space, the female form, into an allegory of civilizational progress. In response, an arduous intellectual tradition, from Halide Edib's early critiques to the contemporary critiques of Alev Çınar, Meltem Ahıska, Sibel Bozdogan, Gülsüm Baydar Nalbantoglu, Meral Özbek and Ayşe Zarakol, has emerged. These thinkers, speaking from the subject-position of those whose bodies were hijacked by the state's fantasy, have produced the most incisive diagnoses of its pathological core, exposing the trauma of being forced to perform an identity for a recognition that never comes. Their critique reveals that this was not merely a political struggle, but a defense of the liquid vitality, the intimate domain of the body, faith, and dynamic belonging, against a tyrannic alien state's design.

Second, and simultaneously, it is a rebellion of language and memory, the intimate vehicle of consciousness. The state's linguistic engineering—the radical alphabet change and vocabulary purge—was an attempt to break up the nation's psychic connection to its own past, to create a new citizen whose very thoughts would be formatted in conformity to an imported mold. This violent assault on the intimate world of words found its most potent critic in the poet and novelist Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. His masterpiece, The Time Regulation Institute, is the literary embodiment of this chapter's thesis. The novel's titular institute, a bureaucracy dedicated to the

futile and chaotic task of synchronizing all the clocks in the nation conforming an outsider patron, is a perfect allegory for the omnipotent and verticality of the top-down Occidentalist project. It dramatizes the state's absurd and traumatic demand that the organic, personal time of the everyday-life-world conform to an artificially imposed, mechanical schedule of progress. Just as the state tried to regulate time, it tried to regulate language and identity, with similarly absurd and deeply dislocating results.

The convergence of these critiques—the female voice speaking back against the instrumentalization of the body, the literary voice lamenting the engineering of language, and the ethnographic witness to the unintended unraveling of Islamist movements from within—reveals the ultimate failure of tyrannic modernity. As Nilüfer Göle (2002) has analyzed in her anatomy of Islamic modernities in Turkey, the very movements that sought to impose a totalizing religious alternative to the Kemalist script have generated transformations that subvert their own totalizing ambitions: the veiled activist who claims an individual voice, the young militant for whom romantic love becomes a catharsis from the collective political project, the sex scandal that forces a public reckoning with the misuse of religious marriage (2002:103–10). These are not merely hybridities; they are the contemporary manifestations of the rebellion of the intimate that Tanpınar diagnosed and that Turkish women have lived. The Occidentalist project, for all its power, could not fully colonize the intimate realms of being. The very act of violation gave rise to a resistance that was more authentic and enduring than any political opposition, because it was born from the defense of the self against the State-West. The legacy of this trauma, therefore, is not merely a divided polity, but the enduring struggle itself—the permanent rebellion of the intimate self against the macro-political fantasy that sought to define it.

This rebellion of the intimate against the state's prefabricated forms finds a profound echo far beyond Turkey, revealing the global morphology of this schizophrenic condition. The anthropological work of James Carrier (1987) on Ponam Island in Papua New Guinea provides a striking micro-sociological portrayal. Confronted with colonial power, the Ponam people did not merely submit; they strategically refashioned their own ethnohistory, systematically erasing ambiguous earlier encounters to fabricate a mythic narrative of being the "reciprocal amicability and helpfulness" partners of the first Japanese trader (1987:115). This was an active,

communal act of narrative cargo-culting: the performative construction of a born past designed to secure a favorable position within the exogenous order. It is the village-level equivalent of the Kemalist synchronization of clocks and the Rentier State's anxious museology (see chapters IV & V)—a desperate performance that seeks legitimacy by aligning one's own history with the perceived desires of the powerful *Other*, thereby enacting a *breach* with the complex, liquid reality of the indigenous reality.

The Ottoman-Turkish case reveals the historical genesis and intimate rebellion against the schizophrenic condition, a pathology born from a centuries-long, failed performance for Western recognition. If this was a drama of state-led mimicry, the (post)colonial Arab world presents its tragic, fully-realized sequel. Here, the state is no longer merely schizophrenic but has fully metabolized its condition, becoming Ghalioun's ([1993] 2015) pure 'state against the nation'—a guardian of colonial legacies whose very existence makes the quest for an authentic Occidentalism a political and intellectual mirage. The (post)colonial Arab state thus becomes the ultimate theater of the pathology I diagnose in this chapter: a violent *intra-civilizational* encounter erupts within the polity, a direct consequence of the failed *inter-civilizational* encounter with the tyrannic hegemonic North. This is not merely a political conflict but a schism at the deepest level of collective life—a civil war within the 'structures of consciousness and conscience' (Nelson 1973:81), where the state, structured as an imported rationalized template, declares massive war on the indigenous constellations of the societal lifeworld. Therefore, the (post)colonial Arab state is structurally a hegemonic exogenous tyrannic entity which reflect the continuity of the 'past' and the suspected gesture of the 'post'.

The rebellion of the intimate is not merely a historical Ottoman phenomenon but a recurring dynamic in all schizophrenic vassal states. In the contemporary Arabian Peninsula, as documented by Karen Exell, this rebellion manifests in the stark contrast between the global 'white cube' museums and the "immersive, interactive and dialogic environment" of festivals like Qasr Al Hosn (2016:Introduction). While the state performs a mimetic modernity for the North, the societal reality fosters a *hidden transcript* in these spaces, which "articulate local and regional concerns in a rapidly changing world" and serve as a defense mechanism, *reviving* traditional values against the dislocating tide of Ready-Made Modernity (2016:Introduction). This living,

performative resistance of the indigenous lifeworld to the state's imported, solid forms is the very terrain upon which the terminal (post)colonial condition of the Arab world, the object of our next chapter, will be fought.

This rebellion of the intimate is not just a reaction against the state's tyrannic modernity; it is also the living ground upon which any genuine internalization of the Third Pillar must rest. For if the formative labor of translating European norms into Turkish political grammar is to endure, it must be anchored in the very spheres the Kemalist project most violently assaulted, the body that refuses to be instrumentalized in the spectacle, the language that remembers what the state would erase, the daily life that persists in its irreducibly top-down reality. The dialectical threshold opened now in Ankara cannot be secured by its elites alone; it urges a patient, intimate work of those who, in Tanpınar's words, refuse to have their clocks synchronized by anyone but themselves.

Chapter IV

The Arab (Post)Colonial Mirage

Anatomy of the Manufactured State and the Plea for a Guarantee

Illustration. The Yin and Yang of the Tishreen Protest Soul: The Aesthetics of Resistance

This section refers to a triptych of graffiti from the *Tishreen* protests (a series of mass uprisings in Iraq that began in October 2019 and continued into 2020, demanded an end to corruption, sectarian quotas, and Iranian influence), each representing a distinct voice within the movement's collective soul: the scream of imminent martyrdom, the sigh of exhausted heritage, and the sarcastic performance of the wounded resource.

The first figure (Figure 1, available in the digital deposit DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.32231442) appeared in *Tahrir* Square of Baghdad during the protests of 2019. This graffiti is a meticulously composed visual indictment, as a schizophrenic plea, a cry between the sacred and the profane. Its power lies not only in its words but in the silent, damning language of its imagery. At the center stands a stenciled bird—not in flight, but turned away. Its back is deliberately positioned against the blue of a United Nations flag, a gesture of profound disillusionment. This is not just a bird; it is the spirit of a people, pivoting away from the international institutions that have failed them, its gaze fixed instead on the stark, bloody reality of home. That reality is spelled out in the crimson script of the opening line: "The blood of the martyrs is a trust upon our necks." The bird does not see the UN; it sees this blood. It bears witness.

The plea "WHERE ARE YOU?" is inscribed directly above the UN flag, transforming the symbol of global peacekeeping into the addressee of a furious, rhetorical question. The answer is implied by the bird's posture: You are not here. Therefore, the trust is ours alone to carry.

Finally, the entire structure—the witnessing bird, the accusatory text, the rejected flag—rests upon the most fundamental of all commands, the raw imperative that justifies the entire scene: "STOP KILLING." It is the unshakeable ground of this resistance, the demand from which there is no compromise, and the ultimate purpose of the sacred trust they carry.

This poignant appeal is more than a mere symptom; it is the definitive ritual of a *modern political cargo cult*. The protesters, reduced to mere end-users of a failed, imported democratic state, did not formulate a sovereign, indigenous plan for self political repair. Instead, their blame is directly addressed to the United Nations —'WHERE ARE YOU?'—as a desperate invocation aimed at the original

'manufacturers' of their political system. This was not a call for revolution but a plea for a manufacturer's guarantee—the ultimate cargo cult metastasis. In this ritual, the only conceivable solution to systemic failure is to appeal to the mystical powers who first delivered the *cargo*, a performative admission that the local population has been systematically stripped of the tools, and even the will, for indigenous political debugging and self-repair.

The second figure, definable as *an exhausted heir, an anachronistic love story and the melancholic legacy* (Figure 2, available in the digital deposit ibid). This graffiti captures the profound cognitive dependence of the modern Iraqi political project. The protester, masked against state weaponized pandemic raise to extinguish the protests of 2019-2020, sits in exhaustion. It captures the moment of conclusive disillusionment with the imported *modern* political project. The protester's exhaustion is not merely physical; it is a profound fatigue with a political system—an Occidentalist import—that is fundamentally alien and illegible to his experience.

The statement, '*ln yfhmnā as-syāsīwn*' (The politicians will never understand us), is a verdict on the entire imported political paradigm and a perfect articulation of the schism of aversive gaze versus intimate melancholy. The state elite, conditioned by Vicarious Conditioning, looks upon the populace with an Aversive Gaze, seeing their traditions and demands as illegible obstructions to the mimetic project. The protester, in turn, embodies the Sentiment of Intimate Melancholy—a grieving, profound connection to a civilizational bedrock that the state's illegible greenhouse of imported laws has systematically defamed.

In a powerful act of indigenous turn, 'he' abandons the *crumbling* concrete of the imported state and seeks foundation on the ancient bedrock of the Hammurabi Code. This is not a *nostalgic* retreat, nor is it the 'fundamentalism' that the hegemonic gaze would label it. It is, rather, a *melancholic reformation*—a desperate, authentic attempt to find a source of law and belonging in a jurisprudential lineage that predates and indicts the failed Ready-Made import. The statement "Me and Iraq: A Love Story" reflects a love for a melancholic ideal that transcends the corruption of the present, forging a bond with a homeland whose true constitution is not based on an imported paradigm, but on its ancestral values. Paradoxically, however, the schizophrenic vassal state has committed itself to anxiously and desperately upholding the malicious imported paradigm in order to secure recognition from the North.

The third is the Figure 3 (available in the digital deposit ibid), definable as a sarcastic performance for a blind world. This image merges the protester's physical body with the geopolitical body of Iraq. A wounded demonstrator, his injury a testament to the state's violent repression, sarcastically camouflages himself as an oil barrel. The world map is emblazoned on it, visually indicting the global order as a consumer complicit in this violence. His plea, "Do you see me now?", is thus a challenge laced with bitter irony: he is forced to embody the very commodity—the 'OIL' that forms the barrel's heart—to become visible. This is not just a question but a performance of grotesque mimicry, highlighting how the lives and blood of individuals are rendered invisible, while the resource beneath their feet commands the world's full attention.

If the previous chapters traced the philosophical and historical genesis of Schizophrenic Vassalage, the Arab (post)colonial condition presents its most metabolic and politically crystallized form. This pathology, which renders authentic critique a mirage, finds its ultimate expression not in a discourse of hatred, but in the abject political form of the Manufactured State—a condition whose terminal symptom, the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee, was starkly visible in the 2019 Tishreen uprisings in Iraq. To understand this endpoint, we must first excavate the broad historical and epistemological foundations across the Arab region that make such a plea inevitable.

1 Introduction. Stereotypes: Occidentalism, Sectarianism, Failed State

If the Ottoman-Turkish case illustrates the historical genesis of the Schizophrenic vassal state, and the Japanese case its philosophical misrecognition, the Arab world presents its most acute and politically crystallized contemporary manifestation. Here, the (post)colonial state becomes the perfect embodiment of Ghalioun's 'state against the nation,' its inherent void of legitimacy filled not by an organic social contract, but by the sterile performances of a Conceded Modernity that renders any authentic Occidentalism a mirage.

The visceral harshness of the *Tishreen* protests, their graffiti, slogans, and wounded bodies camouflaged as oil barrels, has been met with a categorically controversial portrayal by the dominant analytical frameworks of Western media and academia. The protest is frameable through three interchangeable, yet equally pathological, lenses:

First, as a new chapter in the supposed genealogy of 'Arab Occidentalism', suggesting a rage reading, not properly political, but civilizational—a primordial, irrational hatred of the West, as a rejection of modernity itself. The acclaim "WHERE

ARE YOU?" is emptied of its referent and transformed into a symptom of a cultural immune response, a society pathologically unable to assimilate the democratic cargo delivered to it. This framing, popularized by polemicists like Buruma and Margalit, performs a crucial epistemic containment: it converts a structural political plea into a psychological disorder.

Secondly, as the inevitable expression of sectarian strife, Iraq's complex social composition is reduced to a timeless Sunni-Shia-Kurdish trichotomy, a pre-modern tribal mosaic perpetuated and fragmented by colonial alignment. This interpretation explicitly rejects the fragmentary sectarianism shaped by sectarian distribution (muhasasa ta'ifiya), implemented as the primary sustenance of the political architecture that manufactures sectarian identity as a tool of governance. Hence, by interpreting the conflict as a mere sectarian conflict, the analysis naturalizes a colonial and (post)colonial engineering project, confusing the manufactured symptom with an anthropological essence much deeper than its apparent and misinterpreted manifestation.

Third, the protests are framed as yet another case study in failed democracy or authoritarian resilience. From this perspective, they represent either the death throes of a liberal project undone by native illiberalism, or definitive proof of a region culturally incompatible with pluralist politics. What this narrative systematically overlooks is the foundational fact, the top-down democracy that failed was never an indigenous bottom-up project. It was a Manufactured State, assembled in 2003 as a massive imported constitutional modules and a sectarian operating structuralism, a political machine whose primary legitimacy was contingent on external validation, never internal sovereignty. To speak of its failure, therefore, is to blame the end-user for the malfunction of encrypted software they were never empowered to understand, adapt, let alone debug.

Each of these dominant interpretations, despite their differing ideological paradigms, shares a common epistemological move, as they all locate the pathology within the Arab subject. Whether the diagnosis is cultural hatred, sectarian atavism, or political immaturity, the problem is deemed to reside in the society itself, never in the structure of the global order that produced the schizophrenic political form it is forced to inhabit. These frameworks are not merely inaccurate; they are active components of what this book terms the *machinery of misrecognition*, perpetuating the epistemic

fabrication of Occidentalism, as a polemical category designed to pathologize critique and thereby preserve an asymmetric North–South epistemic order.

Yet these dominant interpretations collapse upon contact with the lived reality they purport to explain, and nowhere more starkly than in the grammatical evidence of the protest itself. The Occidentalism thesis stumbles against the grammatical structure of the protest. The graffiti does not proclaim '*Leave us alone*' but 'WHERE ARE YOU?' This is not a rejection of the international order, but a desperate appeal to its own promised grammar of protection and guarantee. The protester, as subaltern, appeals to the normative promises of the hegemonic order, the United Nations, only to find that the order is structurally incapable of fulfilling them, thus not as an enemy, but as a default manufacturer, invoking the warranty on a political system that arrived with a label of international legitimacy but no local manual for repair. Thus, pathologizing this cry as hatred is to misrepresent the message at its core; it is a labyrinthine plea from a desperate consumer, not the curse of a nativist.

To grasp the specificity of this plea, the Iraqi case must be distinguished from another, seemingly successful, yet equally pathological, modern form: the aesthetics allocative mirage of the hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states. The ostensible aesthetical prosperity' of the Gulf states represents a distinct pathology of massive modernity. This model, far from refuting the thesis of the schizophrenic vassal state, exemplifies a parallel pathology rooted in what Hazem Beblawi identified as the 'rentier mentality'—a "break in the work-reward causation" (1987a:52). Rentier state thesis structure these policies as *aesthetics contingent* formations whose modern borders and political structures were *solidified* by external powers, to derive their legitimacy not from an indigenous social contract but from the direct *distribution* of external wealth. Therefore, the state forecloses the need for ethical sovereignty by purchasing a *wellbeing-belonging*. The principle of 'no taxation without representation' is inverted into 'no representation because no taxation.' (Beblawi 1987b:385) Consequently, the state functions as an *allocative* mechanism, creating a hierarchy of rentiers (Luciani 1987:65). This model bypasses the mimetic desperation for Northern Recognition, but it does so by foreclosing the very possibility of an indigenous dialectical journey toward ethical sovereignty (*für sich*). While the distinct pathology of the 'Rentier Cargo-Cult State' will be fully anatomized in the next chapter, its allocative logic, purchasing

modernity and foreclosing sovereignty through distribution, stands in stark contrast to the schizophrenic anxiety and manufactured dependency analyzed here.

Iraq, by contrast, presents the archetypal case of manufacturing. Unlike the fabricated rentier states of the Gulf, it possessed a deep, complex historical substrate. Forged from the Ottoman provinces and governed by a British-installed monarchy, it developed into a potent, if brutal, nationalist nation-state. The 2003 invasion did not create a new entity in a vacuum; it systematically dismantled this existing state throughout a violent process of manufacturing, where the existing state was dismantled, and a new one was assembled in its place using a Ready-Made prefabricated template of liberal democracy, deliberately engineered with a sectarian segregationist quota system that functioned as a double-edged political weapon.

Beneath this political and economic architecture lies a deeper, more fundamental schism. At its core, the pathology manifests as a violent intra-civilizational encounter with the northern tyrannic hegemony. This is not merely a political conflict but a schism at the deepest level of collective life—a clash of competing regimes of living—where the state, structured as a rationalized imported template, declares war on the indigenous constellations of the societal world, a clash over Collier and Lakoff's fundamental question: "How should one live?" (2007:23), as a claim into universality through impersonal principles, rendering alternative ethical frameworks as particularistic, and therefore, illegitimate arguments.

This schism operates at the most fundamental level: the state's relationship with its own history. The state, a product of colonial fabrication, suffers from a profound archival anxiety. It cannot root its authority in the present, so it displaces its legitimacy into a manufactured past, as a state-regime-sponsored, 'experience-distant' history in sharp contrast to the 'experience-near' concepts that an individual "might himself naturally and effortlessly use to define what he or his fellows see, feel, think, imagine, and so on" (Geertz 1974:28) that is packaged and spectacularized. This 'born past', in Glass terms (2016:97) is violently grafted onto the populace, actively suppressing the experience-near, intimate historical consciousness of the societal life. The failure of the Pharaonist project by the Egypt nationalism, for instance, starkly revealed this schizophrenic bind. This project sought to forge a secular, autochthonous national identity rooted in the ancient Pharaonic legacy, predating the Arab conquest and Islam. However, the very management of this would-be solid identity exposed its

conceded nature, as the Archaeological Service that curated and legitimized this Pharaonic past was directed by the French, not by Egyptians. The state's claim to authenticity thus rested *per se* on a colonial structure. Consequently, this state-sponsored identity was perceived by broad segments of the Islamic *Umma* as little more than a mimetic parabola, a Westernizing fiction in "abyssally deep contradiction" with the society's Islamic identity (Wood 1998:185). As this chapter will demonstrate, the ultimate consequence of this anxious and manipulated historiography is a political and intellectual terrain so fractured that any coherent critique of the West becomes structurally impossible—an argument fully developed in the sections that follow.

To understand why these frameworks fail, we must first excavate the historical machinery that produced the terrain upon which *Tishreen* erupted, a terrain built not by organic social contract, but by colonial fabrication, economic architecture, and archival anxiety.

2 Colonial Fabrication: An Islam *à la française* and the Mechanisms of Dependence

Before the mirage of Arab Occidentalism could even be contemplated, the very ground for a sovereign intellectual project had to be dismantled. The colonial strategy was not merely political control, but the systematic *infantilization* of consciousness through what we have theorized as Vicarious Conditioning. This mechanism, by instilling a mimetic desire for Rewarded Northern Models, locked the elite into an anxious performative cycle. This section examines the mechanisms of this fabrication, showing how the preconditions for the Schizophrenic vassal state were laid.

The colonial project in the Arab world was not merely territorial but epistemological. It functioned as a system of what Laroui would term *colonial tutelage*, as an extended epistemic climate in which indigenous elites were "imbued with liberal values" and conditioned to seek validation within a framework they did not generate (1997:6). This reality, as *tutelage*, must be understood within the broader historical framework Laroui identifies earlier as as a profound *retard culturel* (cultural delay) (1974). Laroui highlight that the central dilemma of the modern Arab world is its anachronistic synchronization with a specific moment of European modernity, the liberal epoch of the 18th and 19th centuries, a moment defined by the primacy of historical time and rationalism. Colonialism, in this view, is not the cause but the brutal symbol and consequence of this delay, forcing an encounter on terms that the

Arab world was not prepared to meet on its own (1974:7–8). This delay is not a moral failing but a factual starting point that structures the entire subsequent intellectual and political project. The (post)colonial state and its intellectuals are thus tasked with an impossible mission or mandate to catch up within a global order that has already moved on, leading to the pathological compensations and schizophrenic splits this chapter venture to diagnose.

The most explicit case was the French policy of fabricating a "Gallicized Islam." As confessed by its architect, Le Châtelier, the goal was to create a unique Islam *à la française* through the suppression of the charitable philanthropy (*Wāqf*), the seizure of mosques, the transformation of clerics into colonial-state officials, and the regulation of pilgrimage to serve colonial interests (Le Châtelier 1910). This was a deliberate strategy of cognitive alignment, producing a "Europeanized Islam" whose (post)colonial result could only be a fractured and alienated religious landscape.

This was not merely an assimilation, but the incarnation of Vicarious Conditioning on a civilizational scale, by hijacking of elite mentalities and a fabrication of their dysfunction, as the very dysfunction that would later define the schizophrenic state, through the systematic intellectual sterilization and substitution of elites. The colonial strategy did not merely persecute indigenous intellectual strongholds; it rendered them structurally irrelevant by creating-empowering parallel institutions—exemplified by the American University of Beirut, the American University in Cairo, and programs like Fulbright—that redefined the western standards of academic legitimacy. A degree from these institutions became the passport to elite status, while qualifications from national universities were systematically devalued. This was not a one-time intervention but an ongoing large process of institutional substitution, one that continues today with the proliferation of Western campuses across the region: NYU in Dubai, Georgetown in Doha, and now Manchester University in Riyadh. Each new campus further entrenches the hierarchy, producing a class of colonial-phile elites whose intellectual formation and professional loyalties are aligned with the global North, not with their own societies, placing them entrants, rather, midway between both contexts, yet alien to both. Their function is not emancipation but to act as agents of a perpetuated dependency, embodying the schizophrenia of the artisan who operates a system whose source code they will never possess.

The case of post-2003 Iraq is stark, after a policy of massive 'ideocide' that annihilated the academic class, through selective assassinations and exile, scholarships were funneled to associates of the new political order, creating an intellectual class whose loyalties and paradigms were aligned with external powers (Alnasir 2025). In the Maghreb, the intellectual sphere remains dominated by graduates of the French system, a living continuation of internal colonization. This cognitive capture was not a uniquely French project but reflected a broader Western epistemological stance that fabricated a knowable, pathological Arab subject.

3 The Colonial Laboratory and the Fabrication of the State Sectarian Subversion

This fabricated Arab subject—pathological, unknowable, inherently deceitful—was not merely an abstract stereotype. It was the epistemological precondition for a concrete and devastating colonial project: the systematic re-engineering of entire societies through the manipulation of their legal and communal structures.

The colonial discourse, by pathologizing tactical behavior, performed a crucial ideological function, it discredited the political and economic struggle of the colonized, reframing it not as resistance but as evidence of a cognitive epistemic defect. This supposed defect then served to legitimize the very civilizing mission that purported to correct- supplant it, a perfect circular logic of domination. The ultimate irony is that the true pathology lies not in the subaltern's refusal to comply, but in the schizophrenic demand that he perform honesty for a master who came to plunder his land.

This trope had a long pedigree. Guy de Maupassant, in his Algerian chronicle 'Allouma' (1889), codified the same prejudice, asserting that lying was "one end to the other [...] with or without motive," and declaring the lie to be "one of the most surprising and incomprehensible signs of the indigenous character [...] a second nature, a necessity of life" (Maupassant 1889). What the colonizer labeled as inherent duplicity was, however, a rational and often collective tactic of resistance. The Egyptian chronicler Al-Jabartī, witnessing the French invasion of 1798, documented how his countrymen sold a single egg to French soldiers for the price of ten chickens, a tactical overcharge designed to drain the invader's resources and fund resistance (Al-Jabartī [1878] 1998). This was not a "mania for lying" but a tactical logic of resistance psychology.

As a traveler through postcolonial Southeast Asia—Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand—, even throughout South America—Colombia, Peru—I often encounter what feels like a casual relationship with truth-telling, a readiness to say what the interlocutor wants to hear rather than what really is. Is this the native duplicity of a residual colonial fantasy, or something else, a residue of centuries of struggles under predatory powers, a habit of strategic evasiveness so deeply ingrained that it survives the conditions that produced it? The question deserves further empirical study; serving the traceability theory a framework for such inquiry.

This was not merely a battle of representations. The colonial discourse that pathologized the colonized subject served a concrete political purpose, it justified the wholesale dismantling of indigenous institutions. If the indigenous was congenitally deceitful, then his laws, his courts, his tribal structures could not be trusted to govern him at a civilized manner. They had to be replaced, remade, or placed under tutelage. The colony thus became a vast laboratory—not only for extracting wealth, but for engineering new forms of identity, new structures of dependence, new kinds of intersubjectivity. This engineering operated at the most intimate level of law and social organization. This process is starkly visible in the transformation of legal and tribal structures, a technique perfected first in Egypt by the Napoleonic invasion and beyond, and recently applied to Iraq.

Following the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt, a deliberate policy of judicial fragmentation was imposed. As documented in earlier work (Alnasir 2021a), Napoleon established mixed courts that artificially inflated Coptic representation to 50%, deliberately marginalizing both the existing Islamic judiciary and other confessional groups like the Jews. This was not an act of pluralism but a calculated sociocolonial empowerment segregation. The jurisdiction of these new courts was systematically expanded at the expense of the pre-existing, integrated system, while the appointment of jurists was transformed from meritocracy into a system of popular influences and charismatic selections, effectively trivializing the land-law. The result was the emergence of arbitrary religious jurisdiction to confront the sectarian colonial empowerment (Alnasir 2021a:VIII). This judicial sectarianism stood in stark contrast to the metropolitan French policy, where metropolitan courts was actively dismantling religious particularities in law to create a unified civil sphere (CCF Cerf c. Cougenheim

1846). While in the colonies, colonizer's exported the very fragmentation it was dismantling at home.

Another colonial grid was then applied to Iraq. The tribal complexity often cited as the primordial obstacle to Iraqi statehood—lamented by colonial observers like Hollingworth ([1952] 2015) as a source of native turbulence—was itself a colonial artifact. The British Empire, through the East India Company, executed a profound ecological and demographic alteration. This involved deviating the Euphrates river to construct the, so known, Indian Dam (*Suddat al-Hindiyya*), deliberately creating a fertile enclave to serve as a colonial purposes settlement environment. Into this manufactured landscape, they mobilized tribes from the southern Arabian Peninsula, a movement accelerated by Wahhabi expansion, and imported labor from South Asia, actively encouraging conversions to Shiism among them. The explicit goal of this massive social engineering project was to craft a sectarian and tribal shatterzone to disrupt Ottoman maritime and logistical routes to the Gulf and, by extension, complicate their passage to India (Alnasir 2021b:408–9). The subsequent Ottoman policy was twofold, first, a defensive economic maneuver that settled these weaponized tribes, transforming chiefs into a landed gentry and shifting the social structure from an anthropological synoikismos to a system of capitalist monopoly; and second, a political strategy of colonial-elite fabrication through institutions like the 'School of Tribes.' As referred in Chapter I, this was not a charitable endeavor but a calculated tool for seduction and brainwashing, designed to create intellectual masses aligned with imperial interests (Rogan 1996:87). This approach, regarding the transformation of a productive state concession into a mechanism for tribal distribution, would be revisited and further developed in Chapter V as the anthropological foundation of the modern rentier state.

The legacy of this dual strategy was a perfectly conditioned comprador elite: economically rooted in a distorted land system and politically groomed for subservience. This is starkly illustrated by the fact that Abdul-Muhsin Al-Saadoun, a graduate of the School of Tribes, became the first Prime Minister of the British-installed Iraqi state in 1921 (Alnasir 2021b:408), cementing the pattern where the alumni of such imperial schools became the foundational—and perpetually compromised—architects of the political colonial vassal.

Upon the Ottoman collapse, the British did not encounter a vacuum of power but a landscape they had helped create, where tribes now acted as subversive state entities. The British solution was not to dismantle this structure but to formalize its subordination, merely obliging tribes to report their judicial verdicts (Gellner 1983:3–4), thereby cementing identitarian tribal egocentrism as an insuperable firewall for the future state (Alnasir 2021b:410–11).

The colonial fabrication of society, in addition, produced a parallel crisis in the memory and indigenous identity, by precipitating a collective anxiety of writing a coherent national history according to the colonial epistemes, a dilemma which Ulrike Freitag (1994) identified as the 'Search for the Nation.' One of the examples of this crisis is symbolically captured by the fact that the declaration of the Algerian independence struggle, drafted in exile, in Tripoli (Libya), not in Arabic but in the very language of the colonizer, French. This was not an isolated incident but symptomatic of a broader reality, as most literary (post)colonial narratives, even those advocating decoloniality, were produced exclusively in the same colonizer language. Even a figure like Sahli, who emphasized the urgent need to decolonize history, paradoxically wrote his essays in French (1965). This linguistic paradoxy produced a foundational schism central to the schizophrenic condition, an intellectual field split between a colonial-phile elite, producing work in a language alien to its own realities, and those confined to an often-marginalized indigenous tradition. The exceptional case of Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, who wrote his critique of Arab thought in Arabic, only underscores the rule, highlighting him as a rare proto-Arab critic addressing his interlocutors in their own language, and thus struggling against the very grain of this captured historical consciousness.

An even more palpable symptom of this rhetoric was the fact that the Algerian declaration of independence was drafted in French, a detail that is not merely symbolic; it is further evidence that the very medium of historical and political discourse was a contested terrain (Freitag 1994). A Francophone elite, educated within the colonial system, produced historical works that were often far removed from the conceptual discourse of their own fellow citizens. This created a disconnect between the official state narrative and the society it purported to represent, further deepening the schizophrenic divide.

Two centuries later, on a different continent, the same paradox persist. In Tashkent (Uzbekistan), the Museum of Memory of Repression (*Қа ағ н Қур нлари х ира и муз йи)* documents the Tsarist Russian atrocities against the Uzbek people, the suppression of their native prose, the forced imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet, yet the entire exhibition is written in Russian, in that very Cyrillic script. The colonizer's language remains the only legitimate medium to narrate resistance to the colonizer. The museum, ostensibly a site of national memory, becomes instead a monument to epistemic captivity, or utmost a place of schizophrenic epistemic.

By other hand, Afaf Marsot observed that the dominance of Western-influenced narratives was structurally reinforced by the fact that much early Egyptian history was written by Europeans using 'predominantly British or western sources,' leading local scholars to dismiss these works as lacking objectivity (1973:2). This structural bias persisted even as a native historiography developed after the 1952 revolution, since new works were "written in Arabic and seldom translated," and suffered from a "paucity of local professional journals and their narrow distribution" (1973:3–4). This created a vicious cycle as Egyptian scholarship remained largely invisible to Western academia, while Egyptian historians themselves had limited access to international developments, an immediate form of the intellectual dependency Laroui critiques (1974).

This dynamic apparent to what can only be described as a collective Stockholm syndrome. At a 1975 congress of African historians, when a Nigerian presenter argued that intellectuals fled French-colonized zones to escape the cultural forced assimilation, Francophile attendees reacted viscerally, defending the "French colonial matrix, its legacy and its virtues" (Zbādīẗ 1979).

Half a century later, the script repeats. At the *V Afro-American Congress of Interdisciplinary Studies*, held in Tumaco, Colombia (November 2024), I witnessed the same dynamic. After my intervention on cultural emancipation and indigenous knowledge emancipation, a 'Black' Colombian academic reproached me in the plenary for attempting to "pervert historical evidence", for questioning his use of the term '*la Conquesta*' as naturalized colonial language. Later that day, when I urged a moderator to protect a speaker's time from a disruptive intervention, another 'Black' attendee turned on me: "Who are you? We are Colombians; we understand each other. Don't come from Spain to tell us how to think!" The audience applauded. I left the hall to their cheers. The foundation's president later apologized: "This is precisely the

epistemic perversion we struggle against." His words confirmed what the applause had revealed—that the colonial-phile reflex is not just a relic but a living, surviving, defended identity, even among those it subjugates.

This same reflex defined their opposition to Said's critique of Orientalism (1978), a reaction shared by various southern related voices who accused Said of practicing an 'inverse Orientalism' (Schmitz 2009) or of representing a Western cultural industry rather than an authentic Southern voice (Varisco 2011). Figures like Ibn Warraq went further, explicitly defending Western colonial identity against what they saw as Said's misrepresentations (Warraq 2007), while others, such as Abaza and Stauth, criticized him for imposing an overly Weberian reading on behalf of Islamic fundamentalism (1998). In defending the very identity imposed upon them, they perpetuated the orientalist narrative that had justified their subjugation.

This epistemic and institutional alienation created a perfect cultural laboratory for Vicarious Conditioning. The Francophone Arab intellectual, educated within the French system and producing work in a colonial language, became the equivalent of a subject in Bandura's film-mediated experiments. (A)conditioned to replicate the forms of Western scholarship—its methodologies, its theoretical paradigms, its very language —but were systematically detached from the philosophical ecosystem of their own societal reality. Just as the children imitated the aggressive film model without understanding the real-world context of violence, this sterilized elite produced a derivative critique, a *modernité concédée*, that was often more intelligible to the external manufacturer of knowledge than to the society it purported to represent. Their intellectual output was utmost a compliance for the Northern gaze, far from an indigenous production from within their own societal world—generating what S. Hanafi and Arvanitis identify as a dependency by choice, reinforced by structural constraints that marginalize their own linguistic narration (2014).

This intellectual sterility is the product of what Chapter I has theorized as Cold Thought, a cognitive mode that prioritizes the superficial comfort of replicating imported forms over the neurologically costly work of indigenous critique. The grand treatises of El-Messiri and Hanafi are monuments to Cold Thought, having replicated the architecture of Northern theory (multi-volume systems, historical surveys, tripartite structures) while systematically avoiding the labor of decrypting, to adapt, the imported paradigm's philosophical source code. They are not failed thinkers but

symptomatic outputs of a conditioned cognitive miserliness, the path of least resistance taken by an elite trained, through the Vicarious Conditioning, to mimic rather than to create.

The systematic substitution, and, utmost ideocide of indigenous intellectual classes produced a field fundamentally severed from its own societal everyday-life-world. This diagnosis finds its most damning confirmation not from Western critics, but from within. The Iraqi scholar Muhsin Mahdi, who navigated the transnational educational system—Baghdad, the Sorbonne, Chicago, Harvard—without being colonized by it, offered a sobering assessment. Invited to a Cairo congress on the Arab language, he observed that Arab academies had not yet formed an independent *school* of thought. Some, he noted, followed tradition blindly, ignorant of modern epistemic developments; others chased Western trends, ignorant of their own heritage. The result, implicitly, was a field of echoes—repeating either the past or the foreign, incapable of generating new thought rooted in contemporary reality and openness to universal horizons (Mahdi 1985). His words diagnosed precisely the condition of intellectual class trained to replicate, not to create.

This elite disorder, however, did not emerge in a vacuum. Its prototype and the schizophrenic state-form it would administer were first perfected not in the 20th century, but in the 19th, within the crucible of the Ottoman Khedivate of Egypt. Before returning to that historical precedent, however, we must first examine the broader colonial laboratory in which such forms were engineered, a laboratory that operated through discourse, law, and the systematic fabrication of dependent identities.

4 The Khedivial: A Historical Anatomy of Schizophrenia

CARTOON.—FEBRUARY 26, 1876.
INDIA
THE LION'S SHARE.
"Gare à qui la touche!"
☞ The acquisition of the Suez Canal Shares was accepted by the country as securing the safety of "The Key to India."—1876.
No. 83.

Figure 2: 'The Lion's Share,' a contemporary British caricature

Visually encapsulating the core pathology of the Khedivial state. It depicts the Khedive of Egypt (Ismail Pasha) as a docile spectator while the British Lion devours the Egyptian treasury, graphically illustrating the financial vassalage and mimetic dependency detailed in this section. (Tenniel 1878) © NYPL 1108393

If the (post)colonial Arab state of the twentieth century surges as a schizophrenic entity, alienated from its society and perpetually performing an anxious modernity for external validation, its prototype was perfected in nineteenth-century Egypt. The reigns of Khedives Ismail (1863-1879) and Tewfik (1879-1892), chronicled by John Eliot Bowen (1886a, 1886b, 1886c), reveal a state whose internal logic was fractured by an anxious mimetic desire towards Europe and subordinated to foreign financial and political control—a system in which Vicarious Conditioning had fully captured the state apparatus, producing a classic schizophrenic vassal. This condition, culminating in the

British occupation of 1882, prefigured the core pathologies of the later (post)colonial dilemma, perfectly illustrating the rupture of Ghalioun's 'state against the nation'.

The most visible symptom was the ruler's schizophrenic auto-negation: a desperate compass for the costly Third Pillar of Western recognition. As diagnosed in Chapter I, this withheld recognition stalls the dialectic, condemning the vassal state to what Hegel called the *Unhappy Consciousness*—a consciousness divided against itself, yearning for an acceptance that never comes.

This mimetic desire fueled a spectacular desperation of modernity financed by massive foreign debt. Railways, canals, and palaces were built not precisely purusing indigenous development-well-being but to massive purchase an aesthetic civilization—and, with it, the longed-for European acceptance. The fiscal cruelty of this vassalage was stark. As Bowen detailed, European financiers extracted wealth through a systematic architecture of debt: loans were issued at heavy discounts, bonds were bought up at fractions of their value, and commissions absorbed vast sums. Between 1868 and 1875, public loans with a nominal value of nearly £59 million delivered barely £35 million to the Egyptian treasury—the difference pocketed by European banks, middlemen, and speculators. The pattern was the same for the Khedive's private debts. Bowen's verdict was unequivocal: it was 'reckless robbery,' a "wicked waste of a country's resources," in which Western moneylenders displayed "a good deal of Shylockism" (1886a:315–16).

This massive financial hemorrhage funded a project perfectly epitomized by Khedive Ismail's disreputable boast that Egypt was "no longer a part of Africa, but of Europe" (Bowen 1886a:330). The statement stands as the paradigmatic proclamation of the schizophrenic vassal: a desperate, performative disavowal of one's own geography and history in the futile hope of massive purchasing entry into the coveted European club.

The fiscal hemorrhage proved unsustainable. By 1876, bankruptcy had brought Anglo-French Dual Control, formalizing the state's vassalage. Egyptian finances were now under foreign comptrollers who answered to London and Paris, not to the Khedive, by placing placing the state's finances under foreign comptrollers who answered to their home governments, not the Khedive. The decree of November 1879 granted them powers that institutionalized the schizophrenic rupture of the 'state against the nation.' The comptrollers enjoyed absolute powers of investigation over all public services (Art. 1), the rank of ministers with a seat in the Council (Art. 4), and

immunity from removal without the consent of their home governments (Art. 6). They even set their own salaries and expenses (Arts. 7–8). Article 3 provided the only concession to Egyptian sovereignty, as the comptrollers were to "take no part in the management" and confine themselves to observations—but this was explicitly a temporary arrangement, subject to the consent of France and Britain. In practice, the power to investigate everything and to block any decision was indistinguishable from the power to govern (Bowen 1886b:449–52). The (post)colonial state remained sovereign in name only, subsisting as a 'scaffold (post)colonial structuralism' (Alnasir 2023), a framework that performs sovereignty while remaining structurally dependent on its colonial architects. Such eventuality, far from the Western dogmatic concept of sovereignty, surge to provincialize the idea of sovereignty itself within the (post)colonial global south, far from its northern ideological conception.

The ascension of the more pliant Tewfik after Ismail's deposition did not resolve this schizophrenia but intensified it. His government, described by Bowen as "largely out of sympathy with the reform movements," was caught between the demands of the European controllers and a rising nationalist movement within the Egyptian army led by Ahmed Urabi (Bowen 1886b:450). The state's duality became stark: it was tasked with implementing *reforms* dictated by foreigners—which included slashing the very army that was its instrument of power—while facing a populace increasingly hostile to the foreign influence those reforms represented. As Bowen notes, "The people could not look without envy and jealousy on the foreigners who were drawing immense salaries from the Egyptian treasury" (Bowen 1886b:455). The state, in its comprador role, was now utmost commissioned for the extraction of national wealth on behalf of a foreign agenda.

The Urabi revolt of 1881-82 was the inevitable explosion of this contradiction. It was a cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians' against a Khedivial state perceived as a scaffold tool of foreign interests. The ultimate schizophrenic rupture, revealed during the rebellion climaxed, Khedive Tewfik, the nominal sovereign, sought protection from the British fleet bombarding his own city, Alexandria. Meanwhile, Arabi, the rebel, was hailed by the people and even received clandestine support from the Ottoman Sultan, the Khedive's own suzerain (Bowen 1886b:468–69). The state had literally split in two, one half (the Khedive) allied with the foreign power, the other (the nationalist officers)

claiming legitimacy from the nation, same scenario were seen again in Iraq, by the 1941 revolts.

The British victory and occupation resolved the revolts by force but cemented the scaffold schizophrenic structure. Lord Dufferin's subsequent reforms created a facade of representative institutions, as legislative councils and general assemblies, which Bowen himself dismisses as almost absurd given the "abject condition" of the farmers (Bowen 1886b:489–90). Such institutional mimicry, designed to appease liberal opinion in Europe, created a state that appearance the rituals of Western governance while its real authority resided by foreign technocracy exercised by the British advisors. Yet the parallel tragedy in Sudan further emphasize the dynamic, where the Egyptian government, under Tewfik, was reduced to a powerless bystander in the loss of its own vast territory, its authority utterly hollowed out (Bowen 1886c:656–69).

The Khedivial precedent is thus indispensable. It demonstrates that the scaffold structures of the twentieth-century Arab state, as per its schizophrenia, its comprador character, its anxious desperation of a modernity dictated from abroad, were not original sins of the postcolonial era but were themselves structurally (post)colonial from the outset. They are the direct legacy of a nineteenth-century model of state-building founded on mimetic desire, financial dependence, and a fundamental rupture between the governing apparatus and the societal life, a rupture ultimately enforced by colonial occupation. Bowen's chronicle provides the essential historical anatomy for the theoretical diagnosis offered by Ghalioun and Laroui, revealing the Khedivate as the archeological site where the pathology of the modern Arab state was first unearthed.

If the Khedivate revealed the political and financial anatomy of vassalage, this dependent structure was reinforced by a parallel economic blockade that systematically foreclosed the path to industrial sovereignty.

5 The Foreclosed Path: Industrialization and the Preservation of Vassalage

The scaffold structuralism of the Arab vassal state extended decisively into its economic sovereignty. Its most profound aspiration, to build an indigenous productive base through industrialization, was systematically foreclosed by the hegemonic discourse of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. This was not merely an economic blockade; it was an epistemological enforcement—one designed to secure and perpetuate vassalage.

The discourse of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm did not merely block industrialization; it actively pathologized the very desire for it. To seek economic

sovereignty was framed as naive, irrational, unfortunate or dangerously nationalist (Hollingworth [1952] 2015:304). This was the epistemic core of the prohibition, the vassal was to remain a consumer, never a producer. The consequences of this structural blockade would later crystallize in the rentier state, as a formation we will examine in the next chapter, but its foundations were laid here, in the systematic foreclosure of industrial sovereignty, being as the core of the No-Derivatives Paradigm: you may consume the finished product, but you are forbidden from mastering the generative process, either modify it.

The Arab world, and very similarly all over Africa, was structurally blocked from developing any such indigenous model. Hollingworth's critique constructs a perfect double-bind for the industrial aspiration, as local attempts are doomed to produce "poor, shabby, badly wearing" goods, while the elite's preference for superior foreign products is branded as snobbery or a lack of patriotism ([1952] 2015:306). The only form of industry that received approval was that which remained under foreign tutelage—the petroleum sector was praised precisely because it was "entirely in foreign hands and is foreign-run" ([1952] 2015:316). The schema perform perfectly the vassalage at economic scale, were the vassal is conditioned to provide labor and raw materials, while innovation, management, and capital development remain the privileged domain of the master, serving the structure as alliance or friendship. The moment the vassal state attempted sovereign resilience through 'Egyptianization,' or nationalization in general, it was framed as a "reversion to Oriental methods," corruption, and xenophobia (Hollingworth [1952] 2015:312), thus demonized as a pathological deviation from its assigned modern sovereignty.

This structural and discursive obstruction was not a conjectural fault of policy but a defense of a structural geopolitical paradigm. The Northern state's consistency relies on a productive-redistributive loop, mass exporting finished goods to a captive global South. Thus, the Southern emancipation (industrialization) represents an existential threat to this model, seeking to shatter the vassalage's dichotomy from a massive consumer of finished Northern products into a sovereign producer. Empowering the South to become a competitor would directly defeat the Northern state's foundational consistency and shatter the epistemic hierarchy that legitimizes its internal projection. The enforced failure of indigenous industry locked the southern state into the rentier configuration, where distributing exogenous rent replaced sovereign production to

maintain consistent the subalternity dynamic. Therefore, the terminal plea for a manufacturer's guarantee was the logical outcome of this century-long, systematic foreclosure of the right to become a manufacturer, a cry from a populace whose state had been engineered to consume, never to create.

The welfare state erected in Ba'athist Iraq and Gaddafi's Libya must be understood not as an authentic, indigenous socialist project, but as a form of Rentier-Socialism, were the state employ hydrocarbon rents to massively import and install the concluded forms of a socialist well-being net, as subsidized goods, public healthcare, guaranteed state massive employment, while systematically bypassing the generative mentality of proletarianization, industrial class formation, and the historical struggles that produced these forms elsewhere. It was a cargo-cult socialism, replicating the redistributive rituals of welfare to secure legitimacy, but its economic base was allocative, not such a proletarian productive, thereby foreclosing the very dialectic of state-society negotiation that defines a structural sovereign political community.

The post-2003 order in Iraq represents this catastrophic collision of two distinct pathological cargoes, escalating the economic schizophrenia into a terminal institutional crisis. The attempt to install a Ready-Made Liberalism atop the ruins of a Rentier-Socialist structure created a perfect storm of schizophrenic incentives. The new paradigm preached private-sector growth while failing to install the source code of a functioning liberal order, as a reliable regulatory antitrust, reliable analogous social security, and the rule of law on the open labor market. The populace, conditioned by decades of allocative wellbeing-belonging, was now confronted with a state deliberately shrunk by a new ideological import. The resulting civil servant feudal anxiety is the logical outcome of this vacuum.

This pathological convergence finds its starkest empirical validation in metrics of elite function. Iraq's 2025 rank of 150th out of 160 in the Elite Quality Index (Casas and Cozzi 2025) is not merely a statistic of failure; it is the quantitative signature of the rentier cargo-cult metastasized to the highest institutional level. The EQR diagnosis—that state organs, including courts, operate as enablers of rent-seeking rather than as guardians of public interest—corroborates this book's core thesis, the manufactured state does not merely have corrupt elites; it structurally produces elites, a political class whose *quality* is measured by its efficiency in value extraction rentability, not value creation. This aligns with a global pattern of disordered states, such as Honduras,

Turkey, and Tunisia, where systematic overreach and elite value extraction form a coherent syndrome. In the Iraqi case, this is the ultimate outcome of the clash of cargoes, were liberal façade grafted onto a rentier body, resulting not in being a functioning hybrid, but a hyper-efficient machine for the systematic sterilization of public value and the foreclosure of any indigenous capacity for elite-institutional repair. Such structural labyrinth of industrial sovereignty would later find its perfected form in the rentier state, where consumption replaces production and wellbeing is purchased through redistribution rather than forged through labor, a theme to which we will return in the next chapter.

Therefore, the economic and institutional foreclosure had a profound corollary in the realm of culture and identity. The state, stripped of legitimate foundations in the present or future, became pathologically anxious about its past, giving rise to what can be termed the anxious archive.

6 The Anxious Archive: Rewriting History and the Crisis of Origins

The schizophrenic state's pathological behavior extended beyond the cynical instrumentalization of religion for everyday-life legitimacy. It exhibited a deeper, more fundamental instability, a profound anxiety over its own historical narrative. This anxiety root directly from the condition identified in this work's broader framework, where the 'post' in (post)colonialism is largely a misnomer (see Introduction). These states, as we have seen, remain structurally colonized—functioning as what I have termed a *scaffold structuralism*—lacking an authentic social contract and/or genuine popular validation. Their legitimacy cannot be rooted in the present thus creating an anxious displacement toward the past. The state, a direct product of colonialism, is thus compelled to fabricate a pre-colonial, and within, anti-colonial lineage to justify its existence, turning the national archive into an existential battleground (Freitag 1994) for the legitimization of an inherently illegitimate present. This results not in a break with the past, but in a fallacious camouflage and a sterile, resentful pulse, perpetuating the endless spiral of colonialism.

This anxious archive is the symptomatic manifestation of a profound chronicle schizophrenia. The state, operating in the imported, irreversible time of the spectacle (the time of *progress* and *development*), is simultaneously committed to manage a societal reality whose relationship to time is often more complex, layered, and in parts still cyclical or rooted in a different historical consciousness. To bridge this schism, it

fabricates a born past, a packaged, *spectacularized* history (Debord [1967] 1992:157) that is as consumable and sterile as the *pseudo-cyclical* time of its political anxiety. This is the *past as born*, an encrypted, unchangeable history that justifies a predetermined future, in stark opposition to the *past as longing,* the intimate, contested, and living history of the subaltern, which is the true substance of lived time (temps vécu) and the only ground for an indigenous future.

6.1 *The state's 'born past' fabrication*

This state-driven anxious historicism was not a conjectural casualty but a structural active, ideological project. The (post)colonial era witnessed a series of state-sponsored initiatives across the Arab world, from Nasser's Egypt and Ba'thism in Iraq and Syria to Algeria and Gaddafi's Libya, explicitly aimed at "rewriting the history of the Arab Nation." These projects, often launched under the aegis of newly formed bodies like the Union of Arab Historians (founded 1973), were conceived as a "further step towards the achievement of complete independence in the cultural sphere." Their stated goal was to "efface all negative interpretations that were inserted into it" by colonial scholarship and to present a unified national narrative that would contribute to "the revival and prosperity of the Nation" (Freitag 1994:19–24). This was the institutional machinery of the epistemic fabrication diagnosed by Laroui as a top-down imposition of an experience-distant historical truth, designed to manufacture the cultural legitimacy that the Schizophrenic vassal state so desperately lacked. The anxious archive was, therefore, an instrument of the state, a factory for producing the born past that would justify its present. Such pan-Arab project of historical fabrication, however, inevitably clashed with the specific, schizophrenic dilemmas of individual nation-states. Nowhere is this tension more vividly illustrated than in the failed project of 'Pharaonism' in Egypt, a case which lays bare the profound contradictions of the vassal state's search for an *operable* past.

This foundational dilemma of anxious historicity, the struggle to find an operable past between colonial interference and internal schism, has not disappeared but has been transformed. In some contexts, such as Egypt, Iraq, or Algeria, the struggle took the form of pan-Arab nationalism, as a project to rewrite history top-down, forging a unified narrative that could mobilize the masses against colonialism and Zionism. But in other contexts, the same dilemma produced a radically different response.

In the emergent hydrocarbon-rich Gulf states, where modern borders were drawn by colonial powers and where the social fabric was systematically engineered through tribal fragmentary settlement and the importation of labor, the anxious historicity took a different shape. Here, the state did not seek to mobilize the past for revolution but to fantasize it for rentier consumption—see next chapter. The most potent and well-funded expression of this state-driven project is found in the modern heritage museums of the Gulf states.

This mimicry is not confined to political rhetoric but extends to the very architecture of cultural identity. The Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, for instance, functions as an archetype public transcript for Northern consumption. As observed by Exell, it presents "an exact version of the acceptable Islamic world—disconnected from religion and politics" (2016:Introduction). Thus, it is not an indigenous expression of Islamic civilization but a meticulously crafted desperation of legibility for the Northern gaze, deploying the Western disciplinary framework of art history to sanitize a complex cultural identity into a recognizable, non-threatening commodity. Its primary audience is not the local populace but the international press and cultural elite, from whom it seeks the coveted the *Recognition*, proving the state's membership in the categorized club of *modern* nations.

The attempt to fabricate a usable past is not left to historians alone but is elevated to a national project of aesthetic engineering. Whereas museology is stated as a culturally coded paradigm to serve a pedagogical function of self-criticism (as in Turkey) or a triumphalist self-regard (as in the US) (Alnasir 2021c:198). The Gulf model, however, constitutes a third paradigm, where the anxious museology of the legitimacy-starved state serves as a therapeutic instrument for managing the ontological insecurity. Its explicit purpose to actively conceal "potentially contradictory and politically awkward tribal histories" and replace them with a state-authored, "homogeneous, timeless, 'legendary' past" (al-Sharekh and Freer 2022:Common tribal tropes). This is the past reprimanded and realized in marble and interactive displays, a strategic re-undertaking of history, not a working-through of it.

In these states, the museum becomes the architectural engine for a state-manufactured national soul. The invention of new symbols like Qatar's 'desert rose' is a form of epistemological creationism, a deliberate bypassing of actual, fraught historical lineages nomadism vs. metropolitanism (*badū/ḥaḍar*) in favor of a neutral, state-

owned origin myth. This project represents a distinct, contemporary modality of the fictive modernity whose economic substrate, the rentier state, will be discussed in the next chapter.

These complexes dynamics created what we can term the dilemma of origins. The new states were faced with an impossible question: where does the nation begin? The Ottoman past was a period of subjugation to be rejected, or even, re-negated, as the colonial interlude was the source of traumatic humiliation. The immediate pre-independence struggles was often too short, too fragmented, or too romanticized to serve as a substantial foundation. Consequently, the project of writing history became an exercise in manufacturing a usable past. This manufacture often involves a selective retrieval of history, such as the popular narrative of an Islamic 'Golden Age'—a period of scientific and political supremacy spanning from Spain to India, as chronicled in works like Firas Alkhateeb's Lost Islamic History. This narrative, focusing on achievements in *Baghdad's House of Wisdom* or the Umayyad caliphate in Córdoba, provides a potent counter-narrative to contemporary marginalization, offering a vision of past glory that can be leveraged for present-day identity politics (2014:V).

This process was not monolithic but a labyrinth of concurring narratives, as different factions within the elite sought to impose their vision. Nationalists, regionalists, and Islamists each promoted their own timeline, creating a fragmented historical consciousness that mirrored the political dissonance between states like Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia. The state, in its attempt to impose order, often became the primary sponsor of official history factories, producing an official, packaged narrative. However, this state-sponsored history was itself a vicarious product—an imported model of national history applied to a context it did not fit—and thus failed to achieve organic resonance. It was a top-down imposition, precisely because the state lacked the indigenous intellectual class (the requirement for a plain state) that could generate an authentic native national culture from the background (Gershoni and Jankowski 1986; Takriti 2013).

This anxiety is particularly acute given the specific tradition of Arab historical consciousness. As Laroui reminds us, early Arab historiography defined itself in opposition to myth, priding itself on its method of verification and its claim to factual truth (1974:23).The contemporary state's struggle to manufacture a usable past is thus a profound disorder or fall from a tradition that once held historical truth as a

cornerstone of cultural identity, exacerbating the schism between a glorified historical self-image and a precarious present.

6.2 *Archive laundering*

This epistemological crisis was materially mirrored in the chaotic state of the national archives themselves. Marsot describes the Egyptian archive as being in "dire need of a new and more comprehensive cataloguing," having been moved repeatedly and housing over 36,000 uncatalogued dossiers alongside "cratefuls of archives which have never been opened within living memory" (1973:5). She recounts how scholars literally "stumbled onto material" by accident, highlighting an archival landscape that was as disorganized and fragmented as the historical consciousness it was supposed to be the central informant of the emergent nationalism. This physical disarray symbolizes the (post)colonial state's failure to systematically master its own past—the archive as both a treasure trove and a testament to institutional neglect, where history remains buried in unopened crates, awaiting a genuine effort to resurface.

This neglect, however, was not merely bureaucratic. As Rifaat Ali Abou-el-Haj argues, the Ottoman period was systematically marginalized in Arab historiography not because it was irrelevant, but because it was politically inconvenient. For post-Ottoman elites, especially those who had served the Ottoman system before collaborating with colonial powers, the Ottoman era represented a past that had to be laundered. To legitimize new, territorially bounded identities, these elites had to 'abandon, reject, and deny' their own Ottoman-era roles (1982:187). Dismissing the era as one of decay and skipping directly to a mythologized pre-Ottoman golden age was thus an active tool of political legitimization, a deliberate obscuring of a past that contradicted the nationalist myth (1982:190). The archive's disorder, therefore, is not just a symptom of state failure but also a political strategy.

Hence, the strategy of manipulation and archival monopoly became an active tool of the metanarrative, thereby reinforcing the thesis of decline, which had its origins in Orientalist scholasticism and which, despite having been largely abandoned by historians of the Ottoman Empire (Mikhail and Philliou 2012:725), served as a useful populist instrument of the post-Ottomanism.

Laroui elaborate an empirical diagnosis for this failure. He argues that the intellectual who operates within a Conceded Modernity but fails to consciously grapple with the historical disorder is condemned to one of two roles, rather to be a rootless

cosmopolitan or a derivative illustrator (1974:16). This dependency is trapped in a fundamental double-bind. The conceded modernity granted to the Southern intellectual often critiques a mirage. The postmodern, anti-historical trends that might brand classical Arab thought appear advanced are largely confined to the Western academic left. Meanwhile, the logic that actually governs Western geopolitical and economic power remains that of history-progress, and economic rationality, the very logics whose deep historical source code remains decipherable and inaccessible to the South. Thus, the anti-Western critic, armed with conceded tools, often attacks a shadow, as the West's self-critical edge, while leaving the fortress of its material and ideological structuralism untouched.

Yet Laroui's critique coincides with its contemporaries of the 1970s, as Marsot already detected promising shifts within Egyptian historiography—a movement away from diplomatic history and elite politics toward "a rising interest in social history and in the study of the mass of the population, a trend which is strengthened by Marxist interpretations" (1973:14). This involved turning to new sources as folk-tales, songs, customs and manners (1973:5–6), an attempt to derive analytical categories from Egyptian society itself rather than applying imported models. While these trends did not yet constitute a full overcoming of the delay as disorder, they represented an embryonic step toward the kind of indigenous, critical scholarship Laroui advocated, one that seeks to understand society through its own textures, not through reactive inversion.

This dichotomy finds clear expression in the practical model of historical writing. Marsot in her survey of 20th-century Egyptian historiography, highlight a significant shift after the 1952 revolution. The previous generation of historians, often writing in Western languages, was focused on "explain[ing] and justify[ing] Egypt to the west, because they needed the west and depended on it, not only materially but also psychologically" (Marsot 1973:2). This aligns closely with Laroui's cosmopolitan stance. In contrast, the post-revolutionary current turned introspectively concentrating "on writing history for Egyptians and by Egyptians," (1973:2) reflecting a desire for intellectual self-determination and a move toward the illustrator position, aiming to define a national identity free from Western psycho-dominance.

Projects as of El-Messiri and Hassan Hanafi, which will be examined by the next section, despite their anti-Western appearance, often resemble the work of illustrators,

by applying sophisticated Western philosophical frameworks (phenomenology, hermeneutics) to an Islamic or Arab corpus, producing a critique that is, in its epistemological foundations, deeply dependent. Their works, for all its critical ambitions, remains symptomatic of the very schizophrenic political space and cultural delay they seek to overcome.

This intellectual dependency is further complicated by the historical voids upon which their critiques are built. Abou-el-Haj observes that even when Arab historians turned to social history or Marxist frameworks from the 1950s onward, they often continued to treat the Ottoman period as a blank space—a 'non-era' of stagnation. This selective historiography was not just a scholarly failure but often served as a nationalist regional agenda. By adopting Western modernization frameworks that focused narrowly on the rise of the nation-state, historians like Anis (Egypt) and al-Wardi (Iraq) implicitly validated the colonial-legacy borders, thus serving the elites who governed within them, further fragmenting the possibility of a pan-Arab historical consciousness (Abou-el-Haj 1982:188–89, 197). This created a truncated historical consciousness, where the rise of the nation-state appeared as a natural rupture rather than a contested outcome of Ottoman collapse and colonial intervention (Abou-el-Haj 1982:188–89). Therefore, any Occidentalism emerging from this fractured historical base is bound to be reactive and structurally derivative, lacking the deep historical grounding needed for a truly indigenous critique.

In doing so, the state actively suppresses and defames the experience-near historical consciousness of the societal pragmatism, the witnessed past of intimate anecdotes, communal grievances, and vernacular nostalgia that constitutes a people's lived sense of time. The struggle over the national historicism is, therefore, not merely between competing facts, but a fundamental epistemological clash as a state-sanctioned, experience-distant history that justifies the Schizophrenic Vassalage, versus a subaltern, experience-survived memory that is the very substance of ethical sovereignty and the key to its recovery.

The archive's disorder, therefore, was not a symptom of state failure but a strategy of political legitimation. The stage was set for the intellectual drama that would unfold in the postcolonial era, where Arab thinkers would attempt to critique the West while standing on the very ground their own state had rendered unstable.

6.3 *Conclusion: The Impossible Ground for Occidentalism*

The ultimate consequence of this anxious, state-driven historism was to render the project of a coherent Arab Occidentalism *stillborn*. A critique of the *Other* (the West) presupposes a stable, confident understanding of the *Self*. When the self is a contested, fabricated entity—when the nation's history is a labyrinth of state-sponsored narratives, linguistic alienation, and material voids—any Occidentalism produced will be a reactionary mirage, or even a phantom. It will be a critique emanating from a void, an inversion without a solid foundation. Stripped of a coherent self and a usable past, the political imagination of the vassal state is left with only one recourse when its imported systems fail, to demand that the original manufacturers honor a warranty on a product they were never empowered to understand or repair.

7 The Mirage of Arab Occidentalism: Intellectual Sterility and the Sociology of Knowledge

The theoretical, historical, and historicist pathologies diagnosed in the previous sections culminate in a definitive intellectual outcome: the failure to produce a coherent Arab Occidentalism. What appears as a discourse of critique is, upon examination, just a mirage.

Reputed works of figures like Abdelwahab El-Messiri, while ambitious in their scope, exemplify the theoretical challenges inherent in constructing a counter-discourse from a position of epistemological dependency. His monumental critique, which synthesizes disparate Western philosophies into an apparently cohesive adversary, is periodically undermined by a methodological approach that conflates the foundational with the symptomatic. For instance, his analysis extends to framing quotidian aspects of Western life, such as consumption patterns—perfumes and deodorant—, as direct manifestations of a 'de-humanizing secular materialism' (Al-msīrī 2007). This analytical move, while intending to reveal the pervasive nature of the paradigm he critiques, has the effect of flattening the hierarchy of evidence and diverting the argument from a rigorous engagement with core philosophical tenets toward a reductionist cultural critique of surface phenomena. Consequently, the discourse risks resonating not through its theoretical rigor, but by providing a simplified, reactive narrative for a complex historical condition. It thus becomes a telling symptom of the very intellectual landscape it seeks to diagnose, one conditioned to operate with tools that predetermine the form, if not the content, of the critique.

The monumental scope of El-Messiri's critique of Western epistemology belies a foundational methodological flaw that renders its scholarly contribution problematic. Throughout his work, El-Messiri operates as a sovereign narrator, deploying a vast arsenal of Western *philosophical* concepts, historical claims, and cultural *observations* without embedding them within a verifiable academic framework. Key terms and syllogisms, often presented in their original English, are introduced as self-evident truths, stripped of their authorship and intellectual lineage.

This systematic omission of a conventional scholarly apparatus—the lack of precise citations, engagement with specific texts, or a clear delineation between his own synthesis and the arguments of others—creates an epistemological *vacuum*. The reader is presented with conclusions, such as the characterization of a homogeneous 'Materialist Model,' (Al-msīrī 2001) but is given no transparent path to audit the evidence or trace the deductive process that led to them. Consequently, the work accrues not as a *falsifiable* academic thesis built on cumulative, referenced knowledge, but as an extensive quasi-intellectual narrative reliant on the author's anecdotal experiences and overarching declarative authority, more characteristic of an academic chronicle than of critical and contributory prose.

Such methodology fundamentally compromises the work's academic utility. It becomes impossible to distinguish between a concept El-Messiri has developed indigenously, one he has adapted from a marginalized school of thought, or one he has appropriated from the very mainstream scholarship he critiques. The resulting oeuvre, for all its ink and hundreds books and thousands pages, thus stands as a self-contained citadel of argumentation, impressive in its scale and internal consistency, but ultimately unmoored from the collaborative and cumulative discourse that defines scholarly enterprise. It is a complex of erudition that, upon inspection, lacks the requisite substance for genuine academic engagement.

This is not intellectual dialogue; it is the Vicarious Conditioning in action, where the subaltern scholar performing the ritualized forms of Northern theory, even while attempting to challenge its hegemony. The critique may be Arab, but the epistemology remains encrypted, a perfect illustration of the schizophrenic bind this chapter attempt to diagnoses.

This failure finds its precise theoretical diagnosis in Laroui's concept of *modernité concédée*. For Laroui, contemporary thought in the Arab world is not an indigenous

product but a modernity granted by the West's own post-liberal turn, a *naïve modernity* in the Hegelian sense, received 'as a gift' without the arduous intellectual apprenticeship that produced it (1974:17). Critically he traces the roots of this dependency to the period of *colonial tutelage*, where intellectuals, 'imbued with liberal values,' developed a 'permanent ideological twist' by seeking to *justify* these foreign ideals within an Islamic framework (1997:6).

The works of El-Messiri are the terminal symptoms of this condition. For all their anti-Western ambition, they are reactive anxieties born from this same *tutelage*; as mentioned earlier, they use tools and categories (phenomenology, hermeneutics) borrowed from the very epistemological sphere they claim to critique, thereby remaining a symptom of the *delay*—a perfect example of modernist concessionary, rather than a means of overcoming it as seen in the Japaneses or Ottoman cases. Their work exemplifies the *hijacked dialectic* diagnosed in this book's theoretical framework, as they are forced to operate with the Northern *für sich*—the concluded theories of Western philosophy—as a pre-packaged in-itself, which systematically forecloses the possibility of an authentic, indigenous Arab philosophical *für sich*. They are just master artisans of a conceded paradigm, far from being sages of own sovereign one.

This is the intellectual corollary of the schizophrenic schism, a foundational fracture as a perfect example of the Ethical Schizophrenia dynamic, by a one-way flow of ideas that Gu and Guo identify as the mark of non-Western intellectual dependency (2015). Their Occidentalism is a reactive mirage, not an indigenous creation. It is a critique emanating from a position of dependency, which is why it can so easily be collapsed into the caricature of irrational hatred that the discourse of Occidentalism imposes. Their work, however sophisticated may appear, remains a symptom of the schizophrenic political space and the epistemic shift, not a means of overcoming it.

Arab Occidentalism persist errant into admiration and resistance labyrinth as Arab intellectual history further undermines the notion of a coherent Occidentalist discourse. From pre-Islamic encounters through contemporary nationalist movements, Europe was both a model and a threat. The Cairo Center for Occidental Studies and Hasan Hanafi's interventions illustrate how Occidentalism in the Arab world emerged less as *hatred* than as a program for self-critique and intellectual renewal. Hanafi's "Occidentalism" was not a discourse of demonization but an attempt to *provincialize* Europe (Chakrabarty 2008), to situate it within a broader epistemic horizon. Even

when anti-colonial polemics adopted the language of resentment, they were grounded in historical grievances—occupation, exploitation, betrayal—not in abstract hostility toward the *West*. Confronted with this conditioned reality, the project of constructing an authentic Arab Occidentalism was doomed to fail. The intellectual attempts were themselves products of the very sterility they sought to overcome, throughout a monumental project for a *Science of Occidentalism* (ʿlm al-āstġrāb), 716 pages in Arabic, represents its most ambitious, and ultimately tragic, *quasi-esoteric* form.

A close reading of its foundational chapters reveals the project not as a map out of the labyrinth of dependency, but as its most detailed floor plan. Hanafi's work represent the archetype of the schizophrenic intellectual output theorized in this book: it manifests a sovereign desire to construct an indigenous framework for critiquing the West, yet its execution remains pathologically conditioned by the very epistemic vassalage it seeks to overcome.

The promised science collapses upon inspection into a series of *empty signifiers* —'Neutral Consciousness,' the 'Tripartite Structure' (Hanafi 1991:I)—declared with polemical fervor but devoid of methodological rigor or philosophical grounding. His analysis of European thought, spanning hundreds of pages (Hanafi 1991:II&III), remains a superficial narration of the history of ideas, a storytelling devoid of introspection, traceability, or genuine theoretical comprehension. It replicates the form of a grand intellectual system—the multi-volume treatise, the historical survey—while systematically missing the essential cargo: the capacity for sovereign, critical, and indigenous thought. This is not a failure of intellect, but a structural outcome. Hanafi's project perfectly exemplifies Laroui's earlier referred diagnosis, Arab 'scholars', are rather rootless cosmopolite or the derivative illustrator, attempting to use the borrowed tools and grand narratives of Western philosophy to critique the West, thereby remaining trapped in the gravitational pull of the very paradigm it seeks to escape. It is the brilliant, sprawling, and ultimately sterile desperation of a sage *manqué*—a would-be sage produced by a system that sterilizes the possibility of genuine *sagehood*. Therefore, his work serves as the most compelling evidence of the illusion of Arab Occidentalism as a symptomatic manifestation of Schizophrenic Vassalage—a desperate and conditioned replication of form in the absence of sovereign substance.

Another starkly illustration seen by the project of Ahmed Al-Sheikh and the Cairo Center for Occidental Studies, which, despite its stated aim of a critical dialogue with

Orientalism, often reproduced the reflexes of the anxious archive it sought to escape. Al-Sheikh's method—a series of *journalistic* interviews presented as a groundbreaking "excavation into the inner world of the Orientalists" (Al-šīḫ 1999:8), lacked the methodological rigor and transparency of a true critical apparatus. Its most profound failure, however, was substantive.

By one of his dialogue with Jacques Berque reveals the project's ultimate limit. Berque, defending his own universalist progressivism, while insist in retain own legacies and people heritage as own identitarian constructs, issues a warning: if Arab modernizers ignore their roots, the 'Ghoul' (al-ġūl), the evil, will 'devour them.' (Al-šīḫ 1999:24) This was not a benign observation but the rhetoric core of a secular-hegemonic prescription: a vicarious purification of the indigenous legacy, where the Western sage dictates which parts of the native tradition are authentic (the anthropological, the poetic) and which are demonic. That Al-Sheikh failed to press this point, to challenge Berque's epistemological right to define the Arab 'Ghoul,' reveals the ultimate limit of his dialogue. It remained a recorded anxiety of the very conditioning it hoped to critique, demonstrating that the dominant categorization of the Arab scholars, are just cosmopolitans, lapsing into a storytelling that documented their own subjugation, far from real epistemological illustrators.

This internal collapse from grand theory to hollow anxiety finds its most literal and damning evidence in the subsequent works that claim to build upon this feeble foundation. The case of Ali Al-Namlah, a former Saudi minister, is paradigmatic. His professedly foundational work on Occidentalism (Al-nmlï 2014), which purports to systematize the thesis of Al-Sheikh, is revealed upon inspection to be a citational mirage. The text is built upon repeated, verbatim references to non-existent pages in its source material, citing blank folios and biographical sections of the earlier referred Al-šīḫ, as if they contained substantive argument (Al-šīḫ 1999:239, 319). Crystallizing not merely academic sloppiness; it is the intellectual corollary of the schizophrenic condition, a perfect simulation of scholarly rigor that meticulously documents its own absence of authenticity. Al-Namlah's 'methodology' is the ultimate proof of the mirage: a promised science of the Other that cannot even accurately describe the book lying open beside it, thereby confirming that this entire discursive field is a monument to epistemic vassalage, its grand treatises mere facades for an enduring and conditioned intellectual sterility.

Such internal diagnosis is confirmed by voices from the Arab academic diaspora itself. The Iraqi-born Harvard professor Muhsin Mahdi, in a 1985 interview, categorically denied the existence of anything that could be considered an *Arab academy* or school. He characterized Arab intellectual tribunes as mere calques, repeaters of echoes, alien to all scientific productivity and devoid of empirical reasoning (Mahdi 1985). This verdict, while severe, encapsulates the profound epistemological dependency and sterility that defines the current landscape, rendering the very project of a sovereign Arab Occidentalism a mirage.

That verdict of profound sterility is not refuted but precisely illustrated by the most sophisticated attempts at critique. Consider the case of Mohamed Arkoun. In his dialogue with Ahmed Al-Sheikh, Arkoun positioned his primary work as an *oppressed narration* from Algeria and offered a substantive, methodological correction, by dismissing contemporary Orientalist scholarship as a marginal, polemical segment, contrasting it with the more legitimate, innovative currents of anthropology and emergent historical research (Al-šīḥ 1999:66). Yet this very move, as an attempt to earn legitimacy by aligning with the advanced sectors of the french metropolitan academy against its backward ones—is an example of the repeater of echoes. It demonstrates a fluency in the internal hierarchies, but not the capacity to generate an epistemological framework from its own bedrock. Arkoun's nuanced critique, the highest form of intellectual production in this field, remains an anxiety within a conceded modernity, thereby confirming Mahdi's diagnosis of a landscape where even the most refined voices are, in the final analysis, curators of imported paradigms rather than creators of sovereign ones.

Yet such an intellectual sterility is not a passive condition; it is actively and violently enforced through a policy of Ideocide. The case of the Saudi scholar Raja Ạlḥwạly is paradigmatic. Raja Ạlḥwạly (also transliterated as Raja al-Hawali) is a Saudi Islamist scholar whose work represents one of the most sophisticated indigenous critiques of Western theological and political hegemony to emerge from the Arabian Peninsula in the late twentieth century. His work, a monumental, 3,059-page doctoral thesis for the state university Umm al-Qura, offered a *fundamental critique of Western theological history* (Ạlḥwạly 2018). The response revealed the sinister synergy of this repression: Western scholars like Chandler & Gunaratna (2007) weaponized his work, accusing him of inseminating hatred and terrorism. This framing was grotesquely amplified by

the discovery of an annotated copy in Osama Bin Laden's library—a fact transformed into a pretext for his imprisonment. This constitutes a profound perversion of intellectual responsibility: an author was effectively held culpable for the mere fact of his work being read by a suspected criminal, a logic that would criminalize any challenging text. This mechanism, where Western discourse provides the pathologizing label ('terrorism') and the vassal state enacts the physical silencing, completes the cycle of intellectual annihilation. It ensures that the space for indigenous critique is foreclosed, not only by local authoritarianism but by a global regime of knowledge that neutralizes dissent through guilt by spectral association. In this reality, the field of 'Arab studies' in Western institutions metamorphoses into 'anti-terrorism studies,' actively functioning as an epistemic securitizing apparatus that pathologizes dissent. The imprisonment of Ạlḥwạly, for the crime of having his work read by a suspected criminal, completes the cycle of intellectual annihilation, ensuring that the space for indigenous critique remains foreclosed.

The trajectory of Arab Occidentalism confirms this book's central thesis: it is not a coherent counter-discourse but a mirage—the same holds for the 'Muslim world' itself, a category whose modern genealogy Aydin has shown to be a product of late nineteenth-century imperial politics, not an ancient genuine Ummah (2017). As the analysis of the anxious archive demonstrated, a critique of the *Other* is impossible when the *Self* is a contested fabrication. This fabrication is not random; it is the epistemological consequence of a conceded society. In such a society, the individual becomes a tactical operator who must navigate "*plusieurs sociétés superposées*" (several superimposed societies) in daily life (Pascon 1967:211–12, 1973:21–22). This produces a *composite, or even a mosaic, subjectivity* incapable of grounding the uniformed, sovereign subject required for a coherent philosophical critique.

The mirage of Occidentalism is thus the symptomatic manifestation of a schizophrenic (post)colonial condition, perfectly illuminated by the convergence of Ghalioun's political and Laroui's cultural analyses. Laroui's concept of the '*retard culturel*' (cultural delay) explains why any Occidentalism produced in this context is likely to be a form of '*modernité concédée*' (Conceded Modernity), a reactive, borrowed critique that fails to achieve authenticity because it does not emerge from a resolved historical consciousness (Laroui 1974:17), or utmost, self-coherent. Thereof, projects of El-Messiri and Hassan Hanafi were not the foundation of a school of thought, but the

ultimate symptom of this complex condition, a desperate anxiety from within the labyrinth, not a map for its overcoming, exemplifying Barthes's 'vaccine' mechanism. By granting the existence of an 'Arab Occidentalism' as a limited, pathological phenomenon, the hegemonic order inoculates itself against the more dangerous recognition that the critique might be justified. The Arab intellectual becomes the unwitting carrier of the vaccine, producing vast systems of thought that only reinforce the naturalized image of 'hatred' (Barthes [1957] 2012:Le mythe, à droite).

Thus, they represent a frantic, yet sterilized, attempt at what Spivak, similarly critiquing Foucault and Deleuze, identified as a failed "counterhegemonic ideological production" (1988:69). Their work, a paradigmatical example of conceded epistemology, stumbles into the very trap she outlined as "banalities of leftist intellectuals" (1988:70; 2010:46), by attempting to articulate a sovereign critique while being epistemologically dependent on the tools of the hegemonic North, thereby producing a speech that is, in fact, a symptom of the deeper silencing. In contrast, the true subaltern, the illiterate peasant, the urban sub-proletariat, the woman whose voice is erased between state patriarchy and colonial historicism remains in the space of what she extends the term the 'differend' (1988:97), as a harm that cannot be phrased within the existing idioms. The 2019 plea for a guarantee is precisely such a cry from the space of the different, a desperate anxiety that fails its reactionary purpose, met only with the silent, algorithmic logic of the new empire (see Epilogue).

The compromising nature of this modernity, as defined by Laroui, with its postmodern and anti-historical tendencies, makes classical Arab thought seem *advanced*. However, these ideas are themselves largely confined to Western intellectual circles, while the logic that truly governs Western power remains that of "history-progress and economic rationality" (Laroui 1974:17–18). Therefore, Arab Occidentalism is not only epistemologically dependent but is often politically inconsequential as well, missing its real objective, as a symptomatic manifestation of a deeper cognitive capture, not the founding of a school but the prologue to a chapter yet to be written.

The landscape of *conceded modernity* and derivative critique is not, however, entirely monolithic. As referred in sec. 8.2 Chapter I, the ambitious project of anthropologist Hammoudi, calling for an independent Arab anthropology grounded in the Arabic language and the shared 'concerns' of a vast nation ([2019] 2025:7, 13), represents a direct, praiseworthy attempt at the *vernacular theorization* and *sovereign*

repair this work advocates here. He explicitly seeks to move beyond the simple logic of borrowing and achieve a national re-appropriation of the discipline. Yet, the trajectory and reception of his project itself tragically reaffirms the structural diagnosis. His seminal work remains a monumental but isolated effort, lacking the cumulative epistemology necessary for the foundation of a school. Thus, Hammoudi's *output* stands as a testament not to the impossibility of sovereign knowledge, but to the immense, solitary labor required to produce it within the schizophrenic political and academic ecosystem of the vassal state. Although being as the *sage manqué*, his inescapable labyrinth is that of being a wandering sage in a system designed to produce nothing but artisans.

This dynamic of *modernité concédée* is not, however, a pathology unique to the Arab (post)colonial context. As the analysis of Japanese modernity in Chapter II demonstrated through the Western reception of Zen, this is a deeper, structural feature of asymmetric intellectual encounters. There, a non-Western tradition was not engaged with as a sovereign system but was *conceded* as a versatile screen for Western projections, a mirror image of the dynamic Laroui diagnoses. In both cases, the subordinate tradition is instrumentalized to serve the dominant existential and philosophical dilemmas. As Ames observed, Zen served as a versatile screen for Western projections: "Mystics can find mysticism in Zen. The unmystical find plain sense and sanity. The theological find God in Zen Nothingness. The untheological find nothing [...] beyond what is in man and his world, and find that enough" (1960b:32). Here, a non-Western tradition was not engaged with as a sovereign system but was *conducted*, or conditioned, as a tool for the West's, or western, therapeutic and intellectual concession, a mirror-image of the schizophrenic dynamic. This suggests that conceded modernity is a structural feature of profoundly asymmetric intellectual encounters, where the subordinate tradition is instrumentalized to serve the existential and philosophical dilemmas of the dominant one, regardless of the direction of flow.

The cumulative outcome of this epistemicide and conditioned sterility was a political field stripped of the very capacity for indigenous diagnosis. When the intellectual class is reduced to *repeaters of echoes*, engaged in cargo-cult science and concessionarism, political elites is left without the tools for self-understanding, let alone self-repair. It is from this *vacuum* of sovereign thought, this foreclosure of the sage's function, that the most abject political symptom inevitably emerges, not as an

organized revolution, but a plea for a warranty. Thus, the intellectual mirage of Occidentalism finds its terminal truth not in a text, but in a cry from the public squares.

The intellectual sterility diagnosed in the Arab context finds a precise methodological diagnosis in Dussel's concept of the 'abstractive fallacy.' As Dussel argues, critics who reduce ethical or political reflection to the purely abstract level, without developing the necessary categorical 'mediations' to move from universal principles to concrete, complex situations, inevitably produce a discourse that is either irrelevant or self-contradictory (2007:174). The principles in their most universal enunciation are 'abstract'; their 'application' still far from reaching the 'concrete-complex' (2007:175). The projects of El-Messiri and Hanafi, for all their monumental ambition, commit the same Dussel's fallacy, by operating at the abstract level, deploying Western philosophical categories as if they were self-evident universals, while failing to descend to the concrete-complex level where the victim's suffering is actually located. Their work is not a false critique; it is a critique that remains trapped in abstraction. Thus, the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the political expression of this abstractive fallacy, a cry that cannot find its concrete referent because the intellectual tools for diagnosing the concrete have been foreclosed.

Finally, these thinkers exemplify what Hegel diagnosed as the *Unhappy Consciousness*, theorized in Chapter I, as a consciousness divided against itself, yearning for an unattainable essence (the West's secret, the authentic Islamic alternative), producing vast systems of thought that remain, in Hegel's words, "the movement of an infinite yearning" (*die Bewegung einer unendlichen Sehnsucht*) toward a beyond that "flees when grasped" (Hegel [1807] 1979:§168). Their work is not failure but symptom, the theoretical expression of a political condition that has foreclosed the possibility of formative labor.

This cognitive capture is not merely a philosophical diagnosis; it finds its stark, empirical validation in the institutional machinery of the Arab academy itself, where knowledge production has been systematically reconfigured into a rent-seeking cargo cult (as will be discussed in sec. 9).

8 The Terminal Symptom: From Intellectual Vacuum to the Plea for a Guarantee

If the intellectual mirage of Occidentalism represents a crisis at the apex of the epistemological structure, its most devastating and terminal symptom erupts at the base of the political order. The foreclosure of a sovereign intellectual project, the absence of critique to conceded modernity, creates a vacuum that is filled not by rebellion, but by a desperate, abject plea. The 2019 uprisings provide the most poignant and tragic evidence of this terminal condition.

The protesters' slogans embodied a profound paradox: they cried out for a sovereign nation while their demand for a manufacturer's guarantee revealed the utter depths of their epistemological capture. This was not a logical contradiction but a symptomatic plea from a populace structurally stripped of its capacity for self-repair. They could no longer conceive of fixing the state themselves because the state was an exogenous, imported product, as a direct result of Vicarious Conditioning and Ideocide that had annihilated and disabled the indigenous intellectual class. Their cry was for a customer service intervention from the original producers, the ultimate admission of their reduction to passive consumers of a failed system. In this plea, the mirage of Occidentalism dissolves entirely, revealing not hatred, but the utter foreclosure of an indigenous, sovereign future.

The struggle embodied by Arab Occidentalism is not fundamentally about the West; it is about the painful absence of a self-generated framework for understanding, a direct result of Vicarious Conditioning. The Arab case demonstrates with particular clarity how the failure to produce an indigenous elite, a core component of a plain state, results in a political reality where populations are mere passive consumers of massively imported systems. The 2019 uprisings, where citizens demanded a guarantee from the manufacturer for democracy's failure, are the logical endpoint of this dependency.

Therefore, what is called Arab Occidentalism is not the foundation of a school but, as advanced earlier, the prologue to an unwritten chapter. The current texts are diagnostic evidence of a profound cognitive capture. The rebellion against this condition will not emerge from grand treatises but from the intimate, daily subversions of those refusing the assigned identity and from the arduous work of intellectual decolonization. As Abou-el-Haj reminds us, this decolonization must include a reckoning with the Ottoman centuries, not as a period of decay to be skipped,

but as a formative era that shaped land tenure, legal systems, and religious authoritarianism across the Arab world. Until Arab historiography confronts this complex legacy, the project of self-understanding, and with it, a coherent Arab Occidentalism, will remain incomplete. The Arab case, with its terminal plea, thus completes this book's tripartite evidence, demonstrating definitively that Occidentalism is an epistemic fabrication, a polemical category that pathologizes the symptomatic output of the real pathology, the schizophrenic vassal state.

A contemporary review of Laroui's work noted that it was "evidently distressed by the disproportionate echo" that fleeting Western intellectual fads found in Arab universities, where scholars engaged in "near fanciful researches" to prove the *modernity* of their traditional lore (Khalid 1975:77). Thus, he pinpointed the philosophical core of this failure, observing that "The 'modernity' which is sought to be established for something long past is at best 'naive', as Hegel would have it" (1975:78). This is a precise prefiguration of the *an sich* relationship to imported paradigms that this book theorizes. Laroui himself traced this intellectual sterility to its material base, arguing that "dependence on economic tutelage is bound to prevent a rupture with the traditional order," creating a political elite whose *traditionalism* was a fragile defense mechanism against overwhelming external domination, sustained only by 'vigilant effort' (1975:79). This analysis from the 1970s reveals that the structural dynamics of the schizophrenic vassal state, its economic dependency, its sterilized intellectual production, and its foreclosure of an indigenous future, have been operating for decades, confirming this book hypothesis that the *post* in (post)colonial is indeed a misnomer and that the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee in the squares is not an anomaly, but the tragic, logical culmination of this long-standing, engineered helplessness.

Finally to remind once again that the Japanese philosophical project represents a sovereign, albeit conflicted, commitment to transcending and refining modernity from a position of indigenous strength, whereas the Ottoman-Turkish project was a century-long, anxious struggle for recognition, while the Arab (post)colonial condition yields little more than a consumer's plea for assurance. The combination of overcoming, desperation, and supplication traces a spectrum of growing dependence on epistemological vassalage. To gain an even deeper comprehension of this stunting, we

must examine the sociology of knowledge that fosters this intellectual sterility, particularly within an academic system built on an impossible promise.

9 The Sociology of Sterilization: Knowledge Production as an 'Impossible Promise'

The theoretical diagnosis of a *derivative* intellectual field finds its empirical verification in the sociology of Arab knowledge production. Sari Hanafi and Rigas Arvanitis's *Knowledge Production in the Arab World: The Impossible Promise* (2016) empirically interpret the region's research structures and exposes the machinery of intellectual vassalage. Their inquiry demonstrates knowledge-economy paradigm operating as the political-economic embodiment of the perpetually withheld Third Pillar *of Recognition*, developed here, as a promise of validation structurally designed never to be fulfilled within the dependent framework of the vassal state. Arab academia thus intensifies productivity anxiety in pursuit of recognition it cannot secure.

Central to this dynamic is what S. Hanafi and Arvanitis calls "dependency by choice": Arab academics choose English as the only language of legitimacy, not because of its intrinsic scientific superiority but because it is the passport to international recognition. (2014, 2015:VII) Linguistic hierarchy becomes a voluntary (auto)discipline. The very act of knowledge production is re-oriented structurally toward *recognition* rather than discovery, transforming research into a performative economy of visibility and donor appeal. The marginalization of Arabic is self-reproducing, internalized through promotion systems and journal hierarchies that convert linguistic subordination into professional capital. Elite institutions such as the American University of Beirut and comparable foreign-linked campuses act as hubs of *linguistic dependency*, generating scholars globally visible yet detached from their own publics and everyday social realities. Within this system arise the intellectual entrepreneurs, as consultants who "manage the cultural codes of donor agencies" (2015:186) to embody the shift from autonomous scholarship to externally validated expertise. They embody what this book terms Ethical Schizophrenia as an anticipating external approval as the very condition of intellectual existence, in a dialectic of recognize foreignly to exist internally.

Such dependency is materially encoded in the very architecture of educative systems through a deliberate curricular hollowing-out. Thus the epistemic servitude that S. Hanafi and Arvanitis map empirically had already been diagnosed by Philip Altbach

who identified it as the core of neocolonialism as a structure where "the educational systems of most developing countries remain rooted in the administrative structures of the former colonial rulers," perpetuated by "the voluntary acceptance of colonial models and concepts by indigenous elites", as a structural perpetuates dependency even after political independence (1971:237–38). This *voluntary acceptance*, or tacit consent is the very engine of the escalation of commitment theorized in this book. The post-colonial elite, having staked its legitimacy on the imported paradigm, cannot acknowledge its failure to secure genuine recognition (the Third Pillar). Instead, it escalates its investment, creating additional bureaucratic barriers and curricular structures that are often more rigidly mimetic and exclusionary than their colonial precursors. The *Cryptouniversity* (supra Chapter I) is thus not merely the persistence of a colonial model, but its perfected and escalated form of an educational system whose frantic desperation of modernity is a desperate, schizophrenic attempt to force a recognition that the logic of hegemony is structured to withhold (Alnasir 2024, 2026).

The Cryptouniversity is thus not an aberration but the perfected architecture of that neocolonial logic structured as an educational system whose very autonomy consists in reproducing *spirally* its subordination. It deserves to recall when its predecessors, Le Châtelier and Hardy, who designed pedagogies to create loyal intermediaries rather than sovereign thinkers (see chap. I supra). Today, this logic is perfected in the abyssal disparity of curricular loads. A law degree from a European university, requiring about 6,000 hours of theoretical and philosophical training, produces a potential sage of the legal epistemology. In stark contrast, an equivalent degree from a university in the United Arab Emirates may require as little as 132 hours of instruction, often focused on procedural codes and rote memorization, the pure definition of an artisan. This is not an educational discrepancy; it is a geopolitical strategy. The diploma granted to the Southern artisan is thus just *Fetish-Certificate*, a hollow credential that grants the symbolic status of a 'lawyer' or 'PhD' while systematically foreclosing the epistemological depth required for genuine legal creation or theoretical innovation. It enables the holder to use the law, to apply a theory, or to gather data, but never to create, theorize, or interpret empirically from a position of sovereign understanding. This is the contemporary, quantified manifestation of the Ottoman School of Tribes: a system designed not to educate but to produce a managed elite of end-users, fluent in the operation of imported systems but constitutionally incapable of mastering their

philosophical source code. The Southern PhD holder, in this light, is often the most sophisticated artisan of all, hallucinated by the fetish of their certification into believing they possess a mastery that the structure of their education was meticulously designed to withhold intellectual strata.

Hanafi and Arvanitis's surveys and bibliometric analyses portray a fractured assemblage rather than an organic scientific community. Three institutional regimes dominate, according to their categorization: state universities, donor-driven NGOs, and international think-tanks. Public universities remain underfunded and constrained by centralist bureaucratic control; NGOs, favored by external donors, produce project-based studies evaluated in terms of projects and deliverables rather than intellectual continuity; while the think-tanks address mainly foreign policy audiences. The result is a *research economy governed* by short-term contracts and external reporting requirements, replacing inquiry and empirical introspection with the production-rentability of deliverables. It is, therefore, the NGOization of research, an institutional neofeudalismo as form of *epistemic dependency*. International donors such as the EU and UN agencies bypass universities they deem inefficient, further dislocating knowledge from education. Within this logic, knowledge becomes a rent-seeking commodity, an unsubstantive product traded for recognition and funding, properly an academic mercenary.

Language, funding, and institutional fragmentation converge in a politics of citation that reproduces the same hierarchy epistemically. Bibliometric mapping of Arab-Uprisings scholarship shows that 85–90 percent of references flow northward, while southern journals are seldom cited even by Arab authors (Hanafi and Arvanitis 2015:VIII). Local research thus circulates as empirical material, not theoretical source. This unequal exchange is reinforced by the fetish of rankings. Global indices such as Scopus and the Times Rankings serve a symbolic and ideological function legitimizing benchmarking (Hanafi and Arvanitis 2015:55 ff.), thus Arab universities internalize these metrics as proof and recognition of modernity. The expansion of predatory open-access publishing deepens the *illusion of visibility*, whereas, the vassal's self-measurement becomes the mechanism of his subordination, the more he measures, the more his autonomy declines.

Hanafi and Arvanitis note that the quantitative increase of publications has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in visibility or local impact (2015:6). This

paradox can be read today through a more explicit economic lens: across several Arab systems, publication and citation have been commodified into rentist transactions. In Iraq, for instance, governmental programs compensate academic staff with roughly 2.5 million IQD per Scopus-indexed article—about 1500 USD—creating an incentive structure that converts authorship and citation into marketable commodities. Such practices generate the very pattern Hanafi and Arvanitis observed: a hypertrophy of indexed output with minimal cross-citation or intellectual exchange. They publishes more, but communicates mainly through economic signals rather than epistemic dialogue.

These conditions culminate in what Hanafi and Arvanitis call "the broken cycle between research, university and society" (2015:306). Research, teaching, and social demand no longer communicate; universities operate as certification manufactures, issuing degrees that grant symbolic recognition within the same external economy of validation. Scholars publish for promotion rather than transformation, while public intellectuals perform in media spheres disconnected from research. Knowledge circulates vicariously without integration, a metabolism without a body.

Field interviews reinforce this portrait. Respondents acknowledge that publication primarily serves *career promotion* and that in international projects Arab partners often limit their role to data collection while theoretical framing and publication remain Northern. Partnership thus masks a pedagogical dichotomy, the South gathers, the North interprets and theorizes. Such collaboration sustains the tutorial hierarchy of recognition that the system pretends to overcome.

Political constraints compound other structural dependencies. S. Hanafi recounts that a security officer once remarked that "the number of dissident researchers could fit in a single bus and can easily be taken to prison" (2015:214), capturing the state's contempt for critical inquiry. Here, autonomy is substituted by a logic of bureaucratic-centralist survival.

The accumulative result of donor fragmentation, political repression, and linguistic dependency is the prevention of emergent and consolidation of coherent epistemic communities. Hence, the paradigm of the 'impossible promise' constitutes the perfect architecture of what I have termed a cryptouniversity, an entity that masters the form and ritual of global academia (publishing, indexing, citing) but whose real function is not the generation of sovereign knowledge, but rather the relentless mining of

external validation in exchange for tokens of symbolic recognition. Like in a gallery of intersecting mirrors, the knowledge of others is endlessly replicated, multiplying sterile reflections without generating any vision of one's own, serving merely as a channel for distributing prefabricated knowledge.

But in-depth, the pathology runs deeper, as the Arab academy exists as fragmentary *islands of competence* (Oliveira 1985), whose centrifugal energy mirrors the pull of exogenous recognition. This dynamic enacts a profound *reification of knowledge,* where the living process of inquiry is congealed into a tradeable commodity, a publication count, a project deliverable, or a certification. This process finds its most telling manifestation in a pervasive local industry of *fictive Northern certification*, where entities with adjectives like 'The American Board' or 'German Academy' issue aesthetic *credentials* in English that are valued above indigenous qualifications. This is the internalized logic of vicarious(ity) made flesh, as a self-degrading confession that local knowledge is inherently inferior, and that validation must be *borrowed*, even if only symbolically, from the global North, a perfect illustration of the academic dependency, and a persistent *servitude of the mind* (Altbach 1977).

The quantification of this servitude is as revealing as its scale. The fact that over 70% of retractions for specified reasons are due to *fake peer review* and *issues with peer review* is the ultimate empirical paramount of the iceberg. It demonstrates a system that has mastered the meticulous replication of the form of scholarly rigor, as much as the ritual of peer evaluation, while systematically eviscerating its epistemological substance. This is the quantified reality of Feynman's warning as they are "doing everything right... but the planes don't land." (2018:394) The very process designed to ensure quality and integrity becomes the primary site of its grotesque, transactional simulation. This cosification is the essential precondition for a rentier state of knowledge, culminating in a condition of profound ethical schizophrenia, as a divided field against itself, trained to seek validation from without for a substance that has been hollowed out from within.

This system finds its ultimate expression in the *rentier state of knowledge*, where academic capital is acquired *transactionally*. The promotion ladder is a parody of scholarship, where Nordic systems require a *professorship tenure habilitation*, many Arab universities anoint full professors based on a single Scopus-indexed article. An even worse practice is found at most Latin American universities, which grant

professorial status without a doctorate and even appoint individuals to departmental leadership positions and deanships, in many cases, without even a master's degree. This is the institutionalization of the *Fetish-Certificate*. The diploma, the publication, the title, all become *tokens* traded for salary increments, utterly divorced from the neurologically costly job of deep, transformative thought. Universities auto-sustained by the cold thoughts, their scholars publish just for the promotion rather than transformation, perfecting the schism between the desperation of intellect and its misconception.

The commodification of academic Recognition is not confined to one single country but characterizes a wider *rentierization* of knowledge across the Gulf and, increasingly, the African continent. In Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, universities and ministries operate structured cash-reward systems for publication in indexed journals. Qatar University, for example, issues a *Publication Reward Form* granting monetary bonuses for articles in Scopus or Web of Science journals, while Kuwait University's Research Sector provides fixed-sum payments per article according to journal rank. Comparable *research-incentive awards* at UAE institutions scale rewards by Quartile, offering between 5,000 and 20,000 AED for Q1–Q2 publications (Boufarss and Laakso 2020). These schemes mirror the symbolic economy they seek to *transcend*, where recognition is converted into *measurable rent*. The logic extends beyond the Gulf's rentier paradigm. In South Africa, the Department of Higher Education and Training subsidizes each accredited article through block grants to universities, creating a national pay-per-publication infrastructure. Kenyan and Nigerian universities offer cash prizes to faculty who publish in indexed journals (Afe Babalola University 2023; University of Nairobi 2024), while Morocco's Abdelmalek Essadi University allocates up to 40,000 MAD—about 4300 USD— per article. Across these contexts, the pursuit of visibility in Scopus or Clarivate has become a *fiscal mechanism*, reinforcing the *rentier model of knowledge*: intellectual capital rewarded not for substance but for marketable indexation. The table below synthesizes these incentive regimes, drawn from official university policies and ministerial directives, illustrating the systematic *pecuniary valuation* of academic recognition.

The table below synthesizes these incentive regimes, drawn from official university policies and ministerial directives, illustrating the systematic pecuniary valuation of academic recognition.

Country	Institution / Policy	Reward / Mechanism
Iraq	Ministry of Higher Education / University of Mosul Directive	≈ 500 000 IQD per Scopus Q1–Q2 or Clarivate article
Iraq	Minister Al-Aboudi announcement (Nature & Science journals)	≈ 3 000 000 IQD award
Saudi Arabia	National / University incentive schemes (KSU, KAU, KAUST etc.)	Cash rewards and promotion points for indexed articles
Qatar	Qatar University Publication Reward Form	Cash bonus for Scopus/WoS publications
United Arab Emirates	University of Sharjah / UAEU Research Incentive Awards	AED 5 000–20 000 per paper (Q1–Q2 journals)
Kuwait	Kuwait University Research Incentive Policy	Fixed KD amount per publication by journal rank
Bahrain	University College of Bahrain Reward Form	Cash / in-kind reward per publication or patent
South Africa	DHET Research Output Subsidy System	National funding per accredited article to universities (block grant)
Kenya	University of Nairobi Research Incentive Policy	Cash bonus per publication / book chapter
Nigeria	Afe Babalola University Founder's Research Prize	Cash prizes for Scopus publications
Morocco	Abdelmalek Essadi University Incentive Scheme	Up to 40 000 MAD per indexed article
Algeria	National Scopus Awards (Elsevier / MESRS)	Awards for most-cited researchers

Table 2: Financial Incentive Regimes for Academic Publication in Selected Countries.

This global comparison empirically confirms the conversion of epistemic recognition into rent. The logic extends beyond the Gulf's rentier paradigm (Chapter V), manifesting in similar incentive structures from South Africa to the Maghreb. This panorama renders Hanafi and Arvanitis's 'impossible promise' not only sociological but fundamentally pecuniary. The broader structural logic is thus confirmed, academic recognition becomes monetized, the epistemic core atrophies, reduced to bureaucratic theater. As the data in Table 2 and Figure 2 illustrate, this rentier epistemology has become a globalized system, with financial incentives formalizing the trade in academic cargo from the Gulf to South Africa—and beyond.

This global ledger, compiled from public institutional sources, empirically confirms the conversion of epistemic recognition into rent. The *Fetish-Certificate* thus finds its most naked expression not in the diploma alone, but in this pay-to-publish economy. Here, the spectacle of knowledge is fully commodified. The Scopus-indexed article becomes a *token*, a commodity traded not for intellectual dialogue, but for a direct cash transfer from the state's treasures. This system does not just produce *artisans*; it produces academic day-traders, optimizing their output for the algorithm of the journal ranking, not for the indigenous development of their society's thought. The publication is, thus, the perfect ritual of the cargo cult, the form of global scholarship is meticulously replicated, but its substance, the scientific integrity Feynman longed as the true cargo, is lost. In this, the Southern PhD holder becomes the most sophisticated artisan of all, hallucinated by the fetishism of their self-certified productivity, convicted they possess a mastery that the very structure of their academic financial structure was designed to sterilize.

This rentier epistemology, however, extends far beyond state-sanctioned *cash-for-publication* schemes. It has metastasized into a fully-fledged shadow economy of academic fraud, a perfect mirror of the Cargo Cult paradigm. On campuses from Baghdad, Riyadh, and Cairo to Algiers, among many other cities, a blatant open market has emerged, with "article kiosks" openly selling *ready-to-publish* manuscripts, priced according to the journal's Quartile, and even offering an additional package of citations. This transactional mindset is further exacerbated by the departmental structure, where deans and university presidents impose co-authorship and citation quotas as an informal obligation on their faculty members. The academic hierarchy

thus becomes a pyramid scheme of citation and authorship, transforming intellectual production into a currency for bureaucratic patronage.

If the Southern Cargo Cult academy represents the pathological production of scholarly legitimacy, a mirror phenomenon has emerged in the North itself, its pathological consumption. Today, commercial services openly operating in Europe and North America offer to sell PhD dissertations and journal articles on demand. This is no longer the Southern artisan desperately mimicking Northern forms; it is the Northern itself, in a state of perfect alienation, outsourcing the very act of thought itself.

The Southern paradigm thus finds its rentier counterpart in the Northern individual, who can purchase the simulacrum of academic legitimacy without undergoing its transformative labor. The *manufacturer* now sells pre-written guarantees to its own citizens. The epistemological decay, therefore, is not a Southern failure anymore, but a global system failure, one that now turns the North against itself, producing new hierarchies of segregation within the North itself.

The pathological symptom of this systemic perversion is captured in the cruel data of retraction (Figure 2), but the true geography of crisis reveals itself only through per capita contrast (Figure 3). While China and India dominate absolute numbers due to their demographic scale, the intensity of the crisis tells a different story.

A comprehensive understanding of this dramatic phenomenon could be further complicated by the notable presence of retractions from Southern scholars affiliated with Northern institutions. This emphasizes the gate-crashing dynamic, which can be defined as a parasitic mimicry where the desperation for legitimacy collapses under its own contradictions. However, this intersubjective analysis has been postponed, thus allowing room for future comparative studies.

Methodology. To quantify this pathology, I analyzed all retractions in the Retraction Watch database (snapshot: 01 October 2024) targeting the misconduct reasons as (Plagiarism, Fake Peer Review, Issues with Peer Review, Fabrication of Data, Falsification, Forged Authorship, and Issues About Authorship), which represents the gross of the total or retractions. Then, subjectively to distinguish global-scale including/excluding large-scale countries (Russia, Brazil and India), this evidence quantitatively validates the core thesis of a system mastering the form of scholarship while eviscerating its substantive integrity.

From the original 67,232 retractions in the database, the analysis examined 30,088 instances (44.8%) that matched these specified categories across the target countries, based on *Retraction Watch* database using Python/Jupyter Notebook with research commands assisted by DeepSeek AI.

The complete data-sheet is available in the digital deposit associated to this book in DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.32231442.



Figure 3: Global distribution of retractions.

However, the true geography of this drama reveals itself not in absolute numbers, but in *per capita* analysis, which exposes specific pathological epicenters. China stands alone as the undeniable crisis zone, with retraction rates per million population (11.35) that dwarf all other major academic systems. This isn't merely a function of scale, but evidence of a deeply compromised knowledge-production ecosystem. Russia emerges as a surprising second (8.01 per million), revealing an academic crisis of comparable intensity to China's, though on a smaller absolute scale. While the Gulf and Middle Eastern academies in general, particularly Saudi Arabia (7.10) and Iran (6.03), show alarming intensity, confirming the presence of specific regional pathologies that transcend mere demographic explanations. While the most revealing is India's position

(1.71 per million), while accounting for thousands of retractions in absolute terms, their rate is actually proportional to population size, suggesting different underlying dynamics than the comparative realities elsewhere.

While the relative absence of Japan from this congregation as pathological epicenters serves as a silent but powerful confirmation of its ethico-sovereignist legacy contrasted in Chapter II. Japan's sovereign, philosophical struggle to debug imported modernity, while fraught, did not result in the same systemic collapse of academic integrity. This divergence underscores the core argument, as the anxiety for recognition and belonging to the northern club quantitatively, but not qualitatively, bankrupting the indigenous epistemological sovereignty.

This per capita lens transforms our understanding: we're not looking at a uniformly distributed Global South crisis, but at specific, intense pathological nodes where again its evidencing the dramatic rupture of the academic social contract. Per million population, reveals the true intensity of the academic integrity crisis, mapping directly our comprehension onto the schizophrenic political morphologies and the rentier cargo-cult states (see Chapt. V).



Figure 4: Global Retraction Drama

10 Toward Sovereign Repair: A Normative Agenda

The anatomy of the Arab (post)colonial mirage, from colonial fabrication and Khedivial vassalage to the anxious archive, the intellectual sterility, and the terminal plea, delivers a diagnosis that is also an indictment. It indicts not a people or a culture, but a global structure of knowledge and power, the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm and its psychological engine, Vicarious Conditioning. If the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the terminal symptom, what then is the prescription? This prescription must address a field already emphasized by empirical critic. Laura Doyle's 'inter-imperiality' describes the tightening global circuits that condition such encounters (2014, 2025); Wiebke Keim (2016) and Sari Hanafi (2021) detail the fraught circulation of knowledge that transcends simple core-periphery binaries, advocating for an ecological blend of universal concepts and local specificities. While Abdelkebir Khatibi's call for a double critique, of both Western ethnocentric discourse and its derivative Arab echoes (1983:38), a proposal resonates in somehow with the perspective build here. Yet the pathological political morphology of the Schizophrenic vassal state explains why these intellectual projects so often falter. S. Hanafi's 'impossible promise' and Khatibi's double bind are not mere academic challenges; they are the symptomatic output of a political condition where the *Transcultural Elite* fails in translation, the

Developmental Elite is sterilized, thereby hindering the process of Recognition. Therefore, moving beyond the mirage requires more than an ecological intention; it demands a prior, radical act of sovereign repair, a debugging of the conditioned political and epistemological machinery itself.

10.1 Reorienting the gaze, from Occidentalism to structural diagnosis

The first casualty of this reorientation must be the polemical category of Arab Occidentalism. As this chapter has demonstrated, what is labeled as hatred is, in fact, the rage of the artisan (the intellectual struggling with encrypted tools) and the labyrinth of anxious plea (the populace demanding a warranty). Future research must abandon this pathological framing and instead adopt the diagnostic toolkit developed in this book. This means:

- Tracing circuits of imitation, by mapping the precise pathways—constitutional transfers, educational curricula, museum imports—through which ready-made paradigms were installed.
- Identifying the tripartite elite dysfunction, by questioning if the failure one was of translation (Transcultural elite), adaptation (Developmental elite), or withheld recognition (Patron elite).
- Diagnosing the substrate clash by analyzing the concurrence into imported solid state form that violates the indigenous liquid or composite social fabric.

The scholarly task shifts from explaining 'why they hate us' to explaining how a political form designed in a place generates specific pathologies of helplessness and dependency elsewhere.

10.2 *Methodologically, recovering the subaltern archive and historicity*

The state's historicist anxiety must be countered by a new historicist methodology grounded in the subaltern's own constructs, reviving the past as their own legacies and experiences, and giving voice to oral narratives, vernacular poetry, protest graffiti, and everyday resistance as integral elements of indigenous memory. This will not amount to a melancholic anachronism, but rather an epistemic necessity. And this recovery must be linguistically meticulous, ensuring that the subaltern speaks in the vernacular, not in a colonial language, expelling the greenhouse of legibility and the hybridity of transliterated concepts. The language of the new historicist regime must not be neutral; on the contrary, it must be forged as the primary terrain of epistemic sovereignty to confront and overcome subjugation.

10.3 Analytically to recognizing the manufactured state

Analysts and policymakers must learn to identify the Manufactured State as an exceptionally distinct political form. Its crises cannot be resolved through more democracy or better governance as if it were a sovereign polity undergoing organic reform. When citizens demand a guarantee from the United Nations, they are not rejecting politics; they are acting out the only political script available to them within a manufactured system. Hence, any interventions that fail to address this fundamental circumstance, namely the exogenous construction of the state itself, will only lead to deeper cycles within the labyrinth of supplication and betrayal. The lesson of Iraq is not that democracy failed, but that democracy cannot be installed as a finished product; it must be authored, debugged, and owned by those who live under it.

10.4 *Intellectual emancipation, from artisan to sage*

The Arab intellectual spectrum, caught between the stifling greenhouse of Conceded Modernity and the state's instrumentalization of religion, faces a stark choice, between remaining a perpetual artisan of imported paradigms or embarking on the arduous endeavor of becoming a sage of indigenous thought. This does not mean a nativist withdrawal, but rather doing precisely what the Japanese scholars of the Meiji era did by not transliterating 'religion' as shūkyō, for example, but inventing hi-shūkyō ('non-religion') to master and adapt the concept. It means constructing theory from native metaphysical categories rather than massively applying modern ready-made frameworks. It is a call for vernacular theorization, a scholarship that speaks from within its own civilizational substrate, capable of a sovereign dialogue with other modernities.

10.5 *For the future of algorithmic vassalage*

The pathology diagnosed here is not static. As the Epilogue of this book warns, the 20th-century machinery of dependence is evolving into 21st-century Algorithmic Vassalage. The manufacturer is no longer a colonial office, parliament or an international consortium, but the infra-state *Cloud Empire*, through multi-platforms and AI systems that export ready-made consciousness as black-box software. The plea for a guarantee may soon be automated away, replaced by silent, algorithmic captivity. The intellectual and political struggle, therefore, must now also encompass digital sovereignty, to fight for open-source sovereignist infrastructures, auditable algorithms,

and the preservation of technodiversity, as a right for societies to develop their own technological orbits, not just massive consume pre-packaged digital modernity.

10.6 *Concluding movement, from plea to repair*

The graffiti of Tishreen, the wounded body painted as an oil barrel, the cry to an absent UN, none of these have to be the final voice. They can become the assertion of a different political grammar. Moving beyond the mirage means rejecting the role of the consumer-claimant and demanding the capacity for indigenous repair. It means resetting the fabricated clocks of (post)colonial time and beginning the slow, unglamorous work of *hewing stotypology reveals an escalating pathne from one's own quarry*.

For scholars, this means a methodology of traceability and recovery; for intellectuals, a practice of vernacular theorizing; for citizens, a politics of sovereign self-authorization. The Arab (post)colonial condition, and, by extension, the Southern condition in general, with its labyrinth of plea, stands not as a testament to cultural failure, but as a raw map of a global disorder, and a summons to debug it.

This debugged understanding, moving from the rage of the artisan and the labyrinth of the desperate plea toward sovereign repair, will then allow us to map the full global spectrum of pathological statehood, from the anxious performer to the silent captive, albeit in different guises, including the welfare-rentier condition to be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter V

Genealogical Anatomies of Vassalage — A Typology of Pathological States

> They're doing everything right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the planes don't land. (Feynman [1974] 2018:392)

The preceding case studies have diagnosed the Schizophrenic vassal state across its philosophical, historical, and (post)colonial dimensions. This final analytical chapter synthesizes these manifestations into an explicit typology of political pathology. Moving from a foundational anthropological clash between *solid* and *liquid* statehood substrates, by employing the Bauerian framework to construct a spectrum of dependency. This spectrum ranges from the anxious performance of the Schizophrenic Vassal State, through the abject dependence of the *Fabricated State*, to the terrifying, silent captivity of the *Rentier Cargo-Cult State*, as the terminal stage where the struggle for recognition is rendered obsolete by *allocative* logic.

1 Introduction: The Many Faces of a Disorder

The preceding chapters have diagnosed a global condition of Schizophrenic Vassalage. Yet, this pathology is not a monolith; it manifests in distinct political morphologies, each a specific adaptation to the tyrannic imposition of Ready-Made Modernity. This chapter provides a genealogical anatomy of these forms, tracing their lineage from a foundational anthropological clash to their contemporary, terminal stages. To navigate the anatomies that follow, we first establish a theoretical spectrum of state forms, summarized in table 3 below.

This theoretical anatomy of the 'state against the nation'—what we will term the Schizophrenic Vassal State—finds its stark historical prototype not in the (post)colonial

epoch of the mid-20th century, but in the viceregal courts of nineteenth-century Egypt. The reigns of Khedives Ismail and Tewfik, referred by the preceding chapter, offer a pre-colonial architecture for the mimetic pathology that would later define the (post)colonial condition. Following this, we will dissect two other pathological forms: the *Manufactured State* and the *Rentier State*, thus to complete a comparative typology of political vassalage.

State Form	Core Logic	Civilizational Substrate	Economic Base	Social Contract	Epistemological Stance	Terminal Symptom
Sovereign State (e.g., European Synoikismos, Japanese Kokutai)	Indigenous Generation	Solid (Land/Blood/Time) or indigenous Spirit	Productive	Organic & Reciprocal	Sage (Source Code Access)	N/A (Homeostatic)
Schizophrenic Vassal State (e.g., Ottoman-Turkey)	Mimetic Performance	Clash (Solid Imposition on Liquid Base)	Mixed	Performance for Recognition	Artisan (User of Encrypted Forms)	Ontological Insecurity
Manufactured State (e.g., Post-2003 Iraq)	Assembly & Guarantee	Manufactured Composite	Rents & Aid	Plea for Warranty	Consumer (Assembler of Parts)	Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee
Rentier Cargo-Cult State (e.g., Gulf Monarchies)	Allocative Distribution	Amplified Liquid/Nomadic	External Rents (e.g., Oil)	Distributive (Well-being Belonging)	End-User (Purchaser of Effects)	Foreclosed Sovereignty (Silent Captivity)

Table 3: Presents the key variables that define our typology of state pathology.

This typology reveals an escalating pathology of dependency, which the historical cases in this book exemplify: from the anxious performance of the Ottoman-Turkish schizophrenic vassal, to the abject dependence and plea for a guarantee of the manufactured state in post-2003 Iraq, to the final, quiet captivity of the rentier cargo-cult in the Gulf monarchies, a populace that consumes modernity as a finished product, no longer aware of the concept of any indigenous production.

2 The Anthropological substrate as a Clash of Civilizations

The most critical and evident error that can arise from any hermeneutics of the state and modernity is the generalisation of the civilisational socio-political substrate of peoples in order to construct a comprehensive exegesis of the theory of the state. It is evident that at least three macro-civilizational substrates coexist, insofar as the empirical understanding of the defects of massification is inescapable when interpreting such phenomena. This, in turn, enables a more comprehensive interpretation of systemic North-South, East-West failures, or other phenomena that may result in each context. But it deserves to highlight that the 'solid' and 'liquid' substrates diagnosed here are not identical to Armstrong's distinction between territorial (sedentary) and genealogical (nomadic) identity frameworks. Armstrong's typology, invaluable for understanding the persistence of premodern ethnic boundaries, focuses on how groups maintain identity through border guards (language, endogamy, legal codes). The solid/liquid distinction, by contrast, is a political-ontological one: it concerns the metabolism of social belonging, how a society reproduces itself through land (solid) or through language-faith-loyalty (liquid). The two distinctions are complementary, not competitive. The colonial imposition of a solid state form onto a liquid substrate produces the Schizophrenic Vassalage that Armstrong's framework, concerned with persistence rather than pathology, does not address. Where Armstrong asks, How do ethnic boundaries persist?, this book asks, What happens when a solid, imported political form is violently grafted onto a liquid, indigenous social body?

This phenomenon is elucidated through the following diagram and will be elaborated upon in the subsequent sections.



Figure 5: Sociopolitical civilizational substracts

2.1 *The Solid Foundations, as Sovereign State Models*

Now, we will begin the anatomical introspection by first establishing the baseline of sovereign statehood, the model against which the pathologies are defined. This foundation is found in the indigenous political forms that emerged from what can be termed the solid civilizational paradigms.

The *solid* paradigm of the modern nation-state, exported as *Ready-Made Modernity*, is the political expression of a specific European historical experience. Its logic, as Paolo Grossi elucidates, is one of *juridical factuality*. European identity coalesced through a *synoikismos* (Mommsen 1863), as a joining of dwellings, a political and institutional project of incorporation(s), as defined by Ortega y Gasset ([1946] 1966:51) organized around the trinity of *Land* as an inalienable territory as a juridical

good, *Blood* as a myths of ethnic continuity, and *Time* as a linear, chronicle progressive national history (Grossi 2007:25). This socio-political architecture produces a state that functions as a fixed container for a homogeneous content, its legitimacy derived from the juridical management of this tangible, spatialized reality, a fertile space to materialize in modern political unions, as a nation's state.

The Japanese case, as we shall see in the following section, presents another civilizational paradigm, as the Kokutai (国体), or 'national body/structure', as a form of sacred-organic sovereignty distinct from both the European solid and the Arab liquid substrates which will be discussed in the section 2.3.

2.2 *The Japanese Kokutai, Sacred-Organic Sovereignty as an Oriental Adaptive Paradigm*

If the European state emerged from a *synoikismos*, as a joining of dwellings organized around the solid trinity of *Land, Blood, and Time*, the Japanese case presents a fundamentally different civilizational paradigm. This is the Kokutai (国体, 'national body/structure'), as a political form defined not by territorial-juridical factuality but by the spiritual-imperial unity of the emperor and the people as a single, sacred organism.

According to Walter Skya, *Shintō* as an ultranationalism ideology underwent a profound transformation from the conservative, patriarchal family-state in the late Meiji period to the radical, mass-based totalitarian forms in the Taishō and early Shōwa periods (2009). This theory reached its paramount development by Kakehi Katsuhiko (1872–1961), a constitutionalist Shintō scholar who articulated a vision of the Japanese state as the earthly manifestation of a divine cosmic order.

At the center of this order stood the emperor as *arahitogami*, as "a divine being transmuted into human form," a "god manifest as man, or a living incarnation" (Skya 2009:200). The emperor was not a sovereign over the people in the Western sense, but the living incarnation of *Amaterasu Ōmikami*, the Sun Goddess, and through her, of the entire Shintō pantheon. According to Skya, Kakehi's central concept built as *isshin dōtai* (一心同体), literally "one heart, same body", defined as "the intrinsic being of one heart and the same body of all people high and low unified by, and under, the superintendence of the single line of emperors established and unchanged since from the beginning [of creation]" (Skya 2009:194). This was not a metaphor for social cohesion but a literal ontological claim. The individual Japanese subject did not merely belong to the state, but the individual was absorbed into the emperor's mystical body.

According to this, individual self consciousnesses is denied, as "subjects cast aside their individual selves and 'enter into the emperor'" (Skya 2009:195). The emperor, in turn, was the 'universal self', (*fuhenga*), or a 'universal person' (*fuhenjin*) or 'great life' (*daiseimei*), the animating spiritual core of the entire national body (Skya 2009:198).

This cosmology is visually represented in a diagram by Skya, standing the Emperor at the center, being radiated outward in concentric circles as the spirits of the imperial ancestors; the Sun Goddess Amaterasu Ōmikami; the six central deities of the Shintō pantheon; the two creator deities, Takami Musubi no Kami and Kamu Musubi no Kami; and finally, the rest of the universe (2009:220). Thus, the Japanese state is not a container for this cosmology; but it is this cosmology made politically manifest itself. Kakehi's stated political goal was "to realize the Plain of High Heaven centered on Japan", to make the divine order immanent in political life (2009:210).

Thus, its to highlight that the Kokutai paradigm differs from the European solid in three fundamental respects. First, the rejection of the subject-object split. European modernity, from Descartes to Kant, is built on the separation of the knowing subject from the known world. The Kokutai is devoid of such split. Kakehi, according to Skya, insisted that "the formation of the state was a religious act on the part of the gods" (2009:207). By its social contract, the emperor was simultaneously the subject of sovereignty and its object itself; the people were not citizens standing before the state but cells within the emperor's embodiment. Therefore, there's no private sphere of individual rights standing against the state because the individual, properly understood, as there's no autonomous existence outside the emperor.

Second, the unity of ritual and rule. Where European modernity, following the *Peace of Westphalia* (1648), gradually relegated religion to a private sphere by instituting a secular state apparatus, while the Kokutai knew no such division, as the Japanese state had retained the religious essence that Western states had lost, since the very essence of its social contract, as previously stated, is intrinsically tied to the gods.

Third, the elimination of the individual as an autonomous political unit. The European solid state, even in its most authoritarian forms, presupposed the individual as the basic unit of political structuralism. The Kokutai, however, actively annihilated the individual. According to Skya, Kakehi asserted that "one does not possess oneself. This life is not one's own life. All are the Tarōs and Jirōs of the emperor" (2009:196). The individual who thought of himself as 'what he is' was, in Kakehi's words, "not a

true Japanese" (Skya 2009:194). True subjectivity was achieved only through the erasure of individual will and the absorption of the self into the emperor's universal being.

This paradigm is neither solid nor liquid. It is sacred-organic (infra)subjectivity, a political form in which sovereignty was not located in a tangible factuality, land (Europe), nor perpetually deferred between competing ethno-solidarities (Arab), but incarnated in a living deity whose body is the state and whose will is law. The Japanese state, according to this hermetic exegesis, was not a container for a people nor a battlefield of tribes and faiths, but a theater of immanent divinity, a political form whose internal logic was the expansion of the sacred body to encompass the universe.

Yet this paradigm contained a tragic paradox. As Skya documents, the Kokutai underwent a transformation from the conservative, patriarchal family-state of Hozumi Yatsuka in the late Meiji period to the radical, mass-based, totalitarian forms. Hozumi's state was authoritarian but pre-modern, as the emperor was the father, the people were children, and the relationship was one of absolute passive obedience. But by the 1910s and 1920s, with the politicization of the Japanese masses, this model became obsolete. Uesugi and Kakehi responded by democratizing the emperor, not in the sense of making him accountable to, or over, the people, but in the sense of eliminating all mediating structures between emperor and subject. The result was a totalitarian ideology that demanded not obedience but self-annihilating devotion.

In the terms of this book, this paradigm consist in a hyper-mimetic escalation, as an attempt to overcome Western modernity not by rejecting its mobilizational techniques but by perfecting them, creating a state more integral, more demanding, and more spiritually unified than anything Europe had produced. The Kyoto School's philosophical project of 'overcoming modernity' (kindai no chōkoku), examined in Chapter II, was both the highest expression of Japanese sovereignty and its tragic capture by the very logic of mimetic rivalry it sought to transcend. The Kokutai thus stands as a third, or another, civilizational paradigm, neither the homeostatic solid of Europe nor the fragmented liquid of the Arab world, but a sacred-organic form whose very strength contained the seeds of its own hypelling.

2.3 *The Liquid Substrate in the Arab World*

The historical (pre-Islamic) sociopolitical formations of the Arab world have been characterized by dynamics that produced what can analytically be described as a 'liquid'

substrate, in contrast to the European sociopolitical 'solid' paradigm of synoikismos. Primarily defined by liquidity and the absence of its very pillars:

- Land, was not a fixed asset for rooted identity but a *transient resource*. For the Bedouin nomad, it was a passageway dictated by pasture and seasonal settlement. For the hydraulic communities of Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley, it was a prize of perpetual conquest, a fragile paradigm of belonging that attracted successive invasions, rendering territorial sovereignty a fleeting concept. Its unstable tangibility therefore impacts the identity related to it.
- Blood, lines were cosmopolitan and mestizo, systematically hybridized by centuries of migration, domination, and submission. There was no pure genealogical trunk to serve as the mythic core of a nation, only a heterogeneous community lacking a pattern of racial or sanguine uniformity.
- Time, as a result, became a zero-sum value, incapable of forging the deep, intergenerational attachment that binds a people to a specific plot of earth and a shared historical destiny. The constant cycles of invasion and societal reconstitution shattered historical continuity.

From this liquid reality, the primary, trans-tribal anchor of identity could not be territory or a myth of common descent. First, in its place, language served. Arab identity was, and remains, an *anthropological fact* based on the mastery of the Arabic tongue. This principle is powerfully encapsulated in a culturally resonant, albeit debated, prophetic tradition later endorsed by modern Islamic doctrine "whoever speaks Arabic is an Arab", thereby constituting a flexible *system of incorporation*. Language thus functioned as a transliminal bond of identity, a universal vehicle that served to unite Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, transcending faith and genealogy. Such *liquidity* was not an absence of order but a different, adaptive form of social organization. A *joining of cognitive servitudes*, optimized for mobility, oral tradition, and the management of transient resources, cemented in order of succession by language, faith, and loyalty, standing in stark contrast to the rigid, territorial joining of dwellings of European synoikismos (Alnasir 2023:179).

Under this paradigm, faith serves as the most solid instrument of identity, as the Abrahamic peoples gather under a single deity, albeit one idolized through intercessory deities. Each tribe had its own deity with whom it identified and gathered, who in turn served a higher deity, to whom the other tribes gathered in alliances, a tribal

confederation of of all deities, and therefore of the allied tribes around the higher deity —with those peoples who did not gather to that higher deity being considered outsiders, deemed unbelievers (Al-dūrī 2008:11–12). Hence, the emergence of monotheism drew upon the very cognitive constructs of these tribes, displacing the tribal deities with a single higher order constituted as the new dwellings of cognitive servitude: faith, whether Jewish, Christian, or later Islamic (Alnasir 2021b:397 ff.).

The great riverine civilizations of the Nile and Mesopotamia demonstrated that a solid state structure could emerge organically from this ecosystem. As Karl Wittfogel's model of the hydraulic society suggests, the imperative for large-scale, centralized management of water for agricultural production could, in specific ecological niches, generate powerful, enduring state structures (1957). For this reason, authority emerges not from charismatic distribution but from the technical-organizational imperative of irrigation, flood control, and harvest storage. Its legitimacy rests on its capacity to sustain the agricultural cycle, not on its ability to dispense favours.

Therefore, the solid/liquid distinction is not a timeless cultural typology but an analytical heuristic describing the outcome of specific, long-term historical processes: the consolidation of civilizational formation (the European joining of dwellings) versus structural fragmentation (tribalism through the Khaldunian hermeneutics). This fragmentation, however, was not a mere absence of statehood but the persistence of a pre-Islamic proto-rentier logic, wherein in nomadic tribal society, the leader's authority resides not in organizing production but in distributing transient resources. Within this proto-rentier logic, authority is distribution, and distribution is authority. When there is nothing to distribute, leadership collapses and the tribe becomes a band of brigands.

The sociopolitical goal of Islam was precisely to supplant this logic, denigrated as '*asabiyya al-jahiliyya*', with the universalist project of the Islamic Umma. To this end, the Khaldunian hermeneutics served to reveal the diagnosed failure of this suppression. The Arabs, Ibn Khaldun declared, are "the most alien of nations to the art of governance" ([1394] 2004:290), not due to any inherent incapacity, but because the tribal-distributive logic continued to triumph over the productive project of the state.

Modern rentierism, as will be seen in the following sections of this chapter, is not properly an invention of oil but the exacerbation of this proto-rentier tribal logic. Oil replaces pasture, the rentier state replaces the tribal chief, but the logic remains:

governance is defined by the charismatic authority to distribute, not by the capacity to produce. Colonial interventions—Ottoman in Iraq, British in the Gulf (analyzed in detail in Section 3 of Chapter IV)—did not create this logic *ex nihilo*, but rather strengthened and instrumentalized it, transforming productive concessions into distributive mechanisms and settling nomadic tribes into micro-states sustained by this rentier logic. The result is the Rentier Cargo-Cult State, a polity where the struggle for sovereign recognition has been replaced by acquiescence purchased through distribution.

The Khaldunian hermeneutics, therefore, does not diagnose an absence of statehood but the triumph of tribal-distributive logic over riverine-productive logic. Ibn Khaldun identified a social structure whose very strengths—clannish jealousies consecrated by tribal intersubjective charismatism—are constitutively adverse to the impersonal institutionalization of authority and its delegation for the management of a collective project that defines statehood. Hence, *savagery* is not a moral failure but an anthropological constant that resists political sublimation. Thus, the modern imported state did not encounter a *tabula rasa*; rather, it encountered a social field where the indigenous potential for organic and productive state formation had long been superseded and marginalized by the more pervasive logic of the desert and the tribe.

Colonial interference, however, did not reverse this dynamic but rather perverted it further. In the case of Iraq (as seen in Section 3 of Chapter III supra), the Ottoman Empire attempted to settle nomadic tribes mobilized from the Arabian Peninsula, transforming them into riverine societies through land concessions (*iqṭāʿ*). However, the tribal chiefs retained the lands for themselves, converting the tribe's members into peasants and themselves into landed proprietors (*iqṭāʿī*). What had been a state-colonial concession with productive ends was perverted into a distributive mechanism of tribal basis. This colonial failure, as a failed attempt to create productive riverine societies that resulted in the consolidation of distributive landed proprietors, prefigures the logic of the modern rentier state. Oil would later replace pasture, but the logic of distribution-as-authority would remain unaltered, now amplified by external rent and purchased acquiescence.

This anthropological clash between the liquid and the solid mirrors the violent process of anonymous society formation described by Moffett (2020), but with a critical pathology, where the force of subjugation is external, and the *markers* of the new

society are not organically forged but are a pre-packaged, imported paradigm. The colonial mindset is starkly revealed in Hollingworth's account of Great Power policy towards nomadic tribes, as they "did all they could to encourage settlement" because they "disliked tribes wandering between one country and another without passports or identity cards of any kind" ([1952] 2015:54). The logic of the solid, territorial nation-state, with its fixed borders, documented citizens, and legible populations, was explicitly weaponized against the liquid, transliminal bonds of tribal identity. The Bedouin resistance, which Hollingworth records but cannot comprehend, was an embodied defense of the liquid lifeworld against the state's solidifying, tyrannic grid. With this anthropological violation consummated, we may now turn to the precise anatomies of the pathological state-forms that emerge from it.

It is worth recalling that even within the European paradigm, redistributive ethics are far from homogeneous. On the one hand, the Nordic corporatist form, where welfare functions as productive redistribution within an ethically closed polity; on the other hand, a Mediterranean familist form coexists, where redistribution often reproduces a clientelism founded on kinship ties. In both cases, however, the logic is internalized: the state redistributes what society itself produces. In the Arab-nomadic world, by contrast, redistribution is externally funded and legitimacy depends on exogenous sources of Recognition. In Europe, welfare consolidates sovereignty; in the Arab world, welfare replaces sovereignty to consolidate dependence. This distortion is deeply ingrained, even reflected in migratory mindsets—a theme that invites further research into migratory movements and their process of integration, or adaptation, from this paradigm.

Consequently, the Arab system of incorporation was not a joining of dwellings (like the European) but a *joining of cognitive servitudes*, cemented in order of succession by language, faith, and loyalty. The prefabricated Westphalian concept of the territorial nation-state was not a universal form but a profoundly alien European artefact. Its abyssal imposition was not merely a political act but an anthropological violation, which prepared the stage for a rupture whose roots lay in the deepest structures of collective life, whose own political metabolism was already schizophrenic. Hence, the modern schizophrenic vassal state is the direct heir to this ancient conflict, an imported solid shell attempting to contain a liquid reality fractured by the millennia-

old struggle between the incorporative logic of Faith and the disintegrative impulse of the Tribe.

These were not anthropological facticities of the synoikismos type, but something more. They were forged by the collective necessity of managing transient resources, and therefore liquid, with a belonging based on distributive wellbeing. From this point forward, in this chapter, this is emphasized as *wellbeing-belonging*. This is the deep pre-colonial root of the contemporary Arab schizoid-rentier anxiety to which this chapter seeks to offer its hermeneutics.

3 The Bauerian Engine and the Two Paths to Modern Statehood

The preceding analysis of the different sociopolitical substrates reveals a fundamental geopolitical dichotomy. To understand this not as a static cultural typology but as a dynamic historical pathology, we must turn again to Bauer's seminal theory of the nation as a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*—a 'community of fate' (1907) (see Ch. I sec. 3 supra).

Bauer posits that a nation is forged through the shared historical experiences of a people, particularly their collective struggle for subsistence (*Daseinskampf*). This fate is transmitted to subsequent generations through two distinct channels (1907:3):

(1) The *Naturgemeinschaft* (Natural Community): The shared fate *breeds* specific physical and mental characteristics through natural selection. The traits most adaptive to the historical conditions of production are biologically inherited. The national character is, in this sense, 'congealed history' (erstarrte Geschichte) (1907:21), sedimented into the very biology of a people through their *community of descent*.

(2) The *Kulturgemeinschaft* (Cultural Community): The same shared fate produces a specific culture—language, law, custom, epistemology. This is transmitted not biologically, but socially, through education, custom, and communication (*Erziehung, Sitte, Verkehr*).

Crucially, Bauer argues that for a nation to consist in the modern era, the *Kulturgemeinschaft* must become the primary, active binding force. The *Naturgemeinschaft* is a legacy of a distant past that can be fractured by territorial isolation and demographic mixture. A modern nation is sustained not by this receding biological commonality, but by the creation of a new, living, shared culture that integrate its populace (Bauer 1907:3). The liquid civilizational substrate, with its unresolved tension between universalist faith and particularist tribe, represented a

Naturgemeinschaft inherently resistant to being sublimated into a stable, supra-tribal *Kulturgemeinschaft* of the modern sort. Thus, the colonial-ready-made-state did not create this schism; it violently imposed a foreign cultural aesthetic upon it.

The key factor in this process is the fate of the elite class that stewards it. A 'nation with history' possesses a surviving, indigenous social elite, historically, a national bourgeoisie, capable of (re)generating its own national culture and steering its historical trajectory. This elite is the engine of a society's ethical sovereignty; it serves as the sage who writes, interprets, bridge and (re)produces integenerationally, in each historical moment, the nation's historical 'source code.'

This Bauerian model allows us to reinterpret the solid and liquid paradigms not as essential civilizational types, but as divergent outcomes of the nation-forming process:

- The European *Solid* Synoikismos resulted from a successful *Kulturgemeinschaft* project. The Northern European state, as described by Grossi, represents a case where the modern *Kulturgemeinschaft,* built on the triad of land, blood, and yime, could be organically synthesized from and superimposed upon a compatible, pre-existing *Naturgemeinschaft*. The joining of dwellings was also a successful joining of fates, resulting in a sovereign, indigenous cultural-political form. Their elite served constantly as a nation-building elite.
- The Southern Arab Substrate interpreted through the liquid hermeneutics represent a blocked or distorted *Kulturgemeinschaft*. The Arab world's liquid base, with its unresolved tension between the universalist Islamic *Umma* and the particularist pre-islamic *Tribe*, was a *Naturgemeinschaft* inherently resistant to political sublimation. Hence, the liquid cycle is the political labyrinth of a community incapable of creating a stable, supra-tribal *Kulturgemeinschaft*. Furthermore, by obstructing the elites' ability to rebuild an indigenous community of destiny capable of forging a modern nation-state from within, its political entity remains errant in the schizophrenia and vassalage theorized in this book.

Armstrong's comparative civilizational analysis provides the empirical grounding for this reinterpretation. According to him, the territorial principle in Europe emerged from a long history of sedentary settlement, fixed frontiers, and the transfer of civic loyalty from city-state to nation-state, whereas the genealogical principle in the Middle East persisted through nomadic and post-nomadic social structures, endogamy, and the

primacy of lineage over land ([1982] 2017). Through this hermeneutics, the Bauerian framework, emphasized in Chapter I, is the masterkey to the pathology of the Schizophrenic Vassal State. The state is schizophrenic precisely because it is a massive attempt to force-install a foreign *Kulturgemeinschaft* (the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm) upon a *Naturgemeinschaft* with which it is fundamentally incompatible, and whose own capacity for generating an indigenous *Kulturgemeinschaft* has been systematically *distracted*, or *sterilized*.

The *sterilization* of national elites theorized in Chapter I, proposed its diagnoses by the following sections of this chapter is the direct result of this dynamic. The *Transcultural Elite* (Segment 1) fails because it is tasked not with building a new culture from its people's own fate, but with transliterating a foreign one. The *Developmental Elite* (Segment 2) is foreclosed because there is no living, indigenous *Kulturgemeinschaft* for it to develop. They are artisans of an encrypted import, not sages of a sovereign tradition.

Thus, the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee (Chapter IV) is the terminal symptom of a populace that has been reduced to what Bauer termed *Hintersassen der Nation* (1907:50)—the 'dependents of the nation'—excluded from the very *Kulturgemeinschaft* that defines the political entity ruling them. They are consumers of a state they did not build, because the process of building it, the arduous labor of forming a sovereign *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*, was hijacked by the machinery of Vicarious Conditioning that lies at the core of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm.

4 Anatomies of Pathology

4.1 *The Schizophrenic Vassal State, an Anxious Performer (Core Logic: Mimetic Performance for Recognition)*

As the Ottoman-Turkish case-study demonstrated (Chapter III), the Schizophrenic Vassal State is defined by its mimetic desire for the perpetually withheld Third Pillar of recognition. Its intellectual culture was forged in the crucible of colonial tutelage. As Laroui argues, this period produced a specific type of intellectual, exemplified by figures like Muhammad Abduh, who were defined by a 'permanent ideological twist' (1997:6), a desperate attempt to find a traditional basis for newly acquired, colonial-era ideals. This conceptualization encapsulates the intellectual essence of the schism that will be theorized as a governing elite that has been conditioned to function on a hybrid, frequently contradictory, epistemological foundation. They perpetually adopt an

identity in response to external perceptions that originated during their period of tutelage.

This hermenautics explains the embodying what Ghalioun theorizes as the 'state against the nation', a governing apparatus fundamentally *ruptured* from its own society (2015). Constituted top-down as a guardian of colonial structuralism rather than a bottom-up popular mirroring, thus, it operates as a quasi-autonomous power, often producing a *settler-like* elite that governs underminingly through a deep state mechanisms with unprecedented violence against popular aspirations. Thus, being constructed from the residual remainder and legacies of the colonial order, their primary *raison d'être* becomes the management of resentment and the maintenance of those same colonial legacies structured as its carnal social contract. As Ghalioun argues, this elite maintains power through a strategy of systematic annihilation of any independent political or social force, ensuring societal disorganization ([1993] 2015:9–11).

Faced with a void of political legitimization, these states consistently instrumentalized religion as a cultural sublimation, or utmost, a *compensatory fiction* (Colom 2019:86), in their persecution of (post)colonial *patriotic forgement* (Gamio [1916] 1982). This is a direct consequence of what Ghalioun refers as as the state's foundational premise, being a foreign body implanted in the social fabric rather than an organic outgrowth of its own soul. Therefore, lacking indigenous legitimacy, it is forced to "borrow its legitimacy from external sources" ([1993] 2015:8), whether from a mythical past or a prefabricated doctrine like state-sponsored religion. A prime example of this phenomenon is the sudden imposition of Islamic law by a secular Baathist regime in Iraq. This action cannot be considered a philosophical conversion but rather a tactical maneuver aimed at addressing a legitimacy vacuum (Sadi 2011:27–28), a phenomenon that is analogous to numerous cases observed across the Arab world and beyond (Saigol 1995:470–71; apud Saleem 2017:6).

The dilemma is not so much political schizophrenia as the cultural contrast it inevitably creates. Following Laroui, it produces a fatal "a rift between culture and society, between intellectuals and the people" (1974:17). The state's inorganic nature severs the intellectual class from the societal daily-life-world, rendering their modernity a sterile academic exercise irrelevant to the daily struggles of a society judged on economic and political battlegrounds. Such a double rupture, both political as cultural, leads to a vacuum in which authentic discourse should be cultivated. Into this

vacuum step the state's instrumentalization of religion and the intellectual's Conceded Modernity—a critical concept developed by Laroui, which I'm emphasizing it's different scopes through the different chapters of this book, denoting a modernity granted by Western epistemological trends rather than earned through an indigenous historical process. Both are hostile substitutes for a genuine, organic social contract.

In response to a crisis of social legitimacy in Egypt stemming from the "peace" agreements with Israel, Sadat, then president, enacted a constitutional reform elevating Islam to the status of "the" source of the law—a maneuver intended to counteract his loss of legitimacy, thereby triumphantly proclaiming himself "a Muslim president for a Muslim country" (Alnasir 2019:45). In Ba'thist Iraq, as noted in the preceding paragraphs, the aconfessional party, after its defeat in Kuwait (1990-1991), abruptly imposed Islamic education to mitigate its eroded legitimacy. These were not acts of faith but symptoms of a state incapable of generating authentic political legitimacy, forced to resort to ideological compensatory fictions. This cycle of *spurious* aestheticism and internal rupture, when pushed to its breaking point, obstructs the possibility of sovereign repair and prefigures the political landscape's ultimate collapse into a desperate plea for a manufacturer's guarantee.

The emergence of these states typically followed one of two paths: active vassalage to a former or new colonial power (first the USSR, then often the US), or, for those attempting genuine emancipation, they were repressed with severe demonization and punishment. This dynamic ensured that resistance was channeled into a sterile (post)colonial anti-establishment narrative that ultimately traced all resentment back to the West, often manifesting as violence. The (post)colonial state, as the guardian of the colonial structuralism, thus became both the primary cause and the incubator of the anti-Western sentiment it set out to combat.

If the Schizophrenic Vassal State is defined by performance and the manufactured State (Chapter IV) by assembly, the *Rentier Cargo-Cult State* represents a terminal transcendence of both: the silent captivity of allocative logic.

4.2 *The Rentier Cargo-Cult State*

The violent symptom of the schizophrenic vassal state, its mimetic performances and eventual pleas for repair, find their totalized counterpart in the silent, allocative logic of the Gulf rentier states. Here, the pathology of Ready-Made Modernity achieves a terrifying perfection, it no longer manifests as a cry for recognition, but as the

systematic foreclosure of the very capacity to conceive of an indigenous future. Here, the *Third Pillar* is not withheld; it is rendered irrelevant by an allocative (distributive) logic that purchases acquiescence and sterilizes sovereignty at its root.

The economic base of this model, theorized by Beblawi as the rentier state, produces a totalizing social pathology. The rentier mentality metastasizes from macroeconomics into every facet of existence, academia, finance, social relations, and individual psychology. By grafting the hyper-charged Ready-Made Modernity paradigm onto a pre-existing nomadic, *liquid* civilizational substrate, the Gulf model has generated a society where all value is derived from placement and distribution, never from indigenous generation. This chapter traces this logic from the stock market to the marriage contract, revealing a form of life perfectly adapted to a terminal stage of dependency.

In the genealogical anatomy of vassalage, the *Rentier Cult* represents the terminal stage: a polity that no longer performs for recognition or pleads for repair, but instead purchases the simulacrum of modernity outright, foreclosing the very possibility of an emerging indigenous future.

The rentier mentality is produced and reproduced as the economic substrate of Ethical Schizophrenia. Following Beblawi, the "age-old dictum linking reward to work is dramatically broken in *favour* of chance, opportunity, or rather accident." ([1984] 2015:1 A Rentier Economy) The state's revenue, derived from external rents (mainly oil and minerals), is fundamentally beyond and disconnected from all over social productive activity. This fiction fosters a collective mindset obsessed with the present moment and quick profits, undermining the slow, gradual, long-term productive mindset—"In the long run we are all dead" (Beblawi [1984] 2015:50).

Here, the state operates on one logic—the distribution of exogenous wealth—while the societal lifeworld is systematically divorced from the productive struggle that forges a genuine social contract. The rentier mentality is thus a fractured consciousness where the link between effort and outcome is severed, creating a citizenry that consumes wealth through a wellbeing belonging dynamic, rather than producing it. This mentality finds its lucid economic expression in what I'd term onward as the *Rentier Implant*.

Economic Base of the Rentier Implant

This economic vassalage is perfected through a logic of 'placement, not investment.' Beblawi's critical distinction is the financial manifestation of the conditioned dependency theorized earlier. True investment adds to the productive capacity of an economy, while *placement*, a term Beblawi derives from French—better rendered in English as *speculative acquisition*—, designates "the purchase of titles and shares which does not add [real substance] to the productive capacity of the system." ([1984] 2015:28)

The Gulf elites, as latecomer savers, were conditioned to be *placeurs*. They master channeling petrodollars through Northern financial institutions but were systematically deprived of the epistemology for sovereign capital formation. They thus become *artisans* of capital flows, experts in global finance, yet lacking the sage to acknowledge the broader context—the comprehensive ability of the sage to build a self-sufficient economy, and even to structure their own financial system within the global one in which they operate as artisans. This is the No-Derivatives Paradigm applied to macroeconomics.

The *rentierism* thus is the political-economic embodiment of the Cargo Cult Paradigm. Its citizens are not anxious performers on a runway; they are pacified consumers in a warehouse of modern finished goods, waiting for the next release, having forgotten how to manufacture anything themselves. This dependency creates a political-economic reality that systematically extinguishes the motivation for productive, long-term investment, creating a mirage of a vacuum where the drive for indigenous development should be. Beblawi documents how domestic investment opportunities degenerated into "trade, real estate and the new-found gold mine speculation in securities" ([1984] 2015:1 A Rentier Economy)—to which we must now add the cryptocurrency boom. The elite, aligned with global financial circuits, had no motivation for risky industrialization, while traditional elements were seduced by the fast profits of speculation. The state, as the ultimate *allocative* mechanism, distributes rent but cannot generate the motivational architecture for a productive society.

Hegel's conception of Spirit as "the I that is We and the We that is I", discussed in Chapter I, provides the normative standard against which the Rentier State's silent captivity must be measured. In a genuine community, mutual recognition and socioeconomic dwelling is achieved through shared labor, through the formative activity that transforms the world and, in doing so, transforms the self into a being-

for-others. The Rentier State forecloses this possibility at its root. Its citizens do not produce together; they consume in parallel into a massive-tyrannic consumerism culture. Their relation to each other is mediated not by shared labor but by the state's allocative apparatus. The 'I' seeks recognition not from the 'We' but from the distributor; the 'We' is not a community of mutually recognizing subjects but an aggregate of claimants. This is the absence of Spirit, not merely political dependency but the systematic foreclosure of the very conditions under which a people might become, in Hegel's words, "the individual that is a world" ([1807] 1979:§325).

The Gulf model thus represents a distinct pathology from the mimetic performance of Turkey or an Egypt. The latter engages in a frantic performance of Western modernity in a desperate bid for the *Third Pillar* of recognition. The Gulf state, by contrast, bypasses this performance altogether. It does not seek recognition; it purchases the aesthetic and technological artifacts of modernity and Occidentalism outright, presenting himself with an added anxiety for a recognition as a peer consumer. Despite the absence of a mimetic social contract as its foundation, the principle of "no taxation without representation" is inverted into "no representation because there is no taxation." Thus, the need for ethical sovereignty is rendered obsolete by the *purchase* of belonging as a form of well-being. This phenomenon can be considered the ultimate manifestation of Bauer's concept of a 'parasitic society', whereby social cohesion is not established through a shared historical project, but rather through the deliberate allocation of income.

In the terminal stage of the Rentier Cargo-Cult State, the anonymous society is reduced to its most hollow form. The shared marker of belonging becomes mere consumption of the state's allocative wealth, throughout the dichotomy wellbeing-belonging. Therefore, the populace, reduced to end-users of a pre-fabricated national identity, no longer participants in its creation, perfectly reflecting Moffett's observation that fans root for the sports team's uniform, not the players within it.

Such allocative *fascination*, however, is not merely a macroeconomic or political condition. To understand its true power as a totalizing pathology, we must trace its roots deep into the anthropological substrate of Gulf societies and follow its metastatic spread into the most intimate spheres of life, from the academy and the stock market to the very structure of the family and the identity of the individual as a global actor.

4.3 *The Anthropological shift, Nomadism to Petro-Rentierism*

The modern rentier state did not create a new mentality *ex nihilo*; rather, it amplified a pre-existing anthropological foundation. Considering the nomadic traditions of the Peninsula were founded on a logic of proto-rentierism, an economy of discovery and access to non-produced resources (seasonal pasture, scattered water sources). Such fluctuate existence contrasts with the mentality of riverine civilizations, sustained on collective and transformative labor, as referred in earlier sections.

Therefore, the *shift* to petro-rentierism proceeded smoothly, since the underlying model remained the same: a sudden windfall of wealth that is simply claimed as one's own, without any effort or sustained creativity, that is, devoid of any logic of work-reward. The modern state merely replaced the camel with the oil rig, executing a hyper-efficient version of the same script. This explains the rapid cognition of the rentier mentality, which does not suppose an alien imposition, but the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm turbocharging a compatible, indigenous liquid worldview, a manifestation perfectly explainable from the Khaldunian hermeneutic.

4.4 *the metastasis: rentier logic in the social structuralism*

The Rentier Implant, once active, does not remain confined to the state economical structure; it metastasizes like a cognitive cancer, transforming every sphere of life into a site of allocation.

4.4.1 The epistemological capture: the rentier academy (knowledge as speculative acquisition).

The university is systematically reconfigured as a Cargo-Cult-Cryptouniversity. Thus, scholarship operates on the core rentier logic of speculative acquisition*, not investment.* Knowledge is not produced through dialectical inquiry but is acquired as a *Fetish-Certificate*. Research becomes a transaction for Scopus-indexed publications, rewarded with cash payments—a perfect micro-level analogue to the distribution of oil rents. Rentier anxiety reaches the peaks of the epistemological engine of the "no-derivatives" paradigm by spiraling (re)production of academic artisans who are fluent in the procedural language of global science but (meta)sterilized from accessing its philosophical source code. The result is the 'impossible promise' (Hanafi and Arvanitis 2015), where the performance of scholarship *cannibalizes* its substance.

If the rentier academy functions as a *Cargo-Cult-Cryptouniversity,* mastering the form of scholarship while eviscerating its substance—one would predict a systemic,

quantifiable collapse of academic integrity. As the empirical analysis in Chapter IV demonstrates, the global data on research retractions provides startling confirmation of this pathology, revealing the rentier epistemology not as a metaphor but, now, as a measurable reality.

4.4.2 The financial capture, a speculative spiral from stocks to crypto.

A wealthy founded on unearned rent naturally gravitates towards speculative finance. The stock market becomes a pure casino, detached from any industrial-financial essence. Thus, such logic finds its ultimate expression in cryptocurrency. Crypto is the quintessential rentier asset, a purely speculative vehicle, entirely abstracted from any real-world productive entity. It represents the final victory of speculative acquisition over investment, a financial instrument where wealth generation is a pure, fictional game of algorithmic chance, the absolute triumph of the break in the work-reward causation. It is the fiction of the fiction itself.

Therefore, the speculative spiral, from stocks to cryptocurrency, represents a perfect cargo-cult mentality, the belief that wealth can be summoned through magical, algorithmic chance, as a speculative acquisition rather than indigenous investment throughout a productive labor.

4.4.3 The social & intimate capture, the transactionalization of kinship & the self.

In a rentier context, when social status is not grounded in productive achievements or in ethical and personal autonomy, but instead becomes a cossified asset, its glorification turns into a new form of anxiety stemming from the need for presumption and self-display. This leads to a pervasive metastasis in which everyday life becomes aestheticized, an obsessive performance of worth through conspicuous consumption, transforming the self into a curated display of a speculative power.

This pathological transmutation of the intimate sphere is not an indigenous invention, but the localized, high-amplitude reception of a global script of market-mediated emotional life. Following Eva Illouz argument in her *sociology of negative relations*, the pervasive emotional uncertainty in love and intimacy in late liberalism is the direct product of a market-therapeutic complex that frames relationships through the prism of individual choice and consumable satisfaction (Illouz 2021). The rentier state, in its role as the importer and ultimate allocator of Ready-Made Modernity, does

not shield its society from this script; but, it massively subsidizes and accelerates its adoption.

Yet the rentier state does not merely import these ideals; it reifies them. Even liberal reforms, such as the legal and economic empowerment of women, are absorbed into the speculative-allocative logic. Women's rights, rather than becoming instruments of genuine autonomy, are converted into an additional rentier paradigm, cossified through the very *dower* system they were meant to transcend. Thus, the institution of marriage is reconfigured into an extensive rentier deal, the dower (*Mahr*) inflates from a symbolic commitment into a large, upfront financial transaction, a fast earn strategy that converts the primal site of kinship into a sphere of tactical, speculative engagement. The curated self on massive social media becomes a branded asset; the soaring divorce rate is the statistical evidence of a society trying to run the imported software of romantic, choice-based individualism on the hardware of a kin-based, honor-driven social matrix. This is not the failure of tradition, but the ethical collision of two incommensurate regimes of intimacy, one organically honorific (kinship), the other imported and hyper-commodified (tyrannic market cossified intimacy), throughout the rentier state acting as the conflicted, distributing broker of both.

Thereof, the self and the family become portfolios of assets. As a world of an anthropological mall, a social space where prefabricated identities, transactional relationships, and aestheticized lifestyles are consumed under the glittering lights of speculative wealth allocation, crystallizing the end of the societal and the triumph of the *portfolio synoikismos*, or an almost, 'symbolic liberalism' (Hanafi 2025). It is no longer a community forged by a shared historical project (a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*), but a curated marketplace of belonging, where the rentier self shops for an identity, forever an end-user in a mall of manufactured signs and aesthetics, never a creator of a sovereign social reality.

Such pathological transmutation is not an organic evolution but a project actively mediated by a specific class, the Western-oriented intellectual, the colonial-phile elite, theorized in this work as the product of Ethical Schizophrenia, throughout the mimetic desire for Rewarded Northern Models, theorized in Chapter I, locked the elites into a performative cycle. As early as 1985, Al-Thakeb identified this vanguard, noting that "all segments of the society, probably with the exception of some Western-oriented intellectuals, will resist changes contrary to Islamic teachings" (1985:579).

These elites, educated within and psychologically aligned with the Northern epistemological sphere, function as the *internal agents* of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. Their role is to pathologize indigenous ethical structures, family governing and intimacy to champion their replacement with the massive imported ready-made *ideal* to over-raid the most intimate of the individual mentality, and social constellations, which they mistake for universal modernity.

The devastating social consequences of this transactionalization are starkly visible through empirical perspectives. Sociological studies of the Gulf reveal an epidemic of divorce, particularly within the first months of marriage (Anser 2013), as young couples find themselves trapped in a perverted intersubjective bind. They are conditioned to desire the imported, companionate model of marriage, with its expectations of individual choice, liberal romantic love, and western aestheticism, while the institution itself remains embedded in the unyielding, transactional logic of kinship and rentier transactionalism—through substantively rentier dower in-out—. The soaring divorce rate is the statistical evidence of this Ethical Schizophrenia at the intimate micro level.

The pathological breakdown of the family structure, hollowed by the rentier approach and the erosion of its organic ethical foundations, cannot sustain the imported software from romantic individualism. The result is not a harmonious hybrid, but a seismic failure that manifests as a crisis of spinsterhood, marital breakdown, and intergenerational alienation (Al-Thakeb 1985).

Tragically, the state's prescribed response to this intimate crisis, as reflected in academic and policy circles, is not to heal the break but to *escalate* further the rentist logic. Policy recommendations and interventions focus on material solutions, as state-sponsored 'Marriage Funds,' as financial-economic support for divorced women (Anser 2013:70), yet another motif of rent allocation. The rentier state, acting as *guarantor* and repairer of its *failed social aesthetic models*, progressively turns its citizens into further claimants, as it assumes responsibility for the consequences of its own failures, thereby capitalizing on the dependency that caused the rupture. The self, the family, and the state are thus locked in a vicious cycle where the only recognized currency is rent, and the only possible relation is that of allocator and claimant. Individual responsibility is thus relegated to the state, even becoming a source and object of speculative rentierism.

The rentier logic of allocation finds its ultimate cultural expression in the fabrication of an *aesthetic spectacular past*. Unlike the *anxious archive and historicism regime* of the Schizophrenic vassal state, which struggles to manage a complex historical inheritance, the rentier state often operates from a *tabula rasa*, or a deliberately simplified pre-history. Its project is not curation but creation, the (re)production of a born past as a consumable spectacle. Thus, events like *Abu Dhabi's Qasr Al Hosn Festival*, described by its organizers as "seamlessly fus[ing] the traditional with the modern" (Exell 2016:Introduction), are prime examples. This is not an organic outgrowth of collective memory but a top-down, therapeutic simulation. It actively suppresses the *experience-near* realities of the tribal hermeneutics, the collapse of the pearling economy, and the traumatic velocity of modernization. In its place, it offers a seamless, conflict-free narrative of national becoming—a pre-packaged heritage designed for allocative distribution of wealth as part of the *wellbeing-belonging* contract. The past is thus transformed into yet another commodity, another object of cossification, added to the portfolio of the rentier state. This process stifles the spontaneous and dialectical emergence of a genuine engagement with history.

The assignative mirage is, therefore, the political-economic embodiment of the paradigm of cargo cult, understood in the context of the anonymous society formation. The citizens of the rentier state, again, are not anxious performers on a runway; they are pacified consumers in a warehouse of finished modern goods. They have been provided with the *concluded fetiche markers of modernity*—gleaming museums, global brands, imported curricula—without any memory of, or capacity for, an indigenous labor of generating their own societal markers. This paradigm echoes Moffett's idea that the seemingly trivial act of a population steeped in consumerism comfortably assimilating a prefabricated national identity is a sign of a profound sociological shift, revealing the emergence of a captive and anonymous society in which the shared expression of belonging is reduced to the mere consumption of the wealth distributed by the state, a carnal sense of wellbeing-belonging.

A necessary critique of this typology would point to states that emerged from colonial fabrication or deeply composite foundations yet *appear* as successive, such as Malaysia and Singapore. This phenomenon does not invalidate the model of pathological vassalage; rather, it elucidates its diagnostic scope by underscoring the variables that may impede its emergence. Malaysia, despite its ethnic pluralism, had

forged a post-colonial bargain—known as the *Bumiputra* policy—that, however contentious, was an indigenous political project. It represented a sovereign, if contested, attempt to manage its composite nature, not through mimetic performance for a Northern gaze, but through a form of internal critical translation and negotiation, preserving a core civilizational identity (Khoo 1995; Cheah 2002; Wang 2005; Ishak 2014; Keo 2025). Singapore, in stark contrast, constitutes a unique case of a productive rentierism. It rejected the allocative logic of oil states and instead leveraged its geo-strategic position to become a rentier of global logistics and finance. Its social contract, while often described as an amalgamation of coexistence and exchange between political rights and economic wellbeing, is inherently productive. The sense of *wellbeing-belonging* is derived from its role as a critical node in global capitalism, not from a disconnected external rent. This has allowed it to build a potent, if engineered, national identity (Wee 2007; Barr 2013; Chua 2017).

These cases are not refutations but crucial boundary markers. They demonstrate that the terminal symptoms of schizophrenia and silent captivity can be avoided where the artificial condition is met with a sovereign, developmental elite capable of genuine, adaptive translation (the Japanese model) or where rentier logic is harnessed to a project of indigenous value creation, thereby achieving a functional, if circumscribed, negotiation of the Third Pillar.

5 The Transnational Rentier: Dependency Beyond Borders

The rentier subjectivity, forged within the allocative state, is not bound by its borders; it operates on a global scale, revealing the totalizing nature of this vassalage pathology.

5.1 The Citizen-Rentier in Exile

The Kuwaiti case during the 1990-91 invasion is a stark illustration. The state-in-exile functioned primarily as an allocative mechanism, distributing *exile rents*. Thus, the diaspora became recipients-in-exile. The defense of the territorial homeland was secondary to maintaining the distributive chain, revealing a citizen-state relationship becomes defined and continually reaffirmed through pure allocation, even existentially. The nation became a portable payroll.

5.2 The Migrant as Global Claimant

This mentality travels cognitively. Migrants from rentier states often perceive host-country welfare not as social solidarity, but as entitlement—a globalized rent derived

from their claimant status. This explains asylum shopping and simultaneous registration in multiple countries. The logic is of maximizing *allocative returns* globally, a direct extension of the domestic rentier contract. The individual relates to the world not as a contributor, but as a perpetual claimant.

6 Boundary Markers

A suggestive critique of this typology would point to states that emerged from colonial fabrication or deeply composite foundations yet appear as successes, such as Malaysia and Singapore, or to post-Soviet ongoing cases like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan where linguistic and mnemonic revival follows complex, non-linear paths. These are not refutations, but provocative anomalies—boundary markers that test the limits of the framework and open essential research questions.

Malaysia's Bumiputra policy represents a rare, sovereign attempt to manage a Composite Society through an indigenous political bargain, not through Northern gaze mimicry. Yet this very bargain institutionalizes ethnic stratification as a governing logic. Does this constitute a genuine sovereign translation of modernity, or a stable, internalized tripartite dysfunction where elite segments are appointed by ethnic quota rather than functional role? The case evokes parallels with the sectarian drama in Lebanon and the *lebanonization* of Iraq (Alnasir 2020). However, the absence of resistance in this context does not necessarily indicate a healthy state. Instead, it suggests a managed schizophrenia, a society that, despite its fragmentation, exists in a negotiated equilibrium that hinders deeper ethical integration.

Singapore, by other hand, presents an even sharper particularity having leveraged its geo-strategic position to become a productive rentier of global logistics and finance, building an influential national identity without apparent schizophrenia or conflictive resistance. Yet such *adaptive sovereignty* is contingent on total subordination to global capital flows, a deliberately depoliticized public sphere, and a state-led instrumentalization of identity. Is Singapore a genuine exception, a sovereign debugger of imported modernity, or the prototype of a new, silent vassalage, an algorithmic rentier state that purchases modernity so efficiently it no longer recognizes the concept of an indigenous future? The answers raise more complex questions, yet. Given that the absence of protest does not necessarily imply discontent, it could instead be indicative of a preventive political grammar or proactive submission driven by an *anxious longing* for the most advanced outpost of the future Cloud Empire (see the Epilogue).

India represents a third boundary case, distinct from both the Malaysian and Singaporean trajectories. As Sudipta Kaviraj (2002) has argued, Indian modernity followed a path of 'improvisation' rather than 'replication'—a reflexive, context-sensitive adaptation of modern institutions shaped by the specific sequence of colonialism, democracy, and state formation (2002:151–54). Unlike the Ottoman or Arab cases, where the postcolonial state became a guardian of colonial legacies, India's democratic politics—however compromised by caste, corruption, and communal violence—has provided a mechanism through which the subaltern has repeatedly forced its way into the political process, compelling improvisations that the Ready-Made Paradigm did not anticipate. Yet improvisation occurs under conditions not of the improviser's choosing. The persistence of caste as a political category, the chronic crisis of secular institutions, and the enduring legacies of colonial epistemic frameworks all attest to the deep marks that Vicarious Conditioning leaves even where it does not fully succeed. India thus occupies a distinctive position on the spectrum of vassalage: neither a sovereign translation on the Japanese model nor a full schizophrenic collapse on the Arab pattern, but a contested terrain where democratic reflexivity and colonial path-dependency remain in unresolved tension.

In contrast, the post-Soviet sphere, by other hand, offers another set of diagnostic puzzles. In Uzbekistan, narratives of national revival are often articulated in the language of the former oppressor (Russian), as seen in state-sponsored museums — *Museum of Represion (Қа ағ н Қур нлари х ира и муз йи)* or, even, the *Temorian history* (State History Museum of Uzbekistan)— projected in Russian. This represents a form of mnemonic vassalage, a revival that remains epistemically captive to the colonial tongue. In contrast, Azerbaijan's assertive linguistic revival suggests a different trajectory, one where decolonization is pursued anthropocentrically through vernacular revival. Yet both raise the same critical question: does revival in the colonial language perpetuate epistemic vassalage, even after political independence? And can linguistic decolonization alone produce ethical sovereignty, or does it risk becoming another form of performative nativism anxiety, a folkloric cargo cult that replicates the aesthetic form of sovereignty while missing its philosophical source code?

These cases do not invalidate the typology; they stress-test it. They demand a next generation of research that applies the diagnostic toolkit—Vicarious Conditioning,

Ethical Schizophrenia, elite dysfunction—to seemingly successful or exceptional cases. The goal is not to force them into the pathology spectrum, but to ask: What variables insulate a polity from terminal vassalage? And at what cost? The answers will not only refine the model but reveal the hidden trade-offs and camouflaged dependencies in even the most celebrated modernity projects.

Whether the framework developed here might illuminate other cases—China's combination of economic hyper-modernization with political centralism, for instance, or the post-Soviet trajectories of linguistic and mnemonic revival—remains a question for further research. The diagnostic toolkit offered in this book does not claim to exhaust the field of possible modernities, but to provide the instruments for a more precise mapping of the pathologies that haunt them.

7 Terminal Stage: Silent Captivity (Recapitulation)

If the Schizophrenic Vassal State is defined by the anxious performance of modernity, and the Manufactured State by the abject plea for its repair, the Rentier Cargo-Cult State represents the terminal stage of this pathological spectrum: *Silent Captivity*. Here, the struggle for recognition *is* over, not because it has been won, but because it has been rendered obsolete by the *allocative* mirage.

In this stage, the populace is no longer a performer on the global stage nor a claimant at the manufacturer's door. It has been transformed into a *pacified* captive, a massive consumer of a *finished modernity*. This silent captivity represents the terminal stage of the temporal pathology. Here, the *pseudo-cyclical time of the spectacle* achieves its totalizing perfection (Debord [1967] 1992:153). The populace no longer experiences time as a field of historical struggle or potential (irreversible frame), but as a *managed* cycle of consumption—the rhythm of the *shopping festival*, the tourist season, the distribution of rent. This is time as a *consumable product*, stripped of all qualitative becoming. The *aesthetic welbeing-belonging* is precisely this consumption of time-as-image, the aesthetic time where life is reduced to the contemplation of a succession of falsely novel moments, all of which confirm the eternal present of the *allocative system*. The foreclosure of an indigenous future is, therefore, first and foremost a foreclosure of a sovereign relationship to time; it is the replacement of history with the endless recurrence of the massive cargo ritual.

The Third Pillar of recognition is neither sought nor withheld; it becomes *irrelevant*. The state forecloses the very question of legitimacy not through a

compelling national narrative, but by systematically purchasing acquiescence. The social contract is no longer mimetic ('we are like you') or garantist ('you must fix what you broke'), but allocative ('we, the state, provide for you, the populace').

This is the ultimate victory of the Cargo Cult paradigm, perfected. The 'planes' of modernity are no longer anxiously awaited on a makeshift runway, as advanced. The citizens now live *inside* the airplane—a fully assembled, climate-controlled, and endlessly provisioned simulation of the modern. They are surrounded by the *aesthetic* and technological *artifacts* of a world they neither built nor are capable of repairing. The constant, low hum of distributed wealth and consumer comfort *anaesthetizes* the political psyche, creating a profound corrupted and silent alienation. The capacity for indigenous desire, as referred earlier, the very drive to "quarry stone from one's own bedrock", atrophies from disuse. The concept of an alternative, self-authored future becomes cognitively inaccessible.

Such silent captivity is not peace; it is the *end* of politics. It is the point where the schizophrenic rift between the state and the everyday-life-world ceases to be a site of tension and becomes a settled, managed reality. The state is not against the nation in a violent struggle; it has simply become a different entity, an allocative service provider to a population of end-users. The ultimate expression of this logic is the state's power to unilaterally define and revoke the very status of *citizenship*. As seen in the case of Kuwait's Bedun (the *stateless*), individuals and entire lineages can be administratively stripped of their nationality, rendered into a class of *non-citizens* who exist within the territory yet are formally excluded from the *allocative* contract. This practice weaponizes the 'need to belong' with terrifying precision: dissent can be met not merely with repression, but with ontological erasure from the distributive roster (Al-Naqeeb [1990] 2012; Rabuffetti and Wills 2025). The Bauerian *Hintersassen* are no longer resentful dependents; they are compliant beneficiaries of a system that has surgically removed the neurological pathways for sovereign historical production.

Thus, the terminal symptom of the global Cargo Cult is not the cry of the protestor in *Tahrir* Square(s), but the quiet swipe of a credit card in a Dubai mall. Yet, it is not the rage of the conditioned artisan-elites who cannot repair the imported system, but the pacified citizen-consumer *living* in a warehouse, or mall of polished goods, waiting for the next shipment, having forgotten how to manufacture anything themselves. Thus, the silent captivity, paradoxically is the most profound violence of the Ready-Made

Modernity Paradigm by achieving the foreclosure of an indigenous future, not through explicit denial, but through the gentle, totalizing provision of a prefabricated present. Thus, the political morphology of dependency culminates in a triad of terminal symptoms: the rage of the artisan in the Schizophrenic Vassal State; the plea of the consumer in the Manufactured State; and, in its most perfected form, the silent captivity of the end-user in the Rentier Cargo-Cult State.

This silent captivity represents its political realization as the final form of spectacular domination: the integrated spectacle (*le spectaculaire intégré*) (Debord [1979] 1988:V). Debord observation on this stage born from the fusion of the concentrated and diffuse forms, is characterized by five principal features: incessant technological renewal, the economic-State fusion, generalized secrecy, the unanswerable false, and a perpetual present ([1979] 1988:V).

The present analysis demonstrates that the rentier state's opacity and its veneration of commodities (cargo-cult) are consistent with Debord's critique of the spectacle. The rentier state operates in such a way that it becomes integrated into reality to the very extent that it speaks of it, reconstructing it while describing it discretionally from behind the spectacle, as the decisive complement that reveals it. Thus, it endeavors to stand "behind the spectacle, as the decisive complement to what it shows and, if one gets to the bottom of things, as its most important operation ([1979] 1988:IV). Such cultural logic is performed through the allocative mirage, the state does not just perform modernity; it *purchases* and *distributes* the very sensory and temporal experience of it. The populace lives inside a *perpetual present,* as a managed cycle of consumption where the "incessant circular passage of information" returns constantly to the same trivialities, annihilating the qualitative, irreversible time of historical becoming (*le temps irréversible*) ([1979] 1988:V). This spectacular temporality is the cultural superstructure of the rentier mentality's economic base, which, as Beblawi identified earlier, is "obsessed by the present moment" and displays a "profound impatience with a continuous, slow, gradual process of change" ([1984] 2015:1 A Rentier Economy). This is the terminal foreclosure of the sovereign relationship to time that is the prerequisite for an indigenous *für sich*.

Furthermore, this stage operates under a 'generalized secrecy' (*le secret généralisé*), which stands behind the spectacle aesthetics "as its most important operation." In the rentier state, this is the secrecy of the allocative mechanism itself, as the *opaque*

distribution of wealth, the hidden circuits of political patronage, and the camouflaged source code of the ready-made paradigm, reduce structurally the citizen to an end-user, depriving him/her from any awareness of the system's structural mechanisms and relegating him/her solely to its distributive effects. Such secrecy ensures that the plea for repair can only ever be a cry into the void, or a desperate appeal to the occulted original manufacturer. Thus, the silent captivity of the rentier end-user is thus the lived political experience of the integrated spectacle's triumph, as a world where, as Debord concluded, "the true has become a moment of the false" ([1979] 1988:XVII).

This silent captivity is now stratified by algorithm (see Epilogue). For the populace, it is not a *conscious* helplessness but an *unconscious subjugation*; their desires, social bonds, and political horizons are pre-emptively shaped by the soft biopolitics of platforms they use unthinkingly. The warehouse of finished modern goods now includes their own algorithmic identities, further exacerbates the captivity of the elites by imposing another conscious dependence, artisan-like dependency. Now, the elites are the custodians of the digital infrastructure through which they pacify their people. However, they remain forever incapable of altering its core logic. Thus, their only recourse is to appeal to their northern manufacturers for enhancements, thus perpetually entrenching their *ethical dependence*.

The silent captivity, in addition, is being a stratified helplessness, to persists not merely because of a lack of access, but because the very motivation for an indigenous path is extinguished at both societal levels. The general populace, whose consciousness is colonized unconscionably, cannot conceive of an alternative to the algorithmic reality that defines their world. Where, the Fetish-Elite, conditioned, since earlier to be perpetual artisans of imported systems, deepen their lacks to define and identify the massive tyrannic and conscienceless algorithmic captivity.

This condensed synthesis recapitulates the core logics and terminal symptoms of the pathological states anatomized in this chapter, revealing an increasing scale of dependency from anxious performance to silent captivity. The following condensed table summarizes their defining logics and terminal political symptoms, providing a definitive typology of vassalage.

State Form	Core Logic	Social Contract	Terminal Symptom
Sovereign State (e.g., European Synoikismos, Japanese Kokutai)	Indigenous Generation / Sovereign Translation	Organic & Reciprocal (based on a living *Kulturgemeinschaft*)	N/A (Homeostatic) or Critical Purification (Latour)
Schizophrenic Vassal State (e.g., Ottoman-Turkey)	Mimetic anxiety	Performance for Recognition (The Third Pillar)	Ontological Insecurity / Ethical Schizophrenia
Manufactured State (e.g., Post-2003 Iraq)	(Post)colonial conceded structuralism	Plea for a Warranty	Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee
Rentier Cargo-Cult State (e.g., Gulf Monarchies)	Allocative Distribution	Well-being Belonging (Distributive)	Silent Captivity / Foreclosed Sovereignty and ethical dependence

Table 4: Synthesized Typology of Pathological State Forms: Core Logics and Terminal Symptoms.

This typology reveals an intensifying scale of dependency. The schizophrenic vassal state's performance is active and anxious, the manufactured state's plea is abject and consumerist, while the rentier state's captivity is silent, foreclosing the very desire for sovereign recognition.

8 Conclusions: The Cargo Cult as Tyrannic Modernity and the End of Politics

The genealogical anatomy diagnosed here, reveals that the schizophrenic vassal state is not a monolithic disorder but a spectrum of political pathology, a global massive Cargo Cult of Ready-Made Modernity. From the anxious performance of the schizophrenic vassal, through the abject dependence of the manufactured State, to the silent captivity of the rentier Cargo-Cult, we witness an escalating spectrum of dependency, each stage foreclosing further the possibility of ethical sovereignty.

This typology provides the final, definitive refutation of the Occidentalism thesis. What polemics misdiagnose as a monolithic hatred of the West is, in reality, a set of distinct symptomatic outputs generated by specific structural premises:

- The Schizophrenic Vassal State produces the rage of the artisan, the complex philosophical and political struggle of an elite that may operate but does not

master the encrypted system. This struggle is often misdiagnosed as the pathological hatred of Occidentalism, a polemical category that obscures the true political pathology of Schizophrenic Vassalage.

- The Rentier Cargo-Cult State produces the silence of the end-user—a pacified captivity where the very drive for recognition and sovereignty has been *anaesthetized* by allocative logic, a condition mistaken from the outside for contentment or cultural incompatibility, then generating unconscious ethical dependence.

The true tyranny of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, therefore, lies not only in its imposition of a political form but in its capacity to generate these pathological states that actively foreclose the arduous labor of building an indigenous future. The path beyond this global hermeneutics cannot be a better performance, a new plea, or a quieter consumption. It must be the intimate, daily work of 'quarrying stone from one's own bedrock', the only act that can reset the fabricated clocks of (post)colonial time and dispel, once and for all, the polemical mirage of Occidentalism as a massive cargo modernity.

8.1 Theoretical Implications. Toward a Typological Turn in Political Theory

The paradigm's typology developed until this point not only serves to classify; it also reorients the very study of state formation, dependency, and modernity. Therefore, the implications of the aforementioned factors necessitate a typological shift in the domains of both political theory and comparative analysis. This shift entails a departure from the conventional holistic approach centered on anthropocentrism and cultural essentialism. Rather, it involves the pursuit of more comprehensive explanations that encompass the institutional sterility observed in the context of global vassalage. This sterility must be understood through a structural diagnostic lens, which is essential for formulating effective remedies and strategies.

First, it provincializes the Westphalian model. The concept of the sovereign nation-state should no longer be portrayed as the universal final goal of political development. Rather, it should be regarded as a specific historical formation, the solid outcome of a European synoikismos. However, when this concept is extensively exported as a ready-made solution to liquid or composite substrates, it can become tyrannical. Therefore, comparative politics approach must begin not by asking "how states fail," but "what

kind of state was implanted here, and upon what, and, or, which anthropological terrain?"

Second. The necessity of reconstructing epistemology in political analysis. The primary conflict is not only about access to resources or institutions; rather, it is a struggle over the fundamental principles of political rationality. The concepts of Vicarious Conditioning, Ethical Schizophrenia, and the plea for a guarantee are not mere metaphors but rather measurable psychopolitical conditions engendered by the global hierarchy of knowledge production. A comprehensive scholarly investigation must encompass not only the movement of capital and arms, but also the dissemination of curricular models, legal paradigms, aesthetic structures, urban models, and even museum blueprints.

Third. It is important to note, however, that it does not provide a cultural framework, but rather a diagnostic one. The typology does not label cultures as schizophrenic or rentier. It identifies political morphologies that can emerge in any context where indigenous elite function is sterilized and Recognition is structurally withheld. This allows for genuine comparison—between Ottoman Turkey and Brasília (see Appendix II), between Gulf aesthetic rentierism and Singaporean productive rentierism—without failling into oriental-occidentalist fallacies.

Fourth. This phenomenon serves to bridge the macro and the intimate, as the rentier logic that distorts macroeconomics also invades the most intimate life and family structures. The anxious historicity of the state is mirrored in the individual's schizophrenic navigation of composite legal identities. Therefore, a comprehensive analysis must encompass a broad range of issues, from the geopolitics of oil to the micro-politics of the *Mahr* (dowry), from constitutional imports to the algorithmic colonization of everyday life.

The final phase of the process entails the transformation of the diagnosis into a normative project. The term schizophrenic vassal is not intended as a condemnation of the state in question; rather, it is a term used to identify specific points of intervention. Such intervention is necessary due to the state's failure to translate, the withholding of the Third Pillar, and the intellectual sterilization. The typology, in this case, functions as a tool for sovereign repair, serving as a means to *troubleshoot* the imported software by extracting elements from the local *bedrock*. Thus, the scholarship must encompass

more than a mere description of the cargo cult; it must also contribute to the development of the local airport.

This typological turn, therefore, is not an academic exercise. It is a necessary step toward dismantling the epistemic fabrication of Occidentalism and confronting the real global disorder, as the systematic production of political forms that foreclose the possibility of ethical sovereignty. The spectrum from *Rage* to *Plea-Labyrinth* to *Silence* is not inevitable. It is the result of an archetype that can be traced, understood, and, ultimately, reprogrammed, but only if we first *comprehend* its distinct, and devastating, architectural forms.

Conclusions

If Occidentalism is, as this book has argued, not a historical discourse but an epistemic fabrication, a polemical apparatus designed to obscure a deeper asymmetry, then what is the true pathology it engenders? The examination of the philosophical struggles within Japan, the Ottoman-Turkish anxiety for recognition, and the Arab (post)colonial plea illuminates a persistent and considerably more pernicious disorder: the global production of the schizophrenic vassal state, the utmost of ethical dependence. The polemic of civilizational hatred is shown to be untenable when faced with the weight of the evidence, which instead suggests a diagnosis of political psychosis. This condition arises from the tyrannical imposition of a Ready-Made Modernity that systematically forecloses the possibility of ethical sovereignty.

The global Cargo Cult of Ready-Made Modernity does not suggest a monolithic condition, but a spectrum of political pathology(ies), defined by an *exploding* scale of dependency. The empirical evidence culminates in a definitive tripartite typology, where each state-form manifests a distinct terminal symptom:

(1) The Schizophrenic Vassal State (The Anxious Performer): Its core logic is mimetic performance for a perpetually withheld recognition. Its terminal symptom is not hatred, but the rage of the artisan, the complex, antagonist struggle of an elite that can operate but not master the encrypted system, a struggle reductively misdiagnosed as Occidentalism.

(2) The Manufactured State (The Abject Consumer): Its core logic is assembly and guarantee. Its terminal symptom is the consumer's plea, the abject cry for a warranty from the original manufacturers, a desperate admission of a populace stripped of all capacity for political self-repair.

(3) The Rentier Cargo-Cult State (The Silent Captive): Its core logic is allocative distribution. Its terminal symptom of the end-user, as a pacified captivity where the very drive for recognition and sovereignty has been anaesthetized, foreclosing the desire for an indigenous future altogether.

The spectrum of pathological state-forms anatomized in this book—the Schizophrenic Vassal, the Manufactured, and the Rentier Cargo-Cult—reveals the structural underside of the Multiple Modernities thesis. Eisenstadt (2000, 2002) rightly observed that modernity and Westernization are not identical and that non-Western societies have generated distinctive interpretations of the modern cultural program. What his framework does not fully theorize is the mechanism by which such plurality is prevented from emerging: the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, operating through Vicarious Conditioning and Ethical Schizophrenia and the structured withholding of

the Third Pillar of recognition, does not merely coexist with multiple modernities but actively forecloses them, producing in their place not a flourishing plurality but a spectrum of pathological dependencies—the Rage of the Artisan, the Plea of the Consumer, and the Silence of the End-User.

This triad—Rage, Plea-Labyrinth, Silence—maps an intensifying foreclosure of ethical sovereignty. It is the definitive refutation of the *Occidental-Modernism* thesis, revealing a global structure of dependence where the polemic of hatred masks the true injuries of engineered helplessness and cognitive sterilization, and provides the political-economic morphology for the epistemological dilemma of the subaltern. This work thus answers the question posed by Gayatri Spivak—'Can the subaltern speak?' (1988, 2010; Chatterjee 2010)—with a holistic and introspective diagnosis. The subaltern cannot speak because the Schizophrenic Vassal State is a political form designed for the systematic sterilization of the sovereign voice, ethically subjugating him. The fury of the artisan (misdiagnosed as *Occidentalism*) is the stifled cry of the intellectual subaltern; the plea is the collective voice of the political subaltern; and the silent captivity of the rentier end-user is the terminal stage of subalternity. The path beyond this hermeneutics, therefore, cannot be a better representation of the subaltern by the Fetish-Elite, but throughout what has been stated repeatedly in this book as 'quarrying stone from one's own bedrock', a decolonization of the very structures of consciousness to reclaim the capacity for indigenous speech and repair, as an ethical decolonization.

This diagnostic journey allows us to reframe the subaltern dilemma of representation—which Said, and later Spivak building on Marx's dictum that peasants "cannot represent themselves; they must be represented" (Marx 1937:62), established as a theoretical cornerstone, by providing its missing substantive interpretative structure. This structure operates on two levels. The first is genealogical: a political morphology of the subaltern condition, where Vicarious Conditioning and the Ready-Made Modernity paradigm systematically produce a fetish-elite of perpetual artisans and a populace of end-users, foreclosing the very capacity for indigenous self-representation. The subaltern cannot speak because the political structure is designed to sterilize the sovereign voice at its source, a process further conditioned by the anthropological clash between imported-solid state forms and indigenous-liquid anthropocentric substrates.

The second is aesthetic, as a pathology of performance, where the schizophrenic vassal elite, its consciousness hacked by colonial education, is rendered incapable to perform the re-presentation, of making its own world present again through an

authentic, critical *trans-lation*. Instead of re-presenting the *self*, it is conditioned to represent the *other*, performing a scripted modernity that actively overshadows, nullify and defames its own societal life. The illegible greenhouse of its intellectual production and the anxious performance of its statecraft are not failures of will but the logical output of an aesthetic function captured by the hegemonic North. Thus, the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is the terminal admission of this double foreclosure, a clamor from those who have been made incapable of both self-representation and self-repair.

This spectrum of dependency is not accidental but programmed. It is the engineered outcome of a precise structuralism of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, which massively exports the concluded forms of Northern modernity as encrypted, proprietary software. This paradigm is installed through Vicarious Conditioning, a psycho-social mechanism that produces subaltern elites as perpetual artisans, fluent in the operational *what* but systematically divorced from the philosophical *why*. The entire system is locked in place by the perpetual, structured withholding of the Third Pillar of recognition, weaponizing the fundamental *need to belong* and inducing a state of chronic ontological insecurity.

The Japanese exception is a noteworthy case study that serves as a cautionary tale and a source of inspiration. It asserts that even the most sophisticated engagement with modernity can be subverted by militarism and what was once imperial ambition in the form of armed conflict. In this sense, the convergence between the Kyoto School and militarist ideology left an indelible mark on the philosophical perspective, regardless of its strength and argumentative coherence. However, it serves as a warning against the temptation to succumb to the influence of the other path—amid the artisan's indignation, the consumer's plea, and the end-user's silence.

Japan's achievement cannot be solely attributed to the rejection of Western modernity; rather, it was the result of a formative adoption of Western ideas and practices. Through patient and fruitful efforts in translation, adaptation, and philosophical reflection, the Japanese elite attained a self-confidence that the vassal states of the Ottoman and Arab worlds did not manage to achieve. Thus, the transition from a state of fear to one of organization, from an anxious performance to objective productivity, was evident.

This is the core of '*quarrying stone from one's own bedrock'*, repeatedly defended in this Book; it is not nativist withdrawal but the Hegelian labor of making the foreign one's own through work. It is the transformation of the imported object into an

expression of indigenous self-consciousness. This path is unique in that it provides a means of navigation beyond the labyrinth of the *Third Pillar*. It does not ensure recognition; rather, it makes recognition secondary and irrelevant. The work itself, when genuine, produces its own, or self, certainty.

The vassal state's plea for a guarantee arises from its historical exclusion from the capacity to construct its own. The task of sovereign repair is to clear the ground for building again. However, the repercussions of this political disorder transcend the intellectual, extending to the material and economic domains. The economic fate of nations is inextricably linked to their degree of epistemological sovereignty.

Turkey serves as a salient example in this regard. Despite its enduring pathologies, Turkey endeavored to localize the code, to adapt imported paradigms rather than merely consume them. Such revival effort have been shown to unlock generative potential. The empirical evidence is unequivocal. In 1960, Turkey and Egypt, being at similar demographic baselines of roughly 28 and 27 million respectively, saw Turkey's GDP (US 7.5billion) stand at approximately 180 percent of Egypt's (US 4.2 billion); while by 2024, after decades of sovereign resilience and localizing the modernity code, Turkey climbed to nearly 340 percent, tripling the size of Egypt's stagnant consumerist counterpart, despite Egypt's population having since surged to over 116 million against Turkey's 85 million (World Bank 2024).

This economic divergence is not merely a story of policy. It is a story of epistemological capacity. Turkey has finally succeeded in reconciling modernity with its own indigenous epistemes. Egypt, by contrast, remained trapped in a consumerist plea, ruled by a parasite schizophrenic elite in a state of profound vassalage. The states that stayed mere consumers, locked in a cycle of Vicarious Conditioning and Ideocide, became end-users not only of foreign paradigm's but of their own economic stagnation. The schizophrenic vassal state is therefore not just a political disorder but an economic death sentence.

Beyond the political and economic, the ultimate tyranny of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm is its imposition of a specific temporality, by replacing the lived, irreversible time of historical becoming, the *past as performed* by the societal reality, with a visualized through public aesthetic spectacular past as born. As a frozen pseudo-cyclical entity of consumption, an encrypted (neo)chronology that justifies a future predetermined by the State itself. Its example can be found in adoption the Kemalist adoption of *laiklik* (french *laicité*) was not just the import of a *secular* formula, but the

installation of an exogenous Western *für sich* with its own frozen timeline, weaponizing a misunderstood past to foreclose an indigenous future. This is the deepest anthropological violation: the 'synchronization of clocks' at the level of civilizational consciousness, the ultimate *hostilization* of time itself.

The path beyond this *labyrinthine hermeneutics* cannot be a better mimicry or a new plea. It must be a radical shift from the pathological structures of the state to the intimate, daily work into indigenous reality. This is the foundational, political prerequisite for any genuine ecological autochthonous perspective or a double critique, the sovereign grounding that makes a dialogue of equals, rather than a cycle of mimicry and resentment, finally possible. This is not a call for radicalization but for a sovereign dialogue, a project of agential recovery that demands:

(1) The Recover from the Aesthetic Fiction to the self essence. It requires moving from a state of what Baumeister (2025) characterizes as *inauthentic*, '*Das Man*' conformity, merely doing what *one does* in the mimetic script, in Heideggerian terms ([1927] 2010), toward the arduous work of authentic, sovereign choice. This is the essence of this indigenous labor: not a rejection of modernity, but the conscious, effortful construction of an indigenous *matrix of possibilities* and the development of the volitional capacity to choose among them. It is a liberation from the tyrannic determinism of the Ready-Made architecture and a reclamation of the *condemned freedom* that is the birthright of all civilizations.

(2) The Recovery of Historical Memory, by a praxis that challenges the state's historicism anxiety and archive and validates the past as lived legacy, by intimate and subaltern narratives that serve as both didactic strategy and reverie against the sterile, official chronicle.

(3) The Decolonization of Everyday Experience: The application of liberatory psychologies and methodologies like 'Giving Voice to Values' (Gentile 2010) which act as micro-level epistemologies for debugging the conditioned self, rebuilding the 'moral muscle memory' (Gentile 2022:917) toward a sovereign action.

(4) The Empowerment of indigenous Thought, by *capacitating* the scholarly labor of indigenous recovery, as exemplified by the Kyoto school to construct a confident critical re-articulation that generates its own criteria of validity and

enters a dialogue of equals to (re)produce adaptively incoming values as own and coherent with the local ecosystem.

(5) The intensification, or almost, massification of a thematic universe perspectives of the people, not to deposit a *pre-packaged* solution, but to engage in a co-intentional dialogue where the untested feasibility (*inédito viável*) of a sovereign future can be named and acted upon (Freire [1970] 1987:53). Such promise demands the love, humility, faith, and hope that Freire identified as the preconditions for true dialogue, virtues that are themselves acts of resistance against the necrophilic logic of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm.

The Japanese, Ottoman-Turkish, and Arab cases, therefore, are not exceptions but archetypes of a global condition. They represent the political morphology of the cargo cult that Lindstrom identified as having 'percolated out of [Melanesia] into the wider world.' (2019:168) Thus, what is polemically dismissed as Occidentalism is, in fact, the symptomatic output of this universal dynamic of unrequited political desire.

In doing so, this work has heeded the call, advanced by Benjamin Nelson (1973), for a sociology that takes civilizational complexes and intercivilizational encounters as its ultimate material of analysis. Therefore, by diagnosing the global Southern schizophrenic vassal state, I have moved beyond abstract typologies to expose the pathological political morphology that results from these encounters. This pathology is not one of civilizational hatred but of a pathologically structured negotiation for a fundamental human need, the 'need to belong' (Baumeister and Leary 1995), which is systematically manipulated and perpetually monopolized by the hegemonic North.

The final contrast into the Japanese epistemological sovereignty and the Arab Schizophrenic Vassalage manifest in a desperate plea for a guarantee, but its form reveals the degree of a civilization's epistemological capture. In Japan, the philosophical reaction emerged defending its indigenous structure, as a reactionary and nativist plea, attempting to debug the massive imported modernity through an appeal to a higher, ancestral guarantee, the divine Emperor and *Shintō* native cosmology. This was a conscience reaction which confronted the hyper-mimetic projection, a counter-bid to overcome the Western tyrannic epistemology with a fanatical indigenous script. While In the Arab (post)colonial context, where Vicarious Conditioning and ideocide were more total and perpetrated in the collective epistemology, the plea is consumerist and abject. The 2019 Iraqi protester's cry to the northern powers, United Nations, is the plea

of a stripped-down end-user, and recognizing their own inability to self-repair, who can only demand the original Western manufacturer honor a warranty on a failed product. One pleads to the ancestral gods to fix the imported system; the other pleads to the imported system's makers, having lost all connection to an ancestral repair manual. Both are empirical testaments to the tyrannic modernity that explain the contrast into two societies, the Japanese who succeed to overcome massivity enforcing it's ethical sovereignty, and the Arab who lost entirely not only it's ethical sovereignty, but it's epistemic ability, reminisce errant and pleading for manufacturers guarantee, as a sort of neocolonial epistemic dependence and slavery.

This diagnostic journey, which positions the present work within the camp arguing for multiple modernities, reveals a system that is not merely asymmetrical but fundamentally *tyrannical* in its structure. Indeed, the pathological dynamic diagnosed here—the perpetual performance for a recognition that is systematically withheld—finds its grim, macro-sociological logic in the principles of social dominance. The Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm functions as the ultimate hierarchy-enhancing myth, a consensual ideology that legitimizes a global asymmetric order. Its mechanisms of Vicarious Conditioning and epistemological distortion are not merely pedagogical errors but are functional tools for maintaining what Sidanius and Pratto identify as a stable, *group-based hierarchy* (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Sidanius and Pratto [1999] 2001; Hiel and Mervielde 2005; Pratto, Sidanius, and Levin 2006; Levin et al. 2012).

This analysis confirms that the *structured refusal* of the Third Pillar is not a passive omission but an active, systemic feature. It aligns with the tendency of such hegemonic orders to resist equity, a tendency that, as noted in an earlier work (Alnasir 2021c), is powerfully amplified when the hierarchy is rationalized through a pervasive and manufactured othering as a structural pervasive, manufactured element to maintain *loyal* subaltern. Thus, the struggle for ethical sovereignty is not merely a cultural or political project, but a fundamental challenge to the deep structures of social dominance that characterize the contemporary international system, where the schizophrenic vassal state is the necessary product and perpetual victim for maintaining the *stability* of the social distancing and dominance structure. The Ready-Made Modernity paradigm is, *ironically*, constitutionally designed for the maintenance of the global *order* itself, where whatever emancipator initiative is demonized as a threat to this global order.

The future task, therefore, is not to invert the West but to advance the intimate, daily work throughout an intellectual labor of indigenous recovery according to the built framework in this book, by introspectively debugging the hacked self, the recovery of historical memory from within oneself and one's immediate surroundings, and the de-ideologization of everyday experience. However, if this diagnosis is validated, it suggests that any *prospective* political therapy for the schizophrenic vassal state must commence not with the formulation of novel governance blueprints, but rather with the fundamental task of revitalizing the atrophied, or even extinguished, consistency for ethical sovereignty itself. The anxiety for recognition and the plea for a guarantee must be subverted from below by the will to become, once again, the manufacturer.

The consistent argument claimed here as the schizophrenic vassal state's plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is a cry for recognition that the hegemonic North is structurally designed to withhold. But recognition, as Dussel has shown, is not the highest ethical category. Mere tolerance, Dussel writes, "presupposes a certain indifference before the other, a 'tolerating' of the other with a certain passivity of one who disregards their destiny; it is a failure to take responsible charge of the impossibility that the other might have in accepting reasons" (2007:297). What is required, instead, is solidarity, "a drive of alterity, a metaphysical desire for the other who is found in the exteriority of the system [...] a taking-charge" (2007:298). The path beyond the plea for a guarantee is not a better performance of recognition but a transformation of the global order from a hierarchy of recognition to a pluriversal solidarity—a solidarity that begins not with The Northern Sage's gift of modernity but with the subaltern's demand to be heard as a creator, not merely a claimant. This is the normative work to which this book's diagnostic typology is a first step.

Lastly, in this diagnosis, my work diverges from a scholar whose historical narrative I otherwise admire. Cemil Aydin concludes his study of pan-Islamic and pan-Asian, or what I'd call pan-southern, thought by calling for a renewed commitment to 'shared universal values' and "strengthening international institutions that can implement global norms" (2007:187). He believes that "the idea of a dialogue of civilizations is therefore inspired by a noble goal and could play a role in defining and delimiting legitimate power" (2007:188). This is a generous and hopeful vision. Yet my framework suggests that the very institutions Aydin hopes to strengthen—the League of Nations, the United Nations, the international legal order—are not neutral arenas for dialogue.

They are themselves products of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, designed to encode Northern massive and tyrannic epistemic authority and to systematically withhold the Third Pillar of recognition from subaltern states. The existing framework of the, so known, dialogue of civilizations presupposes a level of epistemic equality that the schizophrenic vassal state cannot access. The plea for a manufacturer's guarantee is not a cry that can be answered by more dialogue or institutional reform; it is a symptom of a system that has engineered the very incapacity for sovereign speech. Where Aydin sees a path forward through normative universalism and institutional repair, I see a requirement for a more radical, real and essential decolonization of knowledge and power—a "quarrying stone from one's own bedrock" that precedes any genuine dialogue. Where Aydin sees a path forward through normative universalism, I see a requirement for a more radical decolonization of knowledge and power. My work, therefore, is not a refutation of Aydin but a diagnostic prerequisite: until the machinery of Vicarious Conditioning is dismantled, dialogue between civilizations will remain a performance of vassalage.

Epilogue

Postlude: The Silicon Cargo Cult as a Ready-Made Modernity in the Age of AI: Toward a Research Agenda on Algorithmic Vassalage

If historical colonialism annexed territories, their resources, and the bodies that worked on them, data colonialism's power grab is both simpler and deeper: the capture and control of human life itself through appropriating the data that can be extracted from it for profit. If that is right, then just as historical colonialism created the fuel for industrial capitalism's eventual rise, so too is data colonialism paving the way for a capitalism based on the exploitation of data. Human life is quite literally being annexed to capital (Couldry and Mejias 2019:Preface).

The following reflections are not a conclusion but a coda, a tentative mapping of how the machinery of dependence diagnosed in this book may be evolving in the 21st century. They are offered as a research agenda, not as a settled argument.

If the 20th-century pathology was the schizophrenic vassal state undermined by anxiety for recognition from a geopolitical hegemon, the 21st-century terminus is *algorithmic vassalage*: a silent, automated captivity enforced by a new, astute, *hybrid* colonial power. This power is no longer a consortium of states; rather, it is a private infra-state, the *Cloud Empire*, a conglomerate of platforms and AI giants whose operational grammar is designed to be invisible, implying an inescapable dependency. This development has engendered the emergence of a novel, ominous, and ruthless colonial apparatus and conceptualization: a hybrid manifestation of neocolonialism, orchestrated through the rise of hybrid non-state actors. Through the substantial accumulation of wealth and the consequent control over key technologies, this enables a novel form of data colonialism characterized by its insidious nature. This emergent threat to national sovereignty does not originate from conventional military forces or the pervasive influence of modernity; rather, it is the insidious exploitation of algorithms that has become a primary concern. Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias term 'data colonialism' the phenomenon of black-box systems enacting this new social order, in which human life itself, and its entire everyday-life is annexed as data, akin to the historical annexation of land and bodies during colonialism (2019:Colonialism in Context).

It appears that the Ready-Made-Modernity paradigm has found its vehicle to manifest itself in the new era. Yes, no longer confined to constitutions or curricula, it now operates through the datafying infrastructures of artificial intelligence, aiming for

nothing less than a *ready-made consciousness*. This quest finds its purest expression in the pursuit of what Pedro Domingos calls the 'Master Algorithm' (2015), a universal directory intended to derive all knowledge from data, but which, like Bender and Koller's octopus (2020), can only ever learn form, never achieving a *comprehensive* cognition. Emphasizing the paradigm would be the apotheosis of the Northern *für sich*, as a creation of a single, encrypted massive cognitive source code to be massive and silently installed globally.

Thus, the silent and final stage of the Ethical Schizophrenia is served. By marking the shift from producing artisan-elites who mimic institutional forms, to massive engineering populations whose very perceptions and life-chances are shaped by an exogenous source code they can neither audit nor alter. We have entered the age of *Algorithmic Vassalage*, a sphere where algorithms can oppress and defame entire races or genders (Noble 2018). This new dependency, therefore, serves to exacerbate the epistemological schism at the heart of our diagnosis, thereby bringing the schizophrenic vassal state into the digital age.

This vassalage operates through 'measurable types', as algorithmically generated categories such as Google's gender, a credit agency's reliability, or a police algorithm's at-risk label (Cheney-Lippold 2018:Data Wars and Dataveillance). These are not stable identities but dynamic, proprietary classifications derived from our data, constellated for purposes of control and profit, but fundamentally illegible to us. We are no longer just users of a system we cannot debug; we are its output, algorithmic identities shaped by a logic that is opaque, modulatory, and politically unaccountable, but mainly managed by non-state actors. This represents the carnal stage of Vicarious Conditioning, beyond the Ethical Schizophrenia, but as the colonization of the subjective self.

The new Northern Sage is no longer the Sorbonne academic or the World Bank technocrat, but the 'social quantification sector' (Couldry and Mejias 2019:Introducing the Social Quantification Sector)—the conglomerate of platforms, data brokers, and AI firms that constitute the infrastructure of what they call the *Cloud Empire* as "the overall organization of resources and imagination that emerges from the practices of data colonialism," a totality that achieves "the imperial reality of corporations' domination of life through data" (Couldry and Mejias 2019:The Cloud Empire). It is not a formal state empire but a structure that regresses to the "economic logic of

historical colonialism" through high-tech means (Couldry and Mejias 2019:The Cloud Empire). Therefore, the Cloud Empire acting as a *new* operator of Vicarious Conditioning, no longer a singular city or a state power, but a diffuse *industrial-infrastate* complex. This sector is the new epistemological core, and its *rewarded models* are no longer just political archetypes but entire algorithmic systems for governance, finance, and social management. The mimetic desire of the vassal elite is now for this smart cargo, the predictive policing software, the centralized digital ID, the 'smart city' operating system, sold as the keys to optimized modernity, sourced from this new hegemonic non-state actors.

This dependency is enforced by a brutal economic logic, known as *monopsony* —an economic term known referring to single buyer of all the data we produce (Couldry and Mejias 2019:One Buyer to Rule Them All)—. Thus, it is not an open market that handles our data; rather, the digital workforce of the entire world depends on a single buyer. For a state to be legible and functional in the 21st century, it has no choice but to transact with these monopsonistic gatekeepers, effectively handing over its population as raw material in exchange for access to the operating system of modern governance (Couldry and Mejias 2019:The Logic of the Cloud Empire). Vassalage is now a function overwhelmingly of market structure.

Such tensions represent even the intensification of the epistemological breach at the core of Vicarious Conditioning, now operating at the scale of 'data colonialism.' As the emerging order is "an [...] order for the appropriation of human life so that data can be continuously extracted from it for profit" (Couldry and Mejias 2019:Preface). Where the colonial-phile elite of the 20th century were trained to operate the *what* of imported legal systems, the 21st-century vassal state-elites are reduced to an end-user of the *output* of imported computational systems. The 'source code' of these AI-driven paradigms is not just obscure; it is proprietary, legally protected, and computationally inscrutable, a *black box* designed for extraction, not understanding. Algorithmic Vassalage is, therefore, the chronicle neopolitical morphology of the schizophrenic state within the economic order of data colonialism. Thus, it is the ultimate No-Derivatives license applied to the mind of the collective state itself. The Fetish-Elite is now certified not by a diploma from a Cryptouniversity, but by mastery of the API—the ability to interface with the system, never to *comprehend* its foundational logic. Their new Fetish-

Certificate is the artisans capacity to render their populace legible as data-points for the Cloud Empire.

Crucially, the certification of adherence to this new model has transformed, as the fetish-certificate is no longer a static diploma, it becomes a continuous, speculative act of *data-sharing*. The vassal state and its Fetish-Elite now prove their modernity and worth through a double acts. First, by aggressively indexing their populations into global data structures, rendering their citizenry legible as data-objects; and second, by proactively offering this data to the platforms and systems as social cossificaction. This voluntary data-sharing becomes the highest form of mimetic performance, the ultimate proof of being a good, legible, and *compliant* partner in the Cloud Empire. The elite are reduced from artisans to *curators* of data flows, managers of APIs forever foreclosed from the proprietary 'source code' they administer, thus agents and generators of the new value-good of the neo-empire, an extension of the role they already performed as agents and input generators referred to in Section 9 of Chapter IV.

The political morphology of this new vassalage is a direct evolution of the typology laid out in Chapter V. The schizophrenic vassal state of the Ottoman-Turkish model, with its anxious performance of secularism, now frantically adopts 'smart city' platforms from Northern corporations, presuming a high-tech ready-made-modernity beyond all logics of it's societal world. And most drastically, the Rentier Cargo-Cult State finds its silent captivity perfected, as its allocative wealth can now purchase not just the artifacts of modernity, but the very algorithmic systems that manage dissent through personalized content feeds, pre-empt protest through predictive analytics, and distribute a *digital wellbeing-belonging* that *anaesthetizes* the political psyche more thoroughly than any oil rent.

Here again is the *terminal* symptom of what is now *Algorithmic Vassalage* is thus the foreclosure of *technodiversity,* the systematic elimination of the possibility for indigenous technological paths and the systematic erosion of political self-determination. When very identities are rendered as measurable types, as proprietary, shifting, and unaccountable, the ability to repair the system is lost. Even the language to define the self outside of such system is lost. We become mere algorithmic identities, governed by categories that we did not choose nor contest; therefore, reduced to simple objects of that neo-tyrannic algorithmic modernity. In an era where the fundamental tools of cognition and administration are cloud-based and proprietary, the indigenous

(re)capacitation becomes impossible. The populace is reduced to a state of *Silent Captivity 2.0,* yet, they are not only consumers of finished political, or aesthetics goods but, in a chilling realization of data colonial logic, have become raw material for the system itself, reduced to *renters* of their own digital lives, never owning the platforms or data that mediate their existence.

This Algorithmic Vassalage represents the paragon of the subaltern condition diagnosed earlier by Spivak (1988, 2010). If the 20th-century subaltern was silenced by colonial archives and patriarchal-nationalist narratives, the 21st-century subaltern is pre-emptively silenced by the algorithmic construction of aesthetic desire and social (sur)reality. As the speech of the digital subject is a predetermined output of an algorithmic proprietary black box. Thus, the matter is no longer just about the intellectual's failure to *re-present*, but about the foreclosure of the very possibility of a subaltern consciousness forming outside the parameters of the platform's architecture. The Cloud Empire, as a pervasive non-state hegemonic actor, does not simply mute the subaltern; it computationally precludes the emergence of the subaltern as a historical subject, reducing human agency to a set of optimized, measurable algorithmical types in the service of a silent, automated capital.

The most tragic aspect of this situation, however, is that the system's neo yok have become unpaid laborers ('playbor'), whose everyday activities generate the training data and content that continuously enrich and refine the very systems that manage and subjugate them (Couldry and Mejias 2019:Working in the Cloud Empire). The vassal state is a territory where the people are both the pacified audience and the forced performers in the theater of their own data colonialism. Thus, "human life today is becoming the object of appropriation for extraction" (Couldry and Mejias 2019:Colonial Echoes), turning it into a direct input for capitalist production. We are no longer just end-users; we are the mined resource, the *Hintersassen* of the Cloud Empire, in bauerian terms. Converted therefore in the ultimate manifestation of the psychological foreclosure, the algorithmic system induces a state of engineered satiation, where the 'need to belong' is superficially met by curated digital tribes and personalized feeds, systematically eroding the promotion-focused drive required for the arduous labor of indigenous creation. The populace is not just pacified; they are *psychoalgorithmically* disarmed.

A relevant example is that of the parrot in Koch (2025a; Green 2025; 2025b), wherein the parrot is substituted with an octopus. A now-canonical thought experiment posits that a hyper-intelligent deep-sea octopus taps an underwater cable and listens to two humans conversing on distant islands, thus learning to predict their every verbal exchange with flawless statistical accuracy. Yet when one human cries out for help against a charging bear, the octopus cannot respond. It has mastered form without grounding, mimicry without meaning (Bender and Koller 2020). The vassal state is that octopus, trained on Northern templates, fluent in borrowed reference, anxious in performing ready-made-templates, but silent when the real bear of sovereignty or ecological collapse arrives. Hence, the transmission that can occur through causal chains, such as the Cloud Empire model(s), is due to Nordic ecological-historical and anthropocentric contexts and realities. However, this phenomenon cannot be considered liberation in the full sense of the term, since it represents the culmination of Vicarious Conditioning, a reference without authorship, legibility without oversight, a source code that the vassal can execute but never repair. The octopus passes every test, until the bear, RMM also does, performing aesthetic wellbeing without belonging, without guarantee.

Mark Hunyadi has diagnosed this schizophrenic structure from within the liberal heartland: the user who sees only the tool, not the system; the small ethic (petite éthique) that defends individual rights while accelerating fatalistic submission; the algorithm that functions as a new 'Leviathan', rendering political will a delegated abstraction (Hunyadi 2018:IV). Yet Hunyadi's critique remains a Northern self-diagnosis. He does not ask why the very categories of 'freedom' and 'enhancement' arrive as finished goods from a Cloud Empire whose source code remains encrypted—why the subaltern of the Global South was conditioned, long before the algorithm, to be an end-user, not an author. The algorithm is not the first Leviathan; it is the latest iteration of a Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm that has been exporting its concluded forms for centuries. Or rather, it was tyrannic modernity itself that was that astute Leviathan, and now it perpetuates itself through the neo-power of the algorithm. The octopus is not a new monster; it is the old manufacturer, now speaking in the indicative future.

This is not a parable; nor does its evidence need decades to accumulate. Barely two years after Bender and Koller's address to the *Annual Meeting of the Association for*

Computational Linguistics, GPT's releases in 2022 dramatically shifted the paradigm. By 2024, Yakura (2024) have analyzed three-quarters of a million hours of human discourse proliferated online since the launch of GPT platforms, documenting a disproportionate sociolinguistic explosion of English terms such 'delve', 'boast', 'swift', 'meticulous'. The last of these entered English from French and Latin (*meticulōsus*) around 1540, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (2026), yet its frequency in modern English stood at just 2 per million as late as 2010, —a fact that suggests an urgent update to post-2020 monitoring to capture the surge induced by GPT. In Spanish, by contrast, the RAE records '*meticuloso*' as common and recurrent in both Iberian and, even more so, Central American varieties. What was merely causal in one language becomes massive and measurable in another. Hence, through GPT, linguistic *massification* is even more drastic, consolidating English not only as a *lingua franca* but as the vehicle for a transcendental sociolinguistic revolution, year after year, but no longer anthropocentrically, as sociolinguists suggested half a century for each linguistic mutation, even blurring *geolinguistic factors* as 'markers of variation' (Moreno Fernández 2009:269–70, 21). Such blurring is no longer merely temporal, geographic, or intrusive, language is no longer an anthropo-identity factor in society, paradigm being inverted we are no longer a society of language (Romaine 1994), but the society of the massified language from, of, the Cloud Empire, the new invader of anthropocentrism. An octopus' empire no longer needs to understand what is said by human mouths, instead, it subjugates them to listen to its prefabricated concepts, converting not only states —in their political structures— into its vassals, but entirely *anthropo-vassals*, where recognition is transformed into a silenced, even an astute, imposition of listening.

The ultimate tyranny of this new paradigm lies in its spurious claim to universality and neutrality. It presents itself not as a particular Northern epistemology, but as pure, objective *intelligence*. Yet, these systems are themselves the encrypted products of a specific historical and cultural context, with all its biases, blind spots, and metaphysical assumptions baked in. The imposition of this *solidified* structured computational logic upon the anthropocentric liquid substrates of Southern lifeworlds constitutes the final, and perhaps most profound, anthropological violation. It is, again, the *weaponization* of time itself, replacing the irreversible time of historical becoming with the pseudo-cyclical time of algorithmic processing and system updates. Here we touch on what

Ricœur called the 'aporie of the inscrutability of time' (1985:358), a limit that narrative cannot fully master, and which algorithmic vassalage exploits rather than resolves.

The evolution of *Tyrannic Modernity* has reached its purest and most perfect form in the context of Algorithmic Vassalage. The imposition of the alien *Modus* reaches its logical culmination; it is no longer merely a matter of imposing a chrono-logic (the time of the market and 24/7 clocks), a pragmatics of social media, and an episteme of data as the sole source of truth, but of fusing them into a black-box system that operates in real time. The Cloud Empire does not require manual synchronization of society's clocks; it directly installs the temporal operating system of the collective consciousness. The metaphor of the *stochastic octopus* serves as a perfect illustration of the algorithmic artisan, an entity that has mastered the *modus operandi* of human language to the point of predicting and replicating it, yet remains ontologically excluded from the *modus essendi*—from meaning, intentionality, and the lived world —that generated it. It completes Barthes's nightmare: myth as the theft of language is now automated. The subaltern's speech is not even misheard; it is replaced by algorithmically generated language that has been stripped of history and refilled with the (quasi)naturalized essence of intelligence. Constituting the ultimate 'privation of history', a world where the very possibility of historical speech is foreclosed ([1957] 2012:Le mythe comme langage volé).

In the contemporary era, the concept of sovereignty has evolved to become increasingly complex and multifaceted. This evolution has given rise to a new type of state, often referred to as an *octopus state*, which exhibits a fluid and adaptable form but faces significant challenges in fully comprehending the nuances of sovereignty, regardless of its presence or absence. As such, resistance must evolve beyond a mere political expression; it must become a fundamental defense of the human *modus vivendi* against the encroachment of the *algorithmic modus*. It is imperative to reclaim the agency of shaping the present moment, establishing authentic truths, and determining the fabric of our daily lives.

The path beyond this looming hermeneutics must, therefore, be a radical decolonization of data and computation. It requires a militant commitment to digital sovereignty: not a reactive nativism, but an active construction of open-source infrastructure, auditable algorithms, data cooperatives, and the fostering of an indigenous *technodiversity*. Yet and again, the most profound act of algorithmic

'quarrying stone from one's own bedrock' in the twenty-first century is to write one's own source code, or at least ensure self *psychoalgorithmical* AI learning which could be intended as a territorial application to local critical adaptation, as an adaptive form of localized reception to preserve the self ethical consistency. To resist Algorithmic Vassalage is to insist on the right to open source, to audit, to modify, and to imagine alternatives to the *silicon cargo cult*. In conclusion, the plea for a manufacturer's guarantee must be replaced by the will to become, once again, the manufacturer, not of someone else encrypted software, but of our own, indigenous, and sovereign source code. The struggle must be shifted from the computational layer to reality itself, which is already fully algorithmized.

The very chronology of the works cited in this epilogue, as Domingos's blueprint (2015), Noble's critique (2018), Couldry & Mejias's framework (2019), highlights the central argument that links the thesis of this book to the next step, which is now the epilogue. These foundational critiques, published just years ago, already feel like dispatches from a prior age, rendered almost quaint by the subsequent explosion of Artificial Intelligence Large Language Models (AI-LLM). This velocity is not a rebuttal to their analysis, but its vindication. The *master algorithm* is no longer a speculative quest; it is a deployed product, or actually, disseminated. The *algorithms of oppression* are no longer confined to the simple function of search engines and recommendation facility; they are woven into the very fabric of human communication and creativity. The data colonialism being theorized has entered a new, accelerated phase of primitive accumulation. Herein lies the epistemic lag, where philosophical critique necessarily trails the breakneck pace of technological deployment, is the hallmark of the tyrannic modernity we have diagnosed. The schizophrenic vassal state, and now the *algorithmically vassalized* individual, is forever in the position of reacting to a *fait accompli*, of seeking a guarantee for a system that has already been updated to a new, more encrypted version. The struggle for ethical sovereignty must now contend with an opponent that evolves faster than the language to describe it, and which itself does not impart any alternative ethic upon which to depend, but rather creates a neo, or rather, a *supplantive sub-ethic*, de-anthropologized —extra-human.

Appendix I

Glossary & Methodological Primer

Part A: Glossary of Key Concepts

The framed analyses is built upon a set of interlocking concepts that form the analytical core of this book. This glossary provides their structural definitions, establishing the theoretical vocabulary for diagnosing the pathology of the schizophrenic vassal state and the epistemic fabrication of Occidentalism. The terms are arranged in a deductive sequence—following the logical architecture of the argument—rather than alphabetically, to reflect the conceptual progression of the framework.

- **Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm**: The core geopolitical machinery diagnosed by this work. It describes the conflation of the universal processes of modernization with the particular, historical trajectory of the global North (Westernization). It operates through the massive export of adult paradigms—the concluded forms of Northern modernity (legal codes, institutions, epistemologies)—as pre-packaged, universal solutions.

  This paradigm operates not only by exporting spatio-aesthetics and institutional forms, but also by imposing a specific fictive temporality, as an aesthetic *spectacular time* (Debord [1967] 1992:147). It is the massive export of a frozen aesthetic, a pseudo-cyclical time of consumption, the concluded, non-dialectical time of the Northern *in-itself* (Hegelian terms), which systematically (re)places, devaluate and sterilizes the lived, irreversible time of indigenous historical becoming (*temps dévalorisé*) devaluated that is the prerequisite for a sovereign *für sich*, by exporting the concluded products of the modern work of purification while encrypting the generative processes of translation, in Latourian terms ([2005] 2012).

  This process creates a structural inaccessibility, as the constructive philosophical and historical source code, which includes the *lived*, contingent time of its struggles, is rendered effectively bypassed or retained, creating a relationship of operational dependency rather than philosophical comprehension-cognition. Thus the integral transplant, while bypassing local dialectical role, simultaneously produce a sterilized elite of *artisans* through *Vicarious Conditioning*, who are trained to operate the system while being structurally disconnected from the capacity to decrypt, adapt, or rewrite its

underlying logic. This dual failure, of defective introduction and application, ensures permanent dependency and the reproduction of the schizophrenic vassal state.

- **Tyrannic Modus / Prefabricated Modus**. The deep operative principle of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. Drawing on the Latin etymological root *modus* (measure, manner, form)—which gave rise to both *modernus* ('the recent, the manner of the now') and *modalis* ('the correct manner of acting')—this concept designates the imposition not merely of contents (institutions, laws, aesthetics), but of a triple alien manner or form of inhabiting reality: (1) a chrono-logic, which replaces the cyclical, organic time of the societal everyday-life-world with the linear, irreversible, and stressful time of imported progress; (2) a pragmatics, which imposes a repertoire of performative actions and representations (institutional 'manners') disconnected from their generative source code; and (3) an episteme, which installs a regime of truth and knowledge whose philosophical and historical access remains structurally foreclosed. Ethical schizophrenia is the symptom of the collision between this imported, adult, *solid Modus* and the liquid, indigenous *anthropoid modi* of the receiving societies, whose own civilizational cadence is violently synchronized to an external clock. In the digital age, this *Modus* evolves into its algorithmic form, where rhythm, pragmatics, and episteme are fused into black-box systems operating in real time.
- **The Northern Sage**: A structural function representing the source of knowledge empire, who holds the source code—the philosophical and historical struggles that generated the ready-made paradigms.
- **The (Subaltern) Artisan**: The function of the conditioned elite in the vassal state, trained in the servitude to replicate the operational forms of the imported paradigm (the 'what') while being systematically foreclosed from access to its generative principles (the 'why'), being maintained by the knowledge empire of the northern sage. This division belong essentially to the platonic distinction on sages and artisans.
- **Vicarious Conditioning**: The core mechanism (re)producing schizophrenic vassalage. Drawing on *social learning theory* (Bandura), it is the process by which *ready-made* paradigms are installed like encrypted software,

conditioning subaltern elites to replicate the *forms* of Northern modernity through observation of *rewarded* models. The Neo-Latin *Condicionamentum Vicarium* critically redeploys the standard Spanish translation of Bandura's 'Social Learning' (1982), establishing a precise, cross-linguistic technical designation. This process is characterized by a fundamental epistemological schism: the subaltern is reduced to a *perpetual artisan's servitude*, mastering the operational 'what' of the imported system, while being systematically deprived of access to the philosophical 'why', as the historical struggles and ethical debates that constitute(d) its generative source code, the privileged domain of the Northern *sage*.

This process of cognitive capture finds its profound existential consequence in Baumeister's modern formulation of *free will*, where human agency is not a metaphysical abstraction but a practical capacity to navigate a "matrix of competing alternative possibilities" (2025:920). Vicarious Conditioning is thus, the systematic *weaponization* of this very capacity. It does not merely teach imitation; it surgically *restricts* the perceived field of viable alternatives to a single, pre-approved Northern model, while encrypting the generative principles needed to conceive new, local-indigenous extensions. The vassal elite is thus placed in a double-bind—servitude: they are 'condemned to freedom' (Sartre 1943:163), forced to make consequential choices for their societies, yet their choice is a mirage, a forced selection from a menu structured entirely by the *hegemon*, being, thus, the core of the engineered helplessness that defines their position. This pedagogical relationship finds its purest expression in what Paulo Freire termed the 'banking concept of education,' a core component of the *pedagogy of the oppressor* that actively forecloses the 'pedagogy of the oppressed', where knowledge is treated as a static deposit made by a knowing subject (the Northern sage) into empty, passive recipients (the vassal artisans). In this system, the subaltern is educated to file away the *assets* of the Ready-Made Modernity paradigm, becoming a *curator* of inherited models, never a creator of new ones. Thus, this *banking* method is the pedagogical engine of Vicarious Conditioning, transforming learning from a dialogical process of inquiry into a monological act of reception, perfectly mirroring the political relationship between the hegemonic North and the schizophrenic vassal state.

Therefore, this intentional deprivation of the underlying principles ensures a relationship of permanent dependency and sterilizes the capacity for indigenous adaptation or critique.

- **Rewarded Northern Models**: The specific paradigms, institutions, and practices universalized as neoliberal economic policies, specific legal codes, pedagogical methods, bureaucratic structures, emanating as universal structuralism and presented as universally valid and are systemically incentivized by *recognition*. The reward is a dual-validation system, it confers epistemic validation (recognition as modern, rational, credible) and, decisively, material access (to capital, investment, trade agreements, political legitimacy-interlocution, and military partnerships). This dual reward structure is the core mechanism that makes Vicarious Conditioning so effective, locking subaltern elites into an anxious mimetic performance.
- **Schizophrenic Vassalage**: The pathological condition of a state whose elite, driven by a mimetic desire for external recognition (Vicarious Conditioning), imposes a top-down Ready-Made Modernity. This creates a fundamental rupture between the state apparatus and its own societal world, trapping the nation in a cycle of utopic tension of mimicry and rejection.
- **The Third Pillar (of Recognition)**: The central anxiety defined in this book, drawing on Huntington (1993), often withheld, acceptance by the dominant powers of the target civilization necessary for a successful civilizational shift. This quest for recognition is not merely a political schema but is underpinned psycho-sociology as a fundamental human motivation, the 'need to belong' (Baumeister and Leary 1995). This need requires frequent, positive interactions within a stable framework of mutual concern. The perpetual, structured withholding of this pillar by the hegemonic *North* weaponizes this fundamental need. Thus, it induces a chronic state of *anticipated aloneness*, which triggers a fundamental motivational shift from promotion to prevention focus. This reorientation systemically degrades the capacity for complex, sovereign thought, locking the vassal state into the cognitive, emotional, and pathological consequences of this deprivation, which manifest as *ontological insecurity* and, therefore, *schizophrenia*.

- **Ethical Schizophrenia**: The terminal pathology of the schizophrenic vassal state, its despaired assumption for assimilation and anxiety for recognition. A condition where a society's ethical and epistemological sovereignty are systematically distorted by the imposed Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. This forces a collective consciousness to operate using an encrypted, foreign source code for governance and truth, while its own indigenous lifeworld is systematically defamed and sterilized. It is the cumulative outcome of the machinery of dependence, culturally sustained by a dominance of Cold Thought—a neuro-cognitive mode that prioritizes superficial comfort over the neurologically costly work of reconciling irreconcilable demands. This is not a simple identity crisis, but a foundational rupture in the civilizational fabric, a violent clash between the imported rationalized structure of consciousness adopted by the state elite and the indigenous faith-structures or sacro-magical structures of the societal reality. This schism is a direct consequence of the epistemicide enacted by Vicarious Conditioning, inevitably provokes a *rebellion of the intimate* in the spheres of language, body, and daily life, which manifests as a labyrinthine anxiety between the state's lack of mimicry of an idealized modernity order and the society's ontological reality as a hybrid collective, in Latourian terms (Latour [2005] 2012).
  Therefore, the state elite is conditioned to operate within an imported 'rationalized structure of consciousness' (Nelson 1973:93 CT3), while the societal pragmatism remains rooted in indigenous faith-structures or sacro-magical structures (CT1/CT2). This forces a collective consciousness to operate using an encrypted, foreign source code for governance and truth, while its own indigenous reality persists *systematically defamed and sterilized*—a direct consequence of the epistemicide enacted by Vicarious Conditioning.
  This condition represents the political embodiment of a pathologized Freudian dynamic. The imported paradigm functions as an alien, *tyrannic modernity super-ego*, whose encrypted and impossible demands generate a chronic sense of (auto)guilt—not for a crime, but for the failure to achieve the mimetic ideal. This guilt is not a private neurosis but a collective political pathology, fueling the violent internal schism between the state and its own societal lifeworld.

Such desperate performance is not a sign of learning but of a deeply conditioned dependency, an anxious bid for a recognition that is structurally designed to be withheld. The elite's fervent, often violent, imposition of the Northern template can be understood as a pathological attempt to satisfy the necessity to belong. Hence, the schizophrenic vassalage of the state is the political embodiment of this psychological deprivation, a collective pathology born from the structured refusal of the hegemonic power to offer the frequent, positive interactions within a stable framework of mutual concern that constitute genuine belonging. The terminal symptom of this disorder is not *rebellion*, but a *plea* for a manufacturer's guarantee—the ultimate capitulation of a populace stripped of its capacity for self-repair. This is the individual and collective experience of living within a *composite*, as a mosaic society. The individual is forced to become, in the words of Paul Pascon, a man of several societies, "*l'homme de la société composite*" (Pascon 1973:25)], a composite self strategically navigating the conflicting logics of patriarchal family law, tribal custom, feudal clientelism, and modern bureaucratic rationality in a single day. This constant, tactical switching between incommensurate moral and legal registers, where the only unifying logic becomes a pathological instrumentalism for personal survival, systematically erodes—even alienating — the capacity for a sustainable ethical sovereignty.

- **Schizophrenic vassal state**: Is the political manifestation of a sterilized Bauerian *Schicksalsgemeinschaft*. It is a nation in which the indigenous elite, entrusted with preserving and maintaining the national source code across generations, have been compromised or neutralized by vicarious conditioning. This state is thus reduced to a condition of perpetual servitude, forced to operate with the concluded forms (the in-itself) of a Northern *für sich*, severing its own capacity for the dialectical labor required to become a sovereign *für sich*. Its populace perpetuate the subaltern condition and becomes what Bauer termed *dependents of the nation* (*Hintersassen der Nation*) (1907:50),excluded from the very *Kulturgemeinschaft* that defines the political entity ruling them. In Moffett's terms (2019), it is an 'anonymous society' whose defining markers are not its own, performing a borrowed aesthetic identity for a recognition that the original manufacturers of the paradigm are structured to withhold.

- **Fetish-Elite (Artisan-Elite)**: The comprador intellectual class produced by Vicarious Conditioning. Their status and identity are derived from their mastery of the performative forms and procedural language of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm (symbolized by the fetish-certificate), while their effective capacity for native, sovereign critique and creation is systematically sterilized. They are perpetual artisans, foreclosed from becoming sages.
- **Fetish-Certificate**: The symbolic token (diploma, publication, institutional title) that validates the Fetish-Elite's status within the mimetic economy. It certifies the ability to operate and replicate the imported system but is decoupled from the deep, philosophical understanding required to adapt, debug, or generate new systems.
- **Conceded Modernity (modernité concédée)**: A derivative form of modernity and critique, theorized by Laroui (1974). It is not earned through an internal historical process but is *granted* by or *dependent* on Western epistemological trends. It is the intellectual counterpart to political vassalage, producing a critique that, despite its anti-Western stance, remains trapped within the gravitational pull of the very paradigm it seeks to overcome, often mistaking the West's self-critical fringe for the fortress of its power.
- **Composite Society / Composite State (société composite)**: A social formation, theorized by Paul Pascon (1967, 1973; Bouderbala and Pascon 1970), that is not in transition between coherent stages but exists in a fluctuating equilibrium where multiple, historically distinct social structures (e.g., tribal, patriarchal, feudal, capitalist) coexist and compete. This is not a pluralistic harmony but a field of antagonistic, non-organic layers. The composite state is the political expression of distorted social reality: a governing apparatus that cannot achieve internal coherence because it must perpetually manage the antagonisms between these fragmented stratification. It is a state fundamentally at *war* with the fictive composite nature of the society it rules, leading to chronic instability and a void of legitimate sovereignty.
- **Rentier Implant / Rentier Logic**: The culmination of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm, where the *allocative* principle of the rentier state fuses with and amplifies a pre-existing liquid civilizational substrate. This is not a surgical imposition on an organic society, but the *aesthetic* and economic

perfection of a proto-rentier, nomadic ethos, where wealth is found or claimed (as in seasonal pasture or access to scattered resources), not created through sustained, transformative labor. The modern petro-state replaces the camel with the oil rig, executing a hyper-efficient version of the same script. Rentier logic describes the subsequent aesthetic metastasis of this allocative principle from macroeconomics into every sphere of life—academia, culture, social relations, and individual psychology—creating a 'fiction of a fiction' where society is gathered-forged around distribution rather than production, systematically foreclosing the emergence of an indigenous dialectic and ethical sovereignty. It represents the totalizing perfection of dependency, producing a society of anxious consumers and claimants rather than creators and citizens. Therefore, it represents the totalizing perfection of dependency: aestheticism, welfare-belonging, and emphatic metastasis of consummation.

- **The Cargo Cult Paradigm**: A political morphology of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm wherein a society is conditioned structurally into *anxious* desire for the material and symbolic rewards of a specific *modernity* (the 'cargo'). This conditioning *trains* the society in the ritualistic, performative *replication* of its external forms (the 'cult'), a process that replicates the form of modern institutions while missing the essential element that makes them functional, the indigenous capacity for epistemological self-correction and sovereign thought ('scientific integrity') (Feynman [1974] 2018:392). The perpetual failure of the ritual is not a system error but a feature, locking the polity into a cycle of *unrequited desire* and permanent *dependency*.

  This term is deployed not as a pejorative label for *irrational* non-Western societies, but as a precise structural diagnosis of a global condition. It describes a system, often engineered by asymmetric power relations, that is conditioned to master the ritualistic replication of forms while being systematically excluded from the generative principles, the 'scientific integrity,' in Feynman's terms, that make those forms functional and sovereign.
- **Epistemic Fabrication**: The strategic invention and circulation of a concept (e.g., Occidentalism, Orientalism) is not merely a reflection of historical reality, but rather a tool designed to organize a field of discourse, delegitimize dissent, and stabilize a threatened worldview.

- **Algorithmic Vassalage**: The terminal political condition of a state and society whose cognitive, administrative, and creative processes become dependent on externally produced, exported black-box artificial intelligence systems. This represents an intensification of the Schizophrenic Vassal State, where the governing rationalized structure of consciousness is not merely imported but is computationally enforced and constantly updated by an alien spurious model. The populace is reduced to a state of Silent Captivity, not only consuming finished goods but also having their very perceptions, opportunities, and social realities shaped by an encrypted source code they cannot audit, modify, or replicate. This dependency systematically forecloses the possibility of an indigenous technodiversity, ensuring permanent Ethical Schizophrenia at a civilizational scale.

  This condition represents the ultimate foreclosure of the Bauerian *Kulturgemeinschaft*, as the 'anonymous society' is no longer defined by even imported states markers, but by proprietary industrial, algorithmic categories ('measurable types') that actively dismantle the potential for an indigenous, collective historical consciousness.

Part B

A Primer for Scholars — Roadmap Diagnosing Schizophrenic Vassalage

This primer provides a structured methodological framework for applying the diagnostic concepts developed in this book. It is intended for researchers, students, and policymakers seeking to identify, analyze, and critique the mechanisms of Schizophrenic Vassalage in contemporary and historical contexts.

Diagnostic Toolkit: Recognizing the Pathology

The following conceptual pairs serve as diagnostic markers. Their presence indicates the operation of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm and its resulting pathologies.

Diagnostic Marker	What to Look For	Empirical Example
Mimetic Performance vs. Sovereign Translation	Elite discourses that invoke Northern models as telos, without adaptation to local ethical or historical substrates.	Massive adoption of *laiklik* in Turkey as a transliterated copy of French *laïcité*, beyond/ without the historical anticlerical context.
Vicarious Conditioning vs. Critical Acquisition	Educational and professional systems that reward replication of Northern forms while punishing indigenous innovation.	Academic promotion based on Scopus-indexed publications in Northern journals, while local-language critical scholarship is marginalized.
Ethical Schizophrenia vs. Ethical Coherence	A gap between state-legislated norms and societal everyday practice, resulting in pervasive cognitive dissonance—a silent disobedience of the law.	Legal systems based on imported civil codes that are systematically bypassed or subverted in daily social and economic life.
Plea for a Guarantee vs. Sovereign Self-Repair	In moments of systemic failure, demands for external intervention rather than indigenous political reorganization.	Iraqi protesters in 2019 appealing to the United Nations to "fix" the failures of the 'democratic' system installed in 2003.

Rentier Implant vs. Productive Economy	Economic systems based on the distribution of external rents rather than indigenous value creation.	Gulf state economies reliant on oil revenue distribution, with minimal productive industrialization or intellectual innovation.

Table 5: Diagnostic Schema: Recognizing the Pathology

Methodological Protocol: The Circuit of Imitation

To trace the installation of Ready-Made Modernity—whether before, during, or after applying the protocol—the researcher must position themselves in the transliminal dimension and ask what psychological or identity-related benefits (self-regard, compensation for lack, reaffirmation of superiority) the author derives from the narrative they are about to analyze. This step is not just another question on the questionnaire, but a hermeneutic approach that permeates the entire analysis; hence, I suggest following this five-step forensic protocol:

Step 1: Identify the Traveling-Translation Form

Select a specific institutional, legal, or epistemic form that has been imported: e.g., "parliamentary democracy," "multilevel justice", "popular justice", "secular education," "intellectual property law."

Step 2: Map the Transfer Pathway

- **Source**: Which Northern institution, text, or "sage" is credited as the origin?
- **Channel**: Was transfer mediated by colonial administration, constitutional advisors, university partnerships, NGO projects, UN?
- **Agents**: Who were the local intermediaries (transcultural elites)? What was their social and educational background?

Step 3: Analyze the Mode of Translation

- **Genuine Translation**: Was the form adapted to local philosophical and historical foundations? (e.g., Japanese hi-shūkyō for "non-religion.")
- **Linguistic Sculpting/Transliteration**: Was the form merely grafted into local lexicon without semantic integration? (e.g., Arabic academic prose filled with

untranslated Western theoretical terms, or turkish massive adoption of *laiklik*, etc.)

Step 4: Trace the Performance of Recognition

- How is the imported form publicly justified? Is it framed as "modernization," "progress," "integration into the international community"?
- What symbolic or material rewards were expected? Were they granted, delayed, or withheld?

Step 5: Diagnose the Schism

Where does the imported form clash with the indigenous anthropological substrate? Look for:

- Legal norms ignored in practice —a silent disobedience of the law.
- Educational curricula alien to local knowledge traditions
- Urban planning that disrupts organic social geometries

Case Analysis Framework

When studying a specific state or region, apply this diagnostic grid:

Dimension	Guiding Questions
Elite Composition	Is there a fetish-elite trained in Northern institutions? Is the indigenous intelligentsia thriving or marginalized?
Economic Structure	Is the economy productive or allocative? Is wealth derived from internal labor or external rents?
Historical Consciousness	Is the national history an aesthetic born past (state-sponsored) or anthropocentric lived past (living societal memory)?
Legal-Political Order	Is the legal system experienced as own or as imported? Is legitimacy sought internally or externally?
Cultural Production	Is intellectual output legible to local society, or is it an illegible greenhouse of transliterated concepts?

Table 6: Case Analysis Framework

Normative Guidelines: Toward Decolonial Scholarship

Researchers must avoid reproducing the very epistemic vassalage they study. The following guidelines are proposed:

- **Practice Vernacular Theorizing**: Build theoretical frameworks from indigenous categories rather than applying imported ones.
- **Recover Subaltern Archives**: Privilege oral histories, local narratives, and everyday practices over state-sanctioned historiography. Pay acute attention to the language of the historicity itself—whether the subaltern speaks in the vernacular, in a colonial tongue, or in a hybrid linguistic sculpture. The choice of language is not neutral; it can be an act of reclamation or a symptom of enduring epistemic vassalage.
- **Audit the Academic Dependency Circuit**: Critically examine the political economy of knowledge production—who funds, publishes, and certifies research in your field?
- **Promote Technodiversity**: In digital research, use and develop open-source, auditable tools rather than proprietary platforms that enact additional algorithmic vassalage.

A Test Cases for the Framework could consider:

Case	Apparent Anomaly	Key Question for Diagnostic Toolkit
Malaysia / Singapore	"Successful" development without apparent schizophrenia.	Is this sovereign translation or productive rentierism? Does the state foster a genuine *Kulturgemeinschaft* or a managed wellbeing-belonging?
Uzbekistan (Russian-language revival)	National narrative articulated in the colonizer's language.	Does this represent mnemonic vassalage? Is an indigenous historical consciousness possible in a linguistic medium that carries the epistemic frame of the oppressor?

Azerbaijan (linguistic revival vs. architectural imitation)	Assertive vernacular cultural policy post-independence.	Does linguistic decolonization automatically enable ethical sovereignty, or can it become another form of performative nativism?
Gulf Rentier States	Stability without democracy, modernity without sovereignty.	Is silent captivity a terminal condition, or can allocative logic evolve into a form of adaptive sovereignty?
China	An ancient civilization that has deeply embraced Western mimicry (state capitalism, technology, urban aestheticism) without, *apparently*, succumbing to political subjugation.	Is their 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' a form of sovereign translation-adaptation that encrypts its own source code, or an advanced stage of vassalage in which the (fetishized) elite manages a hybrid system whose ultimate legitimacy remains tied to Western-derived performance metrics (growth and innovation)?
Russia	A civilization engaged in active resistance, employing tools of sovereignty and containment (technology, geopolitical narratives, conservatism) against the hegemonic order of the North/West.	Does this resistance represent a path toward post-Soviet sovereign repair and containment, or is it rather the culmination of the energy-rentier state, where subservience to power dynamics (which mimic one another in their opposition) is replaced by a great-power policy lacking a genuine internal project of ethical sovereignty?
Thailand	Although it is virtually the	Is their exceptionalism a shield

	only country in Southeast Asia that was not formally colonized, it suffers from chronic political instability (coups, mass protests, an opaque monarchy, and ethnic and regional disintegration).	against vassalage or a breeding ground for a hybrid, indigenous form of ethical schizophrenia, where the tension between tradition (monarchy, Buddhism) and imported modernity (metropolitan aesthetics, secularism, capitalism) manifests itself in cycles of mimetic anxiety and ethical collapse?

Table 7: Test Cases for the Framework.

A Research Agenda: Unfinished Inquiries

The study of Schizophrenic Vassalage opens several urgent research pathways, including crucial test cases that challenge or refine the model:

- **Comparative Vassalages**: Systematic comparison of Japanese sovereign translation, Ottoman-Turkish anxious performance, and Arab *consumerist plea*.
- **The "Successful" Mimics, Malaysia and Singapore**: These states present a critical limit-case. Malaysia's Bumiputra policy and Singapore's authoritarian pragmatism represent forms of adaptive statecraft that appear to avoid terminal schizophrenia. Do they constitute a genuine sovereign translation of modernity, or a more sophisticated, productive rentierism that nonetheless forecloses certain forms of ethical sovereignty? Applying the diagnostic toolkit here is essential to determine whether they are exceptions that prove the rule—or models of a non-pathological, yet still derivative, modern statehood.
- **Post-Soviet Linguistic & Mnemonic Reconfigurations**: Cases like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—where narratives of national revival are often articulated through the language of the former oppressor (Russian)—present a profound case of mnemonic vassalage. In contrast, Azerbaijan's assertive linguistic revival suggests a different trajectory. Research must ask: Does revival in the colonial language constitute a form of epistemic captivity, even after apparent

independence? How does the language of the archive shape the possibility of an indigenous *für sich*?

- **Gendered Dimensions**: How does Vicarious Conditioning reshape kinship, marriage, and intimate life, gender parity?
- **Neuro-Political Studies**: Suggesting, encouraging empirical research of ethical schizophrenia as cognitive dissonance at the individual and collective levels.
- **Algorithmic Colonialism**: Critical studies of AI and platform implantation in public sectors of vassal states.

Final Note for the Researcher

The goal is not merely to describe dependency, but to contribute to its debugging. This requires *intellectual courage,* to resist the lure of the fetish-certificate, to 'quarry stone from one's own bedrock', and to write, finally, from a position of ethical sovereignty.

Appendix II

Brasília as a Comparative Case of Anxious Performance

**Note to valued reader*: The following analysis, based on the work of Teresa Caldeira and James Holston (2007), offers a dialog examination of the Ready-Made Modernity *Paradigm* through the construction of Brazil's capital, Brasília. While geographically distant from the Arab and Ottoman cases that form the core of this book's empirical focus, the Brasília case serves as a powerful comparative illustration of the logic of anxious performance, and the counter-politics of sheer life. It is included here as an ex muros example, a boundary case that confirms the typology's relevance beyond the specific civilizational substrates analyzed in the main chapters.

A definitive historical embodiment of the anxious performer is found not in the Old World, but in the New, in the construction of Brazil's capital, Brasília. The analysis by Teresa Caldeira and James Holston (2007) provides an empirical autopsy of this process, revealing the precise mechanisms by which the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm operates, from its utopian inception to its schizophrenic reality.

Brasília was conceived as the ultimate performance of the *Imported Regime of Living*. It was not merely a city but a civilizing agent, a deliberate and violent attempt to "skip over undesired stages of development" and catapult Brazil into a 'radiant future' (Caldeira and Holston 2007:396). Its planners explicitly adopted the *International Congresses of Modern Architecture's* model—a quintessential Northern globalized form—as a totalizing blueprint. This was not a dialogue with local context but a 'homeopathic' act of mimesis: the power of the 'original copy' was believed to lie in its perfect replication (Caldeira and Holston 2007:396).

However, this performance immediately generated the foundational schism. The very workers who built the city, the *candangos*—the pioneering construction workers —, were planned as temporary actors to be excluded from the finished product. When they rebelled, establishing squatter settlements, the state faced its first crisis. The planners' response was a diagnostic moment, rather than integrate the workers into the half-empty Plano Piloto, they enacted a 'strategy of retotalization' (Caldeira and Holston 2007:399). They created segregated 'satellite cities,' legally sanctioning the periphery while ensuring its political and spatial subordination to the center.

This strategy is the political morphology of the Ethical Schizophrenia. The state, committed to the imported blueprint, could not tolerate the organic, contingent reality of its own population. Something similar to the Baghdad's green-zone post-2003, they engineered a dual order, a 'legal center' performing the imported regime, and an illegal periphery that was both a product of and a threat to that performance. An archetypal essence of the Schizophrenic vassal state: it must constantly manage the antagonistic layers it has created, using the "mechanisms of social stratification and repression that are constitutive of the rest of Brazil they sought to exclude." The state Brazilianized itself in the very act of trying to escape Brazil, throughout a perverse outcomes: "Brasília remains Brazil's most segregated city." (Caldeira and Holston 2007:399–400).

From this schism emerged the political struggles that Collier and Lakoff, synthesizing the work of Caldeira and Holston, theorize as a 'counter-politics of sheer life' (Collier and Lakoff 2007:29). Its to document how the urban poor, marginalized by the state's total planning, began to articulate political claims "on the basis of demands for service delivery, infrastructure provision, and participation in planning decisions." This was not a rejection of modernity, but a *counter-politics* that used the state's own promised ideals of social citizenship to demand inclusion. The squatters' demands for water and sewage were a profound ethical claim, that their labor and residence granted them rights to the city. This was the societal reality—the Indigenous Regime of Living based on the ethical imperative of mutual sustenance—struggling to force its way into the biopolitical calculus of the state that had planned for its exclusion. It represents the political mobilization of the sheer life of the population as a lever against the state that had failed to recognize it.

The subsequent democratic turn, codified in the 1988 Citizens' Constitution and the Statute of Brasília, represents a later phase in this struggle. It is an attempt to replace the tyrannic total planning with a democratic model based on popular participation and the social function of property. Yet, as Caldeira and Holston show, this new model is immediately vulnerable to being co-opted by neoliberal urban operations that use the language of partnership to further segregate and enrich private interests. This demonstrates the relentless nature of the pathology: even the tools designed to overcome the schism can be re-absorbed into the logic of vassalage and composite dysfunction.

In conclusion, the Brazilian case is not merely an illustration but a definitive proof of concept. It demonstrates the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm in its most ambitious form: the importation of a total urban blueprint; the inevitable production of a Composite Society through strategies of exclusion and retotalization; the rise of a schizophrenic political field split between a performing center and an insurgent periphery; the emergence of a counter-politics of sheer life as the symptomatic struggle of the societal everyday-life-world for recognition within the imposed order. Brasília is the schizophrenic vassal state rendered in concrete, glass, and social fracture, while emphasis itself the counter-bid resilience revolution from the intimate.

Appendix III

Chapter Summaries

This book's argument unfolds in five chapters. Each chapter constitutes a distinct trace within the broader cartography of Ready-Made Modernity.

Chapter I — It introduces the book's diagnostic methodology of traceability—mapping how ready-made paradigms travel through Circuits of Imitation—and establishes the Bauerian framework of *Schicksalsgemeinschaft* as the sociological bedrock distinguishing sovereign nations from sterilized vassal states. The chapter culminates in analyzing the tripartite elite dysfunction (Transcultural, Developmental, Patron) that operationalizes dependency. Only briefly allude to the dynamics of persistence (escalation) as the lock-in mechanism.

Chapter II — Emphasize that this is the Japanese case of sovereign translation and philosophical depth, which was misrecognized as Occidentalism. Highlight the Meiji bureaucratic innovations and the Kyoto School's complex project. The chapter contrasts Japan's sovereign translation—exemplified by the invention of categories like *hi-shūkyō*—with the transliterative mimicry of Ottoman and Arab cases. This chapter demonstrates how the Kyoto School's philosophical struggle to 'overcome modernity' was misrecognized by Western scholarship as Occidentalism, illustrating the epistemic fabrication thesis at the heart of the book.

Japan appears as the paradoxical case where mimicry achieves autonomy yet is reinterpreted by Western scholarship as pathology. The chapter follows the traces of the 1942 Kyoto debates, and philosophical translations, showing how the interphilosophical *introspection* for an Eastern humanism was reabsorbed into global Westernism.

Chapter III — On the Ottoman-Turkish Case: *Synchronization and Split*, frame this as the historical archetype of the schizophrenic vassal, defined by its escalating mimetic performance over centuries for a recognition that was perpetually withheld. Use the 'synchronization of clocks' metaphor, to emphasis the Kemalist reforms as a high-intensity attempt to force *synchronization* with European temporalities, aesthetics, and legal codes. Through language reform, architectural modernism, and the regulation of religious institutions, Turkey staged modernity aesthetically as *spectacle agency*. The chapter traces the escalation of mimetic commitment from *Tanzimat* to Kemalism, revealing how the perpetually withheld Third Pillar of recognition generated profound ontological insecurity. Through the catastrophic transliteration of *laïcité* as *laiklik*, Turkey became the archetypal Schizophrenic Vassal

State: performing a modernity whose philosophical source code remained encrypted and alien. Here the schizophrenic vassal state becomes visible: an apparatus that mimics Western secularism while relying on the religious infrastructure it claims to surpass. Later in the chapter, comparative integration with native contemporary works to enrich this reading, positioning Turkey as the emblematic case of institutional double consciousness.

Chapter IV — Split the summary to reflect the new structure. First, describe the analysis of the mirage of Arab Occidentalism and the sociology of sterilized knowledge. Then, introduce the Iraq case study as the definitive example of the Manufactured State whose terminal symptom is the Plea for a Manufacturer's Guarantee. Through analysis of the 2019 *Tishreen* protests and their poignant graffiti, the chapter reveals how colonial fabrication, ideocide, and Vicarious Conditioning foreclosed the capacity for indigenous repair, reducing politics to a consumer's plea for warranty.

Chapter V — Frame this as the synthetic typology, to provide a comparative anatomy of pathological states (Schizophrenic, Manufactured, Rentier) and roots them in the deep, anthropological solid/liquid clash, with the Rentier Cargo-Cult state representing the silent captivity of the terminal stage. Building on the anthropological solid/liquid substrate clash and Moffett's theory of anonymous societies, it presents a definitive spectrum: the Schizophrenic Vassal State (anxious performer), the Manufactured State (abject consumer/pleader), and the Rentier Cargo-Cult State (silent captive). The latter represents the terminal pathology where allocative logic purchases acquiescence and forecloses sovereignty entirely.

Conclusions: The Triad of Dependency — Refuting the Mirage. To synthesize the book's evidence into a definitive tripartite typology of pathological statehood, providing the final refutation of the Occidentalism thesis. It argues that the Schizophrenic Vassal State manifests as the Rage of the Artisan; the Manufactured State as the Consumer's Plea; and the Rentier Cargo-Cult State as the Silence of the End-User. This spectrum reveals an escalating foreclosure of ethical sovereignty, engineered by the machinery of the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm—a machinery that co-opts and distorts the very circuits of global exchange and intellectual cross-fertilization theorized by scholars of inter-imperiality (Doyle 2014, 2025) and knowledge circulation. It culminates in a call to move beyond performance and plea, advocating

for the intimate, daily labor of indigenous recovery as the only path to sovereign futurity.

The conclusion reframes the subaltern dilemma through this political morphology: what appears as Occidentalism is actually the rage of the artisan, the plea of the consumer, or the silence—symptomatic outputs of engineered dependency. It then advances a normative agenda for sovereign repair, calling for vernacular theorizing, recovery of subaltern archives, and decolonization of pedagogy.

Epilogue — The Silicon Cargo Cult: This concluding coda argues that the 21st century has ushered in the final stage of Vicarious Conditioning: Algorithmic Vassalage. Through data colonialism and proprietary AI, the Cloud Empire exports ready-made consciousness as black-box software, perfecting the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. The epilogue demonstrates how the Schizophrenic, Manufactured, and Rentier states are evolving into entities whose cognitive and administrative processes are dependent on proprietary, inscrutable algorithms. The terminal silent captivity of the Rentier State is now a stratified helplessness, where populations are algorithmically pacified and elites are reduced to mere curators of systems they cannot modify. The epilogue ends with a call for a radical decolonization of data and computation as the necessary path to avoid a future of perfect, automated dependency. This coda argues that 21st-century Algorithmic Vassalage perfects the Ready-Made Modernity Paradigm. Through data colonialism and proprietary AI, the Cloud Empire exports ready-made consciousness as black-box software, enacting silent, automated fierce and sub-state neocolonial dependency.

The book includes three appendices: Appendix I (Glossary and Roadmap) provides a set of diagnostic tools for identifying Schizophrenic Vassalage and suggests future decolonial research; Appendix II highlights the case of the modernity of the city of Brasília and its connection to the book; and finally, Appendix III contains summaries of the chapters to guide the reader.

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IS THE PREFABRICATED STATE THE INEVITABLE DESTINY OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH?

In many regions of the world, the modern State has not emerged as the outcome of an endogenous historical process; rather, it is a colonial remnant, extensively imported and reproduced without adaptation.

This book critically examines this reality through the concept of the *prefabricated State of the Global South*, revealing the tensions between ethical and epistemic sovereignty, identity vs. belonging, and systems of imitation.

Combining political philosophy, legal theory, and postcolonial analysis, the work explores how certain epistemic frameworks and universalist discourses operate as mechanisms of subordination, generating dynamics of dependency, fragmentation, and loss of interpretative autonomy. In this process, elites are transformed into artisans and *bricoleurs*, becoming agents of their own societies' subjugation.

The book functions not merely as a diagnosis but rather as an invitation to rethink the foundations of the contemporary political order and to question the extent of massive modernity's operation as a form of implicit mimicry and imposition.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE DYNAMICS AMONG POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND RESISTANCE IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL SOCIETY.

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